

## ŚĀNKARĀCĀRYA'S ARGUMENT FROM THE ŚRUTI

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What I propose to do in this paper is this : The conflict between reason and revelation that is historically available in the Western world is not found in the writings of Śāṅkarācārya. The Western concept of revelation carries with it its cultural load and it is alien to Śāṅkara's worldview. He accepts the *śruti* (oral tradition) as a primitive *pramāṇa* and he cites it as a kind of argument in his writings, but the idea of the *śruti* is quite different from the idea of revelation. I argue that, on his view, the *śruti pramāṇa* operates within the realm of *avidyā* (ignorance) only, and that he uses the *śruti* not as a logical argument but as a persuasive argument for the most fundamental thesis of his philosophy popularly known as *brahma-satyam jaganmithyā jivo-brahmaiva nāparah* (Brahman is real, this world is a myth, and the individual is no other than brahman). Śāṅkara underscores the fact that the *śruti* is concerned with *dharma*, what ought to be done, and not with knowledge of the objective world. My argument in this paper has an interesting consequence that Śāṅkara's non-dualism is conceptually and logically independent of the *śruti*. I conclude with the remarks that, on his view, the individual's understanding of himself, unlike knowledge of the objective world, is a part of the pursuit of spiritual excellence (*nisśreyas*) for which analysis, argument and insight go hand in hand.

Śāṅkarācārya's argument from the *śruti* has been discussed in the context of conflict between reason and revelation<sup>1</sup>. Reason and revelation are regarded as ways of knowing things and as guides to man's conduct. Consider the following statements :

- (a)  $2 + 2 = 4$
- (b) Socrates is mortal
- (c) Pallavi ought to keep her promises
- (d) God is merciful
- (e) God created this world.

I know (a) by arithmetical reasoning; (b) by empirical reasoning, and (c) by moral reasoning. All the three fall within the realm of reason. I use "reason" in the sense of giving reasons, argument for justification. Of course, one may disagree about the kind of justification it is possible to give for the knowledge of (a), (b) and (c).

Contrasted with (a), (b) and (c), the knowledge of (d) and (e) may be said to be given to us by revelation. I know (d) and (e) by some kind of personal, private, and privileged access to what is revealed to the recipient me or a religious prophet, by God himself. Neither the senses nor the reason (as the intellectual faculty) give me this knowledge, if it can be said to be knowledge at all. (Knowledge or *pramā* is traditionally defined as justified true belief; it is that *jnāna* (belief) which is supported by *pramāṇa* (justification) and is *yathārtha* (true)<sup>2</sup>. One hall mark of the revealed beliefs is that their justification in terms of analysis, observation, or reasons is not available to us. Not only this, but also the question of their justification in these terms is set aside as irrelevant. You have to accept the existence of God (whatever that may mean) and authority of the recipient of revelation, whatever that be-a book or a man, if you accept beliefs of the type (d) and (e). Do not ask questions ! is the command and the whole thing is beyond, cut off, from reason and common sense.

In this sense, the deliverances of reason and revelation may turn out to be mutually exclusive and may even clash. And, if this is so, then to guide our conduct by what the revelation is, or what its recipient says it is, amounts to following the bulldozer authority blindly.

The question of the relation between reason and revelation has been

important in the Western world during the dawn of the Enlightenment and the fight for supremacy of the Church and the State as to what we ought to believe ? and how we ought to guide our conduct ? I need not go into that cultural history of Europe. What is relevant to my argument is that the idea of revelation is quite different from the idea of the *śruti* (the oral tradition). While the idea of revelation is culturally rooted in the idea of God who discloses his own nature and his purpose for mankind, the idea of the *śruti* is not so conditioned; in fact it needs no God or man for its availability. It stands for the collected wisdom of the ancient seers as it is inherited by us by way of the oral tradition.

Thus, the *śruti* does not mean revelation in the sense that God himself has revealed some transcendent truths to his man. The *śruti* is neither *pauruṣeya* (a work of one or more human authors) nor is it *īśvarīya* (a work of divine origin), although it is regarded as *nitya* (timeless, belonging to time immemorial), and *pramāṇa* in its own right<sup>3</sup>. Typically, this is Śankarācārya's view of the *śruti*, and it shows that the idea of revelation is conceptually alien to his philosophy. There are three notable features of the *śruti* : (i) The *śruti* does not claim to give us knowledge of the transcendent entities like God, nor does it tell us whether he is merciful or not; but it does show us what our *dharma* is, what we ought to do. (ii) The *śruti* is *pramāṇa* in matters of *dharma* which is not the jurisdiction of any other *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* (observation) and *anumāna* (inference)<sup>4</sup>. If the *śruti* says something which is inconsistent with some other *pramāṇa*, then in that case, it is the other *pramāṇa* and not the *śruti* which is accepted as *prāmāṇya* (justification). Notice Śankarācārya's sharp remark in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* : 'Even if hundreds of the *śrutis* said that fire is of the nature of cold or that it does not give light, then that *śruti* is not to be regarded as *pramāṇa*!'.<sup>5</sup> And (iii) the *śruti* is not an exclusive guide to conduct. It is used to guide our conduct in association with *smṛtis* (scriptures other than the *śruti*, *ācāra* (conduct), etc.<sup>6</sup>

It is common sense in the classical Indian philosophy that it is not

the sphere of the *śruti* as *pramāṇa* to give us knowledge of the world, the objective reality including any transcendent reality. and that the *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* (knowledge by analogy) and others are fairly adequate to enable us to gain knowledge of the objective world.

Some scholars of the classical Indian philosophy, notably S.Radhakrishnan, S.N. Dasgupta, M. Hiriyanna (7), have thought that Śankara's fundamental philosophical thesis *brahma satyam jagan mithyā ...* is known on the strength of the *śruti* alone; or that it follows logically from the argument from the *śruti*. This however need not be the case.

There are several interpretations of the *śruti*. Sankara's is one interpretation, not the only interpretation. There are other interpretations, e.g., Madhvacharya's *dvaitavāda*, dualism, which is logically inconsistent with Sankara's *advaitavāda*, nondualism. Śankara constructs his world view by comprehending under his point of view whatever of the *śruti* is available to us. The *śruti* being a name of the oral tradition, different thinkers owing allegiance to the tradition have developed their own world views by picking up whatever there is in the *śruti* which suits them. In building up their interpretations, Śankara and Madhvācārya do three things. One, as the *śruti* is not a systematic account of any one particular world view while different ideas are scattered all over in it, they pick up what suits them from their own philosophic angle. Two, where some sentences of the *śruti* are apparently recalcitrant, they force their favoured interpretation on them to make them fall in line with their point of view<sup>8</sup>. And finally, three, they approach the *śruti* with their own powerful systemic conceptual framework, which they have *a priori*, on their own, independently of the *śruti*. Since they belong to the same cultural tradition, they invoke the *śruti* for supporting their theses. They exploit maximally the knowledge that things with the *śruti* label are better than things without it. A close look at Sankara's arguments shows how he does exactly this with an indefatigable zeal of a religious reformer. Of course, this understanding of the *śruti* may not find favour with many a traditionalist. One thing however seems clear. Sankara's

philosophical worldview is the result of his own interpretation of the *śruti*; conceptually it originates with him, it is his worldview independent of whatever the *śruti* may be claimed to be saying *qua* a text without the context.

One may also look at Śankara's philosophical thesis as something which is entailed by the *śruti*. Unless something of this kind is assumed, it cannot be said that his thesis *brahma satyam jagan mithyā* ... follows logically from the *śruti*, or that he supports his thesis logically on the strength of the *śruti*. I agree that Madhvacharya's dualistic thesis also, in this sense, follows from the *śruti*. But the two theses are mutually inconsistent. They could not be said to be entailed by one and the same *śruti*, or else the *śruti* itself must be said to be false. The oral tradition, however, does not adopt for itself the second alternative, namely, the falsity of the *śruti* itself. Hence, the entailment must be denied making way for Śankara's thesis to be logically independent of the *śruti*.

It is interesting to observe in this context that Śankara himself denies even the possibility of the *śruti* giving us knowledge of reality. On his view, the *śruti qua pramāṇa* operates within the realm of ignorance and it is not its jurisdiction to show the truth of his thesis. In the Preface (*Upodghāta*) to his commentary on the Brahma-sutra he writes that all empirical usages of the world relating to knowledge and *pramāṇas* and all the *śāstras* (sacred teaching) concerning injunction (*vidhi*), prohibition (*niṣedha*), and freedom (*mokṣa*) presuppose *avidyā*. *Avidyā* (ignorance) consists in *adhyāsa*, the mistake of identifying *ātman* with what it is not<sup>9</sup>. When asked how is that, 'How can the *pramāṇas* like perception, inference and the scriptural texts (*śruti*) be said to have that for their object which is dependent on ignorance? he replies : 'without a knower (*pramātṛ*) there can be no operation of the *pramāṇas*. Hence, perception and the other *pramāṇas*, and the scriptural texts have reference to that which is characterized by *avidyā*<sup>10</sup>.

One may reject this argument on the grounds that it presupposes an obsession with formal logic and that it is better to keep logic from the *śruti*. I appreciate the argument and share equally the critic's sentiments. In fact, as I have said above, the *śruti* is not a systematic body of knowledge. Ideas are scattered all over in it. All sorts of ideas, including the ones leading to an inconsistent set of interpretations, At every step in understanding it, one has to depend on some or the other interpretation. An interpretation is acceptable if it satisfies the requirements of *arthāpatti* (contextual interpretation) and *śābda pramāṇas*, which the Mīmāṃsakas accept as primitive to their methodology. It happens as a matter of fact, that Śankara's and Madhva's interpretations turn out to be inconsistent with each other, one speaks in terms of *advaita* (non dualism) and the other in terms of *dvaita* (dualism). Thus, if the entailment is denied and the *śruti* is accepted as true, then Śankara's nondualistic thesis as well as Madhva's dualistic one both are shown to be logically independent of the *śruti* .

If I am right in this thinking, it follows that the *śruti* does not give us knowledge of Śankara's thesis and that the thesis is Śankara's own reached on the strength of his interpretation, analysis and argument. He cites the *śruti* as a support but he depends exclusively on his analysis and argument for what he believes. His argument from the *śruti*, at best, is persuasive<sup>11</sup>. In the course of his discussion, what he does is somewhat like this. He reaches a certain conclusion by analysis and argument, for instance, that knowledge alone leads to liberation, and then adds by citing the *śruti* that the *śruti* also says that. The dangling persuasive *śruti* support can simply be dropped out without any loss to Śankara's argument. The following two arguments, one from his commentary on the *Bhagavadgita* and the other from his commentray on the *Brahmasutra* make this point manifest.

(1) In his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, he argues thus: (A) It is because of ignorance that there is the sense of agency and bondage. When there is understanding and wisdom, then ignorance comes to an end and there is freedom. Since agency presupposes ignorance, action cannot, in

principle, lead to freedom. Knowledge alone can remove ignorance; hence knowledge alone leads to freedom<sup>12</sup>. Having argued in this way on the strength of sheer conceptual analysis, he quotes from the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (111.8), (B) "'Knowing that alone, one attains freedom from death. (We) know of no other way to freedom', and adds 'Thus we learn this from the oral tradition that there is no way other than knowledge which leads to freedom.'<sup>13</sup>.

(2) In his commentary on the *Brahma-sutra* (I.i.v) "*tat tu samanvayā*" (And that, because of harmony), Sankara argues for the view that knowledge of *brahman* is not the result of following the Vedic prescription. He writes: (A) 'Knowledge itself is not action; it is not a mental activity. Action depends upon the choice of a person; knowledge does not. An action may be done, not done, or done in a different way; but knowledge has for its object the thing as it exists. Therefore, it is dependent on the thing, not on a person, not on Vedic injunction. It follows that knowledge whose content is *brahman* and the *ātman* as they really are, is not dependent on Vedic injunctions. It is not concerned with anything to be done, or the pursuit and avoidance of any object. As soon as the individual realizes *brahman*, all his obligations come to an end and everything that was to be accomplished is accomplished'<sup>14</sup>. Śankara concludes his argument by adding (B) 'So says the *śruti* : "If a man should realize the Self as "I am he", what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body"<sup>15</sup>.

In both these instances, 'A' constitutes the core of Sankara's argument. 'B' is only a quotation from the *śruti*; it is not the substance of, or essential to, his argument.

It is usual to distinguish (a) '*p* is accepted to be true' from (b) '*p* is true'. One may give reasons for (a) and reasons for (b); these reasons do not have to be the same set of reasons. '*p* is true' is a good reason for 'accepting *p* to be true' but it need not be the case always; political pressure and/or persuasion may dictate us to do otherwise. And '*p* is accepted to be true' may motivate me to accept that '*p* is true', but generally this is a bad reason for the truth of *p*. The difference between reasons for (a) and reasons

for (b) may be indicated by saying that the reasons for (a) 'p is accepted to be true' are pragmatic reasons, they have appeal to what makes us accept a certain statement/view, while the reasons for (b) 'p is true' are cognitive, logical reasons, which entail the truth of what follows from them<sup>16</sup>. If the premises are true and the argument is valid, then their conclusion also must be true.

Śankara's argument for the fundamental philosophical principle *brahma satyam jagan mithyā* ... consists of pragmatic reasons. They enable the intellect to give assent to the principle<sup>17</sup>, to accept it true. In this sense, I will characterize Śankara's reasons as pragmatic and persuasive. They do not show the truth of Śankara's world view. The truth of his worldview is known and realized by *vidyā* alone, by knowledge, understanding, and insight. The arguments operate within the realm of *avidyā* (ignorance)<sup>18</sup>. Their function is eliminative; they are used to help remove misconceptions and misperceptions, or what Śankara calls *adhyāsa*, the mistake of taking something for what it is not another (*atasmin stad buddhih*). Śankara exploits the knowledge that his readers value the *śruti* and hold it in high esteem the authority it has on our lives and our way of looking at the world. Therefore, he has no hesitation at all to cite the *śruti* as pragmatic, persuasive reason. Rather he does this aggressively.

It seems to me that Śankara is damn right in his method. Reasons for the truth of a thesis can be given from the logical point of view within the limits of a philosophical theory. The principle *brahma satyam jagan mithyā*...constitutes his theory/world view. Logical reasons can be given for a thesis within its framework, but pragmatic reasons are given for accepting the framework itself<sup>19</sup>. Śankara cites the *śruti vākyas*, the statements available in the oral tradition, to make his theory/worldview acceptable, to enable the intellect to give assent to it. Their force is persuasive, and not logical or epistemological.

Later Vedantins, e.g. Dharmaraja Adhvarin, have tried to show by means of logical arguments that the thesis *jaganmithyā*, 'the world is a



myth', is true<sup>20</sup>. Adhvarin states Śankara's thesis as a description on the model of statements about our knowledge of the objective world, and then proceeds to show its truth on the strength of *anumāna* alone. The argument advanced by him is very interesting from the logical point of view. But then these logicians reconstructed and rebuilt their logical and methodological tools to suit their own conceptual needs. For example, in his argument from *anumāna*, Adhvarin introduces a law-like generality statements (*vyāpti*) which by definition (*lakṣaṇāt*) is analytic, at least within his conceptual framework<sup>21</sup>.

Further, Śankara claims that his fundamental philosophical principle really is not a thesis expressing knowledge of the objective world, but that essentially it is an expression of the results of the individual's understanding or knowing himself, that is, self knowledge (*ātma-jñāna*). The *śruti* guides us in matters of *dharma*, and the individual's understanding of himself is *dharma* par excellence (*nisśreyas*)<sup>22</sup>. *Dharma* sentences (*vidhis*) are prescriptive in nature, they are followed or flouted, but they cannot be said to be true or false; and therefore, as the question of their truth is irrelevant, no logical reasons can be given for them. The only kind of reasons that can be given for their justification are pragmatic reasons. And, Śankara gives us a plenty of them by reminding us again and again by using such expressions *iti śrutih, iti śruteh* (this is the oral tradition, such is the oral tradition). And of course we value the *śruti*; it is sacred to us, we are Hindus. In fact, it is through the oral tradition that we learn about the *dharma*, the individuals understanding of himself, that Śankara speaks of. His reasons from the *śruti* are wholly persuasive. They are used to motivate us to adopt self-consciously the spiritual path of self knowledge and freedom.

A concluding word. I show in this paper that Śankara's non-dualistic thesis is conceptually and logically independent of the *śruti*. From this it does not follow, nor do I claim that it does, that the *śruti* sentences have no role to play in Śankara's philosophical framework. In fact, quite a large number of them go into its text. But, from this fact alone it does not follow

that his thesis is logically or conceptually derived from the *śruti*. It does show however that there does exist a connection between the *śruti* and Śankara's philosophical worldview, but this connection need not be conceptual or logical, it may well be cultural. As the Himalayas are the source of the Ganges and other rivers in this country, so the *śruti* may be said to be a source of Śankara's philosophy. The *śruti* and Śankara both are a part of the culture of this ancient land. They share its language, experiences, perceptions, and values. It is natural that a large number of the *śruti* sentences enter into the fabrics of Śankara's non-dualistic worldview; but this does not make me oblivious of the fact that, in the history of the classical Indian philosophy, he stands on his own as an independent individual thinker.

#### NOTES

- 1 See for example K. Sacchidananda Murti, *Revelation and the Reason in Advaita Vendānta*. Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959, 1961.
- 2 See Roderick M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966 (1<sup>st</sup> edition); Robert K. Shope, *The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research*. Princeton University press, 1983, Princeton, N.J., and *Tarka-samgrah* of Annambhatta. Eds. Y.V. Athalye and M.R. Bodas. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1918 (second edition), reprinted 1988.
- 3 Ganganath Jha, *Purva-Mimāṃsā in Its Sources*. The Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 1942, 1964 (second edition); Bhimacharya Jalkikar, *Nyayakosa*. Government Central Book Depot, Bombay, 1983. *Nyayakosa* cites the meaning of *śruti* as *śrotra śabda vad asya artho' nusandheyah*, and *śrotrendriya janyam jñānam*.
- 4 Pratyakṣ ādi pramāṇa anupladhe hi viṣaye agni hotr ādi sādhyā sādhana

sambandhe śruteḥ prāmāṅgyam, na pratyakṣ ādi viṣaye adṛṣṭa darśan ārtha tvāt prāmāṅgyasya. Sankarabhāṣya on *Bhagavadgīth*. Gita Press, Gorakhpur, p. 472.

- 5 na hi *Śruti Śatam* api śītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti bruvat prāmāṅyam upaiti. Ibid, p. 473.
- 6 ārṣam dharm opadeśam ca veda śāstr avirodhinā, yastarkenanusandhate sa dharmam veda netaraḥ. *Manusmṛtiḥ*, 12. 106.
- 7 See Surendranath Desgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*; Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922; S. Radharkrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1927; and M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin London, 1932 .

Dasgupta writes : "Sankara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sutras and the Upaniṣads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upaniṣads...The Upaniṣads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If Sankara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus." (p. 430).

"Śankara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction and deduction. He tried to show by textural comparison of the different Upaniṣads... that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upaniṣads was in favour of the view which he held." (p. 431)

"He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upaniṣads and not simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously appear to be quite reasonable." (pp. 434 - 435)

- 8 This is generally felt by scholars of Śankara's Commentary on the *Svetasvatropaniṣad*, for instance.
- 9 temetam vidyā khyam ātmānatma no ritaretar adhyāsam puraskṛitya sarve

- pramāna pramana prameya vyavahārā laukikāḥ pravṛttāḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhi niṣedhza mokṣa parāni. Sankara bhasya on Brahmasutra-catuhsutri. English translation by Pandit Har Dutt Sharma. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1940; pp. 20-21.
- 10 Ucyate-deh endriy adisvham mama abhimāna hinasya pramāṛtv ānupapattau pramāna pravṛtṭy anupapatteḥ. Na hindriyāṇy anupādāya pratyakṣā di vyavahāraḥ sambhavati. Na ca adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa indriyaṇām vyaparāḥ sambhavati. Na ca anadhyastātmabhāvena dehena kascid vyāpriyate. Na caitasmin sarvasmnnasati ātmano' samgasya pramāṛtvam upapadyate. Na ca pramāṛtavam anterena pramāna pravṛtṭir asti. Tasmād avidyā vad visayany eva pratyakṣādini pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti. *Ibid*, pp. 23-26.
- 11 I use "persuasive" in Stevenson's sense' See C.L.Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*. Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1944; pp. 206-226.
- 12 ātma jñānasya tu devalasya niḥśreyas hetutvam...kriyā kāraka phala bheda buddhiḥ avidyayā ātmani nitya pravṛttā mama karma aham kartā amusmai phalam idam karma karisyami iti iyam avidyā anādi kāla pravṛttā...akāryatvāt ca niḥśreyasasya karma sādhana tva ānupapattiḥ...tasmad na karmaṇaḥ asti niḥśreyas sādhana tvam... na hi tamah tamaso nivartakam ataḥ kaevalam eva jñānam niḥśreyas sādhanam iti. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Bhagavdgītā, *op. cit.*, pp.460-463.
- 13 "tamevaviditvāti mṛtyum upaiti nānyah panthā vidyate' ayanāya" (*Svetasvataropaniṣad* (III.8) iti vidyāyā anyah panthā mokṣāya na vidyate iti śruteḥ. *Ibid*. p. 463.
- 14 yad apy akartavya pradhānam ātma jñānam hānāy opādānāya vā na bhavati, tathaiv ety abhyupgamyate. Alamkāro hy ayama smākam, yad brahmāvagatau satyam sarva kartavyatā haniḥ kṛta krtyatā ceti. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasutra-catuhasutri, *op. cit.*, pp 142-143.
- 15 tathā ca śrutiḥ "ātmānam ced vijāniyādayam asm iti puruṣaḥ. Kim icchan kasya kamaya śariram anusamjvaret *Bṛhadāryanakopaniṣad*, (4.4.12) iti. *Ibid*. pp. 142-143.

- 16 Harbert Feigl, "Validation and Vindication", in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, eds. W.S. Sellars and John Hospers. Appleton Century Crofts, New York, 1952.
- 17 Cf. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, London, p.3.
- 18 Śānkarabhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra Catuṣṣūtri, *op. cit.* pp 20-30.
- 19 Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" in his *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Model Logic*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947, 1956 (enlarged edition); pp 205-221.
- 20 Dharmaraja Adhvarin, *Vedānta-paribhāṣa*. English trans. By S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri. The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, madras, 1942, 1971 (reprinted). *Evam anumāne nirupite tasmāt brahma-bhinna-nikhilaprapāñcasya mithyātvā siddhiḥ. Tathā hi. Brahma-bhinnaṃ sarvaṃ mithyā; brahmabhinnatvāt; yad evam tad evam, yathā śukti-rūpyam.* (Tran. Inference having thus been demonstrated, there from results the illusoriness of the entire universe other than Brahman. It is thus; Everything other than Brahman is illusory; because of otherness from Brahman; what is thus (other than Brahman) is so (illusory), like nacre-silver.); p.57.
- 21 For an instance of the later Vedāntin's theory of *anumāna*, see Dharmaraja Adhvarin, *Vedānta-paribhāṣa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-61.
- 22 Śānkarabhāṣya on Bhagavadgītā, *op. cit.* See the Upodghāta, pp.13-16 where he defines dharma as that which leads to material welfare (*abhyudaya*) or spiritual well-being (*niḥsreyas*): *jagataḥ sthiti kāraṇam prāṇinām sakṣāt abhyudaya niḥsreyas hetuḥ yaḥ sa dharmo.*

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