Title
The Unconscious in Social Explanation

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23z014dj

Journal
Philosophical Psychology, 17

Author
Bevir, Mark

Publication Date
2004

Peer reviewed

THE UNCONSICOUS IN SOCIAL EXPLANATION

By Mark Bevir

I. CONTACT INFORMATION

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1950

[E-mail: mbevir@socrates.berkeley.edu]

II. ABSTRACT

The proper range and content of the unconscious in the human sciences should be established by reference to its conceptual relationship to the folk psychology that informs the standard form of explanation therein. A study of this relationship shows that human scientists should appeal to the unconscious only when the language of the conscious fails them, that is typically when they find a conflict between people's self-understanding and their actions. This study also shows that human scientists should adopt a broader concept of the unconscious than the one developed by Freud, that is, one free from his ahistorical concept of the instincts and his ahistorical emphasis on the sexual experiences of childhood. The unconscious, understood in this way, has an ambiguous relationship to more recent linguistic and narrativist strands of psycho-analysis.

THE UNCONSCIOUS IN SOCIAL EXPLANATION

The genius of Freud lies in the concepts he gave us to discuss things people barely could discuss before (Wollheim, 1993, pp. 106-24). Where people had found meaningless stuff, they now find patterns of behaviour that make sense. "Dreams," Freud argued (1953-1974f, p. 122), "are not to be likened to the unregulated sounds that rise from a musical instrument struck by the blow of some external force instead of by a player's hand; they are not meaningless; they are not absurd." Freudianism renders meaningful what otherwise might seem absurd.

Psycho-analysis provides us with a language centred on the idea of the unconscious, a language with which to talk about human beliefs and actions when our standard one fails. It covers cases in which people do not recognise, or even will not acknowledge, features of their beliefs and behaviour we think are significant. When the language of intentionality fails us, we can say that someone believed something unconsciously or that they acted on an unconscious desire. However, to ascribe this role to the concept of the unconscious is not necessarily to subscribe to Freud's view of its range and content. We need not accept that the language of psycho-analysis provides a useful way of discussing almost all of our social life, including beliefs and behaviour adequately explained by the conscious. Nor need we accept that the language with which we discuss the unconscious must be wedded to Freud's theories about things such as human instincts and infantile sexuality.

I want to consider which aspects of Freud's thought are relevant to the human scientist and which should be left to the committed psycho-analyst. In focusing on Freud, I do not wish to imply that all human scientists interested in the unconscious rely on Freudian theory. Although Freud remains the biggest influence on these human scientists, some of them make use of the theories of other schools of psycho-analysis, while yet others draw on theories

from non-analytic psychology (Pomper, 1985; Loewenberg, 1980, pp. 126-56; Runyan, 1980, pp. 219-44). All sorts of formal psychologies have tempted human scientists away from a reliance on the folk psychology of our everyday lives. Nonetheless, I hope a focus on Freud will enable me to reach some general conclusions about the use human scientists legitimately may make of any formal psychology, especially the concept of the unconscious. I will approach such general conclusions by considering the conceptual relationship any formal psychology must have to our folk psychology if it is to have a place in the human sciences. By focusing on the conceptual requirements of any formal psychology when it is applied to social life, I hope to avoid well-rehearsed and – at least for me – difficult debates about the strength of the empirical evidence for formal psychologies.[1] Instead of grappling with these debates, I want to explore the philosophical anthropology of Freudianism. Psycho-analysis

---

[1] My interest is a philosophical one about the relationship between ways of talking about human life. In contrast, most discussions of the validity of deploying psycho-analysis in the human sciences focus on either the empirical issue of the evidence for psycho-analysis or the methodological one of how human scientists can recreate clinical conditions (Anderson, 1981, pp. 455-75; Stannard, 1980, pp. 3-30). Similarly, most discussions of the general validity of Freud's theories focus on either the empirical evidence or clinical problems such as that of contamination (Fisher & Greenberg, 1977; Grünbaum, 1993). The question of the validity of psycho-analysis as a research programme depends not only on the empirical evidence but also on its internal structure. The best known criticism of its internal structure is Sir Karl Popper's claim that it can not be considered scientific because it is not falsifiable (Popper, 1972, pp. 33-65; and for a defence of psycho-theory against this criticism, Cosin, Freeman & Freeman, 1982, pp. 32-59). Of course, one might argue that Freud's theories were pretty reasonable in the context of the science of his times even if one concludes that today's biology or standards of evidence renders them obsolete (Kitcher, 1992).

provides an account of mind and behaviour. My philosophical task is to explore the concepts that inform this account so as to assess their compatibility with other forms of social explanation.

Given the extent of the literature on Freud, perhaps I should say a few words about how I will treat his theories. I will interpret Freud as a scientist who postulated an ambitious set of hypotheses designed to direct a research programme, the validity of which remains undecided. Within this context, I will ask how much of his research programme should be taken on board by human scientists concerned with how they should proceed here and now, not with how they should proceed sometime in the future should these hypotheses turn out to be correct. In treating Freud this way, I will read him as committed to a positivism that seeks to understand social behaviour in terms of the sort of causal mechanisms found in natural science rather than relying on the processes of rationalisation and contextualisation that we generally deploy in our everyday accounts of behaviour. Let me emphasise, though, that my reading of Freud does not preclude attempts to detach his ideas from such positivism. On the contrary, one way of characterising what I am trying to do would be precisely to say that I want to delineate the boundaries of a thoroughly humanist concept of the unconscious. To read Freud as committed to positivism is, however, at least according to some of his interpreters, to downplay the extent to which he later came to reject many of his early theories. Allow me here, instead of trying to justify my reading of Freud, to suggest that such interpretative disputes are largely irrelevant to my main arguments. I want to delineate an acceptable account of the unconscious using "my Freud" as a stalking-horse. Provided others accept my account of the unconscious, I am happy to allow them their different Freuds.

What should human scientists take from Freud? How much range, and what content, should they give to the concept of the unconscious? The answers I will provide to these

questions will lead us to a concept of the unconscious that overlaps somewhat with linguistic and narrativist strands of psycho-analysis.

Standard Social Explanation

To identify the range and content we should ascribe to any formal psychology, we first have to grasp the range and content of the standard language of social explanation. To discover when and how we should refer to the unconscious, we first have to grasp when and how we use concepts tied to the conscious.

As human scientists, we should not discuss consciousness and behaviour using the language of the natural sciences with its concepts such as mass, velocity, and chemical composition. As human scientists, we should discuss them using folk psychology with its concepts such as belief, desire, and intention. All of us are more or less committed to folk psychology in that we use it throughout our daily lives.[2] Moreover, if we remain agnostic as to the evidential validity of formal psychologies, we will continue to give our primary allegiance to a folk psychology whose worth to us is exemplified by the homage we thus pay it in our daily lives. Most human scientists will begin, then, by thinking about behaviour using the concepts of folk psychology. The folk psychology human scientists use gives

---

[2] Most philosophers accept not only that we share a moderately coherent folk psychology but also that we deploy it in our daily lives. Current debates centre on whether this folk psychology is likely to be supplanted by a physicalist one and whether it needs to be validated by a physicalist one. For a defence of the ineliminable and sufficient nature of folk psychology see Rudder (1987). As we will see most physicalists regard a physicalist psychology as an aspiration, so contemporary human scientists have little option but to work with folk psychology even if they believe a physicalist alternative will eventually supplement it.

priority to the conscious over the unconscious, and so priority to a rational, contextualising form of explanation, where the relevant idea of rationality is the broad one of what it is rational for someone to do given their perspective, not the narrower one of what it is objectively rational for them to do. The priority invoked here is a conceptual, not an actual, one. Perhaps there really are more conscious, rational beliefs than there are unconscious, irrational ones, or perhaps there are not. Either way, the conceptual priority of the conscious implies that human scientists should begin by trying to explain beliefs and behaviour in rational terms.

Consider the conceptual priority of the conscious. Our usual account of actions suggests they are under the conscious control of the agent concerned: we discuss conscious behaviour as if it were voluntary. For instance, if we say people went to the cafe because they were hungry, we imply they chose to do so because of their hunger. In contrast, our account of actions brought about by the unconscious implies that they are beyond the control of the agent concerned: we discuss such behaviour as if it were compulsive. For example, if we say people went to the cafe because they unconsciously use food as a source of comfort at times of stress, we imply they could scarcely help but go to the cafe. We identify action brought about by the unconscious as compulsive in a way that contrasts it with voluntary action taken as the norm; and yet we contrast voluntary action, not with action inspired by the unconscious, but with the movement of inanimate objects. Thus, because the idea of compulsive behaviour presupposes a background idea of voluntary behaviour, the conscious is conceptually prior to the unconscious.

The conceptual priority of the conscious appears in two special features of the way in which we deploy the concept of the unconscious. The first is that we appeal to the unconscious only when we can not make sense of something in terms of the conscious. For example, if people told us they went to the cafe because they were hungry, we usually would

accept their conscious understanding of their behaviour. We would look for unconscious motives only if, say, someone who constantly went to the cafe ten minutes after eating a three-course meal told us he did so because he was hungry. The conscious is prior to the unconscious here in that the unconscious comes into view only on those occasions when the conscious in some sense fails us.

The second special feature of the way in which we deploy the concept of the unconscious is that we do so in ways that mirror our understanding of the conscious. We try to account for compulsive behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, and other concepts whose meaning derives from the terms we use to discuss the conscious. If we could not find an intelligible pattern in someone's actions, if we could not describe their actions in terms of beliefs, desires, and other such concepts, then we would say that their actions were senseless, not that their actions arose from their unconscious. The conscious is prior to the unconscious here in that our understanding of the unconscious rests on an analogy with the conscious.

The conceptual priority of the conscious gives rise to a presumption in favour of a rational, contextualising form of explanation. Because the concept of the conscious that operates in folk psychology embodies a presumption in favour of rationality, we should begin by trying to explain conscious beliefs and actions in rational terms. We can see how important a presumption of rationality is with respect to conscious beliefs by examining the way we communicate with one another. Crucially, we could not have a language at all unless saying one thing usually ruled out saying something else. For instance, if saying an object were somewhere did not rule out saying it was not there, then saying it was there would have no meaning. The very existence of a language thus presupposes that there is a presumption of consistency governing its use in particular utterances. Even if a language could exist without a concept akin to our idea of rationality, it would have to embody attributes akin to

consistency, and these attributes would have to constitute a norm since the speakers of the language would not be able to ascribe meaning to utterances unless they presumed consistency. Yet we can not treat people's use of language in terms of a presumption of consistency unless we presume they hold fairly rational beliefs. For example, if someone says an object is somewhere, we can not take this to rule out their saying it is not there unless we presume they do not believe it is both there and not there. Thus, the very fact we have a language shows we presume conscious beliefs are rational in the broad sense of consistent.

We can see how important a presumption of rationality is with respect to conscious behaviour by examining the nature of intentions. If intentions were momentary desires, we could not make plans requiring us to perform a number of actions at different times – we could not have intentions to do things in the future. For instance, when people stand in a queue on a cold, wet evening in order to buy tickets for a football match in two weeks time, they usually do so not because they have a desire to stand in the queue, but because they have sorted their desires into a rational set that enables them to act now in accord with a plan for the future. Folk psychology characterises human actions as intentional, where intentions can not be reduced to the desires of the moment, but rather are more or less consistent sets of desires brought together to sustain future plans. The nature of conscious behaviour as intentional thus presupposes that people organise their desires into consistent sets. Once we accept that intentions are more or less rational sets of desires, moreover, we thereby grant that the actions inspired by intentions also must be more or less rational. If actions embody intentions, and if these intentions are more or less consistent, the actions too must be more or less consistent. Thus, our characterisation of conscious behaviour as intentional shows we presume it is rational in the broad sense of consistent.

The human sciences rely on folk psychology with its presumption in favour of rationality with respect to beliefs and behaviour. The standard form of explanation for social

behaviour, therefore, has a rational, contextualising form. There are a number of common fallacies about what this means. In particular, some psycho-theorists get perilously close to drawing a false dichotomy between "the wishing animal" of Freud and "the selfish animal" of most human scientists, as though not to turn to psycho-analysis must be to adopt a simplistic, egoistic psychology (Gay, 1985, p. 100). Folk psychology does not offer us either of these stark alternatives. It would have us explain human consciousness and behaviour in terms of the reasons people have for believing, wanting, or doing what they do from their own perspective, where the reasons people have for a given belief, desire, or action might be religious, moral, economic, or whatever. Folk psychology would not have us explain things using a more rigid concept of rationality than this one, neither one couched in terms of what one should believe given the evidence nor one couched in terms of economic self-interest.

Some psycho-theorists suggest that although "the selfish animal" is almost adequate for the study of economics, politics, and other areas that have long loomed large in the human sciences, "the wishing animal" is vital for newer trends that focus on topics such as sex and the family. Let us, therefore, take as an example of how folk psychology operates Professor Stone's classic study of The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800. Stone charts the rise of nuclear families bound together by bonds of affection. The norm in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was an extended family based on economic and political interests and "characterized by interchangeability, so that substitution of another wife or another child was easy (Stone, 1979, p. 88). By the dawn of the nineteenth century, the norm had become a smaller family based on genuine affection. How should we explain this shift? Stone offers us a rational explanation informed by folk psychology. He argues that the shift reflected three "concurrent and interrelated changes": "the decline of kinship and clientage as the main organizing principles of landed society," "the rise of the powers and claims of the state," and the "success of Protestantism, especially its Puritan wing, in bringing Christian

morality to a majority of homes" (Stone, 1979, p. 93). Folk psychology enables us to see straightaway how these three changes might lead people to form smaller, more affectionate families. We do not need to refer to the unconscious to explain the latter shift. We can explain it perfectly adequately by referring to the ways in which various experiences and doctrines gave people a new perspective from which it was rational for them to adopt a new type of family structure.

According to Stone, moreover, the three changes leading to this new type of family – the decline of kinship and clientage, the rise of the state, and Protestantism – were themselves products of various factors that altered people's views on things and so what it was rational for them to think and do. These factors included some that emphasised allegiances other than "private and local loyalties to individuals": the Reformation stressed a moral allegiance to God; a grammar school and university education in humanism stressed allegiance to the prince; an Inns of Court education stressed allegiance to an abstraction, the common law. The factors making for change also included people's social and economic experiences of impersonal relationships: "the growth of more commercialized relationships between man and man" helped "to erode old communal affiliations" (Stone, 1979, p. 100). In the context of these developments, the Puritans bequeathed a legacy that included an ideal of holy matrimony as based on ties of love and also respect for the individual. Ironically a reaction to the excesses of Puritanism promoted a spirit of toleration, which reinforced the Puritan legacy in domestic life, as did the new political theory, with John Locke attacking the old argument, as restated by Robert Filmer, that the authority of the king and the father derived from scriptural authority. The Puritan legacy, the decline of religious enthusiasm, and the new political theory provided a context within which Enlightenment ideals took root. Thereafter "family relationships were powerfully affected by the concept that the pursuit of

individual happiness is one of the basic laws of nature, and also by the growing movement to put some check on man's inhumanity to man (Stone, 1979, p. 178).

When Stone finally brings together his interpretation of the huge shift he has uncovered, he alights not on the unconscious operation of our instincts, but on de Tocqueville's notion of the rise of a democratic spirit. Stone's interpretation begins with a change of perspective, and then goes back to the economic and social changes that made this change of perspective possible:

> He [Tocqueville] believed that the spirit of independence was the result of a major cultural shift, fostered by Protestantism and reinforced by the rights of self-government. 'Freedom is then infused into the domestic circle by political habits and by religious opinions.' What he omitted to mention was first the enormous influence of the growth of a large, independent and self-confident middle class, equipped with a genteel education and enjoying sufficient leisure; and second the cultural homogeneity of this class and the landed squirearchy since many of the former were younger sons of the latter (Stone, 1979, pp. 421-22).

This is a fine example of a rational explanation grounded in folk psychology.

One reasonably might assume that because the human sciences depend on folk psychology, and so a presumption in favour of rational explanation, therefore, they constitute a qualitatively different activity from natural science. However, positivist worshippers of natural science happily assimilate the human sciences to it. They rest their positivism on one of two arguments: physicalists suggest that human affairs are at most a manifestation of physical objects; social positivists suggest that we can explain human affairs using the same concept of causation we use to explain physical events. We will find that neither of these arguments should have any force for contemporary human scientists.

Physicalists defend an identity theory of the mind, according to which all cognitive states correspond to neuro-physiological states so we can reduce folk psychology to the language of natural science (Stich, 1983). Clearly we do talk about human affairs in both mental and physical terms: we talk of people having beliefs and desires, and we talk of chemical imbalances in the brain. How, though, do the two languages relate to one another? Physicalists argue that we must reduce folk psychology to the language of cognitive science, or, if we can not do so, we must renounce it altogether. The prestige of the natural sciences makes physicalists impatient with all non-physical languages. The problem with physicalism is that at the moment we can not reduce folk psychology to cognitive science, and yet we do not have a physical language capable of taking its place. Consequently, human scientists have to use folk psychology simply because there is no alternative. Physicalists do not argue that cognitive science already gives us an alternative to folk psychology. They argue only that it will do so in the future. Thus, human scientists reasonably can ask what they are to do while they wait for cognitive scientists to tell them how they should discuss human affairs. Physicalism is an aspiration, a research programme, based on a faith in science. If this aspiration ever becomes a reality, human scientists might have to rethink their disciplines, but until then they should continue to work with folk psychology simply because it is the language we use to discuss human affairs.

Social positivists argue that folk psychology is analogous to the language of natural science. They are reductionists who transfer the concept of causation found in natural science to folk psychology, and thereby suggest that causal laws determine the nature of psychological states. They imply that just as gravity causes apples to fall, so sociological or psychological forces cause people to believe and desire the things they do. At times, social positivists imply that they avoid reductionism because their claim is that sociological or psychological forces determine psychological states only in the last instance. When they thus

claim that determination applies, not straightforwardly, but only in the last instance, they are often able to make their social theories far more subtle since they leave more space for non-determining factors. Nonetheless, the big philosophical issue remains the same whether determination is straightforward or only in the last instance. Either social positivists want to install a concept of causation taken from the natural sciences into folk psychology or they do not. If they do not, they should stop talking as they do. If they do, they can talk in this way, but equally we can challenge the appropriateness of their concept of causation to social life.

Actually, we can not discuss human affairs as we do physical events for the sufficient reason that the application of the concepts of folk psychology depends on criteria of rationality, and these criteria have no place in the language of natural science (Davidson, 1980). We already have seen that when we ascribe beliefs and desires to people, we do so in a way that tries to bring out their inner rationality. In contrast, natural scientists ascribe properties to physical objects using criteria such as mass, velocity, and concentration, and it is the arational nature of these criteria that sustains the scientific concept of causation. We can not explain psychological states as the determined outcomes of law-like relations because the concept of causation found in natural science has no place in folk psychology. Folk psychology commits us to explaining psychological states as products of human reason, and when we explain something in terms of human reason, we suggest that the people concerned, in a sense, could have reasoned differently, and, had they done so, events would not have unfolded as they did. Again, if a thing depends on more or less rational choices, we must explain it as the product of those choices, so we can not explain it as the determined outcome of a law-like process; after all, choices would not be choices if a law fixed them.

We have rejected social positivism on the grounds that the standard form of explanation in the human sciences relies on folk psychology. Yet some social positivists, notably behaviourists, attempt to challenge folk psychology not only as a form of explanation

but also as a mode of description. Many behaviourists want to avoid all descriptions that rely on concepts tied to mental states, however these concepts might be conceived (Todd & Morris, 1994).[3] To a large extent, of course, to argue that explanation within the human sciences depends on concepts tied to mental states is to imply that we reasonably might deploy such concepts to describe behaviour. Perhaps we might even challenge the idea that we can truly distinguish description from explanation. Even if we do not do this, however, we should surely allow that human scientists seek to explain behaviour not just to describe it. Thus, because the relevant explanations standardly deploy folk psychology, we can not properly exclude concepts tied to mental states from the human sciences.

Before we finally put behaviourism behind us, we might pause to locate debates about the range and content of the unconscious in the context it provides. Clearly behaviourism precludes all concepts of the unconscious, including Freud's and that which I will defend. It has even been suggested that the strength of behaviourism within the human sciences helps to explain why Freudianism has had such limited appeal (Kitcher, 1992, pp. 186-90). Yet there has been a remarkably widespread retreat from behaviourism. The Chicago school, and, more recently, poststructuralists and rational choice theorists, in their very different ways, have focused attention on subjectivity and agency as informed by, but also as transforming, social

---

[3] What follows concerns only a methodological, and at times metaphysical, behaviourism that would reject the use of concepts referring to mental states. It does not concern an analytical behaviourism that would allow for the use of such concepts but then interpret them in terms of behaviour (Ryle, 1949).

practices, institutions, and structures.[4] All sorts of contemporary social theorists attempt to understand social life and social change by exploring consciousness and agency, both of which some of them take to be socially constructed. These overlapping concerns with subjectivity, agency, practices, and language, thus pose the questions of how we should understand the intentionality we standardly find in human behaviour, and of what place we should give therein to rationality and the unconscious. If the place of behaviourism within the human sciences contributed to a hostility to Freudianism, and if that behaviourism has been widely discredited, then now would seem an opportune moment to ask once again about the role and content we should ascribe to the unconscious.

In rejecting behaviourism and other forms of positivism, we should think of the human sciences as trying standardly to make sense of human consciousness and behaviour using folk psychology. Because human scientists use folk psychology, moreover, they should give conceptual priority to the conscious and to a rational form of explanation that highlights the inner consistency of the beliefs or intentions of the agent concerned. Human scientists can not renounce this rational form of explanation in favour of a scientific concept of sociological or psychological causation because this would be to make a category mistake – it would be to import into folk psychology a determinism that is incompatible with its very nature (Ryle, 1971, pp. 170-184, 194-211). Similarly, human scientists can not reject folk psychology, and so this rational form of explanation, for a physical determinism because the current state of cognitive science means they do not have an alternative set of concepts to take its place. Human scientists have to work with folk psychology.

---

[4] Early examples of attempts at rapprochements between Freud and respectively the Chicago school and poststructuralism include Swanson (1961, pp. 319-39) and Lacan (1977, pp. 30-113). I am unaware of any similar attempt on behalf of rational choice theory.

<u>The Range of Psycho-analysis</u>

How do formal psychologies fit in with our account of the human sciences? We can start to answer this question, while bracketing-off issues about the evidence for and against psycho-analytic theory, by exploring what conceptual space our adherence to folk psychology leaves for formal psychologies. What role does the conceptual priority of the conscious leave for the unconscious? The answer is: a derivative one. Our standard form of social explanation does not make use of Freudianism. It explains beliefs and actions by showing how they make sense from the agent's point of view, not by referring to an unconscious with roots in innate instincts. More dramatically, we might indicate how our standard form of social explanation, with its reliance on folk psychology, is usually incompatible with Freudianism when applied to any given belief or action. When human scientists explain aspects of consciousness and behaviour using the rational, contextualising form of explanation associated with folk psychology, they typically should not also discuss those aspects of consciousness and behaviour using the language of psycho-analysis. There are two inter-connected features of the language of psycho-analysis that thus make it largely incompatible with our standard social explanation. These are the central role it ascribes to the unconscious, and its positivism. We will consider them in turn.

The first feature of Freudianism that makes psycho-analysis largely incompatible with standard social explanation is the central role it gives to the unconscious. When human scientists deploy the language of psycho-analysis, they replace the conscious reasons someone had for thinking or doing something with allegedly real, unconscious ones, and to do this is to rule out an explanation of the beliefs and actions in terms of the conscious ones. When human scientists introduce unconscious reasons, they thus dismiss as false the relevant conscious ones. They do so because the conceptual priority of the conscious is such that to turn to the unconscious is, as we have seen, to imply that the conscious in some sense has

failed. The fact of our turning to the unconscious implies we can not properly explain the object before us in terms of the conscious. When human scientists turn to the unconscious, they imply there is something wrong with the self-understanding of the person concerned.

Freud rightly built the conflict between the unconscious and the conscious into his definition of the former (Hartmann, 1964, p. 335). He identified three ways in which people can hold a belief, desire, or intention at a particular moment. First, people have self-conscious psychological states, that is, ones they are aware of at that moment. We are self-consciously aware of a psychological state only if we are thinking about it; if we stop thinking about it, it ceases to be part of our self-conscious. Although self-conscious psychological states are things we are thinking about, they need not be especially reasonable or measured: by definition they are the objects of our attention, but our attention could be biased and reckless. Second, people have pre-conscious psychological states, that is, ones they hold but are not aware of at that moment. Pre-conscious psychological states must exist because we can not think about all our beliefs, desires, and intentions at the same time. The pre-conscious includes both psychological states people have been aware of in the past, and those we reasonably can ascribe to them even though they never have been aware of them. Third, people have unconscious psychological states, that is, ones they are unaware of which conflict with their self-conscious, pre-conscious, or both. Our unconscious mental states are not only implicit; they also conflict with at least one of our self-conscious or pre-conscious ones. Whereas pre-conscious states can enter into consciousness without any difficulty, thereby changing from being latent and weak to being self-conscious and strong, unconscious ones are cut off from consciousness by their incompatibility with it, and this is so no matter how strong they are. As Freud explained (1953-1974m, p. 262), the unconscious "designates . . . ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of

their intensity and activity."[5] Incompatibility or conflict is an integral feature of the unconscious.

Some psycho-theorists might seek to adopt a broader concept of the unconscious than that we have ascribed to Freud. They might define the unconscious to include any psychological state people will not acknowledge they hold even though they do. Because this definition does not stipulate that the unconscious must be incompatible with the conscious, it might seem to open up the possibility of assimilating part of the pre-conscious to the unconscious. However, this broad concept of the unconscious still actually makes conflict central to the unconscious. After all, if someone will not acknowledge a psychological state

---

[5] When Freud first reached his concept of repression, and thus the unconscious, in the work he did with Josef Breuer on hysteria, he defined what was repressed, and so unconscious, as an "incompatible idea", that is, an idea in conflict with the self-understanding, values, etc., of the patient (Breuer & Freud, 1953-1974c; and Freud 1953-1974d, pp. 41-61). Later he defined what was kept out as an impulse, especially a sexual one, not an idea, but the impulse was still kept out because it was incompatible with a part of the conscious. Freud's detailed account of this conflict changed somewhat once he committed himself to infantile sexuality. In general, however, the incompatibility was between a sexual impulse, typically rooted in either a post-pubescent memory of a childhood experience or in a childhood experience itself, and a conscious evaluation of the acceptability of this impulse (Freud, 1953-1974r). Freud's mature theory of the mind brought a shift of emphasis from the conflict between conscious and unconscious to that between Ego and Id. The Ego took over the active role of the conscious in repressing ideas or impulses that were incompatible with it, and the Id was seen as the location of these ideas and impulses as well as others that the Ego did not repress (Freud, 1953-1974t, pp. 1-66). Thus, the idea of incompatibility always entered into Freud's definition of what was repressed.

they hold, presumably they will affirm they do not hold it, so at the very least their holding it will contradict their belief that they do not hold it. Surely, then, we should follow Freud in regarding incompatibility as integral to the unconscious. This means that human scientists who explain beliefs and actions using a rational form of explanation grounded in folk psychology can refer to the pre-conscious as well as the conscious thereby turning to psycho-analysis. For example, imagine that a merchant in eighteenth century England came to stress impersonal relationships because his economic activities made him aware pre-consciously of the norms of possessive market individualism. Human scientists could explain his changing attitude to his kin by reference to his pre-conscious beliefs, and they could do so using exactly that rational, contextualising form of explanation we found in Stone's study. They could explain his change of attitude by showing it made sense from his perspective. They would not need to introduce Freudian concepts tied to the unconscious.

Because the unconscious is always incompatible with the conscious, defined to include the pre-conscious as well as the self-conscious, an explanation of a belief or behaviour in terms of the unconscious necessarily suggests there is something wrong with the agent's conscious view of himself. To explain an action by reference to the unconscious simply is to imply that the reasons the agent consciously thinks they had for doing what they did are not the real reasons why they did what they did. An explanation based on the unconscious thus entails a denial of the accuracy of an explanation based on the conscious.

Psycho-theorists might argue, on the contrary, that their deployment of the unconscious does not undermine explanations in terms of the conscious since a principle of overdetermination operates in both psycho-analysis and the human sciences. Professor Gay makes just this argument. He says (1985, p. 187):

[The Freudian concept of] overdetermination is in fact nothing more than the sensible

recognition that a variety of causes - a variety, not infinity - enters into the making of

all historical events, and that each ingredient in historical experience can be counted on to have a variety - not infinity - of functions. The historian, working with a wealth of causal agents subtle and gross, immediate and remote, intent on scanting none of them and on subjecting them to order, can only agree and applaud. Seek complexity, the historian and psychoanalyst can say in unison, seek complexity and tame it.

Gay (1985, p. 189) offers the following example of overdetermination.[6] Nineteenth century reformers who campaigned against prostitution were motivated by a conscious desire to rescue fallen women. This motivation evokes the conscious "improving mentality of the nineteenth-century middle classes." However, the reformers were motivated in addition by "an unconscious idea, the rescue fantasy, the wish to rehabilitate strangers, a disguise for the far more potent wish to restore the purity of the mother who, though officially an angel, does mysterious and terrible things with father behind closed bedroom doors."[7]

Really, we can not generally reconcile explanations of a single object in terms of the unconscious and conscious by appealing, as Gay does, to overdetermination. We can not do so because the conscious alone is capable of providing a sufficient explanation of beliefs and behaviour, so the only evidence we could have for the relevance of the unconscious is evidence that shows the conscious self-understanding to be faulty. If people's actions are perfectly in accord with their conscious self-understanding, we can not have any evidence to which we can point to say their self-understanding is wrong and they actually acted for such and such an unconscious reason – we can not do so precisely because the evidence is in

---

[6] Throughout I refer to psycho-analytic studies in the human sciences only as examples to illustrate philosophical arguments. I do not want to imply they all fall foul of every error I point to.

[7] Freud discusses rescue fantasies in (1953-1974k, pp. 163-75).

accord with their self-understanding. Generally we can have no reason to postulate an unconscious belief or desire unless we find some sort of conflict between people's self-understanding and what they actually say or do. Thus, when we explain beliefs or behaviour by reference to the unconscious, we necessarily imply that someone's self-understanding was faulty, so any explanation of their beliefs or actions by reference to their conscious self-understanding also would be faulty. Explanations in terms of the conscious and the unconscious rarely compliment one another. Rather, they generally conflict with one another, and this is why a principle of overdetermination has little place here.

Overdetermination rarely can serve the function Gay ascribes to it. When we invoke the unconscious to explain behaviour, we usually exclude any appeal to the conscious as more than a superficial rationalisation. Even when our invocations of the unconscious allow a greater role to the conscious, they usually do so not because of overdetermination but because our explanation of an action reflects our understanding of the other behaviour of the actor. Even if an action corresponds to an agent's conscious beliefs and desires, we still might appeal to the unconscious if the action fits a pattern of actions some of which conflict with his conscious in a way that leads us to appeal to the unconscious in those cases. If somebody's actions conflicted with his conscious in a way that led us to ascribe to him an unconscious desire, then we might go on to evoke this desire as one reason he performed another, related action even if that action did not conflict with his conscious. Even in these cases, however, we rightly can evoke the unconscious not because of a general principle of overdetermination, but because we appeal to a conflict between the actions and the conscious self-understanding of the person involved.

To appeal to either the unconscious or the conscious is almost always to preclude appealing to the other in explaining any given action. Consider the example of those nineteenth-century reformers who campaigned against prostitution. What sort of evidence

could Gay have for ascribing a rescue fantasy to them? If all their utterances and actions were perfectly in accord with their conscious, improving mentality, then this mentality would provide a sufficient explanation for what they said and did. Thus, because the unconscious always exists in a state of conflict with the conscious, Gay would have no basis for introducing his concept of a rescue fantasy. Gay has proper grounds for ascribing a rescue fantasy to them only if the improving mentality can not explain their beliefs and actions satisfactorily. He can legitimately introduce the unconscious only if they said and did some things that contradict their conscious, improving mentality, or just possibly if he had evidence of such a contradiction, and so their adherence to a rescue fantasy, from patterns in their behaviour. Yet Gay does not appear to think it necessary to establish the presence of such a conflict.

The crucial point here is that we rightly can appeal to overdetermination only when we have evidence of a conflict between actions and consciousness. It is not that we can not have such evidence in the particular example offered by Gay. Elsewhere Peter Loewenberg (1995, p. 102) remarks on the fact that Gladstone visited eighty to ninety London prostitutes, reading the Bible to them, and trying to persuade them to change their ways. Between 13 and 15 July 1851, moreover, he visited a particular prostitute twice, and on both occasions he afterwards felt a guilt that he tried to assuage through self-flagellation. Loewenberg argues that this pattern of action, and the excessive nature of Gladstone's response to it, conflicts with his conscious beliefs and thereby provides evidence of unconscious motives of which he was not aware. However we judge Loewenberg's interpretation, we should recognise that he rightly appeals to something like overdetermination here only because he establishes an appropriate conflict. For Gay to make his case, he too would have to evoke such a conflict, and, moreover, he would have to do so with respect to several Victorian campaigners against prostitution not just Gladstone. More generally, Gay can explain the actions of the Victorians

in terms of an unconscious rescue fantasy only if an explanation in terms of their conscious is wrong, as Loewenberg does for Gladstone by pointing to the excessive nature of his response. Gay would have to say that although the Victorians appeared to be committed to an improving mentality, they did things contrary to this mentality, and this shows their real motivation to have been a rescue fantasy. His appeal to the unconscious can not simply supplement an explanation based on the conscious self-understanding of the reformers. Rather, it must, in some sense, over-turn it.

Overdetermination typically allows for beliefs or behaviour having either two or more conscious or two or more unconscious sources, but it rarely allows for their having a mixture of conscious and unconscious sources. When Freud himself made use of the concept of overdetermination, he usually did so in just this legitimate way. For example, he first introduced the term in his work on hysteria, where he argued that hysterical symptoms referred back to more than one aspect of an original trauma, which occurred in a state of self-induced hypnosis, or the memory of which had been repressed (Breuer & Freud, 1953-1974c, pp. 173-74). Similarly, one time when human scientists legitimately can make use of overdetermination is when beliefs or actions have both self-conscious and pre-conscious sources. For example, Stone (1979, p. 180) explains the rise of affection in the family by referring to what was probably a conscious individualism and to what was probably a pre-conscious desire for emotional warmth. The role of overdetermination in such cases lends a spurious plausibility to Gay's position. Yet while overdetermination has a place in both psycho-analysis and the standard social explanation, it can not be used to underpin a general reconciliation of the two in explaining a given action or set of actions. Even when we allow for overdetermination, we still should define the unconscious in terms of conflict with the conscious, and so we are still left with our first incompatibility between Freudianism and standard social explanation when applied to the same belief or action.

The second feature of Freudianism that makes psycho-analysis largely incompatible with standard social explanation is its positivism. Whereas folk psychology instantiates a qualitatively different form of explanation from the natural sciences, Freud's scientism commits him at the very least to social positivism and at times to physicalism. For Freud, the unconscious causes behaviour such as hysterical symptoms in much the same way as gravity causes unsupported objects to fall. Psycho-analysis incorporates a form of explanation that instantiates a scientific concept of causation, which is incompatible with the folk psychology informing standard social explanation.

Yet psycho-theorists might argue that Freud's theories are not incompatible with folk psychology simply by denying that Freud's programme is reductionist. It is in this spirit that Gay (1985, p. x) writes, "a reliance on psychoanalysis, after all, need not entail a naive, reductionist, monocausal theory of history." Far from being reductionist, he continues, Freudians can celebrate cultural, historical, and individual variety. Gay (1985, p. 26, 96-7) justifies this interpretation by directing us to Freud's insistence that even the Oedipus complex works under the "influence of authority, religious teaching, education, and reading."

The problem with this view of Freud is not that it is wrong, but rather that it does not tackle the question of his reductionism at the right level. The key to Freud's reductionism is not that he is insufficiently aware of individual variety, but rather that he discusses human consciousness and its products using an inappropriate concept of causation. He tries to explain beliefs and behaviour by reference to unknown causes over which people have no real control, not in terms of the conscious and pre-conscious reasons people have for thinking and doing the things they do. He postulates a causal basis to everything we say and do, a causal basis that is located in a dynamic set of instincts and the wishes these instincts create. No doubt he allows that the exact way in which these instincts operate varies with a wide range of cultural, historical, and individual factors. Nonetheless, it is still the case that, for

him, these instincts are always there, and they are the real cause of our saying and doing what we do. As Freud himself put it (1953-1974o, p. 185), "the whole history of culture only demonstrates which methods mankind has adopted to bind its unsatisfied wishes under changing conditions." For instance, the Oedipus complex is always at work within us, even if its operation varies with factors such as religion and education. The fact that it is always at work in us implies, moreover, that we have no real control over it, so there is a sense in which our actions are caused by it, not chosen by us for reasons of our own. Even the Ego, to which Freud, throughout the 1920s, ascribed the task of responding to reality rather than to wishes, and which thus acts as the seat of reason in psycho-analysis – even the ego makes use of unconscious defensive strategies such as projection and repression. Ultimately Freud supplants the idea that individuals choose to do things for reasons of their own with an account of hidden instincts and desires that cause them to do what they do. He replaces the emphasis that folk psychology puts on conscious intentionality with a pseudo-scientific concern with hidden causes. The language of psycho-analysis is thus reductionist in a way that makes it incompatible with folk psychology.

We have pointed to two features of Freudianism that bring it into conflict with the standard form of social explanation that draws on folk psychology. We are now in a position, therefore, to answer the first of our key questions: what is the range of the unconscious? The range of the unconscious is pretty much restricted to cases which we can not explain appropriately in terms of the conscious.[8] The argument is simple: because we explain normal

---

[8] To say this is to raise the question of what counts as an adequate explanation. I am reluctant to specify criteria of adequacy because it seems probable that whether or not we should accept an explanation as adequate depends on its relationship to a larger body of knowledge (Bevir, 1994). This suggests that the appropriate criteria of adequacy must vary with the context of the explanation being considered.

beliefs and behaviour using folk psychology, and because the language of psycho-analysis is incompatible with folk psychology, therefore the language of psycho-analysis rarely can have any place in our explanations of normal beliefs and behaviour. Human scientists should begin by trying to account for human consciousness and behaviour by means of that rational and contextualising form of explanation that is informed by folk psychology. Only when they decide they can not explain something adequately in this way should they then introduce the concept of the unconscious.

Given that Freud approached his theories as a result of his clinical interactions with neurotics as much as through his clinical analysis of himself, perhaps we should not be surprised to discover his theories apply only to abnormal psychological states. The mistake made by most psycho-theorists is to extend the range of a set of concepts that are suited to discussion of the abnormal so as to try to make them cover normal cases.[9] Freudianism should remain principally a way of making sense of the psychopathological. How, though, should we define the abnormal? The foregoing arguments imply that the abnormal denotes certain beliefs and actions, not a class of people, where, moreover, these beliefs and actions are not restricted to a class of people. Almost everyone will adopt some psychopathological beliefs and actions at some time during their life (Freud, 1953-1974g,r).

Freud seems to have thought that the excessive nature of an emotion or action indicated the presence of the abnormal. Although this is not unreasonable, it is not quite what we are looking for. We found that incompatibility or conflict was an integral feature of the unconscious. Thus, what indicates the presence of the abnormal is a contradiction between the beliefs someone holds and the actions they perform. It is the presence of such a

---

[9] The difficulties of deploying psycho-analysis beyond the psychopathological might help to explain Freud's more or less coterminous descent from fairly reasonable scientific methods to more dubious speculations (Glymour, 1993).

contradiction that might lead human scientists to reject the conscious, rational explanation an individual gives for their action, and so to turn from folk psychology to the language of psycho-analysis. In so far as the excessive nature of an emotion or action usually is incompatible with the account the person concerned would give of it, Freud is right, but he is right only because his idea of excess entails the relevant sort of incompatibility. Human scientists should turn to Freud when they decide they can not explain something in conscious, rational terms since there is a contradiction between the self-understanding and the actions of the people involved. Because we can not have any definite way of deciding when such a contradiction exists, the question of whether one should turn to Freud on any particular occasion must remain a matter of interpretation.

The range of psycho-analysis is the abnormal defined in terms of conflict. Consider Freud's case-history of the Rat Man (1953-1974i, pp. 153-318). When this patient was on holiday, he suddenly decided he needed to loose weight. To do so, he rose from meals before the desert and undertook vigorous exercise until he collapsed with exhaustion. The vigour of his actions appeared to conflict with his conscious reason for performing them. During counselling the patient reached the following chain of associations: the word "dick" (fat) related to the name of his cousin Richard of whom he was jealous on account of a woman. Freud thus concluded that the patient's concern to rid himself of fat was a psychopathological symptom of his excessive desire to destroy his cousin. Consider also a feature of Professor Solomon's (1977) psycho-biography of Beethoven (Freud, 1953-1974h, pp. 235-44, describes the family romance). Beethoven constantly tried to show he had been born in December 1772, even though all the evidence, including his baptismal certificate, which he repeatedly asked to see, showed he had been born in December 1770. Solomon explains this psychopathological behaviour in terms of "the family romance", which occurs when someone rejects the authenticity of their parents whilst imagining their actual parents to have been

eminent people. Of course, we might not agree with Freud's view of the Rat Man, or with Solomon's view of Beethoven, but we still should allow they turned to psycho-analysis at a legitimate moment, that is, when they had come across an incompatibility that undermined an explanation in terms of the conscious alone.

Psycho-analysis has no place beyond the abnormal defined in terms of conflict. Consider Freud's (1953-1974j, pp. 57-146) confessedly speculative study of Leonardo da Vinci. Leonardo wrote of a childhood memory in which a bird flew up to his cradle, opened his mouth with its tail, and beat him about the lips. Freud took the bird to be a vulture, which is associated with the mother in Egyptian mythology, and then launched into a typical piece of over-adventurous psycho-analysis with no basis in a conflict between Leonardo's self-understanding and his actions. The foolishness of Freud's speculations became apparent when it was discovered that the bird was in fact a kite. Consider also a different feature of Solomon's psycho-biography of Beethoven. Beethoven spent much time towards the end of his life trying to get himself made the guardian of his nephew on the grounds that his sister-in-law was an unsuitable mother. It does not matter whether Beethoven was right or wrong about his sister-in-law, in either case there is no conflict between his self-understanding and his actions, so human scientists have no reason to turn to Freud. Nonetheless, Solomon insists on explaining Beethoven's actions as a defensive strategy adopted to hide his sexual desire for his sister-in-law.

The restriction of psycho-analysis to the abnormal applies as much to the study of social movements as it does to the study of individual biographies. We can not accept that religion as such springs from a hidden source in the unconscious, or that the very nature of civilisation reflects the dynamic conflict between the Superego, the Ego, and the Id (contrast Freud 1953-1974n, pp. 1-162; and 1953-1974u, pp. 57-146). To do so would be to ignore the conceptual priority of a rational, contextualising form of explanation that is grounded in folk

psychology and so typically incompatible with psycho-analysis. What we can accept is that Freudianism can help us to explain collective irrationalities whether they be in the behaviour of crowds, responses to charismatic leaders, or some other instance of social psychopathology.

The Content of Psycho-analysis

How should human scientists unpack the concept of the unconscious they use to explain instances of psychopathology? Here too I will put to one side questions about the empirical validity of psycho-analysis, and concentrate instead on the way in which our adherence to folk psychology delimits any concept of the unconscious we might adopt. What content does our account of the relationship of psycho-analysis to standard social explanation suggest we should give to the concept of the unconscious? The answer is: a broad one free from much of the theoretical baggage of Freudianism. We need to jettison Freud's theories in so far as they depend on positivism. When human scientists use the concept of the unconscious to explain cases in which the conscious has failed them, they thereby allow for the priority of the conscious. They deal with the first incompatibility we found between standard social explanation and the language of psycho-analysis precisely by subjecting the latter to the imperative of the former. Nonetheless, this still leaves the second incompatibility to be dealt with. Because standard social explanation is incompatible with positivism, we must adopt a concept of the unconscious that does not presuppose positivism: after all, if we defined the unconscious in a way that depended on positivism, we would imply that positivism was true, and so that the folk psychology informing standard social explanation was false.

Freud argued that the unconscious develops from instincts that are repressed as a consequence of sexual experiences in childhood and that then exercise a hidden influence on

the behaviour of the adult. Neuroses occur when individuals respond to a later frustration by regressing to an earlier stage of libidinal development as fixed by a primal repression.[10] Freud's reliance on positivism means we have to reject a number of the theories that inform this view of the unconscious.

Unfortunately we can not give a single account of Freud's positivism since he changed the detailed content of his psycho-analytic programme several times, and there are debates about how important his earlier commitments remained for the later versions. In his early years, until about 1900, Freud clearly was a physicalist. His Project for a Scientific Psychology (1953-1974b, pp. 281-397) outlined a neurological account of the brain and the way in which it functions so as to produce both normal and psychopathological behaviour. The brain is a network of neurones down which a form of energy flows in accord with the laws of motion. A Constancy Principle states that the system tries to reduce all tensions, defined as a build up of energy, to zero. The elimination of tension through the flow of energy down certain paths within the network of neurones decides how someone behaves.

In Freud's middle years, from about 1900 to about 1920, his commitment to physicalism is less clear. On the one hand, he put to one side his earlier ambition to link psychology to physiology, saying, "our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it has reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, wherever they may be situated in the body" (Freud, 1953-1974q, p. 175). On the other hand, however, the physicalism of the Project clearly continued to influence his

---

[10] The changes in Freud's thought at different stages in his life make it hard to give a satisfactory summary of his views of neurosis, repression, the unconscious, etc. I have attempted to deal with this problem by deriving this initial account largely from his most accessible work, written at the height of his powers (Freud, 1953-1974r) and by referring to some of the changes in his views as I develop my critique of them.

thinking (Amacher, 1965). Crucially, moreover, even if Freud did shun physicalism at this time, his concept of the instincts entails a form of social positivism. Here we might contrast the concept of an instinct, understood as biologically innate and as demanding some sort of satisfaction, with the concept of a desire, understood as what we happen to want because of our particular composition and circumstances. Of course, we do have physiological needs, and these do influence our behaviour, but we can not rescue Freud's instincts by assimilating them to needs. We can not do so, firstly, because his instincts are not tied to the survival of the body in the way the need for food is, and, secondly, because in principle we can over-rule our needs in a way that denies them any power to move us, as, for instance, when people go on hunger strike. Freud's view of the instincts thus continues to incorporate an unacceptable positivism in that they are presented as innate drives bound to influence behaviour in some way or other. They cause our behaviour in that they, not our intentions, best explain it.

In Freud's final years, from about 1920 onwards, he developed a structural theory of the mind in which different parts of our psyche are driven by forms of energy suited to their respective functions. The Id consists of the instincts he had identified in his middle period, the Ego relies on a sort of desexualised libido, and the Superego is driven by a part of the death instinct that is projected on to parents and the like in one's youth (Freud, 1953-1974t). Here too, therefore, Freud's theory of the mind relies on a conception of the instincts, which, as we have just seen, commits him to a form of social positivism. Throughout his life, Freud sought to replace a language of conscious intentionality with one of hidden causes. He always remained wedded to a positivist attempt to explain behaviour in a way contrary to the language of folk psychology.

I have spent some time considering the place of positivism in Freud's thought because this is the fatal flaw that makes his concept of the unconscious of limited relevance to human

scientists.[11] Because human scientists are committed to a folk psychology that is incompatible with positivism, they can not adopt a concept of the unconscious, such as Freud's, that depends on just such positivism. We must remove all vestiges of positivism from the concept of the unconscious if we are to render it usable by human scientists.

If we are to purge the concept of the unconscious of its positivism, we can not tie it to instincts. Freud related the unconscious back to instincts, as opposed to desires and beliefs because he thought that human behaviour had a causal basis outside of conscious intentionality. He argued that humans had innate instincts, which, if frustrated, either remained blocked awaiting a suitable outlet or transferred themselves from the emotion that originally expressed them to a substitute emotion. If they were repressed, they remained in the unconscious, from where they could produce neurotic behaviour. In his early years, Freud emphasised the role of the Pleasure Principle as the key to understanding our instincts. Pleasure and displeasure acted as psychological corollaries of, respectively, the absence of tension and the presence of tension as described in the Project. The sexual character of the drive for pleasure came to the fore during his middle years. However, even then Freud did not suggest that sexuality was the only human instinct – he could not do so because he needed at least two instincts to generate the incompatibility that was central to his idea of the unconscious. Rather, around 1910, he introduced the concept of ego-instincts, the drive to self-preservation, which sometimes prompts people to repress their sexuality (Freud, 1953-1974l, pp. 177-190). Later, around 1920, he began to contrast sexuality, or the life instinct, with aggression, or the death instinct, not with self-preservation (Freud, 1953-1974s, partic. pp. 38-45).

---

[11] A resistance to Freud's positivism on behalf of folk psychology underlies Wittgenstein's (1982, pp. 1-11) argument that we should describe psycho-analysts as offering interpretations of meanings rather than diagnoses of causes).

Our rejection of positivism entails a rejection of Freud's portrayal of the unconscious in terms of innate instincts. We should thus replace Freud's account of the unconscious as a product of definite instincts with one couched in terms of desires and beliefs which might or might not have their origins in instincts, which, in turn, might or might not be connected to sex and aggression.[12] We should replace Freud's pseudo-scientific talk of innate instincts with folk concepts such as desire and belief. The unconscious arises not from timeless instincts, but from the repression of beliefs and desires which vary across time. In freeing psycho-theory from Freud's positivism, we have replaced his over-riding concern with largely unchanging instincts with an account of the unconscious couched in terms of historically situated beliefs and desires. No doubt human scientists sometimes will ascribe a sexual or aggressive content to unconscious motivations, but at other times they will not do so. Even when they do so, moreover, they still will regard such motivations as historically situated, not as part of a timeless Freudian drama. The unconscious consists of contingent desires and beliefs that happen to conflict with those contained in the conscious.

Once we reject Freud's view of the instincts, we necessarily undermine his account of the operation of the unconscious (Freud, 1953-1974p, pp. 141-158). Because people can not bring their unconscious states into consciousness through the usual processes of introspection, there must be some way in which they block them out. Freud described this process of censorship in his theory of repression. He argued that repression occurs during childhood when an instinct is denied entry to consciousness, and so does not develop

---

[12] Freud's attempt to reduce the unconscious to innate instincts and drives has been challenged by several prominent psycho-analysts, including Erich Fromm as well as the linguistic and narrative theorists I will consider later. I am trying to use a consideration of Freud not to refute psycho-analysis as such, but rather to see what constraints an acceptance of folk psychology places on the concept of the unconscious we might adopt.

properly, usually because of a traumatic, sexual event (Freud, 1953-1974e, pp. 157-186). The failure of the instinct to develop properly fixes the libido at an early point in its development. When someone later experiences frustration, they regress to this fixation-point, where they then seek satisfaction, developing neuroses if they still can not obtain it. For Freud, the working of the unconscious is thus fixed by a childhood experience that leads to the repression of an innate instinct. In contrast, because we want to avoid a commitment to instincts, which must be expressed or repressed, as opposed to controlled, we can not accept Freud's theory of repression. For a start, we can not tie the operation of the unconscious to a fixation-point since to do so would be to assume a natural path of development for an innate instinct. Instead, we should analyse the working of any particular unconscious in terms of the particular beliefs and desires of which it is composed. In addition, we can not accept Freud's emphasis on the primacy of childhood experiences because to do so would be to tie the unconscious to a concept of regression that only makes sense in terms of his analysis of fixation.[13] Instead, we should leave open the question of what provides the initial impetus that leads people to repress a belief or desire in their unconscious.

The unconscious does not bring about regression to a fixation-point decided in childhood. Rather, it leads to the repression of specific beliefs and desires at specific moments in time. In freeing psycho-theory from Freud's positivism, we have replaced his overwhelming emphasis on sexual experiences in childhood with an account of the unconscious that is more open and flexible with respect to its formation, development, and operation. To do this, we should note, is not to reject the very idea of infantile sexuality – a

---

[13] Freud's insistence on the paramountcy of childhood has been challenged by several prominent psycho-analysts, including Adler and Jung. A number of prominent psycho-analytic studies in the human sciences likewise consider the way later events shaped the character of those they study (Erikson, 1970).

rare example of a Freudian theory that has received almost universal acceptance. It is to deny only that all manifestations of the unconscious have their sources in the sexual traumas of childhood. No doubt human scientists sometimes will explain the operation of some aspect of a particular unconscious by reference to a sexual experience, even a sexual experience in childhood, but at other times they will not do so. When they do so, moreover, they still will regard its operation as historically situated, not as entrenched through a process of fixation. The unconscious works in much more diverse ways than are allowed for in Freud's theory of repression.

We are in a position now to answer the second of our key questions: what is the content of the unconscious? The content of the unconscious, at least as it appears in the human sciences, should consist of beliefs and desires that are incompatible with the conscious. The argument is simple: because human scientists are committed to folk psychology, they must adopt a concept of the unconscious that is compatible with it, so they must reject Freud's positivism, and thus both his theory of the instincts and his account of repression. Psycho-theorists should base their concept of the unconscious on the inherent incompatibility between it and the conscious, without adopting the dubious theories tied to Freud's positivism.

The broad concept of the unconscious at which we have thus arrived does not negate Freud's. Rather, it provides a framework that encompasses most of his theory without committing us to the questionable commitments inspired by his positivism. We did not commit ourselves to Freud's theory of the instincts. Instead we identified the content of the unconscious with historically specific beliefs and desires that might or might not turn out to have an origin in innate instincts. Likewise, we did not commit ourselves to Freud's theory of repression, according to which sexual experiences in childhood create fixation-points to which people return when they are frustrated. Instead we identified the working of any given

unconscious as dependent on the nature of the specific beliefs and desires of which it is composed.

Psycho-theorists should explain the abnormal in terms of historically specific beliefs and desires, only some of which will have their origins in the sexual experiences of childhood. Unfortunately there can be no definite criteria telling us when we should give an unconscious state a sexual content or a basis in a childhood experience. Here too we must rely on interpretative judgement. Consider once again Solomon's account of Beethoven's "family romance". Solomon explained Beethoven's unconscious desire to prove his parents were other than they were by referring to the horrors of his childhood, notably to his father's drunkenness and immorality. The explanation makes interpretative sense in terms of a concept of the unconscious based in folk psychology. We can see why Beethoven might have detested his father, and how this detestation might have inspired an unconscious desire to be rid of him. Because it is his parents he unconsciously wants to change, we would not be surprised to find his childhood experience of them helps to explain why he does so. We do not need Freud's dubious theories about the instincts and repression to sustain Solomon's reference to childhood.

Psycho-theorists should not explain distortions by reference to innate instincts that are repressed at particular fixation-points because of sexual experiences in childhood. Consider Alexander and Juliette George's (1964) study of Woodrow Wilson. When Wilson was President of Princeton University, he had a quite extraordinary series of rows with Dean West concerning the University's Graduate School. The Georges argue that Wilson took West to be attempting to dominate him, and that the vigour of the rows reflected his unconscious resistance to being dominated. Their argument rests not just on the rows with West, but rather on a pattern of action of the type we found characterises many cases of overdetermination – Wilson behaved in a similar fashion when dealing with the Democratic bosses of New Jersey

and with Republican Senators such as Henry Cabot Lodge. If we accept the evidence to which they appeal, then, we will allow that they provide an insight into Wilson's adult personality. In addition, however, the Georges attempt to trace this personality – the strength of his resistance – back to his childhood struggle against his father's over-bearing personality. Wilson allegedly felt a violent resistance to his father's authority, a resistance he repressed because he never dared to express it, a resistance that came back to haunt him in his rows with West. Yet even if we accept the Georges's view that Wilson was engaged in a series of power-struggles, why should we trace his concern to resist domination back to his childhood unless we privilege Freud's narrow concept of the unconscious? Here our broad concept of the unconscious opens up a greater sensitivity to other possible sources of his resistance to being dominated.

Language and Narrative

Recognition of the place and implications of folk psychology within the human sciences requires us to ascribe a narrower range and a broader content to the concept of the unconscious than did Freud. We have thus used Freud as a stalking horse by which to identify the parameters within which a concept of the unconscious must fall if it is to be acceptable within the human sciences. In doing so, however, we open up a further debate as to the relative merits of concepts of the unconscious, or psycho-analytic theories, that fall within these parameters. While Freud appears to have been committed to positivism in his analyses of instincts, drives, repression, and infantile sexuality, other psycho-analysts have sought to break with his views in just these areas. Even Freud himself, like many

psychologists of his age, relied less on experimentation than on folklore and philology, as well as clinical cures, to provide the evidence for his theories.[14]

By way of a conclusion, then, I will briefly explore the relationship of my arguments to some anti-positivist theories of psycho-analysis.[15] My arguments will inspire two reactions to these linguistic and narrative theories. In the first place, because they eschew the positivism we found in Freud, they fall more or less within the broad parameters I have

---

[14] Obviously I do not think Freud's appeals to thing such as philology and folklore should blind us to his positivism. For a start, such appeals were not unusual among positivist scientists of his day (Kitcher, 1992). In addition, although Freud undoubtedly engaged in interpretation, he seems, as I have suggested above, to have conceived such interpretation in positivist terms with respect to both his underlying theories and standards of evidence. Freud, like the narrative theorists considered below, seems to have thought that interpretation, or narrative, did not constitute a proper form of explanation. However, whereas the narrativists thereby tend to divorce psycho-analysis from explanation, Freud sought to buttress his interpretations with forms of explanation premised on positivism or even physicalism (Freeman, 1989, pp. 293-308; and for a more general study of the limited nature of Freudian moves away from positivism, Breger, 1981).

[15] Among the many reasons for the growing interest in such things, we might mention not only the impact of other disciplines – such as philosophy and literature – but also the declining place of psycho-analysis within society and especially the difficulties psycho-analysts have had coming to terms with the emergence of relatively cheap and low-risk medications. One response of psycho-analysts to the rise of such psycho-pharmacological therapies has been to emphasise the interactive, conversational, and dialogic nature of their practice.

delineated for an acceptable concept of the unconscious within social explanation. In the second place, however, because they typically arise out of a concern with the epistemology of psycho-analysis as a cure, they do not orientate themselves to folk psychology in quite the way I have suggested psycho-theory should if it is to fit with standard social explanation. Within the broad parameters of an acceptable concept of the unconscious, therefore, we might rethink aspects of linguistic and narrative theories of psycho-analysis.

Jacques Lacan famously sought to bring psycho-analysis together with structural linguistics. He conceived of the unconscious as structured like a language instead of in physical or analogous terms. Although Lacan often appealed to Freud's work as a source of legitimacy and authority, the dramatic nature of his challenge to the positivism that dominated psycho-analysis clearly played a part in his well-known disputes with the International Psycho-Analytic Association even if the dominant issue therein was the treatment of students (Roudinescu, 1997). According to Lacan (1956, p. 40), "it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject." Freud's insights, he argues, need to be brought to light free of the physicalist language that so often ensnares them. For Lacan, the human mind, the unconscious, and language, are not products of social forces found in a more real world. Rather, they are creative sites at which we find the symbolic world being constructed through play. A similar repudiation of physicalism and positivism in favour of a focus on language and play, contingency and agency, appears, moreover, in most other linguistic approaches to psycho-analysis.[16]

While we should applaud Lacan's unsettling effect on positivist psycho-analysis, we might also point to an ambiguity within his concept of a language (Fink, 1995). On the one

---

16 Although Lacan's use of structural linguistics dominates the field, other psycho-analysts have drawn on different theories such as the transformational grammar of Chomsky, (Edelson, 1975).

hand, Lacan appears at times to be evoking language only so as to draw our attention to the psychological experiences we have of self, others, and objects. Language stands here as a vehicle through which people express their conscious and unconscious beliefs and desires. If we understand Lacan in this way, his appeal to language represents a refusal of positivism but not the offer of a particular form of explanation for the beliefs and desires the subject expresses through language. Thus, it allows us to deploy folk psychology in our standard explanation of social behaviour. On the other hand, however, Lacan's debt to structuralism appears at times to lead him to conceive of language as an abstract system that governs its own performances and in doing so establishes or even disperses the subject. Language stands here as a kind of structure that explains the character and meaning of particular utterances. If we understand Lacan in this way, his appeal to language points to an attempt to explain utterances and behaviour by reference to a structure inherent within the unconscious and even language itself. The problem with such a structure is that it appears to conflict with standard social explanation since it prompts a structural form of explanation rather than the rational, contextualising one embedded in folk psychology.

So, my arguments press Lacanians to unpack the concept of a language in a way that is compatible with folk psychology. They should orientate themselves to beliefs and desires, not just the language in which these are expressed. And they should explain such beliefs and desires by reference to agency influenced by social traditions, not a determining structure.

Narrative theorists of psycho-analysis typically renounce structuralism as well as positivism. Influenced by postmodernism, narrative theorists typically attempt to detach psycho-analysis from a belief in an objective reality to be accessed through memory and interpretation within a clinical encounter, although some commentators argue they still retain a lingering attachment to the very reality they seek to deny (Spence, 1982; Schafer, 1992; and for comment, Moore, 1999). Donald Spence, for example, explicitly rejects Freud's belief

that the stories reached by patients in analysis lead to cures because they are historical truths that have been hidden in their unconscious. In his view, the analyst and patient exchange and develop stories about the patient's past gradually arriving at a better story that helps the patient because of its aesthetic unity, and its pleasing and plausible nature. Psycho-analysis aims at narrative coherence, not positivist respectability. "Gaps must be filled; explanations must be supplied; puzzles must be clarified", explains Spence (1982, p. 180), and, in this sense, "what we are after, it seems, is a narrative account that provides a coherent picture of the events in question."

While we should applaud the unsettling effect of narrative theory on positivist psycho-analysis, we might also point to an ambiguity in the concept of a narrative. On the one hand, narrative appears at times to be evoked largely so as to indicate that behaviour needs to be understood as the contingent product of agency rooted in conscious and unconscious beliefs and desires. Narrative might stand here as a form of explanation based on the conditional and volitional connections that characterise the natural sciences (Bevir, 2000, pp. 152-168). Temporal sequences, scene setting, and characterisation would then appear as secondary features of narratives, the nature and role of which would need to be explored in relation to folk psychology. If we understand narrative in this way, then a narrative theory of psycho-analysis would compliment perfectly our attempt to develop a concept of the unconscious in accord with the folk psychology embedded in standard social explanation. On the other hand, however, the narrative theorists' clear debt to postmodernism appears at times to lead them to conceive of narrative as an imaginative construction governed by purely aesthetic criteria. Narrative stands here as a product of our projecting a plot and interpretation on to various memories that need have no basis in the world. If we understand narrative in this way, it represents an attempt to characterise the activity of psycho-analysts as leading to a cure, a story that transforms the patient, in a way that takes no interest in the explanatory

power of that activity, or story. The problem with this concept of narrative is that even if it suits psycho-analysis as a therapeutic activity, it offers no resources for the explanatory dimension of the human sciences. Although we might accept that no fact is simply given to us, it remains the case that human scientists can not simply ignore what they believe happened or invent what happened, as might a writer of fiction or a psycho-analyst concerned only to transform an unwanted pattern of activity.

So, my arguments press narrative theorists – at least if they want their theories to mesh with the human sciences – to unpack the concept of a narrative in relation to its explanatory power rather than its therapeutic efficacy. They should think of narrative as a form of explanation based on folk psychology. And they should justify particular explanations by reference to epistemic criteria rather than in purely aesthetic terms.

Psycho-theorists often commend Freud to their colleagues on the grounds that human scientists are of necessity amateur psychologists, and Freud's project can give them a solid theory of the mind (Gay, 1985). When they do so, however, they ascribe far too broad a range and far too narrow a content to psycho-analysis. No doubt human scientists are amateur psychologists - as we all are when we deal with other people in our daily lives - but this does not imply they are confused and so in need of Freud's theory of the mind. Rather, human scientists deploy a coherent folk psychology - as we all do when we deal with other people in our daily lives - and this implies they can adopt Freud's theory of the mind only if it is compatible with this folk psychology. Here, however, Freud's project is compatible with folk psychology only if, first, we restrict the role of the unconscious to occasions when the conscious fails, and, second, even on these occasions we open up the concept of the unconscious so as to detach it from positivism. While recent linguistic and narrative accounts

of psycho-analysis come close to doing these two things, they remain ambiguous in ways that

suggest we should be wary of any attempts to import them into the human sciences.[17]

---

[17] An earlier version of this article appeared in Philosophical Psychology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMACHER, P. (1965). *Freud's neurological education and its influence on psychoanalytic theory.* New York: International Universities Press.

ANDERSON, J. (1981). The methodology of psychological biography. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 11, 455-75.

BEVIR, M. (1994). Objectivity in history. *History and Theory,* 33, 328-44.

BEVIR, M. (2000). Historical explanation, folk psychology, and narrative. *Philosophical Explorations*, 3, 152-168.

BREGER, L. (1981). *Freud's unfinished journey: Conventional and critical perspectives in psychoanalytic theory.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

COSIN, B., FREEMAN, C. & FREEMAN, N. (1982). Critical empiricism criticised: The case of Freud. In R. WOLLHEIM & J. HOPKINS (Eds.) *Philosophical essays on Freud* (pp. 32-59) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DAVIDSON, D. (1980). *Essays on actions and events*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

EARMAN, J., JARVIS, A., MASSEY, G., & RESCHER, N. (1993). *Philosophical problems of the internal and external worlds: Essays on the philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

EDELSON, M. (1975). *Language and interpretation in psychoanalysis.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

ERIKSON, E. (1970). *Ghandi's truth: On the origins of militant nonviolence.* London: Faber.

FINK, B. (1995). *The Lacanian subject: Between language and jouissance.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

FISHER, S. & GREENBERG, R. (1977). *The scientific credibility of Freud's theories and therapy*. Hassocks, England: Harvester Press.

FREEMAN, M. (1989). Between the 'science' and the 'art' of interpretation: Freud's method of interpreting dreams. *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 6, 293-308.

FREUD, S. (1953-1974a). *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 Vols. ed. & trans. J. STRACHEY. London: Hogarth Press.

FREUD, S. (1953-1974b). Project for a scientific psychology. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 1).

BREUER, J. & FREUD, S. (1953-1974c). Studies on hysteria. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 2).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974d). The neuro-psychoses of defence. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 3).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974e). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 3).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974f). The interpretation of dreams. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vols. 4 & 5).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974g). The psychopathology of everyday life. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 6).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974h). Family romances. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 9).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974i). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 10).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974j). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 11).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974k). Contribution to the psychology of love I: A special type of choice of object made by men. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 11).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974l). Contributions to the psychology of love II: On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 11).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974m). A note on the unconscious in psycho-analysis. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 12).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974n). Totem and taboo. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 13).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974o). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 13).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974p). Repression. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 14).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974q). The unconscious. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 14).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974r). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vols. 15 & 16).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974s). Beyond the pleasure principle. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 18).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974t). The Ego and the Id. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 19).

FREUD, S. (1953-1974u). Civilisation and its discontents. In FREUD (1953-1974a, Vol. 21).

GAY, P. (1985). *Freud for historians.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

GEORGE, A. & GEORGE, J. (1964) *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A personality study.* New York: Dover Publications.

GLYMOUR, C. (1993). How Freud left science. In J. EARMAN, A. JARVIS, G. MASSEY, & N. RESCHER, (Eds.) *Philosophical problems of the internal and external worlds: Essays on the philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

GRÜNBAUM, A. (1993). *Validation in the clinical theory of psychoanalysis.* Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

HARTMANN, H. (1964). *Essays on Ego Psychology.* New York: International Universities Press.

HARTMANN, H. (1964). Psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. In *Essays on Ego Psychology.* New York: International Universities Press.

KITCHER, P. (1992). *Freud's dream: A complete interdisciplinary science of mind.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

LACAN, J. (1956). Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter', *Yale French Studies*, 48, 40-64

LACAN, J. (1977). *Ecrits: A selection*, trans. A. Sheridan. London: Tavistock.

LACAN, J. (1977). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In

    Ecrits: A selection, trans. A. SHERIDAN, (pp. 30-113). London: Tavistock.

LOEWENBERG, P. (1980). Psychoanalytic models of history: Freud and after. In W. RUNYAN

    (Ed.) *Psychology and historical interpretation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

LOEWENBERG, P. (1995). *Fantasy and reality in history.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MOORE, R. (1999). *The creation of reality in psychoanalysis*. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

POMPER, P. (1985). *The structure of mind in history: Five major figures in psycho-history.*

    New York: Columbia University Press.

POPPER, K. (1972). Science: Conjectures and refutations. In *Conjectures and refutations: The*

    growth of scientific knowledge (pp. 33-65). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

ROUDINESCU, E. (1997). *Jacques Lacan*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

RUDDER. L. (1987). *Saving belief: A critique of physicalism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

    University Press.

RUNYAN, W. (1980). *Psychology and historical interpretation*. New York: Oxford University

    Press.

RUNYAN, W. (1980). Alternatives to psychoanalytic psychobiography. In W. RUNYAN (Ed.)

    Psychology and historical interpretation (pp.219-44). New York: Oxford University

    Press.

RYLE, G. (1949). *The concept of mind*. London: Hutchinson Press.

RYLE. G. (1971). *Collected papers, Vol. 2: Collected essays 1929-1968*. London: Hutchinson

    & Co.

RYLE, G. (1971). Categories. In *Collected papers, Vol. 2: Collected essays 1929-1968*

    (pp.170-184). London: Hutchinson & Co.

RYLE, G. (1971). Philosophical argument. In *Collected papers, Vol. 2: Collected essays 1929-*

    1968 (pp.194-211). London: Hutchinson & Co.

SCHAFER, R. (1992). *Retelling a life: Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis.* New York: Basic Books.

SCHAPIRO, M. (1956). Leonardo and Freud: An Art-Historical Study. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 17, 147-78.

SPENCE, D. (1982). *Narrative truth and historical truth: Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis.* New York: Norton & Co.

SOLOMON, M. (1977). *Beethoven.* New York: Schirmer Books.

STANNARD, D. (1980). *Shrinking history: On Freud and the failure of psychohistory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

STICH, S. (1983). *From folk psychology to* cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

STONE, L. (1979). *The family, sex and marriage in England 1500-1800* (abridged). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

SWANSON, G. (1961). Mead and Freud: Their relevance for social psychology. *Sociometry*, 24, 319-39.

J. TODD & E. MORRIS (Eds.) (1994). *Modern perspectives on John B. Watson and Classical Behaviorism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1982). Conversations on Freud. In R. WOLLHEIM & J. HOPKINS (Eds.) *Philosophical essays on Freud* (pp. 1-11). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WOLLHEIM, R. (1993). *The Mind and its depths*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

WOLLHEIM, R. & HOPKINS, J. (Eds.) (1982) *Philosophical essays on Freud.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.