Abstract
We argue for a virtue epistemological approach to the demarcation problem, for we think that such an approach makes sense from the perspective of an ameliorative epistemology. We argue that sustained and consistent pseudoscientific beliefs and attitudes call for an explanation in terms of underlying epistemic vices, and that remedying them calls for charging the relevant people with vice, but in a responsible and sensitive way. We exemplify some common epistemic vices associated with pseudoscientific beliefs through the case of Feng Shui. We then discuss the value of incorporating pseudoscience in science education and advocate teaching students to identify epistemic virtues and vices in scientific and pseudoscientific practices. We argue for an education focused on epistemic character building and cultivating epistemically virtuous students from early on. This will lead them to become good epistemic agents, in general, and careful (producers and) consumers of science and pseudoscience in particular.
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Notes
It is worth noting here that the demarcation problem was naturally a preoccupation for the 1950–1970s analytical philosophy of science projects (like those of Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos) that aspired to offer grand, unified models of science. But with the rise of the Stanford School in the philosophy of science in the 1980s, championing ideals of disunity and plurality in science, the demarcation problem lost its salience. As Feyerabend (1993) noted, if we cannot clearly delineate/define what science is, then how could we say what pseudoscience is in any principled way? We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
Also see Roberts and Woods’ (2007) discussion of Woltertorff’s book, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief in regard to this distinction.
Robert Merton (1948) was one of the prominent scholars who characterized science in terms of practices, or rather, norms for practice. For him, science was characterized by an “ethos” that can be captured by four institutional norms (sometimes collectively dubbed “CUDOS”): communism, products of science belong to the community and should be freely shared; universalism, acceptance or rejection of scientific facts, regardless of their origin, should not be based on any personal or social factors; disinterestedness, scientists should not be driven by personal or ideological motives; and organized skepticism; organizationally, science involves a skeptical attitude and scrutiny of any ideologies. Merton proposed that these are descriptive rather than normative. These norms have frequently been criticized as too unrealistic and oversimplified and we agree: they are too idealistic and in fact in some cases, arguably undesirable. There are persuasive counterarguments and counterexamples in the literature. See, for instance, Mitroff (1974).
See Battaly (2014) for a discussion on two conceptions of virtues: one (reliabilism) according to which they are just qualities that produce desired ends/effects, another (responsibilism) according to which they are “praiseworthy psychologies” that involve good motives to produce the desired end. While epistemic ends are surely important, we think it is implausible that a scientist could be consistently reliable without having a motive to reach the desired epistemic ends.
See Crerar (2018) for arguments in this regard.
By this, we take him to mean that knowledge stands in some relation to the world—say, correspondence or some pragmatic relation—independent of virtues or vices. We should also note that Cassam is a vice consequentialist in the sense that (as developed in Cassam 2018) character traits that promote the gaining, having, and sharing of knowledge are virtues and those that obstruct them are vices. (We thank an anonymous reviewer for this latter point.).
See Merchants of Doubt by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway (2010) for more cases.
See Paternotte and Ivanova (2017) for historical cases of successful science arising from epistemically vicious scientists.
For this reason, Andrew Wakefield who persistently linked vaccines and autism despite plenty of evidence to the contrary would qualify as a pseudoscientist although biomedical research is a legitimate scientific field.
With regard to (b), one area worth touching on and that is quite relevant to the present discussion is scientism. Scientism has been characterized in various ways such as: presenting an overly triumphalist image of science at the cost of recognizing its historical epistemic and moral pitfalls; believing that science is the only source of all knowledge; claiming that science is superior to all other pursuits; scientists (implicitly/explicitly) claiming to be an authority in fields other than science (for instance, Stephen Hawking and Mlodinow (2010)) claiming philosophy dead); and refusing to meaningfully engage in critiques of pseudoscientific fields and rejecting them by fiat. (See Kidd (2016a) for a virtue epistemological treatment of Feyerabend’s criticism of a 1975 petition in The Humanist, authored and signed by several scientists, that rejected astrology by fiat rather than by appeal to good, detailed criticisms on rational/ epistemic grounds.) Ian James Kidd (2017) has persuasively argued that proponents of scientistic stances suffer from much the same vices as the ones discussed above in the context of pseudoscience: closed-mindedness, epistemic arrogance, dogmatism, and the like. So as we can see, adopting a virtue/vice-epistemological perspective has the advantage of not just demarcating pseudoscience from science, but critiquing epistemically vicious attitudes across the board.
This is a key idea of “epistemic situationism”. See Mark Alfano (2012) for more.
The first emperor’s underground terracotta army and the mausoleum they surrounded were clearly important to him and his descendants. And in the Han dynasty that followed the Qin empire, the belief in life after death was widely accepted, and the burial practice was heavily emphasized.
The Feng Shui conflict between these two famous buildings penetrated deeply into people’s minds, and it was widely reported in western media, such as CNN (https://www.cnn.com/style/article/100-years-of-i-m-pei-bank-of-china/index.html) and the New York Times.
More information can be found at http://architectuul.com/architecture/bank-of-china-tower.
There are serious concerns about the claims Feng Shui masters made. Many of them fabricated their personal history and their “Feng Shui education” as they saw fit. For example, one popular Feng Shui master in Hong Kong, Peter So Man Fung (蘇民峰),claimed he learned from some famous Feng Shui masters when he started his Feng Shui career but later denied it when he became more famous. Also, almost all of them focus on their success stories and ignore their failures.
Today, HSBC still follows Feng Shui practices seriously. On Oct. 22, 2020, when its two auspicious lions sitting at the front gate, Stephan and Stitt, were unveiled after restoration from damages made in Hong Kong protests, Feng Shui master David Lung King-Chuen was at the public ceremony to offer his blessing.
See Martin (1994) for examples.
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Bhakthavatsalam, S., Sun, W. A Virtue Epistemological Approach to the Demarcation Problem. Sci & Educ 30, 1421–1452 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-021-00256-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-021-00256-5