Abstract
This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to “impossible worlds”, or other “points of reference” which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, “quotational” theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own “semantic structure”. I show how this theory can accommodate quantification into belief-contexts. I close with skirmishes against the threat posed by the Liar Paradox.
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Bigelow, J.C. Believing in semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 2, 101–144 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365131
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00365131