

Hope in a Vice: Carole Pateman, Judith Butler, and Suspicious Hope¹

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Eve Sedgwick critiques paranoid methodologies for denying a plurality of affective approaches. Instead, she emphasizes affects such as hope, but her description of hope's openness does not address how hope can avoid discourses that appear to offer amelioration while deceptively masking subjugation. In this context, I will argue that suspicion in feminist political philosophy, as shown in the earlier work of Carole Pateman and Judith Butler, provides a cautious approach toward hope's openness without precluding hope altogether. This analysis will reconsider the domination and empowerment debates in relation to affect, pointing toward compatibilities between the two perspectives. First, I will expand Sedgwick's analysis of hope to explain its potential as a feminist political affect. Second, I will examine the techniques of suspicion employed by Pateman and Butler and how they risk denying possibilities for hope. This will lead to a discussion of how Amy Allen's theory of power indicates that suspicion is compatible with hope. Finally, I will explain how the suspicious approaches of Pateman and Butler illuminate hope as an inherently risky, fragile project. This will show that suspicion does not necessarily take up the totalizing position of paranoia, but rather can productively ensure that hope is not led astray.

BETWEEN PARANOIA AND HOPE

In "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading," Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick critiques the totalizing power of paranoid methodologies in relation to politics and theory. Sedgwick argues that paranoia threatens to crowd out other affective positions (Sedgwick 2003, 132), demanding the constant exposure of occulted violence (139). This demand causes paranoia to repeat itself and proliferate (135), which threatens to lock analyses within the assumption that more bad news is always waiting to be exposed (130). Paranoia hence crowds out possibilities for contingency and surprise beyond our cynical expectations (132). In this context, Sedgwick asserts that paranoia involves "a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once anticipatory and retroactive, averse above all to surprise . . ." (146). This stifled temporality of negative expectation thus precludes reparative affects, such as love (128) and hope (146), that align themselves with change, contingency, and positivity. Whereas a nontotalizing practice of suspicion might be merely open to the possibility that deception is present, paranoia is deployed as a specifically totalizing and

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restrictive mode of suspicion in which deception is ubiquitous and its exposure is mandated at every turn. This totalizing position of paranoia consequently influences our visions of emancipation, as it reduces emancipatory projects of pleasure and amelioration to naivetés that must be discarded (144).

Sedgwick emphasizes that reparative affects such as hope can allow us to escape from paranoia's ossified temporality by acknowledging the potential for positive contingency and surprise arrived at through our emancipatory projects (Sedgwick 2003, 146). In contrast to the rigid anticipation of paranoia, Sedgwick acknowledges that hope is a fragile process, describing it as "often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience" (146). Through hope, we open up our projection of the future to contingency. This opening brings the danger of "terrible" surprises, but also opens up possibilities for positive surprises (146). Sedgwick thus gives us the sense that hope is a fragile opening toward positive possibilities rather than a bolder leap of confidence. Our anticipations for the future are no longer rigid as in paranoia, but instead open to new forms of life and understanding.

Yet key questions remain for how we are to navigate hope's openness, especially when we consider hope in the context of feminist political theory. Sedgwick's emphasis on the fragile openness of hope does not interrogate instances where we might be open to possibilities that appear ameliorative when they are actually laden with domination and exclusion beneath the surface. As Vincent Crapanzano mentions in his analysis of hope, one of hope's dangers is its ability to "promote false objects" (Crapanzano 2003, 19). This risk is dangerous in a world that has been significantly shaped by sexism, as the duplicity of patriarchy runs *contra* to emancipatory visions for women. An awareness of the duplicitous character of patriarchal discourse stretches back to early proponents of women's emancipation, such as Sarah Grimké, who criticized the assertion that subjugation to men was in women's best interests (Grimké 1994, 40–41). How do we remain open to the future without being led astray? Does suspicion's ability to expose delusiveness still have a place when we turn to hope as a politically efficacious affect? And if so, how can suspicion coexist with hope without transforming into a totalizing paranoia?

This essay will consider hope as an affect in the context of political theory by returning to the question of suspicion in feminist philosophy. As will be explained below, suspicion serves as a nontotalizing affect that is open to possibilities of deception without reaching paranoia's restrictive emphasis that hidden dangers are ubiquitous. Because feminist critique must often be mobilized against hidden forms of subjugation, the openness to deception that suspicion offers will often be necessary. But in the context of Sedgwick's critique of paranoia, the compatibility between suspicion and hope must be reexamined.

If we acknowledge the possible dangers of hope's aspirations, then it will be useful to find a way to navigate hope's potentially perilous openness. In this context, I will analyze suspicious theorists and investigate whether suspicion can support hope rather than entail its denial. I will argue that the application of suspicion in feminist political philosophy, as indicated by the earlier work of Carole Pateman and Judith Butler, shows that turning to hope as a political affect requires caution due to the often delusive qualities of domination. First, I will explain why hope is a useful affect to consider in the context of feminist political theory, referring to Cornel West to defend hope from the charge of inaction. Second, I will examine the techniques of suspicion employed by Pateman and Butler, which risk cutting off possibilities for hope. This will lead to a discussion of how Amy Allen's integrative approach toward domination and empowerment indicates that suspicion is compatible with hope. Finally, I will explain how the suspicious approaches of Pateman and Butler positively illuminate hope as an inherently risky, fragile

project. This will show that suspicion does not necessarily take up the totalizing position of paranoia, but rather is able to coexist productively with hope.

FEMINISM AND HOPE

Sedgwick's emphasis on affective hope requires additional analysis when considering its efficacy for feminist emancipatory politics. In his analysis of hope, Crapanzano notes that hope is often employed implicitly in political accounts of "revolution and utopia," but is rarely explicitly analyzed by social and psychological sciences (Crapanzano 2003, 5). This is also true of feminist political theory, in which domination, empowerment, and recognition receive far more explicit attention than the role of hope for emancipatory projects. Hence, Sedgwick's analysis of hope requires development in a political context.

As discussed above, Sedgwick explains that hope involves an affect of openness to the future, which is oriented toward the development of new, even surprising, possibilities (Sedgwick 2003, 146). In the context of politics, this means that we are not trapped within a rigid anticipation of deception, as found in paranoia (130). Instead, hope involves anticipating the ways in which contingency allows for new, even radical, possibilities to unfold (146). Yet it seems unclear why hope is a worthwhile affect for feminist political projects specifically. Why should we hope for certain political outcomes as opposed to comporting ourselves with confidence toward them or desiring them, among a number of other affective or rational anticipatory dispositions? Sedgwick thus offers a glimpse of what the affect of hope involves, but more analysis is required before its efficacy for feminist politics can be endorsed. Why should we consider hope in the context of politics at all?<1>

In "Reflections on Hope as a Category of Social and Psychological Analysis," Crapanzano surveys psychological, cultural, and ethnographic employments of hope to establish the parameters of hope in discourse (Crapanzano 2003, 4). Crapanzano emphasizes that hope's relationship to anticipation provides it with a key "temporal dimension" (6). Hope orients itself toward the future, either directed toward concrete goals or toward possibilities that are "open ended, lacking final definition, vague, and . . . subject to chance" (7). Crapanzano finds this emphasis on temporality in the writings of the philosopher Ernst Bloch, who orients hope's "forward-looking temporality" toward a "category of the not-yet" in contrast to ossified bourgeois ideologies (15). Jürgen Moltmann also expresses this open temporality when he stresses that hope is concerned with "the condition for the possibility of new experiences," pointing toward new possibilities beyond the current state of the world (Moltmann 1993, 18). Here hope is temporally bound to the future, and its openness allows for new possibilities beyond the present. Crapanzano also stresses that this temporality of hope is bundled with an awareness of the limits of human agency, as hope acknowledges that anticipated possibilities may be outside of an individual's grasp, instead depending on fate, chance, or the work of others (Crapanzano 2003, 6).

Crapanzano's analysis thus presents us with a picture of hope that includes an awareness of limitation coexisting with a temporal disposition of anticipatory openness toward the future, either in relation to concrete possibilities or vaguer, contingent possibilities. An emphasis on the limitations of human action differentiates hope from positions such as confidence that anticipate future events in relation to probability rather than fragility. Hope's explicit openness toward the

future also differentiates it from desire, as desire may yearn for an object or event without being open to the possibility of its occurrence.

For example, consider the following quote by Jacques Lacan: “We don't know what will become of psychoanalysis. For my part, I do hope it becomes something, but it is not certain that that's the way it is heading” (Lacan 2008, 3).<2> If we grant that Lacan's reference to “hope” is not a rhetorical gesture, it signifies something different from a confidence that psychoanalysis will become something. This is entailed by his explanation that “it is not certain” that psychoanalysis is headed in such a direction. Yet this statement also expresses something different from if he had written, “I do *desire* that psychoanalysis becomes something,” as he could certainly desire for psychoanalysis to become such a way without finding it possible. Instead, Lacan's hope involves an openness toward the possibility that psychoanalysis could indeed find its way toward its becoming, even if it transcends the ability of certain agents to achieve such a result on their own. Our analysis of hope thus accords with Sedgwick's emphasis on a hope that opens up our anticipations of the future to new possibilities (Sedgwick 2003, 146), in contrast to the rigid, cynical expectation found in paranoia (132).

Sedgwick's emphasis on hope as a positive affect (Sedgwick 2003, 146) also distinguishes hope from anticipatory affects such as fear and dread that look toward the future as a source of misery and misfortune. When I am hopeful, my anticipation is cast out toward a future that resounds with positive potential, offering possibilities for amelioration, renewal, or survival that otherwise would seem distant.

This understanding of hope has much to offer feminist politics. Through its positive, future-bound temporality, hope offers a perspective that is open toward new possibilities for women's emancipation beyond a present that has been shaped by patriarchal domination. Hope also maintains this openness toward radical change while acknowledging the limits of human agency and the reality that emancipation may depend to a large degree on chance, fate, and the actions of others. Yet Crapanzano's analysis of hope is likely to be insufficient for feminist politics due to the risk that hope will fall into a passivity that fails to emphasize concrete action beyond religious sentiment. Crapanzano notes that hope is often taken as a passive disposition (Crapanzano 2003, 6). This coincides with the danger that our hope will fall into inaction because we passively entrust our future to powers beyond human agency (19). Hope is an insufficient reference for feminist politics if it resigns us to waiting for a better world that can arrive only through forces out of our control.

Due to these concerns, it is useful to consider the writings of Cornel West, who explicitly links hope with engagement in politics. Acknowledging the role of the “audacity of hope” in the 2008 elections (West 2008, 2), West cautions that “real hope” is tied to action and engagement, “grounded in a particularly messy struggle” that can be “betrayed by naïve projections of a better future that ignore the necessity of doing the real work” (6). In this sense, West's turn toward hope is concerned with its ability to foster engagement, in contrast to dispositions such as optimism that he criticizes for evaluating the prospects of a situation at a distance instead of leaping into the fray (15).

Similarly to Crapanzano's emphasis on temporal openness, West's engaged hope retains an outlook toward future possibilities. Hope is related to the ability of humans to look ahead and to struggle for a positive future that contrasts with present suffering (West 2008, 38). West also asserts that hope is necessary for young people because it opens up their future possibilities (92). West's account of struggle is conscious of the fragility of human action, since hope appears in the context of despair (216). For this reason hope is linked with tragedy, as “hope is always

blood-stained and tear-soaked” (217). Yet it is hope’s openness and commitment to struggle that West believes provides the strength necessary to continue engaging in emancipatory projects (217).

Considering West is useful because he ties hope to political engagement, allowing for hopeful positions beyond the ultimately theological concerns of hopeful philosophers such as Moltmann. Religion’s role in hope remains potentially present, but is significantly tempered in relation to action and political concerns (West 2008, 73). Through this approach, West also crucially distinguishes hope from inaction, as hope is tied to “the necessity of real work” (6). West’s approach thus offers a more attractive vision of hope for feminist projects, as it can be grounded in political engagement rather than a disengaged hopefulness that emancipation will arrive without the work required for adequate political change. Yet even with hope’s passivity mitigated, we encounter the question of how we can avoid casting our hopeful openness toward objects that appear ameliorative when they are actually the products of sexism and subordination. If we acknowledge hope as an intriguing political affect in contrast to a paranoia that obsesses over deception, how can we avoid placing our hopes in strategies and ends that mask the subjugation they entail? Now that we have considered hope in more detail, we can consider how a return to suspicion might alter our projected political possibilities.

FEMINISM AND SUSPICION

Sedgwick does not always conflate paranoia with suspicion, but rather indicates that the totalizing affect of paranoia arises when suspicion is prescribed as a “methodological certainty” that cannot permit the presence of more open, positive affects (Sedgwick 2003, 125). This indicates that we might be able to investigate suspicion outside of its totalizing mode, enabling us to evaluate its usage within political theory. This allows us to consider suspicious theories in a way that does not conflate them with a paranoia that crowds out all other affects through its expectations of delusiveness (131).

Sedgwick asserts that paranoia involves a “faith in exposure” that demands that hidden dangers be detected and revealed (Sedgwick 2003, 138). Paranoia’s totalizing character also enforces a series of “critical habits” that risk casting the practice of exposure as the epitome of criticism (124). This totalizing paranoia is not merely open to the possibility of hidden dangers, but rather expects to find them at every turn (144). In contrast, if considered in a nontotalizing form, suspicion’s anticipation is open to the possibility that a discourse or situation may contain elements that are delusive. Through its less rigid anticipation, a nontotalizing suspicious affect can be crucial for remaining open to the possibility of deceptive situations without the downside of anticipating deception as ubiquitous and unavoidable.

The ability to detect deceptive situations is crucial for feminist critique. As Uma Narayan asserts, feminist political analyses go beyond calling attention to straightforward problematic discourses and situations. Rather, feminist political theory frequently must expose matters of fact that “are often overlooked or explained away” (Narayan 1997, 34). In a world shaped by sexism, discourses that entail subjugation may present themselves under a veneer of innocuousness, innocence, or beneficence. Hence, a suspicious approach that remains open to the possibility of deception is often required so feminists can maintain an open vigilance toward masked forms of domination.

This does not mean that all feminist critiques must be governed by suspicion. Sedgwick criticizes paranoia for privileging the art of exposure at the expense of challenging institutions and practices that are already visibly problematic (Sedgwick 2003, 140). Violence and subjugation are often immediately visible, and paranoia misses the mark when it deemphasizes visible subjugation in favor of compulsively exposing hidden dangers. Hence, if we consider suspicion as an openness to the possibility of deception, then suspicion will often be unnecessary for critiques of visibly problematic situations. For example, I do not need to be open to the possibility that members of Congress who explicitly attempt to ban contraception are supporting hidden subjugation, because their actions are already visibly linked with the use of power to restrict the autonomy of women. In this instance, my subsequent criticisms are more likely to emphasize the dangerous effects of banning contraception rather than attempting to search for and expose hidden dangers. In this way, practicing feminist philosophy calls for the development of suspicion as a critical faculty, but may not always require a distinctly suspicious mode of critique as exposure.

Through a suspicious approach, feminists can highlight instances of domination that have been swept under the rug and ensure that they are adequately addressed. In this context, it is interesting to consider an archaic definition for *delude*: “to frustrate the hopes and plans of” (Crapanzano 2003, 16). If a nontotalizing suspicion is possible, then its openness toward the possibility of hidden dangers is a useful device for preventing hope from embracing deceptive targets. In this way, we could simultaneously hold hope and suspicion together, opening ourselves up to ameliorative possibilities while critically interrogating the dangers of our hopeful openness toward the future.

SUSPICION AND HOPE IN THE DOMINATION AND EMPOWERMENT DEBATES

Yet if we move from these general features of a suspicious analysis to particular instances of suspicion, we still find that suspicious approaches seem to imply a preclusion of hope. This problem appears when we highlight the affective dimensions of the domination and empowerment debates in feminist philosophy. The differences between theories focused on domination and theories focused on empowerment have resulted in many debates over the pursuit of emancipation in feminist political philosophy. Amy Allen provides a brief overview of these approaches, asserting that “domination theorists” focus on the ways power is used to subjugate women to men, whereas “empowerment theorists” emphasize “the power that women do have” (Allen 1998, 35). Allen notes that empowerment theorists often criticize domination theorists for over-emphasizing the victimization of women, and domination theorists often criticize empowerment theorists for being insufficiently critical of practices “that have themselves traditionally been mechanisms of women's oppression” (35). This debate thus signals a divide between one approach that looks toward the ways in which power stifles women’s agency in the world, and another that highlights new possibilities for women’s emancipation beyond domination’s grasp.

Although Allen’s analysis of domination theorists does not consider suspicion, a focus on power as domination requires critical tools that call attention to the often delusive ways in which power is deployed. The usefulness of suspicion is pronounced for domination theorists because the power that men use to subjugate women is often delusive in relation to sex discrimination, patriarchy, domination, and their intersection with a number of oppressions.

The earlier work of both Pateman and Butler provides examples of concealed domination that must be detected through suspicion. An openness to the possibility of deceptive discourse enables Pateman's argument in *The Sexual Contract* that the supposedly freedom-oriented story found within social contract theory (Pateman 1988, 33) masks its entailment of both the subordination of women to the private sphere and the exercise of a male "sex right" that secures men's sexual access to women (2, 11). It is Pateman's openness toward deceptive possibilities that marks her critique as distinctly suspicious, in contrast to the Marxists and feminists whom Pateman criticizes for accepting social contract at face value (ix, 14). Otherwise, the domination latent within social contract narratives, which entails the free exercise of power by privileged white men over women (221), could not have been detected and exposed.

Pateman continues her suspicious approach by searching for domination hidden within the Lockean idea that people are able to own property in their persons, which purports to support the freedom of self-ownership (Pateman 1988, 13). Here she finds that the concept of property in the person establishes a distance between workers and their labor-power, which is evoked to perform strange manipulations such as framing the slave contract as the ultimate act of freedom (72) and averting critique of both the surrogacy contract and "the prostitution contract" (143). Pateman's suspicious openness toward the possibility of deception, having exposed this curious juxtaposition between slavery and freedom, leads her to conclude that contracts cannot be so innocently divided from subjugation because workers' labor-power remains linked to their "self and self-identity" through the development of their capacities (150). Pateman's suspicious anticipation of delusiveness within the concept of property in the person thus allows her to notice the strange and problematic ways in which this approach is able to mask subjugation as freedom.

Pateman's suspicious consideration of delusiveness also causes her to look for deception behind social contract theory's framing of both men and women as individuals. Although social contract's emphasis on individuals is often purported to support equality, Pateman notes that the concept of an "individual" has been constructed as a masculine figure in a way that obscures subordination and exploitation (Pateman 1988, 14). Behind the benign presentation of "the individual" as a source of freedom lies a problematic interchangeability (223) that reinforces binaries "between natural/civil, private/public, women's/individual—and sex/gender" (225). Pateman's suspicion of both social contract theory and property in the person culminates in a general suspicion of the freedom offered by the contractual order (232) that otherwise would have remained occulted and unnoticed. It is this approach that characterizes Pateman's as distinctly suspicious: she remains open to the possibility of deception within the narrative of social contract, and this anticipation causes her to consider the sexist mechanisms that lie below its surface presentation.

Similarly, Butler's earlier work hinges upon an openness to both the deceptive investments of power in the constitution of subjects and the masked effects of power upon claims for universalization and unity. Butler claims we inhabit an inescapable sphere of power, so every action must arouse our suspicion because power frequently influences subjects in ways that are not always apparent on the surface. Subjects exist within a realm of "political construction and regulation" in which subjectivity is constructed only in opposition to "figures of abjection" who have been erased from consideration in the political and social field (Butler 1995, 47). Butler adds, "My position is mine to the extent that 'I' . . . replay and resignify the theoretical positions that have constituted me, working the possibilities of their convergence, and trying to take account of the possibilities that they systematically include" (42). Agency itself "is always and

only a political prerogative" (47), so even my own actions could be delusive vis-à-vis my constitution within a political nexus of power relations and exclusions.

Both the constitution of subjectivity by power and power's grasp on agency brings Butler to a necessary suspicion of resistance. Butler writes, "power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms" and is "the very precondition of a politically engaged critique" (Butler 1995, 39), barring us from simple innocence. Thus, to be a political actor and critic, we are already submerged in power, and innocence is an illusion. Butler writes, "To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises, and extends in some power-play through recourse to tropes of normative universality . . ." (39). Even an attempt to move beyond power and toward the freedom of innocence is itself a play of power.

Because subjects and their resistance are immersed in a power that depends upon exclusion, Butler is suspicious of attempts to assert claims of "universality," for "such a totalizing notion can only be achieved at the cost of producing new and further exclusions" (Butler 1995, 40). Similarly, Butler holds to "the suspicion that unity is only purchased through violent excision" (Butler 2008, 56). Thus, at the level of theory and practice, Butler asserts that we must anticipate the delusiveness of theories that purport to ally themselves to a universal, unified end when they are actually constituted by problematic and exclusionary forces. Butler's analysis thus shares an affinity with sustained suspicion, as problematic exclusions often infiltrate and constitute struggles for empowerment and emancipation, requiring us to be ever-vigilant and anticipatory of this possibility.

Though the suspicion presented by both Pateman and Butler unmasks occulted forces that otherwise might have remained unchecked, it opens them up to critiques that challenge the compatibility between suspicion and hope. Nancy Fraser brings us to this conflict when she asserts that *The Sexual Contract* denies women's agency. In Fraser's interpretation, the sexual contract's upholding of the "male sex-right" upholds "the right of individual men to command individual women," and thus "institutes a series of male/female master/subject dyads" at the level of individual relationships (Fraser 1993, 173). In addition, the suppression of the sexual contract echoes in other societal contracts, dependent upon the notion of property in the person. Fraser interprets, "The use of these commodities thus requires the presence, and the subordination, of their owners, the latter's subjection to a user's command," and institutes another series of "master/subject dyads" (173). Fraser believes that for Pateman these dyads are "the symbolic template of patriarchal culture," in that the meaning of being a man becomes integrally linked to the sexual command of a woman's body (174).

Based on this interpretation, Fraser asserts that Pateman abandons critical aspects of oppression because her analysis is too focused on individual relationships, resulting in a failure to recognize opportunities for women's agency (Fraser 1993, 177). Fraser gives an example of women who use the pursuit of employment as a method to gain more autonomy from the home (176), especially because bosses do not command workers outside of the workplace (177). In these cases, the "boss/worker dyad" conception of domination is insufficient, for it creates a situation in which "the terms 'woman' and 'worker' are given once and for all as monolithically patriarchal," simultaneously denying "the possibility of trade-offs" and increased freedom and agency for women (177). Pateman's assertion of the sexual contract as literal causes her to also miss the autonomy that many sex workers are granted by their occupation (179). Although Fraser does admit that both employment and "prostitution" can be problematic, she asserts that

"Pateman's approach is too absolutist" (179), thus missing certain realities of freedom and autonomy that can occur even in problematic situations.<3>

Fraser is not explicitly concerned with hope in her critique, but her criticisms also have implications for a political affect of hope. If Pateman foregrounds a dominating and deceptive power that causes her to miss possibilities for increased agency, freedom, and autonomy for women, then she is also precluding an affect of openness toward ameliorative possibilities in these areas. Her suspicious approach thus closes off the affect of hope in key ways, restricting it to an expectation of further domination.

Seyla Benhabib, who views Butler's work as a problematic postmodernism that precludes possibilities for freedom, critiques from a different angle Butler's suspicious approach to subjectivity and politics. Benhabib critiques the postmodern "strong version of the thesis of the 'death of man,'" which holds that human subjects are wholly constituted by existing language. This thesis is problematic because it denies the possibility of "intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, and autonomy" by necessitating a "dissolution of the subject" in which "the subject . . . can no longer master and create that distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively alter them" (Benhabib 1995, 20). Benhabib asserts that this position "is not compatible with the goals of feminism," because feminists "must still argue that we are not merely extensions of our histories, that vis-à-vis our own stories we are in the position of author and character at once" (21). Benhabib thus contends that feminism cannot be reduced to a shadow-play of subjectivity that is traceable to the delusive power of discourse lurking behind agency.

Benhabib names Butler as an advocate for this agency-denying approach, stating that Butler's appeal to the construction of subjects by discourse entails sacrificing "the 'doer beyond the deed'" and the "self as the subject of a life-narrative." In order to move beyond the sexist language-game, Benhabib, disenchanted with this position, sees subjects as more than beings trapped in "the sum total of the gendered expressions we perform." She considers Butler's prescription of performance as a "complete debunking of any concepts of selfhood, agency, and autonomy" (Benhabib 1995, 21), expressing an additional concern that "this reduction of female agency to a 'doing without the doer'" will strike yet another blow to women's already "fragile and tenuous . . . sense of selfhood" (22). Butler's suspicion of a subject beyond power thus results in a worldview that precludes autonomous freedom, which is necessary for feminist projects.

Like Fraser, Benhabib does not take up hope as an explicit part of her critique. However, her criticism of Butler's denial of agency, autonomy, and selfhood signals that Butler cuts off any hope for these possibilities, as they are merely delusive effects of an underlying constitution through power and discourse. Indeed, Sedgwick singles out Butler's *Gender Trouble* as an example of problematic paranoia, which she claims is far removed from Butler's more recent work (Sedgwick 2003, 129). For example, Sedgwick interprets Butler's attempt to sniff out and critique theorists who claim a nostalgic state prior to the power constituting gender difference as a move toward anticipating the inevitability of problematic power practices (130–31). This assumption that all surprises are troublesome reinforces the paranoid assumption that all contingency is dangerous, and hence precludes the possibility of striving for hope. Likewise, Benhabib's analysis shows us that Butler's earlier work in "Contingent Foundations" and "Merely Cultural" can be read as a denial of surprising, emancipatory subjectivity that assumes power will always corrupt our aspirations to freedom. We might thus be led to praise Butler's increased explicit engagement with hope in *Undoing Gender* (Butler 2004, 180), *Giving an*

Account of Oneself (Butler 2005, 21), and her speech for Occupy Wall Street (Hagen 2011), whereas her earlier works remain products of paranoia that are untouched by the light of hope.

INTEGRATING SUSPICION AND HOPE

Despite these criticisms, I will show how Allen's work on power allows us to integrate suspicion and hope in the context of Pateman and Butler, indicating that we can still derive hope from suspicious feminist philosophies. Regarding Pateman, whom Allen considers to be a domination theorist (Allen 1998, 36), Allen asserts that "domination theorists and empowerment theorists each present one-sided conceptions of power" (30). In addition to both approaches denying sufficient complexity, Allen finds that domination theorists "claim that women are powerless" (31) and consequently "cannot help but view female power as a contradiction in terms" (25). "Empowerment theorists" also make an overly strong claim that women possess a special sort of power that cannot be used for "social domination" (27), when clearly this is not the case (31). Thus, Allen calls for "an integrative analysis of power" (31) "that can make sense of masculine domination" but also address "feminine empowerment and its more specific form, resistance; and feminist solidarity and coalition building" (32).

Allen's integrative approach consists of "three basic senses of 'power':" "power-over, power-to, and power-with" (Allen 1998, 33). "Power-over," consisting of "the ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to another actor or set of actors in a nontrivial way" (33), can take the form of a problematic domination when it is not exercised for beneficial aims (34). "Power-to" corresponds mostly to empowerment (34), and includes resistance (35). Finally, "power-with" consists of "collective empowerment" and includes solidarity (35). Allen stresses that each of these forms of power have "conceptual interrelatedness," and all three forms can be present in the same situation (37). Thus, this integrative approach is able to account for both the domination that Pateman is concerned about (under the category of "power-over" as domination) and possibilities for both individual and collective empowerment. We can hence use Allen's conceptions to assert that power is not merely a force of domination requiring constant exposure, but can also be employed for autonomy and solidarity, opening up the future for new ameliorative possibilities. Allen's argument does not include an explicit acknowledgment of hope, but her pluralistic emphasis on power opens up new possibilities for empowerment beyond domination and renews hope's anticipation of positive surprises just beyond the horizon.

Though Allen's integration addresses domination, it does not foreground methodologies of suspicion. What is crucial for Pateman is not just an account of domination, but also the way in which domination often hides itself behind the mask of empowerment and freedom, which the technique of suspicion can expose. Thus, more work is required for Allen's integration to adequately address cases when the "power-over" of domination is masquerading as "power-to" and "power-with."

Luckily, this suspicious line of thought is foregrounded when we turn to Allen's analysis of Butler. Allen maintains that feminism must, when "analyzing and critiquing contemporary gender subordination," consider it "in all its depth and complexity" (Allen 2009, 4). In this context, Allen turns to Michel Foucault's account of power and his assertion that "the individual subject is an effect of power" (4). It is this insight, which Allen links with Butler's project (5), that she considers a necessary insight for feminist theory.

Allen is aware of the criticism, taken up by Benhabib, that such a totalizing account of power and the way it is able to constitute all subjects and their actions makes it "difficult if not impossible to envision agency, autonomy or resistance" (Allen 2009, 5). However, Allen asserts that "Foucault's notion of subjection is Janus-faced: subjection involves being subjected to power relations but this process produces subjects who are capable of action and even of autonomy" (5). Though Benhabib was critical of such a "postmodern" account that puts forth a subject wholly constituted by power, these subjects can also turn around and rework power, enacting agency by moving it in another direction. It is through the expansion of this field of power that we can use Allen's account to break away from the elements of paranoia that Sedgwick associates with Foucault (Sedgwick 2003, 140), and point toward a more emancipatory project. Although the relationship between subjectivity and power requires our constant vigilance against deception, this does not mean that we are confined to an agency that is always a product of dangerous, hidden forces behind the scenes. Rather, this relationship to power can be recast in ways that return us to the agency and autonomy that Benhabib thought Butler had denied, stressing that agency and autonomy remain when power is reworked by a subject.

Allen recasts the central problem of Butler's earlier theory, stressing that it does not address "possibilities for collective negotiation and transformation of gender subordination" due to its primary focus on subjects (Allen 2009, 6). It is this limited focus that gives this earlier theory an inadequate grasp of "intersubjective dimensions of power and the political" (10), and the specific, collective hope that we can derive from Allen's conception of "power-with" remains absent (10). According to Allen, though Butler provides us with an account of an individual's self-creation (Allen 2008, 11), we must go beyond this conception to theorize collective action as well.

In turning to collective action, however, Allen holds steadfast to the suspicious implications of Butler's theory of power in order to problematize the solidarity that "power-with" offers. Allen writes, "If we accept the basic Foucaultian insight that the subject is constituted by power, then we do have to give up on the idea of an Archimedean standpoint outside of power, from which we can impartially and objectively assess the power relations that make us who we are" (Allen 2009, 13). Allen concludes from this that we can indeed hope for autonomy, but autonomy is always "inherently ambivalent," and hence will involve "better and worse exercises of power on both the individual and collective levels" (14). We must be aware that any normative ideals we seek are located in a particular context, and we must be "historically self-conscious and modest about the status of our normative principles" (14), making sure to assert the political as "an essentially contested concept whose boundaries are continually debated and re-negotiated through ongoing processes of politicization" (15). Though we can maintain the openness that hope requires in the context of individual and collective autonomy, norms, and practices of politics, the pervasive field of power requires us to be constantly vigilant and suspicious of these hopes, leaving them open as a site of contestation. Thus, Butler's suspicion, through the intervention of Allen, is compatible with hope. Sedgwick acknowledges that an openness toward hope also makes us vulnerable to "terrible surprises," (Sedgwick 2003, 146), and suspicion can act as a cautious guide as we navigate these open waters.

We can retroactively apply Allen's insights on Butler and power to her reading of Pateman. If we arrive at every scene already constituted by power, and agency is at best ambivalent, then we must remain suspicious of "power-to," "power-with," and any instances of "power-over" that claim to not be domination. Although Pateman does not share Butler's particular stress on the way in which subjects are constituted by power, her philosophy can still accord with the general

insight that various types of power should be viewed with suspicion. Manifestations of power could claim to be in the service of freedom when they are actually instances of domination. This danger was pointed out by Pateman's elucidation of social contract theory's proposed hope of "power-to" (under the guise of empowering individual freedoms) and "power-with" (under the guise of giving individuals a fair basis on which to form agreements), and her exposure via suspicion of these factors as actually playing within the service of domination. We also find here the compatibility of suspicion with hope in that suspicion can dig out problematic instances of power in the service of instructing us to turn toward other possibilities of hope that may not fall into this trap, which Pateman attempts to do by calling for an approach that views women on women's terms (Pateman 1988, 263). Once again, in this context, suspicion and hope are working through contingency together.

Interestingly, Pateman's own hope for women's politics provides a sample situation where suspicion should be brought in to navigate the openness of hope. Butler's suspicion calls us to question Pateman's simultaneous call for "the freedom of women as women" (Pateman 1988, 231) and the abjection of intersex women from this category as "misfortunes of birth" and trans women as "simulacra of women" (223). This is because, as mentioned earlier, Butler's suspicion denies that Pateman's claims can be made from a straightforward and innocent position free of power. In Allen's terms, Pateman is employing her "power-over" in relation to intersex and trans women in order to exclude them from her vision of hope while presenting this move as in the service of increased freedom for all women. In this way, Pateman's hope is exposed to be a problematic hope that entails certain forms of exclusion. Yet this exposure does not chain us to the paranoid impossibility of hope, but rather shows us that we need to navigate our projected hopes in less problematic ways. In this way, suspicion finds itself hovering between paranoia and hope, avoiding the former's totality while allowing us to expose problematic instances of the latter.

HOPE THROUGH SUSPICION

This compatibility between suspicion and hope illuminates certain properties of hope as an affect for politics. Pateman's suspicious openness toward the possibility of occulted domination within social contract theory, as we saw, enables her to expose the deception surrounding its implicit sexism and subordination. Instead, Pateman expresses a hope for moving "outside the structure of oppositions which establish the story of the original [social] contract" (Pateman 1988, 231). This would involve stepping away from the individual and toward "an autonomous femininity" involving "an expression of the freedom of women as *women*" (231). In contrast to "individual freedom," which has been constructed as limitless by social contract theory, political freedom for women would involve an agreement "to uphold limits," which would curtail the strange ability of contracts to give individuals the ultimate freedom of being completely subjugated and unfree (232). Thus, the particular (albeit problematic) version of hope proposed by Pateman acknowledges that certain conceptions of freedom are deceptive, requiring an evasion of these occulting forces by striving toward forms of agency, empowerment, and freedom that are not deceptively bundled with subordination. Through Pateman, we find that hope is an often risky, deceptive endeavor for which suspicion is required to avoid problematic pitfalls.

Butler also uses suspicion to challenge the notion that subjects, their autonomy, and their politics can be innocently disassociated from power. Power and politics cannot be separated in

this way due to our constant immersion in power. Instead, Butler calls for a permanent contestation of postulations such as "universality" that delude us from the exclusions they are based upon (Butler 1995, 41). In this way, we can hope for both the inclusion of abjected groups and their ability to contest problematic universalizations. In contrast to Pateman, Butler deals with her openness toward the possibility of delusiveness by placing an emphasis on contestation rather than seeking alternative, unproblematic possibilities for freedom. Again we find hope as an inherently risky, deceptive endeavor for which suspicion is required in order to prevent oppression from being hastily embraced under the guise of freedom and innocence.

The particular positive insight about hope that we can derive from suspicious feminist philosophers such as Pateman and Butler is that the project of striving for hope in feminist political philosophy is inherently risky and requires caution. We must specifically hope for kinds of freedom, empowerment, and agency that are not overwhelmingly deceptive, avoiding possibilities that obscure subordination while projecting a veneer of emancipation. Pateman sees a potential outside of this deceptive field by pursuing freedom for women on women's own terms, whereas Butler sustains hope within a complicated field of power by calling for the permanent contestation of calls for universalization and unity, allowing a hope that people who have been marginalized or abjected can enter fields from which they have been excluded. By maintaining a suspicious position when practicing feminist political theory, we can strive for a particular kind of hope that attempts to avoid deceptive forms of subjugation as much as possible, maintaining vigilance when navigating hope's difficult, fragile openness. In this way, suspicion can coexist with Sedgwick's call for a pluralism of affective comportments (Sedgwick 2003, 141) while also acknowledging her emphasis on the fragility of hope (146).

In sum, hope is an affect of openness toward new possibilities that Sedgwick contrasts with the restricted affect of paranoia. Both Pateman and Butler utilize methods of suspicion in their philosophy that risk closing off possibilities for hope in feminist political philosophy. Allen's pluralistic description of power shows that we can still derive hope from suspicious feminist philosophies. Suspicious feminist approaches stress the importance of an affective openness toward possibilities of deception because this will help us to avoid placing our hopes in illusions that mask themselves as emancipatory despite leading to subjugation and exclusion. Therefore, the application of suspicion in feminist political philosophy, as revealed by the earlier work of Pateman and Butler, illuminates the role of hope in feminist political philosophy as inherently risky and requiring caution. Furthermore, this project is compatible with Sedgwick's emphasis on both a pluralistic approach to affects and an emphasis on the fragility of hope's openness. Additional research in this area should consider the implications for hope provided by other suspicious feminist theorists, as well as how we can determine how much suspicion constitutes too much suspicion, or how much hope constitutes too much hope. It will also be useful to examine the normative criteria that contribute to determining objects of hope, and to evaluate the areas in which hope is more or less efficacious for politics. In general, I am hopeful that hope might be considered more frequently within a feminist context, carrying Sedgwick's analysis toward new possibilities for feminist visions of emancipation.

NOTES

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1. I thank Lisa Tessman for this crucial question at the October 2013 FEAST Conference.

2. I thank Billy Dean Goehring for this reference.

3. Though Fraser objects to Pateman's framework as insufficiently systematic, Pateman insists her analysis is systematic and does not operate at the level of individual pairs. Pateman also rejects the criticism that she denies women's agency, asserting that "to enter [social] contracts women's freedom must be presupposed, they must be subjects, even if they become subordinates and their freedom is denied" (Puwar 2002, 127).

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