Abstract
One of the main reasons for justifying rights originates from the principle of the separateness of persons. However, it can been denied that persons are definite and “thick” entities, and, as such, that their supposed separateness expresses a fundamental normative principle. Should we then reconsider or abandon rights-talk? I will argue for the contrary, and claim that an extreme reductionist position towards persons is flawed. Moreover, I will claim that right-discourse can be anchored on grounds other than the principle of separateness of persons, as principles of distributive justice and rights are still needed to build up what has been called “ morality in the narrow sense ” , which is, in turn, necessary for protecting “ morality in the broad sense” : that is, the individual pursuit of a good life.
This paper is based on a longer draft read and discussed at the Personal Perspectivity Workshop organized by the Hokkaido University in November 2014. I would like to thank the organizers and all the participants for their useful comments.
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Biasetti, P. (2018). Rights and Persons. In: Altobrando, A., Niikawa, T., Stone, R. (eds) The Realizations of the Self. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94700-6_12
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