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Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Gustav Bergmann
Gustav Bergmann*
Affiliation:
The State University of Iowa
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Extract

The following remarks have been stimulated by Mr. A. J. Ayer's recent essay “The Terminology of Sense Data.” In this paper Mr. Ayer restates several of the points he has made in his book The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The context of his argument is that of the traditional distinction between two kinds of things, sense data, percepts, phenomenal or direct given-nesses on the one hand and so-called physical objects on the other. In this context, Mr. Ayer's argument is, to my mind, very admirable; so I do not intend to comment on it. In some other contexts, some of his formulations may, I fear, give rise to misunderstandings; these, naturally, are the points on which I wish to comment. But before specifying them, I had better make sure that we are talking about the same thing by briefly restating several of Mr. Ayer's points. With some of these, if I understand them correctly, I find myself in agreement; the merit of some others I shall presently examine.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , April 1947 , pp. 152 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1947

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References

1 Mind, 54, 1945, 289–312.

2 In the customary symbolic notation, ‘(Ex)f1(x)’. I wish to draw attention to the fact that I have not attempted in this note to analyze philosophically the corresponding sentence ‘(Ef)F1(f)’ or the sentence ‘(Ex,f)f(x)·F1(f)’. Concerning these matters see my essay’ 'Remarks on Realism“ Phil. Sci., 13, 1946, 261–273.

3 “Positivism”, Mind, 53, 1944, 215–237. See also my forthcoming essay “Undefined Descriptive Predicates” (J. Phil. Phenom. Res.).

4 Several writers recently expressed the opinion that the use of definitions as a tool of philosophical analysis leads to certain difficulties to which they refer as the paradox of analysis. These issues I had to neglect in the present discussion, but I have taken them up in the paper mentioned in the preceding footnote.

5 See, for an early statement, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, Proceed. Arist. Soc., 11, 1911, 108–128 (particularly p. 114).

6 This is the last in a sequence of six articles. The others are “Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions”, Mind, 53, 1944, 238–258; “A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness”, Mind, 54, 1945, 193–226; “Russell on Particulars” (Philos, Rev., to appear); and the two papers mentioned in fn. 2 and fn. 4. Taken together, they constitute what I believe to be a complete analysis of the realism issue from a positivistic view point. If I were to do it all over, I would know how to improve my exposition. Yet I believe that the scientists' practice of publishing articles is the one best suited to progressing work in any field. In a book one has to say so much that has been said over and over again.