

## THE ISSUES CONCERNING HUMAN FREEDOM

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In this paper, we make a moderate attempt to put various considerations together on the issue of human freedom. Some philosophers have believed that the doctrine of universal causation and freedom do not go together. However, this does not seem to be correct. And the other belief that cause and effect are related in such a manner that an effect can be the cause of another event is misleading. The law of causation does not indicate anything more than the relationship between a pair of concepts, namely, a cause and its effect. Yet another belief is that if self can cause some events, then self itself is caused.

It is argued here that the self should be considered something that is rigidly designated. Kripke has spoken of rigid designators, and these rigid designators are capable of rigidly designating one and the same thing in all possible worlds or all possible situations of the actual world. And we make use of the concept of *knowing how* as opposed to *knowing that* of Ryle in explaining the notion of freedom<sup>1</sup>. The knowledge of the freedom and subsequent exercise of freedom belong to the category of *knowing how*. If we confuse this type of knowledge to be cognitive and think that the issue of freedom is one of *knowing that*, then there is basic failure of understanding.

The mind body problem is yet another issue considered to be related to human freedom. How is it that mind even though qualitatively different from body is able to interact with the body which is material in nature? Taking hints from Wittgenstein we claim that symbols that we use in language have necessarily two dimensions : linguistic and the physical. The linguistic dimension includes meaning, grammatical aspects of language etc., and the physical aspect includes the pitch and the volume of the sound etc. Apart from these, gestures and facial expressions etc., are also parts of the language. Certain physical

objects, colours and pictures are accepted as parts of language often by naming them. The contact between language and reality is through symbols with their grammatical rules and the same is true of thought and reality since thought is embedded in language. Therefore, the issue of mind directly interacting with the body or the external world does not arise. It is through the medium of language that mind and body interact with one another.

This essay is divided into five sections. Section 1 deals with the law of causation and section 2, with the notion of a person as rigidly designated. Section 3 deals with freedom and responsibility and section 4, with freedom and self-control. And lastly section 5 deals with mind-body problem.

### **1. The Law of Causation**

To claim that the universal law of causation is true is one thing and to claim that an action is determined is another. The universal law of causation is opposed to indeterminism, and freedom is opposed to determinism. To claim that something had no cause is to go against the universal law of causation. The universal law of causation holds the view that every event has a sufficient cause. Of course from this what follows is that nothing can come out of nothing. Therefore, indeterminism which claims that there are some actions which are not determined i.e., which have no causes questions the universal law of causation. Freedom is not opposed to universal law of causation. In fact, it is often pointed out that if an action is not determined by the self, then one cannot hold the person responsible for the action and thus the question of rewarding or punishing the person for the action would not arise. But, freedom is certainly opposed to external determinism in the sense that action should not be determined by others or other physical forces external to oneself. Quite true that if we speak of an action, we need to speak of the agent of the action following the rule of universal law of causation that every event has a cause. However, universal law of causation is silent on the issue if the self is not an event. A being need not be considered to be an event though it is the cause of an action and an action is nonetheless a happening or event in the world. Therefore, the being called 'self' without being an event itself could be the cause of an action. When you think of an event, you need to think of a cause of that event, but when you think, of a non-event, e.g., a being, one need not think of a cause.

This distinction between a being and an event is blurred in our formulation of the law of causation and the theory of determinism. Only when we talk of change, do we need to speak of the cause of change. Every change of the attribute of the self, is not change in the self. For instance, if a person is frightened, there is some change in the attribute of the self but not in the self itself. We never speak of the cause that determines our will, but we speak of our will determining the events. The law of causation does not demand that a thing that is a cause must itself have a cause. This is because, one can always think of a state without change, and from there one could think of the changing flux and so on. It is not necessary that one needs to know every event in the year 1995 in order to know the events in the year 1996. Similarly, I do not know my great grand fathers, yet I know my parents. When we consider wind as the cause of the motion of wind mill, we have to consider only wind as the cause, not the vacuum created by the heat which is the cause of the wind.

The fallacy of the argument that every effect is the cause of another effect can be exposed by the following argument. If effects were to be necessarily cause of something else, then there would have been only a continuum of cause and effect relationship. This would have resulted in the impossibility of speaking of any event marked as cause and any event marked as effect in the continuum of cause and effect. The fact that we are able to speak of cause and effect as two different events indicates that we speak of them as events and not as flux. And if we need to speak of them as events, what we require is a minimum pair of two events, one, the cause and the other, the effect. Moreover, we do not need to conceive of the cause of the cause and the effect of the effect in order to perceive or conceive of this minimum pair. Universal law of causation simply expresses this minimum relationship. It is not possible for us to conceive of an effect without thinking of the cause of that effect.

It would be an inadequate understanding of the cause and effect relationship if we speak of one event as the cause of another event. Let us consider for the argument's sake the relationship between a cause and an effect is between two events. When we strike a match stick, it lights. We normally identify striking as the cause and the lighting of the match stick as its effect. And these two events have to be marked as events so that we can speak of them as related. Consider now our account of an event. An event is something that is happening and this happening is noticed by change of qualities. We know,

for instance, the match stick moving with certain speed and striking against the rough surface of the match box. The observation is in terms of certain static categories, such as rough surface of the match box, the match stick, the movement of the stick, and brushing of the stick against the match box, presence of certain friction and so on, and then the perception of the fire followed by burning of the match stick. We have presented the process as if we have photographed each and every moment. But this is important because we often fail to notice that this is what we do when we make an attempt to capture dynamic reality into the ambit of language. Time, for example, is measured always in terms of concepts that are static in nature. We measure time in terms of hours, days, weeks, months and years that are all static categories. Even the things that are constantly moving have to be captured in the static category, or concept so that we can know about them and speak of them in our transaction. After having identified a cause in terms of a static category, one is able to relate it to another state of the flux identified as the effect in a similar manner. Thus, we are able to obtain a stable relation between cause and effect.

Our understanding of the cause and effect relationship is misplaced. Following empiricism, we tend to believe the previous state to be the cause of the next state. When the matter arises as to what constituted the previous state, we tend to answer it in terms of observable account of the previous state, This manner of speaking is misleading at times. We tend to think that one and the same event is an effect with respect to another event as its cause, and the event in question be the cause for another event that is yet to occur. But this understanding seems to be inadequate if by an event we understand something what is perceivable or observable. This understanding would lead us to the Humean thesis of psychologism that the two properties are related psychologically or at best logicism where the relationship between two perceived qualities is conceptual.

Neither psychologism nor logicism can explain the phenomenon of change, Humean account can explain the psychological reason behind our expectations and conceptual relation can at best explain the logical relation between the two. But the causal account is the neither of these. The causal relation, thus cannot be between an attribute and another, without making substance a part of this pair of relation, the causal explanation cannot be satisfactory. However, what we notice all the time is an attribute or a change in

attribute and not a substance. Recall what Locke said. We never know the real essences of things. And it is the real essence which is the cause of change in the nominal essence. Thus, we are capable of knowing only the attributes which are nominal essences which are caused by the real essences.

What we require is a substance as the cause for an effect to come into existence. And the substance needs to be in the spatio-temporal world. An attribute of the substance is never the cause of further change, yet the substance which has this changed attribute can be the cause of further change. An implication of this would be that a quality cannot possess further qualities, though a quality can be stated in a qualified manner as is the case with "bright colour" for instance. Thus, we speak of the self as being in the world so that it can interact with the rest of the objects in the world.

## **2. The Notion of a Person**

Kripke has shown that proper names and natural kind terms are rigid designators where by "rigid designators" he means an expression that designates one and only one thing in all possible situations and perspectives including the possible worlds.<sup>2</sup> He has drawn our attention to this important aspect of our use of vocabulary against definite descriptions which also function similarly as referring expressions to refer to objects uniquely and unambiguously, of course, only from one particular point of view. As pointed out by Kripke, all unique descriptions of let us say, Tully, are contingent descriptions of him the only exception being the statement regarding his origin. Even the most important attribute of Tully would not be essential to him, and thus, all his attributes are contingent of him. Some of these attributes help us to identify him or fix the referent of the name "Tully".<sup>3</sup>

Kripke does not deny that a proper name has meaning, but denies the view that meaning is constituted by the criteria or important identifying descriptions of the object named. Thus, each of the proper names would refer to each of the individuals they designate, but what each designates cannot be exhausted by the physical description of the organism since all definite descriptions and all the best descriptions of the individual taken together fail to give the meaning of the proper name. This being so, "Tully" cannot be

understood to be the body with all his psychological dispositions and his physiological attributes with his autobiographical sketches.<sup>4</sup>

Upaniṣads, Gītā and many other schools of Indian Philosophy have held the view that “self” is *eternal* and never changing. However, as opposed to such a transcendent concept, they also have the concept of *jīva*. *Jīva* is supposed to be part of the psycho-physical organism where it acquires certain attributes that are contingent to it. For instance, the intelligence, memory, virtues etc. are all contingent to a *jīva* in the body since these abilities change over time. However, the possession of a particular body itself is taken to be a contingent fact to a self. Though possessing a body is said to be the result of past *karma*, body being itself a contingent object, the eternal self could not have possessed a particular body necessarily. It is said that the self has the potentiality to liberate itself always and that being so it continues to exist in the form of a body as contingent to the self itself.

A self in the body is called *jīva* and we are concerned here with *jīva* and not the eternal self. Whether one believes in the transcendental self or no, a *jīva* is a visible thing. A *jīva* has different contingent attributes which can be perceived such as intelligence, knowledge, ability to act etc. It also possesses very many habits, passions and dispositions. It is not possible to fix the reference of a transcendental self since the self is not having any attribute which is observable. However, this is not the situation with respect to a *jīva*. A *jīva*<sup>5</sup> since it exists along with a body, it is very easy to identify it. All that we need is to find a unique attribute of the body to act as a *criterion* for the person.

Kripke’s understanding of a *criterion* is entirely different than the one which positivists spoke about. A criterion on positivists account is the *necessary* and *sufficient* condition for something to be the case of a certain kind. Kripke felt that a criterion performs a one time function of *fixing* the *reference*. His *causal theory* of names would take care of uniquely referring to the same object after the reference of a proper name once fixed.<sup>6</sup> In order to fix the reference, one need not choose the most important attribute of the thing referred either, it could be most trivial thing but happens to be a unique attribute possessed by the referent in that particular context of naming.

Similarly, no one attribute of an individual *jīva* is essential to it. One could refer to a *jīva* without knowing the most important attribute of it,

sometimes by knowing the least important attributes of it. All the attributes of a *jīva* are contingent to it since all of them are changing. This does not create any problem since we are capable of referring to the same thing uniquely once we have *fixed* the referent using a contingent property of it. An individual *jīva* exists in the same psycho-physical organism from birth to death.

Following Kripke, we can claim that the meaning of ‘Arjun’ is not determined by all the attributes important and otherwise put together. ‘Arjuna’ being a rigid designator in the Kripkean sense would refer to him in all possible worlds without having any essential feature of himself. An individual *jīva* is a rigid designator and it designates one and the same person in real and all possible contexts. We could refer to him even in a counter-factual situation and even after his death. Thus, we could refer to Arjun, a *jīva*, even in the hypothetical context where he did not fight the battle of Mahābhārata.

An interesting consequence of the rigid designation theory is that individuals have freedom contingently. If ‘Arjun’ is a rigid designator, its meaning cannot be elaborated to others and the criteria of Arjun is a contingent attribute of Arjun. That is to say, even freedom which is a contingent attribute of Arjun should not be considered as the essential attribute of his *jīva*.

### **3. Freedom and Responsibility**

Having said that freedom is a contingent property of a person, we expect that there would be some relation between freedom and responsibility. Surprisingly, the notion of responsibility has nothing to do with the sequence of causal events. A doctor may be held responsible for a natural event such as a patient bleeding and eventually dying. And in an administrative setup, a revenue officer may be held responsible for the actions of his subordinates; and in democracy railway minister is held responsible for a railway accident. A citizen is held responsible for not paying income-tax even if he is ignorant of the tax laws. In all these cases, responsibility does not go with knowledge of relevant factors and freedom.

How does transfer of responsibility take place? There are two models : (a) a causal model, (b) a democratic model. In the causal model, we hold a signal man responsible at a railway crossing for the accident of a train and not

the motor man. This is because, the motor man is supposed to go by the signals for the railways. In a democratic model, where we believe that some form of representation of the will of the people is possible, we hold the representatives responsible for the failures of the government. Similarly, we hold the manager responsible for the failure of the workers in a factory.

Quite often, the philosophical slogan is repeated "ought" implies "can". In fact, what one understands by "can" in all the similar cases cited above is not very obvious. The custom's officer who did not have full control over his subordinates is held responsible for certain actions of his subordinates. If human beings are free, how could one have control over others? If one is ignorant about tax laws, how could one have thought of payment of tax? Thus, what becomes evident is that a person is held responsible if he meets or fails to meet the expectation of the people and this expectation is built largely on the basis of what people at large believe that an agent is capable of. Similarly, the punishment or reward is meted out on the basis of this social understanding of how much a person is responsible for an act.

What is often believed is that a human being can interfere with the nature whenever he wants. This is quite true from the point of view of nature. There is nothing in the nature or the laws of nature that would prevent human interference at any point in time. And using nature as a tool, one could achieve any thing that any other human being can achieve. This being so, it is possible to take the thesis to its logical conclusion : everyone is responsible for everything in the universe. By claiming this, of course, we would make the notions of freedom and responsibility useless.

Of course, the other extreme of excess of self-pity, a form of psychological hedonism is also not appreciable. If an agent thinks that he is never responsible especially when it is a matter of blame and punishment, then one could consider such cases an excess of self-pity. Such an agent wants to look at himself as a helpless person coerced by external forces all the time. He is not capable of knowing or admitting that freedom is not a concept, but an action which he should perform and estimate about it. He is not in a position to acknowledge that freedom is a form of skill which one learns through experience and experiments and not as a cognitive concept which one acquires through sense perception or in the form of rational knowledge. The correct



understanding of “can” lies somewhere between the two extremes : that a man is always free, and the man is never free. We cannot count even the subjective feeling of an agent that he feels free all the time and holds himself responsible for everything or the feeling that he is never responsible because he feels feelings always constrained and helpless.

Ryle’s distinction between *knowing how* and *knowing that* is relevant in the context of our discussion of freedom. The jīva does not know its freedom as a concept. It does not know about its capacity to control its hunger and thirst in terms of some cognitive categories in the manner in which it knows the structure of a building. When we speak of the controversy of freedom versus determinism, we speak of freedom as a concept. Ryle has classified all the skills under the category of *knowing how*, and cognitive learning as *knowing that*. Thus, freedom is not a concept and one cannot learn more about freedom by describing what freedom is. One has to realize one’s own freedom and carefully develop the skill to exercise more and more freedom in order to possess more disposition for freedom.

The issue of acquiring the ability to have more freedom is one thing and judge the position of others on a scale is another. In fact, often we would try to formulate a mechanism to measure the freedom of others in terms of cognitive criteria so that we can judge the extent to which the other was free. Obviously this is not an easy task. If freedom is something that belongs to the category of skill, cognitive understanding of it would always be very limited. This is the reason why we often disassociate the issue of responsibility and punishment of an action from the issue of freedom of the agent of the action.

What is required is the correct understanding of the use of the word “can”. Quite true that human being is capable of doing wonders, but not all individuals are equally equipped to do such wonders. This is what is required to be recognized when we speak of “ought” and “can” while expecting certain things from others. “Ought” implies “can” is a psychological principle and nothing more since it only indicates that from the point of view of a moral adviser a moral agent has earned some punishment because the adviser believes that the moral agent was genuinely free. And it is equally possible that the agent thinks of himself as not free and believes that the punishment is unjustified. Thus, it is a psychological principle that if we expect anyone to do some duty,

we should expect that person to have the capacity to perform that action. The logic of the concept of "ought" and "can" is such that one cannot use the word "ought" with respect to a moral agent without attributing the ability to perform the action by the agent as demanded by the "ought". Of course, most of the time our estimation of what the other person can do might match with the physical abilities of the person. However, it would be a fallacy to conclude that an agent was free as a matter of fact and is worthy of punishment from this psychological fact that a moral adviser believes that the agent is responsible because the adviser believes that the agent was capable of performing certain duties.

Moreover, it is also possible that an agent himself over estimates his abilities and thinks that he could have done otherwise than what he did. For instance, some of those cases where the agent repents for not doing certain things are paradigm examples of this kind. It is quite natural to believe that a non-expert of tax laws would not know every provision of income tax. And there are instances of non-experts of tax repenting for having paid higher tax than necessary. And this revelation comes to the non-expert only after the chance to correct himself is no more available to him due to closure of financial matters for that year. Most cases of repentance are of this type : After the performance of certain action in accordance with certain decision, knowledge about certain relevant factors comes to light. If one were to decide once again about the same matter counting the additional information, chances were more of deciding differently than what one actually decided. And presently, the agent is capable of estimating the benefits of such an altered decision which according to him is evidently more than what he has accrued from his past decision and action. But, this line of thinking is of no value since it is like saying "if the causes were different, the effects would have been different". Of course, this is not to deny the value of experience and self-examination. One learns from experience and this self-examination would certainly help the agent to decide in the right manner in future if the contexts remain comparable. Certainly, repentance is largely due to error in estimation of one's own abilities at least in all those cases where people are suffering from the mental illness due to the extreme feeling of guilt.

Often it is uncritically accepted that freedom basically involves making choices. It is correctly believed that if there is no choice, there cannot be freedom, but from this it does not follow that if there is choice, there is freedom. There

seems to be some gap between there being choice and one being free. It is said that it is not enough if there is some choice, but the person in question must be aware of the choice. Thus, one tends to conclude after this qualification that one is free if there is an alternative course of action and the person in question is aware of the alternative course of action. On this theory, if there is a choice and the person in question does not exercise his choice, then he is deemed to have chosen not to choose, Is this choice of not choosing an alternative a free act under all circumstances? We want to contest this contention that it is so.

There is a thin line between one's being aware of the choice and being in the position to exercise one's choice. For example, it may be said about smokers that they resolve stop smoking, and they are aware of the choice of not smoking, yet when it comes to practice not all are in equal position to act accordingly. Some prefer to call this as the weakness of the will, but some want to call this 'bondage' or the state of not being free.

Would it be all right to claim that if there is a choice for one, there is a choice for another as well if they are comparable? For example, there is a choice for one person to give up smoking because he is capable of giving up smoking, while there is no choice for another person to give up smoking because his biological need is such that even if he wants, he is not in a position to give it up. Who has to decide that there is really a true choice or not? If the person concerned has to decide, then there is a possibility of confusing the issue. One might say, if a person succeeds in giving up something, then he had the choice, and if he fails, he did not. Thus, we would make the notion of choice a useless one, It would not indicate anything in the desired direction to understand the notion of freedom.

If there is something called the weakness of the will, then the situation would become worse. If the responsibility should differ depending on the strength or the weakness of the will between any two individuals A and B, then there is no point in linking responsibility to freedom. The net conclusion would be as above, if the person performs in a certain manner, we call him not suffering from the weakness of the will, otherwise he is. In this account, we make the concept of freedom totally redundant as it can be of no help in understanding and estimating the freedom of oneself or of the other.

The objective requirement of deciding who is free and who is not free

on the basis of the factor that one has a choice and another has not cannot be considered externally. Though, in principle one might say that if there is no choice, one is not free, but there is no way of knowing whether there was really a choice or not including the agent himself if we grant that the factor like a weakness of the will should count in deciding about the choice. Sometimes, further choices are available only after having made the initial choice. Only by acting in a certain way, does one realize whether further choices are available or not. Actualizing the potentiality would certainly mean that one should act that way first and realize that a further choice is available. Whether a child can become a good musician or not can only be decided after the child has tried to become one.

This is not to undermine the significance of the knowledge of the choice at all. Having said that freedom is something that requires choice, but if the person is not aware of the choice at all, he could not have acted in that manner. Therefore, it is important that the person is aware of the choice and yet it is not enough to be free that he is aware of the choice. For example, it is possible to think of a citizen that he is aware of his right to vote, and he is also aware of the details about the candidates in his constituency and yet the person does not make the choice to vote or not to vote and does not eventually vote. His not voting need not be taken as his decision and action. There seems to be a third type other than omissions and commissions. It would be the case that the person in question has not made any decision either to vote or not to vote. Therefore, one can conclude that expression of freedom is always preceded by a certain decision.

An event can be said to be something that happens because of the nature and the laws operating on it. We speak of an event as action where the event has the approval of the decision of an individual or of an animal. When an offer cuts a tree, it is an intended action by the animal. Thus, an intention if accompanies an event it would be considered as an action and if the intentional component is absent, then it is merely an event. Moreover, to have only intention is not to act. Intending to go for hunting to the forest is not itself a criminal action though killing a wild animal with intention is one; and reflex actions are not actions since they are performed without intentions and decisions.

An action is intentional if and only if the person has wished a certain result from it. That is to say, intention is a mental state that begins along with

an action and ends when the fulfillment of intended action comes through. Of course, there are difficulties there. It is not easy to explain the form in which my intention exists if I join a company as probationary officer with the intention to retire as the president of the firm. Many things would have changed meanwhile including my style of working and my values. Did I intend to be the president all along in my career in the company for so many years? Did I intend this even when I slept?

Freedom to think and freedom to act are two different kinds of things. Even while being in jail, one could think freely. The freedom of the thought can be snapped by only psychological forces, not by physical forces. Contradiction is the limit to our thought. Thus, it is possible always to think that one is free despite one may not be in a situation to act. As we have noted earlier, this could be an example of a *knowing that* account of freedom. But this account of freedom is without consequence, for freedom belongs to the category of *knowing how*. Knowing that account of one's situation is negatively related to freedom. If we think that we are not free, we do not even make an attempt to perform anything and realize that we were in fact free. To think that one is helpless is to be bound, and to think that one would do much is to realize one's freedom. Often it happens that one has not known one's own ability, or has not known relevant facts about oneself and makes wrong estimates about oneself.

What is noteworthy is that if one decides to do something, and if the person in question is free, then it also would be possible for him to decide against it. Thus, the decision to do something or not to do something always goes with action and thus to freedom. A decision not to interfere with the course of events in nature, and thus allow the determinism to work can be a free act.<sup>7</sup> For instance, it is possible to argue that if the event were not determined, the patient would not have died. Therefore, we cannot say that the event of patient's death was not determined. Yet it is a free action on the part of the doctor who allowed this event to take place by not attending to the patient. Thus, one and the same thing can be considered determined as well as free. Hence, freedom is not necessarily opposed to causal determinism. One could hold the doctor responsible for not taking precautionary measures and avert the unfortunate incident. The same may be said about many cases of road accidents. The accidents would not have taken place if the events were not determined by their causes. Yet, we punish drivers if they have failed to follow the rules of driving.

#### 4. Freedom and Self-control

Since freedom belongs to the category of skill, it has close link with self-control. We sometimes decide to yield to our senses, especially when it is a case of a strong desire or inclination. But that would be exercising one's freedom since decision is devolved. If we act instinctively without deciding, that would be morally neutral action being logically equivalent to an event. We are one like animals and plants if we do not act against our natural instincts.

The only difference between cultured behaviour and natural behaviour is the difference that is visible due to our self-control. All cultured behaviours involve some level of self-control and all uncivilized behaviours are often our instinctive behaviours. To be free in a cultured society meant, one should have more and more ability to have control over oneself. That there is choice does not always indicate that there is freedom, but the exercise of choice does. On this reading, to be free is to go often against one's own natural inclination.

Certain materialists and hedonists think that a person would be free by yielding to his senses because they think that the person in question would be free for the temptations of desires and instincts which otherwise interfere with his normal life. This is not quite true if there is any truth in what Freud has spoken about. One cannot free oneself by having more and more desires and cravings. Where individuals can exercise more choices, one could say that they are free and material welfare often gives us more chances to exercise more choices. However, when one speaks of human freedom, it is not this that the material welfare that is really important all the time.

We have said that often one has to go against one's natural inclination in order to exercise freedom. If so, a Freudian might remark : one would have only psychological patients in the world because of dis-satisfaction and suppression due to self-control. However, this supposition is wrong. Self-control is not the same as suppression or repression. Self-control controls the desire, and not its actualization after entertaining the desire. Self-control as an exercise is different from Freudian suppression. If a person desires something and does not yield to it, that cannot be considered as an exercise in self-control. If that were so, all beggars would have had better self-control. The essential difference between a saint and a beggar is this : a saint has everything that he wants whereas

a bigger is deprived of everything he wants. Self-control indicates that self does not get involved. It does not control not yielding to desires, but controls the desires themselves, there is hardly any desire. Thus the panchasheela that is, exercise in self-control consists of controlling the senses and the mind. Those who have maximum self-control are most free.

## **5. Mind-Body Problem**

Often we wonder how this self-control can work, how mind and body interact. If we can diagnose where mind and body fail to interact, we would have answered the issue equally well. There are occasions where the mind wants our body to act in a particular way and the body fails to comply with it. For instance, each runner in a race wants to come first, yet except one, all others fail to make it. Under the anesthetic influence when the surgery is conducted to one's jaw, the mind is not disturbed at all. Thus, in the former case, the body failed to implement what the mind wanted and in the latter case, again the body failed to influence the mind. Why did these failures occur? Certainly not because mind and body failed to interact. The question of interaction did not arise at all.

Very useful insight can be drawn from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has often remarked that the reality is not divorced from language. He treats a paradigm as the part of the language and speaks of converting an empirical proposition into a rule of grammar by an act of convention. For him, a thing can be both part of nature as well as part of language. For instance, a colour sample, is part of nature as well as part of language of colours. We may say that the reality is governed by the laws of nature and language is governed by the conventional rules of language, i.e., the grammar of language for Wittgenstein.

Taking hints from Wittgenstein we can legitimately claim that symbols that we use in language have necessarily two dimensions; physical and linguistic. The physical aspect includes the pitch and the volume of the sound; the colour and the size of the script; for instance; and the linguistic dimension includes meaning, grammatical aspects of language etc. Apart from these, accompanying gestures and facial expressions etc., are also part of language. Certain physical objects, colours and pictures are integrated with language often by naming them.

Physical things have their physical properties, and our thoughts have intentional properties. Let us suppose, "red light" means "stop", "green light" means "go ahead" at the level crossing. It is possible to relate this intentional meaning with the causal series. For instance, one can design a car where the car is driven by a robot in such a manner that the robot responds to "red light" in the desired manner and stops the car. And exactly the same thing, a human being would do in another car. The language of road signals can be the language of natural series. Of course, this could only mean in the language of Artificial-Intelligence that mental processes are not matched by machines point to point but only intermittently.

The causal series is one, and the intentional series is another. When one perceives "red light" one may stop the vehicle grumbling and linking this idea with something else, may be the thought of fine for not obeying the road rules by traffic police, whereas, the "red light" causes a robot to put the brake and stop the vehicle. These two processes are entirely different. The driver may not believe that there is much sense in traffic lights and the robot cannot just go ahead when there is traffic light. Thus, because of the language human beings are in a position to convert their symbols into causal connections. If there were no symbols, it would have been impossible to design such a car driven by a robot.

Wittgenstein cites following example to indicate that there is nothing that links the decision and action. Suppose at the end of a quarrel I say "All right! Then I leave tomorrow!" I make a decision. But "I am revising the decision to go away tomorrow" only describes a state of mind.<sup>8</sup> Revising a decision is not a process, it does not have a point in time when it begins and another point in time then it ends, but is another mental state. Thus, Wittgenstein would not like to speak of decision as a mental act divorced from the physical act. For him, the mental act and physical act are not separable. The following is another remark of Wittgenstein which emphasizes the fact that intention is something that is inseparably linked to action : I open the drawer and rummage around in it; at last I come to and ask myself 'Why am I rummaging in this drawer? And then the answer comes, "I want to look at the photograph of ....". "*I want to*", not *I wanted to*".<sup>9</sup>

Just to indicate that there is nothing that connects our imagination with



reality, Wittgenstein remarks : The red that we imagine is the same red which we perceive. If that were not the case, then in saying "Here is a red patch" and "Here there isn't a red patch" one cannot be saying the same thing by the word 'red'.<sup>10</sup> What is necessary in language is to be able to recognize the presence as well as the absence of a certain colour when we perceive it.<sup>11</sup> It would be odd to say that a process is different when it takes place from the one which is imagined.<sup>12</sup>

After indicating how thought and reality can be identical, Wittgenstein demonstrates the same by speaking of empirical propositions. The relation between language and reality is such that an empirical proposition may be converted into a rule any moment if that serves one's purpose.<sup>13</sup> If an empirical proposition is used as something with which comparison has to be made, it is a rule, and if it is tested by experience then it is an application of some other rule according to Wittgenstein.<sup>14</sup>

Mind and body are not causally related, nor are they interacting in the manner in which any two physical objects do. Mind does not follow the laws of nature, body does not follow the laws of mind. The relationship can be grasped only by sketching the link between language and reality. The common area is the symbols with their grammatical rules that are part of nature as well as part of language. The contact point between language and reality is therefore through symbols and the same is true of thought and reality since thought is embedded in language. By indicating how language and reality can overlap, we are in a position to state what the relation between mind and body could be. Language is linked to mind on the one hand and to the reality on the other. Language is linked to mind because of the thoughts, imagination, intention and meaning, and the language is related to reality through its grammatical rule, empirical propositions and the paradigms. Since body is part of reality, what is applicable to reality is applicable to body as well. Body has the signals of pain, we groan and call it tooth-ache. Thus, it is through the medium of language that mind and body interact with one another.

#### NOTES

1. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin Books, 1976 pp. 28-31.

2. S. Kripke, 'Identity and Necessity' in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, in Stephen P. Schwartz [ed.], Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1977, pp. 77-79.
3. Identity and Necessity pp. 92-94.
4. Identity and Necessity pp. 98-101.
5. Hereafter we use the term "self" and "jiva" interchangeably to mean self in the body.
6. Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names" in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, pp. 292-296.
7. Anything predictable is deterministic. We hold the doctor responsible not because he did something, but because he did not do certain things.
8. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation [PI]*, Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, \$ 588.
9. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel* Eds, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd Edn., 1981, \$ 8/p. 2.
10. *PI* \$ 448.
11. *PI* \$ 446.
12. L. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32* Edited by Desmond Lee; Blackwell, 1982, pp. 36-37.
13. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, (Eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, 1974, \$ 319.
14. *On Certainty* \$ 98.