ISSN 1011-226 x



QUEST

Philosophical Discussions

SPECIAL: THE WIREDU - ORUKA DEBATE ON CULTURAL UNIVERSALS

An International African Journal of Philosophy

Un Journal International Philosophique Africain

Vol. IV No. 2 December 1990

QUEST

Dept. of Philosophy University of Zambia PO Box 32379 Lusaka Zambia

QUEST: Philosophical Discussions is an African Journal of Philosophy. It intends to act as a channel of expression for thinkers in Africa, and to stimulate philosophical discussion on problems that arise out of the radical transformations Africa and Africans are undergoing.

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EDITORIAL

Cultural universality or peculiarity is the central theme in this issue of QUEST. Two prominent African philosophers Kwasi Wiredu and H. Odera Oruka are in debate on this issue, an issue which is both topical and profoundly philosophical.

Joan Cocks' contribution explores the moral and political implications of fixation of identities in cultural and social struggles. The discussion on Alaine Locke, by Birt, adds a specific perspective from the Afro-American point of view.

Further, a fine analytical article by prof. Miller on the justification of armed struggle in the context of South Africa, as well as a discussion of the historical roots of the concept of 'ideology' by Buezey Zolua.

Last issue, a discussion was begun on Valentine Mudimbe's book 'The Invention of Africa'. Lansana Keita and Mudimbe contributed and a most elegant and interesting article on Mudimbe's work by Manthia Diawara was submitted. We hope to receive more contributions on this issue to continue the discussion.

Gift-subscriptions

Several African Departments of Philosophy are facing serious financial problems and have not been able to subscribe to QUEST. We would like, therefore, to invite readers to guarantee gift-subscriptions to African departments of philosophy or friends in Africa. For US$ 15.- per year you can facilitate African collegues to take full benefit of the information and discussions in QUEST. Please inform us which Department you wish to support.

Rédactionnel

L'universalité et la spécificité culturelles occupent une place prépondérante dans ce numéro de QUEST. Avec Kwasi Wiredu et H. Odera Oruka, nous avons un débat entre deux éminents philosophes africains sur un sujet qui est à la fois actuel et indiscutablement philosophique. L'article de Joan Cocks explore les implications morales et politiques d'une fixation des identités dans la lutte culturelle et sociale pour l'émancipation.

Vous trouvez en outre une remarquable étude analytique du professeur Miller sur la légitimité de la lutte armée dans la contexte de l'Afrique du Sud et une article concernant les origines historiques de la notion 'ideologie' par Buezey Zolua.

Dans le numéro précedent, une discussion avait été amorcée à propos du livre de V.Y. Mudimbe The Invention of Africa. Lansana Keita et Mudimbe prirent part à la discussion et on pouvait lire un article élégant et extrêmement intéressant de Manthia Diawara à propos de l'ouvrage de Mudimbe. Nous espérons recevoir davantage d'articles afin de poursuivre la discussion.

Les abonnements-cadeaux

En raison de sérieux problèmes financiers plusieurs facultés de philosophie ne sont pas en mesure de souscrire à Quest. C'est pourquoi nous aimerions inviter nos lecteurs à financer des abonnements-cadeaux destinés aux facultés africaines. Au prix de US$ 15.- par année vous pourriez faire en sorte que vos collègues africains puissent participer aux discussions soulevées à Quest. Veuillez nous renseigner quelle faculté vous souhaitiez soutenir.

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Résumé

Existe-t-il des universaux culturels?

L'auteur résume son argumentation par le raisonnement reductio ad absurdum suivant: si l'on suppose qu'il n'y a pas des universaux culturels, cela revient à dire que la communication entre les cultures est impossible; or, la communication entre les cultures existe, donc il y a des universaux culturels.

Les données biologico-culturelles de l'être humain et l'instinct de conservation mènant à trois facultés mentales vitales: 1) la perception réflective; 2) l'abstraction; et 3) l'inference. Celles-ci sont à la base d'une identité de l'homme partagée et d'une communication entre les êtres humains.

Les différences de langue ne constituent pas des différences fondamentales (l'on développe l'example de la différence existant entre l'anglais et la langue Akan). En principe, chaque langue peut être apprise par tous. Les problèmes de communication se produisent aussi bien entre les cultures qu'à l'intérieur des cultures.

Ensuite, l'auteur traite du lieu existant entre la connaissance de la signification d'un concept, le fait de savoir appliquer ce concept et la connaissance des conditions de vérité d'un concept, et passe ainsi de 'l'universalisme conceptuel' à 'l'universalisme épistémologique'.

Les considérations sur la langue et la commmunication prouvent déjà l'existence d''universaux culturels'. Cependant, l'on peut aussi montrer l'existence d'un fond culturel dans le principe de 'l'impartialité empathique' pour ce qui est de la culture prise dans un sens plus courant (telles, par example, les règles morales et sociales). Un principe nécessaire pour chaque communauté.

Enfin, quatre arguments sont données en ce qui concerne la comparibilité entre les cultures de coutumes courantes et l'article se termine sur une question: au fond, existe-t-il des aspects culturels non-universels?

ARE THERE CULTURAL UNIVERSALS?

Kwasi Wiredu

Our question is 'Are there Cultural Universals?'[1]. I propose a *reductio ad absurdum* proof for an affirmative answer as follows. Suppose there were no cultural universals. Then inter-cultural communication would be impossible. But there is inter-cultural communication. Therefore, there are cultural universals. Let me now try to unpack this epitome of a proof. I start with the premiss that there is inter-cultural communication. This is too visible here and now to be disputed; what may need arguing is what it implies. But not everything regarding its implications is open to debate. For example, it is tautologically obvious that for any two persons to communicate at all they must share some common medium of communication. In turn this implies that at some level they must share a conceptual scheme, however minimal its dimensions. Any such scheme of concepts is a universal for the given participants in the communication, at least. The question now is 'Is there any scheme of concepts which is shared by all the cultures of humankind?'.

This last question is equivalent to asking whether there is anything about which all different cultures of the world **can** communicate. The answer, in fact, is 'Everything'. But let us start from **vital** fundamentals. I use the word 'vital' here to hint at the fact that in certain respects communication is an existential necessity. Without communication there can be no human community. Indeed, in the total absence of communication we cannot even conceive of the existence of human **persons**; there can, perhaps, be human animals, but that is another matter. A human **person** is the product of culture. Whatever else goes into the essence of personhood, mind must be a crucial factor. But we are not born with a mind, not even with one that is a *tabula rasa*;

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1 This paper was presented at a symposium of the 18th World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton 21-27 August 1988.

we are only born with the potential of a mind (in the form of a nervous system). This potential is actualised to a certain degree through the barrage of sensory stimulation emanating from the purely physical (i.e., non-social) environment; but the person-making attribute of mind is not attainable without another kind of barrage, namely, the cultural or socialising barrage of sensory stimulation from kith, kin and kindred. And this means nothing but sundry forms of communication.

We may say, accordingly, that, by and large, communication makes the mind. But we may say also that the mind is just the thing, more strictly, the capacity that makes communication. Two basic factors are involved in communication, namely, conceptualisation and articulation. The power to conceptualise is only a development and refinement of the capacity to react to stimuli in a law-like manner which is present in even amoebic forms of life. In the more elementary forms of life, response to the environment is governed by instinctual drives for equilibrium and self-preservation. At this level of existence, instinct ensures uniformity of reaction in a species. In so far as one can speak here of an analogue of communication this will take the form of instinctive gestures and noises, instinctually standardised. I see in both types of uniformity the humble origins of the rules of conceptualisation and articulation which are distinctive of human communication. Human behaviour is, of course, governed by both instinct and culture. Because of the element of instinct we can be sure of a certain species-distinctive uniformity in human actions and reactions. But because of the element of culture, that is, of habit and conscious thought, there will naturally be plenty of room for variation. The first consideration accounts for the possibility of objectivity and universality in the standards of thought and action in our species, the second for various degrees of relativity and subjectivity. However, what unifies us is more fundamental than what differentiates us.

What is it that unifies us? The beginning, at least, of an answer is easy. It is our biologico-cultural identity as *homines sapientes*. At the very minimum this status implies that we are organisms that go beyond instinct in the drive for equilibrium and self-preservation in the following specific ways, namely, by means of reflective perception,

abstraction, deduction, and induction. By reflective perception I mean a kind of awareness that involves the identification of objects and events through the conscious application of concepts and which entails, consequently, the power of recall and reidentification. Any being capable of reflective perception is already possessed of a concept of the external world. By abstraction I mean the mental procedure of bringing particulars together under general concepts and the latter themselves under still more general concepts, and so on. Both deductive and inductive capacities are already presupposed in rudimentary forms in reflective perception, for to recognise something as an X is to perceive it as an X rather than a non-X, which implies that it is not both X and not X. Here, implicitly, is the principle of Noncontradiction, which paraconsistentism not withstanding, is the supreme principle of deduction. Further, to bring an object or event under a concept is to be able, in principle, to envisage what would obtain under some hypothetical situations. Hypotheticals loom even larger in the context of action. To embark on an action, that is, a premeditated action, one must have some notion of the consequences of various options and, in any case, of the adjustment or maladjustment of possible means to possible ends. The power of judgment comes into play here, evidently, and, with it, the power of inference.

Action, then, involves judgment and inference, but social action, an essential ingredient of humane existence, involves, besides these, communication. Now, if a being is capable of judgment and inference, then, necessarily, it is capable of communication. Actually, this could possibly be misleading as to the logical order of human mental development, if it were to give the impression that the power of judgment and inference antedates that of communication. On the contrary, it follows from our previous remarks about the making of mind that communication, from the point of view both of giving and taking, is present at very early stages in the development of the thinking powers of a human person. What our immediately preceding remarks were intended to do was to amplify a little the interconnection between thought and communication in preparation towards drawing some species-wide implications. At this stage the issue can be framed as follows: 'Mind

presupposes communication. Granted. But communication with whom? Communication with our own kith and kin can be taken for granted, but can we guarantee the possibility of communication with people of very different climes and cultures?' This question is, in fact, anticipated in the previous paragraph. It was there noted that being a human person implies having the capacity of reflective perception, abstraction and inference. In their basic nature these mental activities are the same for all human persons irrespective of whether they inhabit Europe, Asia, or Africa, just as in their basic nature the instinctive reactions of, say, the frogs of Europe are the same as those of the frogs of Africa. In particular, the concept of object in general is the same for all beings capable of reflective perception, for any beings that need to supplement instinct with wits in their struggle for equilibrium and self-preservation will have to have a regularised way of identifying and reidentifying items in their environment in a manner dictated by both their constitution and the impinging stimuli. On both counts there is a common human identity. The human constitution of flesh and bones quickened by electrical charges and wrapped up in variously pigmented integument is the same everywhere, while there is only one world in which we all live, move, and have our being, notwithstanding such things as the vagaries of climate. These facts, which underlie the possibility of communication among kith and kin, are the same facts that underlie the possibility of communication among various peoples of the world. The same facts make all human beings kindred.

Admittedly, communication among widely separated peoples is often more difficult than communication among people living relatively closely together. This should be easy to understand. Apart from anything else, there is the babel of languages. Widely separated groups tend to develop different symbolism for the articulation of thought. Out of myriads of possible phonetic articulations different peoples will use different subsets through essentially accidental circumstances. Scripts, where there are any, will also differ similarly. Nor are the differences limited to the physical aspects of symbolisation. Space and time are implicated in apparently inscrutable ways in that variegation of patterns of thought evidenced in disparate grammars. Such disparities do quite

sometimes precipitate differences in the structure and content of particular concepts. Consider an example. English has the procedure of forming abstract nouns from 'concrete' nouns. Thus, from, for example, 'chair' you get 'chairness'. Adjectives also can yield abstract nouns. 'Red', for example, gives you 'redness'. On the other hand, in my own language, namely, the Akan language spoken in parts of Ghana, the thought-transitions represented by these English grammatical transformations are handled differently. The word for chair is 'akongua', but what corresponds to chairness is not a single word belonging to a separate category but rather a periphrasis. We say something like 'The circumstance of something being a chair' ('se bribi ye akongua'). Here now is the point of this example. In a language like Akan, it is obviously going to be very hard for anybody to persuade himself, let alone anybody else, of the plausibility of saying something like 'chairness is an abstract object existing over and above particular chairs'; for think what such a piece of discourse would (approximately) boil down to in such a language. One would have to say something which translates back into English as 'The circumstance of something being a chair is an abstract object over and above particulars chairs'. And if this sounds incongruous in English, the situation is compounded by a sizeable factor in Akan. The point is not, as is sometimes absurdly suggested, that Africans don't or can't think in abstract terms, for the phrase 'the circumstance of something being a chair' is as abstract in its significance as the word 'chairness'; the point is rather that the fact that in English and languages like English in this respect there is, in addition to the periphrastic rendering, the unitary abstract noun is apt to inspire objectual deductions in many minds whereas in languages like Akan there is a distinct disincentive to any such objectivisation--I do not say hypostatisation, for I do not want to beg the question in favour of the Akan language. What I want to do is to emphasize the radicalness of the present contrast between the two languages. To this purpose, one might even characterise the contrast by saying that the sentence 'Chairness is an abstract object existing over and above particular chairs' is untranslatable into Akan. One can multiply examples of differences in the conceptual suggestiveness of the

grammatical patterns and lexical formations of English and Akan. As is well known, Whorf made relativistic capital out of linguistic contrasts of this sort in his comparisons of Indo-European with American-Indian languages. But it is not necessary to go to Whorfian lengths in order to note that differences in languages often reflect and are reflected in differences of world view and that these can exercise the most profound constraints on inter-cultural communication.

Let all the foregoing be granted. Yet no **ultimate** bar to inter-cultural communication is thereby revealed. No human language is known which non-native speakers cannot, in principle, learn as a second language. The reason underlying this fact is that language is a system of skills fundamental to being human. These are the skills of reflective perception, abstraction, and inference. By means of the first skill one can, in principle, reidentify any symbol and its possible referent; by means of the second one can, in principle, understand any system of structures and classifications, analysing composites and synthesising units as the case may require, and by means of the third one can, in principle, map out the bearing of an immediate assertion on (at least some) close and remote consequences. In sum, a human being is a rule-following animal. As such, he will necessarily have the capacity to understand and use a language; and if one can understand any one language, one can understand any language. If there be any lingering doubts about this last claim, it might presumably be because one anticipates some possible circumstances that might prevent a person speaking the language of one community from learning the language of another. Perhaps, the language manual to hand is pedagogically ineffective? But, surely, one can circumvent all second-hand aids and go and live among the people concerned and, in the words of Quine's *Word and Object*, 'learn the native language directly as an infant might'.

What, then, of untranslatability? In truth the ability to perceive the untranslatability of an expression of one language into another is a mark of linguistic understanding more profound than the ability to do routine translation; the second ability involves merely moving from one language into the other, whereas the first involves stepping above both,

so to speak, an agility that has not seemed to come easily to some students of 'other cultures'. Untranslatability, then, can be a problem but it does not necessarily argue unintelligibility.

But, it might be objected, if some portions of a language can be untranslatable into another, why may not the entire language be so? We shall develop our answer by way of elaborating on some previous remarks. In essence, the answer lies in the commonality of the concept of object in general among all human persons. The possession of this concept is an essential aspect of the human way of reacting, or better, interacting with the environment. And because a fundamental law governing this interaction is the drive for self-preservation and equilibrium, the essential discriminations of items of the environment, which the possession of the concept of object in general makes possible, will be of the same basic kind in fact, though not in name, among all humankind. These essential discriminations will obviously be of the objects or events of direct perception. The word 'direct' here does not imply the absence of conceptualisation. But at this level there is a basic similarity of conceptualisation among humans by dint of semi-instinctual constraints. For this reason, the nearer a set of items of discrimination is to direct perception the easier it will be to correlate its elements to the different systems of naming obtaining among different peoples. This is what ensures that all human languages are, at bottom, inter-learnable and inter-translatable.

But given this basic inter-translatability, no limits can be set to inter-cultural communication which do not appertain also to intra-cultural communication. The difficulties of intelligibility and translation among humans are due principally to the changes and chances to which the twin procedures of abstraction and inference are subject. It is through these processes that human beings make their semantic ascent from the pedestal of direct sensible perception to the heights of sophisticated theoretical conceptions or into the clouds of conceptual obscurity and confusion. The consequent difficulties of understanding occur both across and within cultures, and they need not necessarily be, though they often are, more radical in the first than in the second context. For example, in spite of inevitable hurdles of untranslatability,

it is probably easier for an African to understand Hume's empiricism than for a contemporary Hume-inclined Anglo-American analytic philosopher to understand Hegel's dialectical idealism. Yet, in an obvious sense Hume, Hegel,[2] and the contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosopher share a common culture which is very different from that of the African. Indeed, the break-down in intelligibility and translation in dialogue between, say, a British analytic philosopher and a British absolute idealist, both holding forth in philosophical English, can at times be more intractable than if they merely spoke mutually unfamiliar natural languages. Nevertheless, whether the difficulty in communication occurs within one culture or between different cultures, because human beings are rule-following animals and because we all, by and large, stand on the same cognitive pedestal of sensible perception, such difficulties can sometimes be overcome, or if not overcome, at least, reduced to something less than impenetrability.

It is probably needless to point out that what needs to be shown is not that inter-cultural or even intra-cultural communication is always successful, but only that it need not be always unsuccessful. That conceptual understanding is possible in both theatres of discourse should be sufficiently clear from the foregoing considerations. This fact, equally plainly, presupposes the existence of conceptual universals. It might, however, be thought that it still remains an open question whether there are epistemological universals. It might still be wondered, in other words, whether the canons of reasoning among the different peoples of the world might not be so incommensurable as to render any cross-cultural evaluation of the truth or soundness of belief systems impossible in spite of the supposed universality of conceptual understanding. Questions of this sort have sometimes launched some commentators on the varieties of ways of life and thought among humankind into well-intentioned flights of relativistic fancy. It is thought to be a mark of tolerance and broad-mindedness to view the

2. The racism of both Hume and Hegel, incidentally, should cause equal damage to Africans and non-Africans alike.

allegedly disparate canons of reasoning as all equally valid within their own cultural domains. In spite of the recent resurgence of sympathy for relativism, however, the trouble with that conception remains the old one, namely, that it is inconsistent. The inconsistency might be specified in various ways. Here what needs to be shown is that it is inconsistent to grant the possibility of conceptual universals and deny that of epistemological universals. This is, of course, only with reference to cognitive relativism. A conceptual relativist would deny the very possibility of conceptual universals. But this is an option which we have forestalled in a fundamental way. A less fundamental, though dialectically more effective, way would have been to argue simply that the very idea of disparate conceptual schemes presupposes the existence of some shared concepts; for, unless one had some minimum of understanding of the sounds emitted or marks wrought on surfaces by the problematic group one could not even begin to speak of a conceptual scheme, let alone of a disparate one.

We now argue as follows for the claim that the existence of some conceptual universals implies the availability of some epistemological universals. To understand a concept is to grasp its possibility of application; but this implies also grasping its criteria of application, that is, the conditions under which **it is true** to say that the concept holds. Two riders should, however, be immediately noted here. First, this argument uses a strong concept of understanding. There is obviously a weaker concept of understanding by which one might speak of understanding the concept of, say, a round square without pretending to envisage the **possibility** of something being both round and square. This is a secondary (or formal) concept of understanding which presupposes a primary (or substantive) concept of understanding at some phase of the given piece of discourse. Thus, in the given example, one impliedly claims a substantive understanding of the concepts 'round' and 'square'. Second, it should be noted that grasping the criteria of application of a concept does not necessarily imply being able to articulate them accurately or adequately or even coherently. Note, incidentally, that when the concepts in question are abstract and basic to what might be called the human world-outlook this inequation reveals the root of all philoso-

phy or, at any rate, much of it.

Our argument exploits the connection, not specially recondite, between meaning and possible truth. (I do not, by the way, speak of a connection between meaning and 'truth condition', an obscure notion rampant in some contemporary talk of semantics.)

But we can go further in linking conceptual with epistemological universals. The ground has, in fact, been prepared for this. As previously argued, conceptualisation involves a basic sensitivity to the principle of non-contradiction and the ability to contemplate hypotheticals, which last implies the capacity to learn from experience. Let us call the principle of all learning from experience the Principle of induction (without prejudging any issues about the exact nature of induction). If these two principles, of non-contradiction and induction --principles that are, by any reckoning, basic to human knowledge-- are implicit in the power of conceptualisation, then it is apparent that together they unite the human activities of understanding and knowing in such a way as to make it impossible that the different peoples of the world might be able to communicate but unable to argue rationally among themselves.

So far, I have been arguing about conceptual and epistemological universals. But suppose it is objected that what is required to be proved is the existence of **cultural** universals, not these. It would quickly emerge that the objection is founded on a quite superficial conception of culture. Culture is not just the social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a human group. These phenomena themselves depend on the existence of language, knowledge, communication, interaction, and methods of transmitting knowledge to the born and the unborn. And this is the fundamental sense of the word 'culture'. In this sense, one might sum up the preceding discussion by saying that the fact of language itself, the possession of one language or another by all human societies, is the cultural universal *par excellence*.

Nevertheless, conceiving of culture as 'the social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a human group' while not the most fundamental way of conceiving of it, is a legitimate way of doing so. Besides, it is probably the most frequent. From this perspective,

furthermore, there is some initial plausibility in scepticism as to the existence of cultural universals. Culture, in this sense, is a patterned accumulation of contingencies of social thought and action in the context of a specific type of physical environment. Here what defines culture, or to be sure, a culture, is the humanly contingent, not the humanly necessary. Thus, it is necessary for any human community to have some language, but what particular language it might be is a contingent matter. In general, it is necessary for human groups to have some customs but contingent what specific sets of customs they might have.

From these last reflections, the following train of thought naturally arises. Since customs are contingent facts of particular social formations, so also must be the principles for evaluating them. It proves convenient and reasonable in this connection to view the concept of custom broadly to comprehend such things as usages, traditions, manners, conventions, grammars, vocabularies, etiquette, fashions, aesthetic standards, observances, taboos, rituals, folkways, mores. All these are rules of thought and behaviour, and to say that the basis for evaluating them is contingent is to say that there are no universally valid principles to that purpose; it is to say, positively speaking, that the rightness or wrongness of these rules is culture-relative. If we now view morality as being included under the contingent rules of good behaviour, the conclusion appears to follow that it too, along with all other rules of conduct, is culture-relative. By this train of thought, then, we are transported not only to descriptive relativism but also to ethical relativism. It is, apparently, not just the case that the standards of good and bad vary from people to people or culture to culture but also that their justification consists just in the fact of being adopted at a particular time in a particular place.

Ethical relativism has often been criticised, and justly enough. But when all is said and done it remains unclear by what criteria normative universals of human conduct are to be identified. Interestingly, the narrowly ethical or moral universals seem to be the easiest to characterise. Suppose we could specify a principle of conduct such that without its recognition --I don't say its invariable observance-- the sur-

vival of human society **in a tolerable condition** would be inconceivable. Let us start with the following minimal assumption. We assume that every human being has a concern for his or her own interests, however the concept of interest might be defined. The problem of morals arises from the fact that not everybody has a natural inclination to be concerned about the interests of others at all times in their conduct. In consideration of this, the following imperative naturally suggests itself. 'Let your conduct manifest a due concern for the interests of others.' The question, of course, is: 'What is **due** concern?' I propose the following criterion. A person may be said to manifest due concern for the interests of others if in contemplating the impact of his actions on their interests, he puts himself imaginatively in their position, and having done so, is able to welcome that impact. This is obviously reminiscent of what has been called the Golden Rule. If phrased as an imperative, it might be called the principle of sympathetic impartiality. Now, I suggest that it takes little imagination to foresee that life in any society in which everyone openly rejected this principle and acted accordingly would inevitably be 'solitary, poor, nasty, **brutish**,' and probably short. It is arguable --though we cannot argue this here-- that this principle suffices for the foundation of morality. One can see, for instance, that the injection of a dose of compassion into Kant's categorical imperative would convert it into a principle of **sympathetic** impartiality, and whatever one may think of Kant's argumentation in founding morality on the categorical imperative, that effort was not trivial. Furthermore, I might observe --harking back to my own background of indigenous thought-- that traditional Akan ethical principles quite demonstrably converge on some such foundation as the principle of sympathetic impartiality. It seems clear, in any case, whether or not, as a matter of philosophy, people regard this principle as the basis of all morals, that, as a fact of ethical life, it is essential to the realisation and preservation of basic human interests in society.

On the foregoing grounds it may be asserted that the principle of sympathetic impartiality is a human universal transcending culture viewed as ' the social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a human group'. But it transcends only this particular concept of culture,

not every concept of it; and, certainly, in being common to all human practice of morality, it is a universal of any non-brutish form of human life.

In retrospect one can now easily spot the error in the relativistic train of thought rehearsed earlier on. That train illegitimately carried morality along with mores, traditions, usages, etc., in the same one bag of contingent rules of good behaviour. But moral rules are a class apart. Yet it is so common to confuse morality with other types of rules and conceptions of conduct that, lexicographically, one legitimate sense of the word 'morality' is 'conformity to ideals of right human conduct'. (Nor do the etymologies of 'moral' and 'ethical' offer any disincentive to the error complained of.) Thus peoples speak, for example, of Stoic and Epicurean moralities, comparing and contrasting them. Similarly, one speaks of Christian ethics and Islamic ethics or even of African ethics and European ethics. It then appears that morality itself is something that can vary from group to group. In fact, however, in the respects in which these systems of rules and ideals of conduct differ, they are customs, contingent styles of life and thought, rather than forms of morality in the strictest sense of this word. I ought, perhaps, to stress that there is no suggestion here that customs or ideals of life may not be appraised as good or bad. The point is only that there are more grounds for appraising conduct than moral merit or demerit. Neither is it implied that the extra-ethical codes and conceptions are not important. Just think of the importance of traffic rules in places like New York! And yet it can hardly be said that such a thought experiment yields proof that traffic rules are moral principles.

Granted that moral rules are humanly universal and stand apart from all other rules of conduct, does it follow that all those others are lacking in cultural universality? No premiss or rule of inference seems available for establishing any such relation of implication, but it does seem to be one of the most visible facts about human societies that their customs vary greatly among themselves. In an obvious sense, this is so. However, on a closer look, qualifications begin to press themselves upon our attention. First, any custom which violates a moral rule is *ipso facto* condemnable as bad, not **for** this or that society, but

simple and short.

Second, customs often rest upon believes about the world. In so far as cognitive standards are ultimately universal, as argued in the first part of this discussion, such customs are, by and large, open to cross-cultural evaluation. Thus, for example, prayer to, or in care of, the Virgin Mary is an important custom among Catholics. But, obviously, if a Catholic were, *per improbabile*, to be argued out of his belief in the existence of God, that custom would, barring instinctual inertia, lose its hold on him. And where argument is concerned the principles of non-contradiction and induction unite all humankind. Similarly, were it, for instance, to be proven that our ancestors do not continue to exist in any shape or form, the traditional Akan custom of pouring libation to the ancestors would be deprived of a rationale. In short, so long as a custom has a rationale, it has, at least, an indirect universality via its trans-cultural intelligibility.

But, third, some customs do not seem to have a rationale. We exclude cases of forgotten rationale, for, logically, they belong to the class already dealt with. The relevant cases here are the ones that seem to be born of caprice or pure accident. Paradoxically, these are, perhaps, the easiest to understand trans-culturally; for caprice is caprice, and accident is accident everywhere. So long as the resultant modes of conduct are objectively harmless, their known variety will, at best, support only a vacuous relativism, since there is, by hypothesis, no real disparity of values. On the other hand, where they are harmful, they are, as argued above, open to cross-cultural evaluation on moral or other rational grounds. In either case, little comfort accrues to relativism, ethical or even descriptive.

Fourth, even in those spheres of human activity, such as culinary art, literary art, fine art, music, dance, games and other recreations, where the historically well-established differences in values and sensibilities among the various peoples of the world have spawned great varieties of form and content, nothing is plainer than that increasing communication and interaction, made possible by the tremendous advances in media technology and the like, are fast universalising not only appreciation but also creative assimilation. Thus, where we cannot as

yet speak of actual universals we can at least speak of potential universals.

It is apparent from all this that when, as often happened, critics of relativism have a quickly conceded descriptive relativism in warming up towards the refutation of normative relativism, they have, in fact, unwittingly passed over some quite significant anti-relativistic considerations.

We started this discussion with the question whether there are any cultural universals. We must now begin to wonder whether ultimately there are any cultural non-universals.

Résumé

L'auteur démontre en s'appuyant sur l'expérience d'une étudiante noire et sa propre expérience dans l'étude de la philosophie que la différence de 'background' (milieu) culturel est un facteur signicatif en philosophie.
Il commente l'analyse des universaux culturels faite par Kwasi Wiredu et propose d'inclure l'intuition parmi les universaux culturels. Il traite de rôle de l'intuition dans les manifestations culturelles, spécialement en philosophie comme forme de culture cognitive. En outre, le rôle des fondements culturels en philosophie est démontré à l'aide de quelque positions typicques provenant de participants à un dialogue philosophique. Celle qui, par example, en tant que réministe, ou noire, ne paartage pas les hypothèses culturelles de la discussion, ne peut prendre part au dialogue de façon satisfaisante.
Comme example d'étude philosophique à base d'autres fondements culturels, on traite de la philosophe de sages africaines.

Obstacles in Philosophical Dialogues

H. Odera Oruka

During the period January-June, 1989, I spent time as a Visiting Resident Professor of Philosophy at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. In the first month of my presence, a student of senior grade (final year) who happened to be an African-American making an acquaintance with me engaged me in the following conversation:

"What courses are you giving?", she asked.

"They are philosophy courses", I replied, sipping my coffee.

"Philosophy! Are you a philosopher?", she wondered.

"Yes, some believe I am."

"Strange, you are the first black man I have met, who has made a career in philosophy ..."

"I can't believe that, noting you are a senior. There are very many black people even in this country teaching philosophy," I explained.

"Well, I have not been able to figure out what the whole thing is all about. All those talks about Rationalism, Phenomenology, Referents and a Priori Truth, etc.. I can't find myself in that! What do they mean to me and the culture of my life history?"

"So, you must have taken some philosophy courses after all," I replied.

"Yes, I have tried to. Among the ones I liked most was the one given by Kate Wininger. It had to do with something about African Philosophy and the development of black culture and thinkers," she explained.

"I appreciate and I do understand your feelings about being lost in the jargons of terminologies which seem immediately irrelevant to your life. I felt the same thing when I came to study philosophy in the U.S.A. in the 1960's. But, I persevered, and this is why I am still here."

"Inspired by Kate, who, by the way, is the first woman philosopher of her status that I have met, I told my mother I was going

to major in philosophy," she went on.
"Yes, what did your mother think?" I asked.
"Crazy! she thought I was becoming a lunatic."
"She must have been worried mostly about your chances of getting a job," I commented.
"Yes, that too. But also, she thought, what am I going into, a field known to be a dominion of a few selected half-normal white males. Kate is white and a very normal person."
"She is indeed a normal person of the first rank," I added.
"I agree. And so you see her position to me seems to dissipate the myth of philosophy as a male-white thing. Still I can't yet bring myself to take it as a major," she concluded.
"I accept and understand your judgement," I said.

1. Preamble

In the history of philosophy in the West beginning with the man alleged to have been the first philosopher, Thales, we pass through great glittering names, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle (in the ancient Greece), Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham (in the medieval times), Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Engels, among others, (treated as philosophers of modern Europe). In the second half of the twentieth century, a student of philosophy in the West could not be allowed to escape doing or at least knowing about the philosophies by names such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, Quine, Sartre and others of similar esteem and intellectual mystery. But one will hardly hear of a woman philosopher of comparable intellectual esteem. Should we believe that philosophy is an activity reserved only for males in the Western civilisation? No philosopher or anyone of fair mind would want to give an affirmative answer to this question. And the question raises a further question of whether or not there are obstacles in some or all cultures which unfairly keep off significant sections of humanity from the dialogues of philosophy.

The historical omission or exclusion of women from the dialogues in Western philosophy parallels the omission of African philosophers from the realm of what has hitherto been entertained in the West as 'philosophy'. We do find 'great' treatises written to show the inability of blacks and women to think philosophically[1].

I was one of the students of philosophy in the 1960's in American and Scandinavian Universities who were concerned with the practical utility of philosophy. And so, we were more inclined to taking up inspiring courses in Ethics, Legal, Political and Religious philosophy. But we could not do without passing grades in what was then known as the main stream philosophy. So, we rightly were pushed through texts like Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Carnap's Aufbau, something about Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica and some analytical philosophers' critiques of Marxism and a strong claim that the so-called laws of dialectics by Hegel are not affirmable by the basic normal laws of thought. On our own we went through texts on Existentialism, on Social Theory of the Marcusian brand and on texts about human liberation and historical domination. But there was no real question about male domination in the classical philosophical and all intellectual dialogues of the decade.

Logical Positivism and G.E. Moore's common sense language philosophy dominated the main stream of Scandinavian, American and British philosophy of the 1960's and 1970's. When we were introduced to Wittgenstein, we hated his language magics but felt very happy to have learnt from him that philosophy has no truth to proclaim, since we interpreted this to refer only to linguistic philosophy but not all philosophy.

Analytical philosophy was so entrenched that no outsider to its dialogues could easily or reasonably explain it away. It could only be explained away by a **palace coup**: And Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the mirror of Nature(1979) has provided the regiments for that coup. Rorty's pitfall is that he has been a child of the palace and thought that theirs is the only palace in the world worth treating as the palace. So, having tried competently to explain away all the assumptions of (Analytical) Western philosophy and being oblivious to African or Eas-

tern philosophy, he claims that philosophy has no role except as a mere equal partner in 'the conversation of mankind'. What an anti-climax?

Rorty's message appears fresh, but it is an old wine in a new pot. His is the message of Marx in a different style in the Poverty of Philosophy.

In **ethics**, when we were students, G.E. Moore's appeal to the common sense in philosophical dialogue attracted us and we rushed to read him. But the very title of one of his best known works, Principia Ethica was the opposite of the common sense language. Why should an Arch-Deacon of 'Common sense' philosophy employ such topics, we wondered? Why did he not use titles like 'Rules of Ethics' or 'Philosophy of Morals'. Inside the work one is treated to the argument that **good** is indefinable (being simple and unanalysable) and yet by this what is meant is not 'the good', this is definable, but 'good'itself is not definable. We failed to see common sense in all this.

I would have abandoned the study of philosophy for something else, but two factors operated to ensure my continuing with philosophy: I had already abandoned the study of natural sciences for philosophy since I felt that philosophy was better suited to my search for a theory to comprehend the world and liberate Africa. Secondly, my immediate Professor of Philosophy, Prof. Ingemar Hedenius of the University of Uppsala, Sweden, proved to me to be an ideal teacher. He was a Professor of Practical Philosophy and most of his interest was in the area of Ethics, Legal and Religious philosophy as well as Political philosophy. He made philosophy very practical and made me feel able to find myself and the problems I had in mind in the discipline of philosophy. Hedenius was fond of Plato and Hume and among other philosophers I profoundly enjoyed reading Plato and Hume. At Uppsala I enjoyed a philosophical company of other scholars like Ann-Mari Dahlquist and Thorild Dahlquist as well as Stig Kanger.

When persons from different cultural backgrounds meet to discuss philosophy, this raises, right from the outset, the issue of 'Cultural Universals'. In this paper I re-examine the notion of Cultural Universals and then seek to identify what I wish to refer to as 'cultural fundamentals' in philosophy and philosophical debate. Then, I assess the

extent to which such fundamentals are obstacles not just to fulfillment of a meaningful philosophical dialogue but also to the 'birth' of potential philosophers, however gifted.

Finally, I suggest one possible way in which we can bracket cultural fundamentals where they happen to be obstacles to dialogues and the realization of new and fresh thinkers in the philosophic path-finding and cross-culture debate. This is done on the basis of a conception of philosophy which might be shocking to many Western professional philosophers who treat their profession with the great expectation of the modesty from their peers. Such a conception I have intuited is the one which would place, say, the traditional native African Sage and a Greek philosopher such as Anaximander or even a modern American philosopher like Richard Bernstein, on equal cultural levels for a philosophic dialogue or comparison.

2. Cultural Universals - Kwasi Wiredu

One of the best minds in philosophical analysis that recent development in African Philosophy has produced is that of Prof. Kwasi Wiredu. In his tightly argued paper, 'Are there Cultural Universals?[2]' Wiredu establishes that there are indeed cultural universals.

He finds language (the fact of the existence of a language to all human communities) as a first proof of a cultural universal: Almost every human group has a language and in principle, at least, all human groups can learn alien language as a second language and engage in an inter-cultural communication with the native speaker of the language. The reason behind this, Wiredu argues, is because 'language is a system of skills fundamental to being human. These are skills of reflective perception, abstraction, and inference' (p. 10).

So despite Quine's thesis about 'untranslatability', inter-cultural communication and understanding, Wiredu explains, are possible since untranslatability is not 'unintelligibility'. And he finds no obstacles to inter-cultural communication which would not obtain also in the intra-cultural communication.

The possibility of inter-cultural communication proves that there are 'conceptual universals'. And with this established, Wiredu infers the possibility of 'epistemological universals', removing the ground from cognitive relativism.

The two basic principles which unite conceptualization to cognition Wiredu finds to be the principle of **non-contradiction** and the principle of **induction**, i.e. the two are the bridges between understanding and knowing. For to understand a concept is to grasp "the conditions under which it is true to say that the concept holds" (p. 13). Hence, it is impossible he concludes that the "different peoples of the world might be able to communicate but unable to argue rationally among themselves" (p. 14).

The proof for 'epistemological universals', Wiredu ably explains, implies the existence of 'Cultural Universals', taking culture in a deep and non-superficial sense. In this sense culture is not just conventions, i.e. social forms and customary beliefs and activities of a people, culture also must include cognition, i.e. language, knowledge and methods of transmitting and preserving them. Wiredu is not rejecting the former sense of culture. He only advises that we widen our conception of culture from the taste of the social cultural mass to include the taste and activities of the Academy.

Within Culture as a system of conventions, **morality**, Wiredu explains, is generally treated as part and parcel. And with this treatment, morality would appear to be devoid of any universals. This, if established, would entail that all moral judgments and actions have no yard stick outside the particular social or historical situations from which they arise. Kant's Categorical Imperative would then come to be an empty slogan devoid of any moral reality.

Finding that Kant's effort to postulate the Categorical Imperative was not a trivial affair, Wiredu gives special colour to morality within Culture conceived as a system of mere conventions: Within the sense of culture as social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a people, there is one aspect of Culture which is universal. That aspect, Wiredu has argued, is **morality**, taking morality in its most fundamental sense.

The principle which makes morality universal in human community,

Wiredu states, is the principle which can be framed to read as the principle of **Sympathetic impartiality.** Without such a principle, life in any society would be almost impossible -it would be nasty, brutish and short. The minimum claim of 'sympathetic impartiality' is that almost everyone in a society has some degree of the concern or respect for others in and outside that society, and that without this there would be no culture even in the superficial sense of the term.

Wiredu has not in his paper related the principle of 'sympathetic impartiality' to John Rawls' principle of Rational Egoism[3]. Wiredu's principle, in my assessment, must be that there is something in the psychology and physiology of being **human** which makes a person **secretly** respect the interest of others. If one respects the interest of others only (1) when appearing in the public eyes or (2) because he fears being suspected of not showing this respect, or else (3) because he sees this as the only way in which he could protect his own interest, then such a person would fail to be true to the principle of 'sympathetic impartiality'. Such a person conforms and appears **human** as everybody else only because he is **rational** not because he is **sympathetic.**

In Rawls' State of Nature individuals lack 'sympathetic impartiality' and they do not even acquire it in a Civil State, otherwise there would be little need for police, prisons and class wars. They remain egoists and many of them are still rational, otherwise the society would have melted away.

So a Rawls' scholar would perhaps wish to prove to Prof. Wiredu that his (Wiredu's) principle is not a necessary condition that explains the fact of the existence of at least a minimum degree of moral order in a society. This role can perfectly be fulfilled by the principle of rational egoism.

To be human entails (as Wiredu has shown) to be **rational.** But to be rational must be shown to be **human** if Wiredu wishes to forestall the objection from rational egoism.

Wiredu could perhaps comfortably provide this requirement, so that **rationality** and **humanness** become co-implicants by invoking Socrates' doctrine of knowledge as virtue or by simply supplying some bridging

argument of his own. If this is done, then the rationality in the Rawls' State of Nature Individuals is the very human or moral minimum sufficient for the principle of sympathetic impartiality.

3. Intuition As A Cultural Universal

Wiredu's exposition on Cultural Universals enables us to establish, in my view, the following as being activities or results of qualities which are true of people of all cultures:

(1) **Logic** (from sensitivity to non-contradiction)
(2) **Science** (from ability to learn from experience)
(3) **Humanness** (from morality)
(4) **Communication** (from the use of language)

Wiredu did not shut the door to the admission of other possible cultural universals.

Among those possible others, I wish to include **Intuition** and state this is the most obvious of all cultural universals and yet the one least recognized and appreciated in philosophical dialogues and scientific inquiry. It is, therefore, not surprising that Prof. Wiredu has not thought it necessary to include it in his list. To some philosophers and scientists of 'clean' inclination, the term 'intuition' exudes the air of a witch in the suburb claiming to see and understand over and above what can be established by all reason and science.

But what is intuition? We can take **instinct** to be the most primitive means by which all animals know and react to the world. But beyond the instinct there are **five** other ways of knowing and reacting to the world which, so far, we have evidence man has utilized. I use the term **know** here in a very wide sense in which it includes even the expression 'being aware of'. These five ways are :

(1) Logic (Rationality)
(2) Science (Induction)
(3) Religion (Faith and Myth)
(4) Common Sense
(5) Intuition (These numbers do not suggest any order of merit)

About the first four ways, much is known. But the fifth way is still covered with much clouds. Logic uses techniques by which ideas are interconnected and can be verified to be so. Science employs induction. Religion employs blind faith or revelation and some religions employ mythology and (many would say) the proof of the claims of religions is to be sought from their pragmatic results not from logical consistency or empirical verification. But what means does **intuition** employ in knowing and reacting to the world?

Intuition is a form of mental skill which helps the mind to extrapolate from experience and come to establish extrastatistical inductive truths or it enables mind to make a correct/plausible logical inference without any established or known rules of procedure.

It might be objected that extrapolation from experience is no more than inference by induction and whatever claim about truth asserted is either a valid empirical claim (probable) or an invalid one (improbable by statistics). Yes, this may be so, but I am not claiming that intuition as a means for extrapolation must be something completely divorced from our own ontology and empirical experience. I mean only to say that it helps give legitimacy to sayings which could in principle be verified inductively, but which in actual facts of the situation we have no immediate way of verifying. Take the following saying of two of my Sage-informers:

> The Superiority which some Africans see upon the White man is not part of the character of being white. What is superior has been white technology, record of history and abundance of material possession. But none of these things (technology, recording and possession) are specialities of any race or anybody. Reserve the direction of these three from the white man to the African man and everybody would salute the 'Black man, master, Alleluyah!' There will then be a new history in which to be **Black** is to be superior and **White** inferior[4].

Now we cannot strictly speaking say that we have sufficient inductive means of coming to establish the truth-claims in the above sayings as valid empirical truths. For this will require, among other

things, that we start the experiment now and wait for at least several centuries before we are in a position to gather sufficient results. Yet, the sayings are not claims that are outside our empirical ability to grasp and even **sense** that they are empirically possible to verify.

Take another example of a saying from another Sage:

> Wisdom is a concern with the future without losing sight of the present and the past. It can be stated easily in this one question: Where are we, where were we and where are we going?
>
> (Stephen M. Kithanje in Sage Philosophy)

Now, it is not possible to find a complete scientific nor a logical method for verifying the above kinds of sayings. Yet, the sayings are neither a matter of common sense nor a religious faith. But at the same time the sayings are earthly, i.e. empirical and logical enough that they do not give their author the colour of one possessed by 'Ghosts in machines'. Still the sayings are not fully amenable by the techniques available to science and logic. These two, science and logic, can verify intuitive claims, but they cannot disprove them. Yet, I am not happy even that we should confuse intuitive truths with the Kantian transcendental world of 'things in themselves'. Intuition is a truth of Wisdom and wisdom is, so far, wisdom of this sensible world. If, say, another planet is discovered populated with manlike creatures with civilizations and physiology entirely different from those available on the planet Earth, then a new conception of man and his wisdom will be needed.

4. Intuition in Philosophy

Now, it seems to me that beyond all the boasts of western philosophers for logical rigor or empirical verification, most of the land marks in Western philosophical development are intuitive claims. Once established those claims form the paradigms within which experts arise. And the experts in creating **niches** for themselves create terminologies best known to themselves which act as **frameworks** for creating **cultures** within a culture. Philosophical experts continue in their **niches** until a

new and more insightful and convincing intuitive claim is postulated to deconstruct the old and find a new path. Great philosophers are path-finders, and path-finders disobey the routines of the pedestrians when they emerge to command the war of the search for knowledge unless they are tempered by the rare quality of wisdom, of sagacity.

For example, being a great philosopher but lacking Sagacity, Hegel is alleged to have boasted that he was the last philosopher. To be last would really be great since no one would have anything new to say after him. And Alfred Whitehead is reported to have said that Western philosophy is all a footnote to Plato -i.e. Plato had said it all.

Cognitive Cultures and Cultural Fundamentals

In the previous sections I explained the role of intuition as a way of knowing and reacting to the world and how it is utilized in creating cultures within a culture. Here I will strive to show the fundamentals which block both the 'insiders' and 'outsiders' for coming to realize a fair philosophic dialogue.

Following from Wiredu we could fairly categorize culture basically into two parts: the Cognitive Culture (concerning knowledge, language and their techniques) and Social Culture (social institutions, beliefs and practices plus morality that guides them).

The first type of culture is the first order on which the second one is a product. Often however, the players in the second order culture claim that they are able to bracket their first order inclinations and remain intra-culturally and even inter-culturally objective. The instruments which help them to ensure that they are objective, they believe, are no other than the **Cultural Universals** minus of course the troublesome intuition, i.e. science, logic, language and humanness. On the face of it these are supposed to be responsible not only for intra-cultural social life and dialogue, but also for cross-cultural dialogues and international inter-actions.

I take cognitive culture to mean a style of life, language and methodology of a given group of persons who advance a particular

aspect of knowledge-claim about the world. I use the term 'world' in a very broad sense to mean simply 'reality'. And knowledge about reality can be anything from knowledge about free will or mind to knowledge about the hidden stars. In this sense philosophy as a discipline is a form of cognitive culture just like any branch of science is a cognitive culture. But philosophy is the most uncultured of all the major cognitive cultures. It speaks with too many voices and too many contradictions. I am not here interested in major cognitive cultures as such but in the reality of the sub-cultures within them. And in this case I have my mind in the cognitive sub-cultures within a discipline known as 'philosophy'.

I take a cultural fundamental to mean a concept, a style of language, a method of work or a psychological expectation that helps to mark one culture from another. Among the sub-cultures of philosophy the cultural fundamentals are very important as signs to be watched in assessing the possibility of a success or failure in philosophical dialogue.

A typical Philosophical Dialogue

To a philosophical dialogue people come with **positions**. I do not mean positions such as the fact that one person may be the expert, another the pupil, the other the employer, still another a Feminist, while some others are outraged apologetics of a race or a culture. These positions are important and it is not sensible to simply ignore them. But the very seasoned high priests of philosophical dialogues can explain them away as irrelevancies or as facts that can easily be bracketed by their subjects. I accept, but let that pass.

Let us say that we have a philosophical dialogue in which all the nuances from the social cultures and historical destinies are bracketed, and in which all are to a larger degree experts. Still, however, since the experts are not identical bodies, they will be sitting in different positions and holding different mirrors with respect to the subject of the dialogue. What are such mirrors?

One mirror is the mirror of the **author** of the subject or text being discussed. There are many inner linings in his mirror, we cannot know them all, neither can he since some of them are subconscious. Those linings will determine how the author contributes and reacts to the dialogue. The author may be one who believes one out to defend one's thesis at all costs, no matter whatever a rational refutation of it that may be advanced. He may be one who treats all dialogues as sports in which the main aim is to win not to establish truth. But he may also be one whose attitude is simply to suggest and try to learn from others. He may on the other hand be one who holds the attitude that one ought to ridicule a given school or to defend an established tradition. We cannot know all his inner linings.

The other mirror is likely to be that of **the participant from the rival school** of thought. Although he is fair and rational and would not mind if he could be convinced about the futility of his school, he nevertheless would be very happy to have the position of his school carry the day.

A third mirror could be that of **a member** of the **same school** of thought as the author. Together with the author he will be trying to state their thesis and defend it against all possible refutations. The holder of the third mirror and the author share a common cognitive culture, their terminologies, methodology and argumentative gestures are similar. Their psychological expectations are the same. But still they have differences, some we may know, others we cannot.

The fourth mirror is that of the **path-finder**. He is supposed to belong to a given school of thought which many expect him to advance and defend, but for him this is just an appearance to be used. His real aim is always to curve an epoch making path. He has no immediate way of doing that except by blowing up all the bottom frames of his school. He could, of course, find a path by coming up with an epoch making theory advancing the expectation of his school and ridiculing the rival schools. But it is always easier to break than to create. For example, Wittgenstein was a destroyer rather than a creator to the philosophical tradition started by Frege, Russell and others. Yet many came ,to appreciate and worship him as a genius of historical range in

philosophy. Marx's emergence from the Hegelian school was different: Marx re-created and advanced Hegel. In our time Marxism is itself in dire need of recreation otherwise it may soon loose its steam.

The fifth mirror is the one I find to be of some special interest to me. It is the mirror of the **dim language participant**. This person is an expert like all the others. But some of the usages and subtleties in the expression of the main-stream dialogue offend rather than attract him. There are, of course, many reasons why this is so but we cannot know them all. One such reason may be that the participant is a Feminist and the domination of the dialogue with words and expressions indifferent to female gender fails to attract her. Of course, she understands that in most ways those words represent both genders. But even if so, she wonders, when was it ordained that only the terms of the male gender would be used. When Rousseau utters "Man is born free but everywhere he is in chains", this does refer to humanity as a whole. But why not begin with the expression "Woman is born free but everywhere she is in chains"? This would radically alter the project of Rousseau's Du Contrat Social and rightly so. For the problem Rousseau should have started with was the domination of woman not the liberation of the capitalists[5].

The holder of dim language mirror could be a person of different racial background. And the dialogue could be one in which the question of the place of his race is very important, although it is one of the nuances the dialogueans want to bracket and have succeeded to bracket. Yet, the issue remains clouded in the terminologies and names employed in the dialogues. The impression may be that his race has been innocent of the activities associated with philosophers. And so it appears harmless in the dialogue to utter such claims, as that Thales, was **the first philosopher** and the Greeks alone mysteriously invented it all. And the whole thing uncoils to the eventuality that logic and science are for a particular race just as emotion and mere feeling are of another race.

The holders of dim language mirror keeps dimming to the dialogueans that the table is not yet properly and fairly set for the dialogue. But the others fail to quite follow what his complaints really are

and they continue full lights with the dialogue.

What illustrate the meaning I attach to 'cultural fundamentals' in philosophy are what I have described above as the mirrors of the participants in a philosophical dialogue.

5. Philosophy As a Perspective

I admire the effort of professor Wiredu for employing great intellectual discipline and philosophic insight to discover the four cultural universals: science, logic, language and morality. Wiredu's is a personal discovery. But in practice the four universals are nothing new. They are the factors the West has employed to justify its colonization and domination of the world by denying that these four gifts are racially universal while allowing that they are to a given race universal.

The West through science (technology) and logic (its Western philosophy and scholarship in general), language (English, French and German) and Humanness (Christianity) was supposed to help ensure dialogue among humanity. But in reality the West took these symbols of cultural universals to be only for its own advantage. So, technology was used and still is being used to dominate the world and to suppress dialogues. Language has been used and is still used to place other cultures in the periphery of human civilisation. And Western Christianity identified itself with Humanness (Do to others what you would like them to do unto thee), but in most places Christianity succeeded mostly in paving and smoothing the way for colonialism and Racial APARTHEID. Both the Dutch Orthodox Church and Anglican Church, for example, had their presence in South Africa right from the early days of the Boer invasion of South Africa in the 17th century. They are still there but what dialogue have they been able to promote in that country?

In the ultimate sense philosophy is not a language analysis, not the exercise enjoyed in a logical dialogue, and not a special insight of the world reserved for some race or gender. Philosophy is a **perspective** of the whole or part of the whole human predicament and insightful

suggestion on how to get out or conform ... . This sort of perspective can be found in anybody (white, black, yellow, female or male). But in every community, there are always persons who specialize in offering or studying such perspectives (In traditional Africa this role was left to the Sages.). As a perspective philosophy is a direct product of an intuition.

In philosophy, different perspectives can have dialogue only if each of the promoters of one perspective appreciates and respects the seriousness of the perspective of a different person or group. But then we shall need to have a referee to conduct and judge the dialogues. So far that referee has been history, but many have been reading history wrongly or biassedly. They have read history to find a justification for their perspective and special position. That position can be of a conviction that one is a master or servant. History is the judge, but history is also often history of a given cognitive culture. Perhaps, if possible, one should use history to create a new history. Then and of course then, one can be confident of being judged fairly at the tables of dialogues.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, let me summarize as follows: What I have tried to do in this paper is to advance the horizon of Prof. Wiredu's thesis that there are cultural universals by arguing that **intuition** is among tha cultural universals. But despise the existence of cultural universals, the reality of cultural fundamentals hamper smooth philosophical dialogues.

I have also tried to impress on my reader that intuition is a fundamental factor in philosophical creativity. Indeed philosophy is here conceived as a perspective about nature and human condition postulated by intuition. Path finders in philosophy redirect the subject by creating new perspectives.

The way enhanced the chance for smooth dialogue in philosophy or in any human dialogue is for the participants to understand and be considerate of the relevant mirrows to the dialogues.

Notes

1. There are remarks and passages in works of persons like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche about the emotive nature and illogicality of women. In case of the blacks the texts are too many for anybody to doubt the claim I am making.

2. A paper read to a Symposium of the 18th World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton 21-27 August 1988. Also in this issue of Quest, to which my page-numbers refer.

3. John Rawls in a Theory of Justice (1971) postulates Rationalism and Egoism coupled with the 'Veil of Ignorance' as the factors behind the fact that persons in a State of Nature would agree to unite and form a Civil State. As egoists each one of them cares only for his own welfare, but as rationalists each realizes he cannot survive without the respect for the welfare of others.

4. Conversation with P. Mbuya Akoko and Oruka Ranginya in H. Odera Oruka, Sage-Philosophy (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).

5. Jean Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract was a bible of the pioneers of the French Revolution, one of the most dramatic historical events in the bourgeois revolution.

Résumé

Cette essai traite de questions concernant l'identité et la contradictoin par rapport au sexe, à la race, à l'ethnie et à la sexualité. On commence avec la contradiction F. Fanon et G. Lamming en illustration de la fertilité de l'identité ambivalente et on poursuit avec les origines historiques et culturelles de la formation puis de la desintégration d'un personalité consistante et cohérente.

L'argumentation explore les promesses et les dangers de la prise de conscience collective dans les mouvements de 20^{e} siècle, comme le mouvement anti-colonial, le nationalisme ethnique, la politique féministe et les anti-cultures sexuelles. Et, enfin, on trouve une analyse de contributions théoriques à la conceptualisation de l'identité collective et de la contradiction chez Marx, Gramsci et Foucault.

CULTURAL THEORY LOOKS AT IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION

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When I began writing I intended to focus on identity and contradiction in the context of gender[1]. But the argument quickly took on a life of its own and led me to questions of identity and contradiction in the contexts of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and race. And perhaps it would be an act of willful blindness to see identity in anything other than multiple terms. Our identities, after all, are hardly uniform. We simultaneously belong, in the deepest psychological, cultural and bodily sense, to genders, sexualities, races, ethnicities. Important theoretical insights on the self have been provided to us not only by studies of masculine and feminine, but also by studies of colonizer and colonized, occident and orient, the erotically conventional and the erotically iconoclastic. And at this moment we are reminded that if gender is a crucial aspect of identity it is hardly a singular one, by the violence with which ethnic nationalism has burst onto the global scene.

Feminist politics, the sexual counter-cultures, anti-colonial liberation movements, and the ethnic nationalisms of Armenia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan in many ways may be absolutely distinct, but in a few ways they suffer similar dilemmas of identity and contradiction. I intend to discuss these dilemmas here.

I should note that the substance of the argument will owe a debt to the cultural theorist Stuart Hall. I even toyed with the idea of mimicking for you Hall's oratorical style, a charming mixture of informality and theatricality. But then I realized that that simply wasn't me. Yet I must confess that part of what I want to do is to cast the same suspicious eye that Hall does on the self-certainty that "this is me and that isn't." I want to affirm the importance of identity at the same time that I question the impulse to pin oneself down, to fix on a cohe-

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1 Originally presented at the conference 'Feminism, Critical Theory and the Public Sphere' at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, June 1990.

rent notion of who one is, to mount a campaign on behalf of a whole, stable, well cemented identity, to denounce or deny any fragmentation, ambiguity, fluidity, exaggeration, or outright chaos in the self. I will call this fixing and pinning and cementing of the self the impulse to **self-certain identity.**

As a prelude to my critique of self-certain identity, let me offer two concrete illustrations of how fertile the **absence** of coherence in identity can be.

To view these illustrations, we will have to shift our sights back from the present moment to the great struggles against European colonial rule in the 1950's and early 1960's. Here we will find, first of all, Frantz Fanon, the famous theoretician of anti-colonial revolution. Fanon's person was marked by contradictions that were elaborate, fertile and rich, even while they were in part a product of a reductive, prohibitive and impoverishing form of social domination. Fanon was born in the French department of Martinique. He studied medicine in the colonial "mother country." In Algeria during the war against French colonial rule, he practiced psychiatry,that science of the unconscious that if it was preeminently Western, also had a dubious Western lineage, having been born out of the brain of a Moravian/Viennese Jew who, while adamantly enlightened and Western in his own eyes, suggested to the European Gentile something inescapably oriental and alien. Fanon was a Freudian, but he was also a Marxist, whose Marxism was an instance of what later in the century Edward Said would call "traveling theory." Originally a theory of class exploitation that was born in the 19th century European setting (but out of the brain of another dubious Westerner, this time a German Jew), Marxism in the 20th century shifted in its geographical focal point from Europe to Russia to the Third World. There nationalist revolutionaries reworked the theory to address the colonial situation, and thus gave to Marxism a transfigured content and a new historical role.

Martiniqueian, French speaking, a Freudian, Marxian, anti- colonial theorist and an active leader in the Algerian National Liberation Front, Fanon is exemplary for us through being a contradictory figure in himself. But he also makes important points about contradiction in his

writing. One point occurs in his discussion of Third World and in this case specifically African intellectuals, who had been educated in colonial schools, who had been culturally colonized much more deeply than their peasant and worker counterparts, and who, after being captured and then captivated by Western culture, turned radically against it. Upon their repudiation of Western culture, such intellectuals typically set out on a search for a pure, essential, eternal Africanness untouched and uncorrupted by colonial contact and constraint. Just as typically they claimed to find it in the native peasant population.

Fanon strongly condemns both the search and the discovery. He charges the anti-colonial intellectuals with reifying the collective identity of their people, with engaging in another variant of colonial exoticism, with denying their people the historicity and dynamism that can accrue only to those who are not chained to a set of predetermined characteristics. In his essay, "On National Culture," Fanon warns against fixing on the overly obvious, objective features of a people and becoming "hypnotized by these mummified fragments which because they are static are in fact symbols of negation and outworn contrivances..." (224)

He stresses that a national culture "is not a folklore..." (233). The **real** life of a people in the throes of de-colonization is "teeming and perpetually in motion." (224) Anti-colonial struggle precipitates a reorganization of people's intelligences. The truths of a nation are not in its distant, untouched past but in the "seething pot" (225) of its present reality. "It is not enough to try to get back to the people in the past out of which they have already emerged; rather we must join them in that fluctuating movement which they are just giving shape to, and which, as soon as it has started, will be the signal for everything to be called into question." (227) Thus Fanon counterpoises to the idea of a pre-colonial truth of African identity, the reality of dynamic contradiction in identity which the extraordinary times of decolonization provoke.

Fanon makes a second point of interest to us in his essay "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness." This time he looks at the effects of too emphatic and rigid a notion of national identity on the post-colon-

ial future. The collective identity so crucial to the struggle for colonial emancipation, he notes, can metamorphose almost overnight into a weapon of cultural domination. "Nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops short, falters, and dies away on the day independence is proclaimed... a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness." (203) If nationalism remains, after the end of colonialism, the dominant attitude, the country will quickly pass from nationalism to "ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism" (156). The Senegalese will demand the exodus of the Soudanese living in Senegal; old tribal and racial hatreds in existence before colonialism will "come to the surface" (159); "the object of hostile manifestations" will shift from the Europeans, the colonizers, to non-national Africans (156).

Fanon strongly intimates that there are serious limitations to any movement based on the assertion of "What we are" rather than on an elaboration of "What we must do." The movement that concerns itself solely with identifying the "we," that never takes the step, in Fanon's words, from national to social and political consciousness, will spend its energies imposing on the we's a static and circumscribed self-definition, and persecuting the non-we's on the basis of their simple being, which by definition they can do nothing about. In contrast, the movement that trains its attention on the question of "What we must do" opens the door to a dynamic and elastic notion of the we's. It also is able to extend an invitation to the non-we's: "If you agree with our general principles and projects, you can join us, or ally yourselves with us, or follow our lead in your own way. Your relation to us will be determined not by who you are but by what you believe in and how you are prepared to act." 5

Let us move from Fanon to a second complex figure, more aptly called post-colonial than anti-colonial, even though he writes at the same time and out of the same general situation as Fanon's. This figure is a West Indian novelist and essayist born in British-ruled Barbados but living in England, who is grappling not with the problem of revolution, but with the problem of audience.

In an essay entitled "The Occasion for Speaking" in his book THE PLEASURES OF EXILE, George Lamming examines the curious plight of West Indians who received an English education in colonial schools, who had cultivated there a love of English literature, and who consequently developed the ambition to become writers themselves. They sought to transform the novel, that Western literary form, to suit their unique purposes. They wrote in English (and English, Lamming reminds us, "is a West Indian language --with however different rhythms than the English spoken in England" [45]), but they used a prose style that was reflective of "the people's speech: the organic music of the earth." (45) And they wrote about characters who were West Indian rather than English, and peasant rather than bourgeois.

Now, all of the writers of whom Lamming speaks (and I should warn you that they are entirely male-- the next struggle to speak and be heard had in the early 1960's yet to be waged and won) -- all of these writers, independently of the others, chose to exile themselves from their native land in order to write about it. Moreover, they chose to exile themselves to the London metropolis, where the habitual weight of the colonial relation would be preserved and intensified. Lamming asks: Why?

In part, he answers, what drew the West Indian writer to England is the myth of England that that writer had absorbed from colonization. "This myth begins in the West Indian from the earliest stages of his education... It begins with the fact of England's supremacy in taste and judgement." (27) Lamming notes that the West Indian writer might have migrated to North America, where he would have discovered his ties to writers of the people like Melville, Whitman and Twain, had he not taken on the English attitude of looking down on the United States as a crass and uncultured place. But what also drew the West Indian writer into exile is the fact that the West Indian peasants about whom he writes, being illiterate, cannot read him, while the educated West Indian middle classes will not. Having themselves been culturally colonized, the West Indian middle classes look down on their own writers in the same way and for the same reason that those writers look down on the Americans, if with far more self-obliterating results. Thus, if the West

Indian writer is driven to the colonial metropolis by his absorption of the myth of English cultural superiority; he is driven from the place he was born to escape the weight of that same myth on a West Indian population that refuses recognition of him as a writer, by refusing to become his reading audience.

Lamming describes the West Indian writers who collected in England as "the product of a new situation -- new in the historic sense of time." He describes "this situation as one example of a new force in the modern world." (23) I think Lamming is alluding to a post-colonial situation which produces exactly the kind of geographical and cultural contradictions in identity he describes. I also think he shows us, in his own example and in the examples of the writers he writes about, that these contradictions can bear rich fruit even though their colonial origins were brutal and mean. 7

II.

I hope we can keep in mind the lessons about contradictions in identity that Lamming and Fanon have to teach, as we turn to consider the opposite notion of identity: the assertion of identity as something that is self-certain, coherent, and fixed.

Historically, the assertion of self-certain identity has come in two politically relevant forms. First, a coherent, clear-cut, cemented identity can be asserted on behalf of the individual self in distinction from and independent of all other selves. Exactly this assertion was made by 17th, 18th and 19th century Western philosophers, economists and reformers. The individual self was said to be rational: fully aware of its interests, able to calculate the most efficient means of achieving them, and disposed to act on behalf of those interests rather than against them. The self was said to be autonomous and self-determining: to be separate from other selves, entering into relations with them only of its own voluntary will; deciding for itself what it wanted, and how to get it, and acting as its decisions dictated. The self was said to know through reason the moral law obligating it, in its own self-interest, to

respect the autonomy of others, keep its promises and fulfill its contracts. Finally, this self was said to be able to fend for itself in the production and accumulation of goods, and thus to be responsible for its own material fate.

This image of the self-certain individual suffered a number of very hard blows in the 19th and early 20th century, at the hands of writers and thinkers on the one side and historical forces and events on the other. At the end of a long assault we find the idea of the self and perhaps even the self itself in a state of almost psychotic decomposition. What happened? First, Marxist theory and radical working-class practice revealed the self to be not separate from other selves, not independent and self-determining, but a member of a socio-economic class. To a large extent the self's desires, actions and material fate were a function of its class position. This class position, in turn, was a function of a material, social, and intellectual order that the individual did not choose but rather inherited -- an order made in the past that weighed heavily on the present. Individuals were shaped and constrained by the actions of previous generations which had been shaped and constrained in the same way.

A second blow to the idea of the self-certain individual came from psychologically attuned writers like Dostoevski and Freud, and anti-rationalist movements from surrealism to futurism to fascism. These figures and movements testified that the individual self did not act solely in a rational way. Instead, the self on the one hand was at the mercy of unconscious, irrational wishes and desires it neither understood nor controlled; and on the other was intentionally perverse, getting more pleasure, more often, by acting capriciously against its interests than by acting instrumentally for them. As Dostoevski puts it in his NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND: "Man may purposely, consciously, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very stupid, simply in order to **have the right** to desire for himself what is very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is rational." (26) "Shower upon him every earthly blessing, drown him in bliss so that nothing but bubbles would dance on the surface of his bliss, ... even then man, out of sheer ingratitude, sheer libel, would play you some

loathsome trick... he would deliberately desire the most fatal rubbish... simply to introduce into all this positive rationality his fatal fantastic element." (27)

A third blow came from writers like Kafka and Weber, and from practical shifts at the very heart of modernity, from relations of sociality and authority that were personal and face-to-face, to relations that were impersonal, anonymous and very often unfathomable. The village was supplanted in prominence by the metropolis, the father by the bureaucrat, the king by the abstract legal-political system, and God by a big question mark as to whether any authority governs the universe at all. Thus the self-certain individual in thought and practice gave way to the anxious, insecure individual --anxious and insecure because it could not easily tell what the rules of the social and cosmic order were or who made them, if anyone did.

Finally, a fourth blow was aimed by amoralists like Nietzsche and existentialists like Gide and Sartre. It was delivered by the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, the triumph of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, and the nuclear bombs detonated over Japan by the United States. This fourth blow produced not merely anxiety but cynicism and despair by shattering two beliefs that had supported the self-certain individual: the belief in an objective moral order in which the individual self fit and from which its life derived meaning; and the belief that history was a story with a happy, up- beat plot in which everything got better and better as it went along, so that the individual could rest easy in the thought that its actions automatically contributed to the advancement of humankind.

In short, by the mid 20th century, and as the result of sea-changes in both theory and practice, we find the identity of the individual self in a shell-shocked, disintegrated shape. But by this point a second impulse to self-certainty had gained prominence on the historical scene. This impulse came not on behalf of the individual self, but on behalf of the collective social group to which the individual was seen to belong and from which it was seen to derive its specific identity. Simultaneous with the fall of the liberal illusion that the individual self makes itself by itself, entirely knows itself, and stands by itself against all other

selves came the rise of the recognition that the self is formed inside a set of social relations, with conscious and unconsious group affinities and allegiances, and is what it is to a large extent because of an identity it shares with others.

An impulse to collective self-certainty became prominent in the second and third quarter of the 20th century, but this is not to say that the idea and experience had never appeared before. The idea had crystallized in 18th and 19th century Western political philosophy, challenging individual self-certainty but never managing to triumph over it. Thus, for example, we find Burke's notion of the individual as an organic part of an inherited community stretching from the past through the present to the future; and Hegel's notion of a national spirit uniting the objective laws and norms of a state and the subjective consciousness of individual citizens into a rational whole. The **experience** was alive in the 18th and 19th centuries in the form of traditional ethnic and regional affinities, radical working-class political movements, and republican nationalism instigated by the French and American revolutions. However, each of these experiences of collective identity--ethnic, radical working class, and republican -- differed from the forms that emerged in the 20th century.

The traditional ethnic and regional affinities, first of all, had roots in a pre-modern past, before social and economic forces had disrupted parochial, settled ways of life and spurred large-scale migrations of ideas, wealth, power and populations across vast geographical areas. In contrast, it was as a consequence of these migrations that the distinctively 20th century forms of collective identity arose. Third World liberation movements were forged in the crucible of colonialism, against colonialism. Feminist movements were forged in the clash between the modern ideal of the independent individual and traditional notions of male domination and female subordination. Lesbian and gay counter-cultures were forged outside the sexual pale, in the anonymity of the modern city, against the backdrop of declining familial control over marriage and reproduction, and growing psychiatric, educational and state welfare control over erotic desire.

Second, like ethnic and regional identities, the 18th and 19th

century radical working-class had traditional elements to it. Artisans and rural laborers only recently turned proletariat, with pre-capitalist notions of community and work still fresh in their minds, were resistant in their very being to the new capitalist regime. But the unique mark of the 19th century radical working- class was that its collective identity was purposely designed to self-destruct. Radical workers united not merely to overturn the capitalist system but to destroy all class identities, including their own, and to usher into being a classless society. In contrast, 20th century identity movements in the main have sought to transform, liberate, valorize and preserve identities that have been subordinated or suppressed, not to destroy those identities altogether. Anti-colonial movements have sought to demolish the colonized consciousness, but to liberate and celebrate Third World peoples. Feminist movements have sought to demolish the femininized psyche, but to liberate and celebrate women. Sexual counter-cultures have sought to demolish closeted erotic desire, but to liberate and celebrate lesbians and gays.

Third and finally, republican nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries asserted the unity of all people living within the same geographical bounds, consenting to the same political principles, and obedient to the same laws. This notion of a modern nation differed from ethnic nationalism through not being based on the blood group of a particular ethnicity or race. It differed from radical working- class movements through not being based on one particular class against the others. It also differed fundamentally from 20th century identity movements. On the one hand, republican nationalism asserted the principle of the sameness of all citizens, while Third World nationalism, feminism and the sexual counter-cultures asserted the key importance of difference. On the other hand, republican nationalism did not consistently turn its principle of individual equality into practice: it made deep political and social distinctions among different races, ethnicities (especially those of different religions), sexes, and sexualities. It was to oppose the tyrannical force of those distinctions that the 20th century identity movements coalesced and rebelled.

III.

What should we make of the impulse towards collective identity in the contemporary age? This question has been an urgent one ever since the rise of collectivist social and political movements: of socialism on the left and fascism on the right; of Third World liberation movements, feminism and the sexual counter-cultures. It has been an urgent one ever since the attack on collective identity by capitalist hyper-individualism in Western states and especially in the United States; and the manipulation of collective identity to support capitalist growth in Asian states and especially in Japan. It is a newly urgent question at this precise moment, with the surfacing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of ethnic and regional antagonisms long suppressed but evidently never destroyed under communist rule; and with the resilience in Asia and Africa of tribal, ethnic and religious divisions that tear at the fabric of post-colonial national regimes.

Obviously, the answer to the question of whether collective identity is a good thing or a bad thing must be couched in properly complex terms. It seems to me that, for a start, we must applaud all assertions of collective identity for their recognition that people are who they are in large part through being members of social groups. Collective self-certainty allows me to say, for example, that I am who I am in part through being a woman or a Jew. It allows me to acknowledge that doors to particular situations and experiences are opened to me and other doors slammed shut sometimes **by** women or Jews, and sometimes **for** women or Jews by the larger society of which these groups are subordinate parts.

At the same time, collective self-certainty has a variety of dangers attached to it, and we need to be quite clear as to what these dangers are. The most obvious is a danger the self-certain group poses for others outside it, above all when the identities of insider and outsider are, despite appearances, intimately intertwined, as they are, for example, in the case of masculinity and femininity. The degree of danger very much depends on whether the self-certain group occupies, with

respect to outsiders, a position of relative power or powerlessness. To get a sense of the difference to collective self-certainty that power and powerlessness can make, imagine a woman who recognizes her identity with all other women and declares "I am a woman on the side of all women," the tacit and often explicit phrase following being "in distinction from and over against men." I think many of us would be pleased by this declaration, coming as it does from a subordinate inside a system of masculine/feminine who must realize her identity with other subordinates if she ever hopes to overturn the system as a whole. But we would not be pleased to imagine the figure in reverse: a man who recognizes his identity with other men and proclaims himself a man "on the side of all men against women." This proclamation of collective identity is precisely what helps perpetuate domination and subordination along sex/gender lines.

To take a more complicated case, imagine the Jew from the age of the Enlightenment to the mid 20th century, in the context of growing European anti-semitism, who declares: "I am a Jew in solidarity with other Jews in distinction from and over against Christians." This declaration acquires increasing significance as the modern age wears on, until in the first forty-five years of the 20th century, it becomes an absolutely courageous and often fatal self-assertion. We cannot help but stand in admiration of Jews who said this, there and then. But what do we think of the Jew who declares "I am a Jew in solidarity with all Jews" during the next forty-five years of the 20th century, in the different geographical context of the Middle East, when the statement is followed by the phrase "in distinction from and over against Arabs," or, more appropriately (for many Jews are also Arabs) "in distinction from and against Arab Muslims"? Jewish self-certainty acquires a different significance when Jews move from a subordinate to an equal or dominant position in the constellation of power relations. Jewish identity changes as well. In such a change we catch a glimpse of the instability that will turn out to be an integral part of all identity. We see the historical nature of identity, as well as the way certain once visible and palpable aspects of identity become, through history, masked, buried, obscured. Not long ago, the phrase "the Jew" conjured up in

the European imagination, with effects on the imagination of Jews living in Europe, an oriental, semitic, and alien figure, geographically inside but culturally outside the West. In our period, "the Jew" more and more strongly conjures up an occidental, European figure geographically inside but culturally outside the Middle East. As Ella Shobat shows us in her essay "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims," this shift in the identity of the Jew, for Jews and for others, from the notion of the oriental Jew over against European Christians to the occidental Jew over against Middle Eastern Arabs, suppresses two facets of Jewish identity at once: the identity of the cultural outsider inside the West that the Jew had for the West for so many years; and the identity of the whole multitude of Arabic Jews-- that is, of Jews who had lived for centuries geographically inside Arabic countries, and who had shared a cultural identity with Arabic Muslims in many important ways.

If the first danger of collective self-certainty is the arrogant tyranny that a self-certain group can exercise over others, a second danger is the stultifying tyranny that a self-certain group can exercise over itself. It is only meaningful to say that I am a woman or a Jew if I can go on to say what being a woman or a Jew means, and there is always the great temptation to pin that meaning down in terms of a set of stable, coherent, fixed characteristics more rigid than actual life is, and then to impose those rigidities on life. Of course, this is a danger that a dominant group presents to subordinates, by forcing them to conform to some fixed and rigid idea on the part of the dominants of what those subordinates are like. But the self-certain group can also present this danger to itself, by imposing a fixed and rigid idea of itself on itself.

In traditional groups, the imposition of a fixed idea on the self is habitual, an extension of what has been done before, understood as a part of an inherited, objective, true order of things. The imposition takes the form of a factual statement uttered, in the following example from Lila Abu-Lughod's VEILED SENTIMENTS, by both male and female members of a traditional group: "Our men, if they are honorable, do not show any dependence on women; our women, if they are honorable,

lower their eyes in front of men on whom they are dependent." In radical groups, the imposition of a fixed idea on the self occurs as a rupture with habit, a self-conscious breaking away from an inherited and entrenched order of things, an attempt to replace the old with something entirely new. For example, the women in a radical women's culture will say: "In the old order, women were forced to submit to men and to subsist in a male culture that was aggressive, violent, anti-nature; in women's culture, women will enjoy equal, cooperative, peaceful relations with other women and the earth." This statement signals at once an emancipatory move with respect to the old order and, let's face it, a censorious move with respect to the new. Women will be permitted, in women's culture, to be egalitarian, cooperative, peaceful, women-centered; they will be prohibited from exhibiting the will to power or frequenting the company of men. To be sure, the self-conscious creation of any culture always will involve permissions and prohibitions of certain kinds. The directive dimension of building a culture is unavoidable. But this is not to say that it is not also dangerous, and the danger mounts when direction becomes command, and command disguises itself in the form of a fact (just as the old order disguised its commands in factual form): "Women will be egalitarian, cooperative and peaceful because they must be, and they must be because they are--that is their true nature."

The direction in the form of a command in the form of a fact today goes by the term "essentialism." Essentialism inevitably masks real ambiguities and fluidities in the collective group. And indeed, each of the self-certain collective identities of the 20th century has masked identities intimately connected to it that are less than fully clear-cut. The variety of Third World nationalism that asserts not merely the historical and political but the spiritual and essential identity of colonized and formerly colonized peoples against the imperial West, masks a number of ambiguous and fluid identities. It masks the phenomenon of diaspora populations rooted ethnically and historically in one Third World country and geographically located in another, living in tense, often highly strained relations with the indigenous population: the Indians in East Africa, the Arabs in West Africa, the Chinese in South-

east Asia. It masks what Stuart Hall calls the "new ethnicities": immigrant populations from formerly colonized countries who now live in the former imperial "motherland", who are both British and West Indian, from Brixton, England **and** Kingston, Jamaica, with all the attendant complications of self. It masks what Edward Said and Gyatri Spivak might suggest we call "post-colonial intellectuals": the growing numbers of people, of whom Said and Spivak are two, from colonized and formerly colonized countries, who now move back and forth across the globe: people of a similar cosmopolitan, multi-cultural, post- colonial sensibility if of different national origins, ethnic backgrounds and political allegiances.

In turn, the variety of feminism which asserts the essential unity of all women against men, and the cooperative, nurturant, egalitarian essence of woman, obscures the identities of women whose tastes and proclivities conform no more to the feminist than to the patriarchal rule: women, for example, who are sharp-edged or positively cruel rather than nurturant and kind, or who enjoy sex dissociated from love, or who engage in abstract theorizing rather than concrete narrating. That feminism obscures the identities of men who are not firmly or centrally masculinist: men who are physiologically male but who do not glory in masculine power, who out of what is called a feminine sensibility prefer the company of women and are loyal to women over men. Finally, that feminism obscures the identities of other feminists who are not monolithically women- centered or women-identified, through being also identified with certain women and men against others along the axes of race and class. As for the sexual counter-cultures: while they often are highly tolerant and expansive, they also can be repressive, outlawing a host of erotic tastes as politically incorrect, and obscuring erotic identities more variegated and unfixed than can be captured by the terms "heterosexual," "lesbian," and "gay."

The last danger of collective identity I want to note tonight very well may be unique to subordinate groups in the contemporary United States. Members of such groups have shown a peculiar tendency to narrow their collective identity through increasingly minute specifications. First, one identifies as, say, a lesbian; then, as an Asian-American

lesbian; a little later, as an Asian-American lesbian vegetarian ... well, I think you get the picture. The result of this attempt to define who it is that one is in more and more minutely qualified terms, is not only that one more and more rigidly attempts to define and stabilize oneself, but also that the social group to which one is affixed becomes smaller and smaller, until collective self-certainty turns back into that solitary point at which one identifies only with that single person who has the exact characteristics of oneself. If I had to guess at the reason for this shrinking back up of collective identity into individual identity, I would say it occurs as the wrong solution to inevitable contradictions in identity. One inevitably will be with some groups on some issues and against them on others: one inevitably will be allied with some meat-eaters and some vegetarians against other meat- eaters and other vegetarians on questions of sexual desire, while being allied with all vegetarians against all meat-eaters on the question of what one ought and ought not to cook for dinner. It is when one cannot tolerate that contradiction that one refuses to identify oneself with anyone with whom one disagrees on anything. That's when one says: "I am a lesbian vegetarian who will have nothing to do with heterosexuals and nothing to do with meat-eaters." This declaration clearly is meant to rule not only one's relations with others but also one's relations with oneself: "I refuse to myself even the briefest heterosexual or meat-eating adventure."

In short, the discovery of collective identity is always a step forward vis a vis a self-certainty that is sheerly individual. It is the recognition that the individual originally is formed inside social groups. It is the recognition that individual independence never is something one begins with but rather is something achieved or won through a struggle to free oneself from particular group dictates and obligations, and hence it is always an independence-in- relation to a group. At the same time, the celebration of collective self-certainty is not so absolutely a step forward. We can feel little delight in the self-certainty of a group that stands in a dominant position over against some other group -- the collective self-certainty of men against women, Christians against Jews, Jews against Palestinians -- because that self-certainty plays a key part in legitimating and perpetuating that domination. We

can feel some delight in the self-certainty of subordinated groups, at the very least because the political struggle against subordination requires the solidarity of the oppressed. The necessity of this solidarity makes the declaration of collective identity by subordinates a key moment in the history of power relations. By the cries -- "I am a black" over against whites; "I am a woman" over against men; "I am a member of the Third World" over against the imperial West; "I am a lesbian" over against heterosexuals -- social groups begin the great project of transforming what had been the ground for their oppression into the ground for their emancipation. Still, there is something even in the self-certainty of subordinated groups that should make us uneasy. After all, such self-certainty can lead, if the subordinate group one day becomes dominant, to a tyranny over others. Self- certainty can lead, by freezing what was a shifting and fluid group identity into a fixed and rigid one, to a tyranny over the self. Finally, self-certainty can lead, through an increasingly narrow specification of the collective, back towards the lonely solipsism of individual self-certainty once again.

IV.

The collective identities I've touched on here all have attempted, in one context or another, to put their stamp on a whole way of life or to resist the stamp of another collective group. While such attempts are fundamentally political, it would be a category mistake to see them as belonging to a "public" as opposed to "private" sphere. As any feminist, post-colonial critic, or cultural theorist would argue, the public/private distinction misfires as a mechanism for dividing off a realm where power operates from a realm where it does not. On the one hand that distinction romanticizes power in the public sphere as representing the will of all or enhancing the good of all; on the other hand it suppresses the power that originates outside citizen/state relations.

The classic critique of the public/private distinction as a mystification of power is Karl Marx's "On the Jewish Question." Marx asserts

there that the communal, egalitarian, and free relations among citizens in modern political society constitute an abstract, "heavenly" sphere on earth that contradicts and obscures the concrete, everyday world of civil society. Marx investigates the relations in civil society of economic class, in which individuals are pitted against one another by a competitive pursuit of egotistic interest; where property difference flourishes, supported by a political society that protects private property rights; and where social domination prevails. It does not require a great imaginative leap to stretch Marx's argument over the relations of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and race. Here too we can argue that a heavenly political sphere of community, equality and freedom contradicts the mundane world of gender, sexual, ethnic and racial difference, whenever that difference is not a benign pluralism but is bound up with power and subjection.

It is important to note that Marx's analysis cannot be extended to cover the relationship of colonizer to colonized. In the colonial world, the political principles of community, equality and freedom do not apply even as abstractions. Indeed, the state's brutalization of the colonized in the absence of equal political rights shows us how crucial even as abstractions those rights turn out to be. Of course, the colonizer enjoys political rights himself as the gift of his mother country, which he surely will glorify as he does all such gifts from home. But as Albert Memmi warns us, the colonizer will lean away from liberalism and towards fascism whenever the situation requires a choice between the two. In any case the colonizer has no intention of according citizens' rights to the colonized. Thus political life in the colonial world has no heavenly aspect at all, but consists in the colonized's being the object of the colonizer's administration, discipline, and force, or, alternatively, in the colonized's becoming the subject of revolutionary struggle against the colonial regime.

Even with respect to gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and race when it is disentangled from colonial power, Marx's analysis in "On the Jewish Question" is not quite tailor-made to suit. Most obviously, while it demystifies the public/private distinction and exposes social relations of domination underneath, it does not offer categories for capturing the

fusion of power and collective identity that go beyond the purely economic. Its most controversial shortcoming these days, however, has to do with its intimated social ideal. Marx's fundamental premise is that class difference is rooted in exploitation. It follows logically that the absorption of abstract community, equality and freedom into concrete, everyday life requires the dissolution of difference in the economic sense. It is much less straightforward that human emancipation requires the subversion of difference when it comes to gender, sexuality, ethnicity and race.

The questions that "On the Jewish Question" does not resolve thus are above all these two: What non-economic categories can help capture the fusion of power and collective identity? And, how do human emancipation and non-economic collective difference intersect?

For contemporary cultural-political theory, one bright illumination of power and identity comes from Antonio Gramsci's concepts of "hegemony" and "counter-hegemony," and his distinction of political society and civil society as the two spheres in which the dominance of a fundamental social group is won. If Gramsci's notion of political society pinpoints power as a "negative educator" that enforces behavioral conformity to a social order through prohibition and punishment (so much for political society as a heavenly sphere), his notion of civil society pinpoints power as a "positive educator" that produces consent to that order through cultural pressures on desire, intention, and belief. Such cultural pressures are exerted by schools, churches, the media; also, as Said adds, by institutes for study, research, and high cultural production; also, as Raymond Williams emphasizes, by the habitual living out of everyday life. These pressures include the overweening social force of specific linguistic classifications (and in the case of colonialism, the superimposition of one entire language over another), specific commonsense beliefs, specific philosophical principles, specific norms of bodily cultivation and gesture, specific rules of social conduct. The category of consent covers the whole spectrum of acclimatizations to the given scheme of things on both the master's and the slave's parts, if I can use the terms "master" and "slave" in their metaphorical sense: from unreflective thought and action to fatalistic resignation to enthusiastic

affirmation. As all cultural theorists will tell us, hegemonic power is never totalistic: there are always desires, ideas and actions beyond its reach. But this does not mean that any sphere of life can be sealed off from its operations.

The second bright illumination of the fusion of power and identity is Michel Foucault's distinction of normalizing and juridical power, and his insistence that power and resistance are active at the local and molecular level. Like cultural hegemonic power, normalizing power functions through the positive production of desire, intention, belief and action, although Foucault goes much further than Gramsci when he claims that power produces identities suitable for its own interventions. Unlike cultural hegemonic power, at least as Gramsci understands it, normalizing power cuts across the division between political and civil society. Finally, and unnervingly, normalizing power cuts across the line between hegemony and counter-hegemony, so that oppositional movements can become agents of its operations.

Foucault's account of the multiple discursive practices in which identity effects of normalization are produced, as well as his emphasis on the local and molecular operations of power and resistance, when combined with Gramsci's notion of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic power, and his insistence on the stature of fundamental social groups, makes for a potent theoretical mix. A good dose of this mix can keep the critical theorist from straying too far in one direction towards conceiving of power as monolithic, top-down, and orchestrated from a single center; or too far in the other direction towards conceiving of power as something so fragmentary and diffuse that it no longer is possible to speak of grand axes of power at all.

How, finally, do non-class collective differences and human emancipation intersect? Should one pin one's hopes on a future in which collective differences in society happily coexist, uncorrupted by power, while in a public sphere individuals meet as equals to engage in undistorted communication?

A quick glance at contemporary counter-hegemonic cultures, or what some feminists call "counter-publics," should be enough to convince one of this ideal's naivete. However fiercely such counter-publics

have championed difference against established forms of domination, they invariably show a new impulse to self-certainty, a new dictation of identity, a new articulation of a way of life with its own pressures and limits effective across public and private bounds. Every positive counter-hegemonic effort, that is, reduces the possibilities for desire, intention and action to a relatively narrow range.

If every new positive order is a limitation of possibility, one should be wary of calling any order emancipatory in an absolute sense. I say this without meaning to intimate with Foucault that freedom lies purely in the act of negation. I do mean to intimate that the emancipatory moment is preserved only in the tension between collective self-certainty and its antidote -- contradiction, multiplication, fragmentation.

The dialectic of self-certainty and contradiction on the plane of collective identity, which on the intellectual plane is the dialectic of systematic theory and deconstruction, becomes on the political plane the dialectic of order and disorder. Key to this dialectic is the forcing into public view of identities that hegemony and counter- hegemony suppress. If the terms "public" and "private" have two truly significant senses -- the first suggesting the difference between the home and the world, the circle of intimates and the universe of strangers; the second suggesting the difference between what is hidden away and what is open to view -- we can explain the point of bringing transgressive identities out of private places and into public light in the following way. The point is not to enable individuals to have a rational public discussion about which identities to cultivate and which to stamp out. It is not to provide an item for collective consensus. It is not a eductive and universalizing move. It is rather a move to increase and complicate, to pry open the popular imagination, to splinter self-certain ideas of the self, to overwhelm a fixed cast of characters with all sorts of unnecessary extras.

The injection of chaos into order, whether it occurs theoretically, artistically, or practically, corrects the second flaw in the ideal of rational, undistorted communication. This flaw is the ideal's supreme monotony and boredom. For surely public and private life would become

a deadly dry thing, if it were sapped of all opacity, tension, confusion, exaggeration, misunderstanding, even self-deception and deceit.

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SUMMARY

This article investigates the historical roots of the concept 'ideology' and the (in the French language) related concepts 'idéologue' and 'idéologiste'. The emergence of these concepts is related to the progressive French enlightenment intellectuals around 1800, e.g. Antoine Destutt de Tracy and Cabanais, the 'industrialists of ideas'.

The article further traces the origins of the pregorative connotation of the concept of ideology and the development of the term in history. Unsatisfactory elements involved in the concept - in relation to Hegel and Marx especially - are highlighted.

The author aims at revitalising the concept of ideology.

DE L'IDÉOLOGIE COMME CORRELAT DES TERMES IDÉOLOGISTE ET IDÉOLOGUE

Buenzey Maluenga Zolua

> "Napoléon, ce n'etait pas un homme pour les paysans mais un programme. C'est avec des drapeaux et son de la musique qu'ils allèrent aux urnes (...)."
>
> K. Marx (1964, p.16)

> "La dialectique enseigne au contraire qu'il n'y a d'unité et de division connaissables que dans la lutte."
>
> J. Rancière (1974, p.256)

> "(...) nous entreprîmes (...) à dégager l'antagonisme entre notre manière de voir (il s'agissait de la conception matérialiste de l'histoire élaborés surtout par Marx) et la conception idéologique de la philosophie allemande."
>
> F. Engels (1960, p.210)

Comme le titre l'indique bien nous nous preposons d'établir le rapport dialectique entre les termes idéologiste et idéologue à partir de leur noyau théorique qu'est le terme idéologie. C'est, en clair, une façon pour nous de sonder les racines à la fois théoriques et historiques du terme idéologie. Il s'agit donc de retracer, de manière peut-être peu exhaustive, son historique en mettant à profit notre expérience critique.

De ce qui précède, il va sans dire que nous nous donnons ainsi pour tâche da déceler comment ce terme est venu à l'existence. Par ailleurs nous essayerons d'interroger le terme idéologie lui-même. Et la voie théorique la mieux indiquée est de faire appel à une explication d'ordre étymologique après avoir déterminé les conditions historique de

son apparition.

En plus, nous esquisserons le projet théorique voire pratique qui a motivé les industriels des idées[1] à créer cette tendence philosophique connue aujourd'hui sous le terme idéologie. C'est pour nous aussi l'occasion de stigmatiser -partant des conditions théorico-historiques de leur apparition- l'origine des termes idéologiste et idéologue d'une part et de parler davantage de la connotation péjorative dont on a nimbé successivement les termes idéologie et idéologue d'autre part. Cette dernière tendance, faut-il l'avouer, dont notre temps reste encore victime.

Pour peu qu'on le dise cette étude revêt des allures par trop classiques. Mais à notre avis elle permet de reculer les ombres théoriques dans lesquelles trop souvent nous nous trouvons lorsqu'il s'agit d'utiliser les catégories théoriques qui font l'objet de présentes réflexions.

DU SURGISSEMENT D'UNE TERME.

D'une manière générale le mot 'idéologie' fait son apparition, pour la première fois en France, à la charnière des 18e et 19e siècles. Son emploi usuel était destiné à caractériser une école française de philosophie [Widmer (1981, p.11)]. C'est pourquoi du point de vue philosophique "l'idéologie", écrit Quillet, "est la bannière sous laquelle se reconnaissent un certain nombre de penseurs qui, à l'époque de la Révolution et de l'Empire, maintiennent et enrichissent l'héritage du siècle des Lumières." [Mortier (1969, p.3397)]

Parmi de nombreux théoriciens de l'idéologie, il faudrait retenir Cabanis qui publia en 1802 un ouvrage intitulé Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme et particulièrement Antoine Destutt de Tracy qui, selon Quillet, utilise pour la première fois le terme 'idéologie' en 1796 dans Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, et lui consacre un traité intitulé Eléments d'idéologie en 1803.

Ces intellectuels sont des républicains d'Ancien Régime (la royauté) et précisément des philosophes de la célèbre révolution française de 1789. Philosophes et "matérialistes assurés, partisans du nouveau pou-

voir, ils n'ont pas hésité", écrit A. Gabel, "à assumer de fortes responsabilités (...)."[Encyclopédia Universalis (1980, p.721)]. Ainsi donc, des figures tels que Condorcet, Lakanal, Laplace, Lamark, Sièyes n'ont pas amnqué d'influencer, **mieux** de contribuer **à l'élaboration de la déclaration des droits** de l'homme; cela se justifie bien dans la mesure où "à la convention c'est-à-dire à la nouvelle assemblée populaire qui, lors du soulèvement, décréta l'abolition de la royauté et proclama la première République française, ces 'idéologues' appartenaient soit au groupe des Girondins, soit à celui des Montagnards." [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, pp. 413-414)]. Ces derniers groupes, pense Lokadi, représentaient probablement soit la gauche soit l'extrême gauche.

Bien plus, sous le régime napoléonien, on rencontre au tribunat certains de ces philosophes à savoir M.J. Chénier, Danou, Laromignière, etc., et enfin au Sénat conservateur (napoléonien) Destutt de Tracy, Volney et Cabanis; auprès d'eux se joindront plus tard Benjamin Constant, Broussais et Ampère.

De ce qui précède, il va sans dire que l'harmonie entre ces jeunes intellectuels et Napoléon Bonaparte ne demeurera pas éternelle. En effet parmi de nombreux événement qui contribuèrent à la briser, le plus saillant est "la mise en application par celui-ci (Bonaparte) de la deuxième, puis de la troisième constitution, qui firent de lui respectivement Consul à vie puis Empereur." [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, p.414)]. C'est donc dans ce sens que les industriels des idées s'opposèrent radicalement au Premier Consul qui, pour parer au plus urgent, supprima brusquement le berceau de l'idéologie marqué par un esprit progressiste, mieux négateur et contestataire de l'ordre établi.

DE L'ÉTYMOLOGIE.

Le problème de la définition des concepts est capital pout toute discipline scientifique. Aujourd'hui, mieux qu'hier, l'aspect polysémique du terme idéologie nouis entraîne dans une néfaste confusion sémantique.

De plus le concept étant infiniment politisé, une entreprise à recenser les définitions attribuées à l'idéologie aboutira, peut-être, à

des centaines de définitions divergentes, mieux contradictoires.

Le terme est soit pris dans une acception sociofonctionnelle en tant que ciment des relations intersubjectives des consciences individuelles; soit dans une acception purement idéaliste et métaphysique en tant que projection imaginaire et spéculaire de la réalité pour en donner une interprétation; soit encore comme une représentation à l'objectivité en tant que justification et arôme spirituel à caractère de classe; soit enfin dans une acception purement épistémologique en tant qu'erreur ou non connaissance. "Selon l'acception actuellement courante l'idéologie", écrit Châtelet, "est un fourre-tout où l'on entasse pêle-mêle toutes les erreurs et toutes les sottises, c'est-à-dire les idées de l'adversaire." [Chatelet (1978, p.10)].

Eu égard à ce qui précède, mieux à cette confusion, l'intelligence postule l'étymologie du terme qui nous dit que l'idéologie (est du mot grec ἰδέα, idée, λόγος, traité) signifie étude des idées et de leur origine. Et par là l'idéologie désignerait une partie de la philosophie qui étudie les idées prises en elles-mêmes comme purs phénomènes de l'esprit humain. Cependant Quillet précise à ce sujet que "(...) les philosophes qui l'ont créé et mis pour un instant à la mode, à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, comprenaient sous cette dénomination la philosophie toute entière, c'est-à-dire la métaphysique, la logique, la morale et même les sciences qui s'en déduisent directement, comme la politique, l'économie politique et la législation." [Mortier (1953, p.2860)]

En effet, si vers la fin du 18e siècle la philosophie tout entière se réduisait à l'idéologie avec la subdivision cidessus, il faut préciser qu'actuellement figure aussi la théorie de la connaissance à côté de la logique, la morale et de la métaphysique dans la subdivision ordinaire de la philosophie. En outre les sciences à savoir la politique, l'économie politique et la législation qui étaient considérées comme des sciences de la morale du fait qu'elles se déduisaient directement de celle-ci, se sont établies aujourd'hui en sciences sociales. Et ce faisant, bien des gens ignorent leur source morale.

Cependant un demi-siècle plus tard le terme idéologie sera repris par Marx et Engels dans l'Idéologie Allemande (1845). Reprise certes, mais reprise sans référence à l'acception des philosophes qui l'ont créé

et mis à la mode. Le terme est employé "pour désigner", écrit Quillet, "les représentations mystifiées et mystifiantes que les hommes élaborent spontanément pour rendre compte des conditions de leur vie réelle" [Mortier (1969, p.3397)]. C'est ce que soulignera Paulin J. Hountondji dans une communication au séminaire international sur la philosophie africaine tenu à Addis-Abéba en 1976 "(...) ce livre de plus de 600 pages (sic!)",dit-il, "est d'un bout à l'autre une déclaration de rupture où Marx et Engels donnent un congé brutal et définitif à ce qu'ils appellent dédaigneusement 'idéologie'" [Hountondji (1976)]. Cette acception marxienne vaut aussi pour la philosophie comprise comme une idéologie. Il suffit de pensar respectivement aux Thèses sur Feuerbach et à l'Idéologie Allemande, à la seule différence de l'idéologie le terme philosophie, selon Hountondji, sera "finalement réhabilité et méthodiquement mis en ouvre dans des ouvrages ultérieurs." [Hountondji (1976)].

Ces représentations mystifiées qui ne sont autre chose que des représentations du monde du point de vue de la superstructure, c'est-à-dire la juridiction, la politique, la religion, etc., rendent les hommes accessibles à la conscience de leurs conditions d'existence dont l'instance dernière, mieux déterminante du paquet infrastructurel sont les conditions économiques.

En effet il convient de souligner que la conscience ne signifie pas la science. Voilà pourquoi dans la perspective marxienne "au contraire de la science, et malgré ses intentions explicites", écrit Quillet, "une idéologie ne vise pas à la connaissance, mais à l'efficacité historique" [Mortier (1969, p.3397)].

Cette perspective marxienne aura influencé la pensée contemporaine qui s'efforce particulièrement à élaborer voire à analyser la notion d'idéologie. A ce sujet Sylvain Auroux et Yvonne Weil retiendront deux tentatives: Celles de Karl Mannheim et de Louis Althusser [Auroux (1975, p.124)].

DU PROJET IDÉOLOGISTE

Les idéologistes (ou les industriels de idées) de cette nouvelle école connue d'ordinaire sous le nom d'idéologie, se sont montrés d'une part plein de courage sous le terreur du premier consul, et d'autre part très français par le goût des idées générales, l'esprit d'analyse et la passion dont ils témoignaient dans l'application de nouvelles méthodes. Ainsi donc "ils estimaient enfin", écrit A. Gabel, "qu'ils n'avaient aucune leçon à recevoir de l'étranger, surtout pas de cette Allemagne où sévissait l'obscur Kantisme" [Encyclopédia Universalis (1980, p.721)].

C'est ainsi donc que l'introduction d'un nouvel esprit scientifique dans la pratique théorique et philosophique de leur époque fut un projet de premier ordre. Ce nouvel esprit scientifiques se fondait sur une problématique anti-métaphysique, voire anti-spéculative, pour une problématique féconde. Ce faisant, on peut la caractériser par la décision de remplacer la méthaphysique et la philosophie, mots certes surannés, par l'idéologie dont l'analyse régressive vise à saisir l'origine et les modes de composition des idées.

C'est autant dire que la nouvelle problématique des idéologistes se veut nettement empiriste. A ce propos, ils se présentent comme les héritiers immédiats de l'Abbé de Condillac de l'Académie française dont la problématique empiriste et l'oeuvre philosophique furent influencées par celle philosophe anglais John Locke [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, p.410)].

Condillac, selon les idéologistes, avait donné des bases inébranlables aux fondements de la philosophie. Ainsi ils cherchent à enrichir l'héritage de Condillac dont le projet était celui de donner un statut scientifique à la métaphysique. Voilà pourquoi ils se donnerent pour tâche l'étude des idées afin d'en obtenir des résultats brillants, voire des vérités et connaissances positives. Tâche certes que la méthaphysique serait incapable de réaliser par manque de fondement solide.

Ainsi, eu égard aux succès remportés dans les sciences dites expérimentales, cette école se proposait d'appliquer à la science des idées outre les procédés d'observation, l'analyse qui procède de la décomposi-

tion d'une donnée complexe en ses éléments originaires.

C'est grâce à ces procédés méthodologiques que les sciences de la nature -par "les travaux de Galilée, Descartes, Newton, Linné, Lavoisier, Buffon, D'Alembert" [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, p.409)]- Connurent un essor prodigieux. En effet cet essor contribua largement écrit Lokadi "à surévaleur l'empirisme comme méthode et comme philosophie des sciences, en mettant clairement en évidence la détermination en dernière instance de la pratique sur la théorie, de l'empirisme sur le rationalisme" [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, p.410)].

Ce faisant, pour Condillac, l'analyse avait démontré que toutes nos idées, tous nos sentiments et toutes nos facultés peuvent nous livrer le secret de leur genèse qui n'est rien d'autre que la sensation. Dès lors les industriels ou théoriciens des idées n'avaient qu'à continuer le projet et la méthode du maître.

C'est ainsi que Destutt de Tracy, dans Eléments d'idéologie, insistera sur l'aspect actif de la sensation tent il est vrai que la sensation se fonde sur le principe de motilité. "Ce dernier", dit Quillet, "il prétend rendere compte de toutes nos facultés par le jeu d'une faculté primordiale, celle de faire des mouvements et d'en prendre conscience" [Mortier (1969, p.3397)].

Par ailleurs dans Rapports du physique et du moral, Cabanis exprime clairement l'assomption du cerveau, ou de l'âme et du monde extérieur, et qu'elle n'est possible que par des conditions physiologiques, c'est-à-dire, l'âge, le sexe, le tempérament, etc.. En clair ces industriels des idées veulent étudier les idées par la médiation des facultés de l'âme, et établir la liaison entre les faits et les idées.

Sur le plan pratique, l'activité théorique de ces philosophes matérialistes n'est pas de moindre envergure. Ils créent beaucoup d'écoles dont la plus importante fut l'Ecole Normale devant servir de modèle pédagogique. Ils organisent aussi l'Institut de France qu'ils considéraient comme réunion de savants et directoire de la science française. C'est de cette façon qu'ils entendaient imposer un nouvel esprit scientifique avant l'effroyable terreur napoléonienne qui brisa leurs ambitions.

DE L'ORIGINE DE 'IDÉOLOGISTE' ET 'IDÉOLOGUE'

L'analyse isolée de ces termes qui, d'entrée de jeu, sont corollaires à l'idéologie n'est pas sans raison. Une certaine logique exigerait certes qu'une étude d'ensemble fût faite dans la même section qui traite de l'idéologie. Mais cet isolement s'explique tout simplement pour des raisons de commodité, mieux didactiques tant il est vrai qu'une spécificité différentielle caractérise les deux termes idéologiste et idéologue- du point de vue de leur apparition et desormais de leur champ sémantique.

C'est cette spécificité qui ne nous accorde pas, quoique corollaires à l'idéologie de les prendre pour des termes analogues à celle-ci. Leur analogie ou corrélation ne peut qu'être relative dans la mesure où si les deux termes sont foncièrement d'origine française, les conditions de leur production sont différentes; et bien plus, les personnes qui les ont créés eurent des intentions dissemblables.

Le Premier c'est-à-dire 'idéologiste', à la lumière du terme idéologie fut aussi créé vers la fin du 18e et début du 19e siècles par les philosophes matérialistes français à savoir Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis pour ne citer que les plus célèbres. C'est donc sous cette dénomination -'idéologistes'- que ces philosophes matérialistes de l'epoque de la Revolution de 1789 en France se désignaient. Comme le souligne Quillet "Destutt de Tracy disait idéologiste" [Mortier (1953, p.2861)].

Ainsi donc on peut tenter d'élucider ce terme en nous basant d'une part sur les conditions historique d'apparition du mot idéologie, et d'autre part sur le projet même de ces philosophes qui se reconnaissaient sous cette appellation. Voilà pourquoi, est idéologiste, selon nous, le philosophe matérialiste français de l'époque de la Revolution de 1789, et partisan de l'idéologie qui, grâce aux procédés d'analyse et d'observation, cherchait une connaissance positive dans l'étude des idées sans lubies métaphysiques.

Les idéologistes entendaient instauer un nouvel esprit scientifique avec la nouvelle école qu'ils venaient de fonder, et dont Condillac avait jeté les bases ultimes. C'est autant dire que l'idéologie (qui se réduisait

alors à la philosophie toute entière) n'était pas un simple lieu de discussion oiseuses et utopiques, plutôt une révolution théorique en tant que science des idées ayant une passion profonde de nouvelles méthodes par delà une problématique clairement anti-métaphysique. Pour mieux dire l'idéologie était un cri de conscience scientifique et progressiste.

Ceci se justifie, que nous sachions, par le fait qu'ils furent placés en position d'extrémistes sous la terreur[2] du régime autoritaire de Bonaparte à l'instauration duquel ils avaient contribué. Leur méthode essentiellement critique suscita le mécontentement du Premier Consul.

A ce sujet Sylvain Aureux nous dit que "en les qualifiant lorsqu'ils s'opposent à lui de 'doctrinaire de chambre', Bonaparte introduit les connotations péjoratives et politiques du terme" [Auroux (1975, p.122)] idéologie.

C'est ainsi donc que le terme idéologue par rapport à l'idéologiste fut créé par Napoléon Bonaparte. "Ce mot idéologue", stigmatise Quillet, "paraît avoir été créé dans un esprit de dénigrement. En mauvaise part, celui qui, dans la pratique, se laisse diriger par les théories plutôt que par les faits et les réalités" [Mortier (1953, p.2861)]. Comme on peut le percevoir c'est cet esprit de dénigrement par la politique d`une part, et d'autre part le dogmatisme philosofique dont on accuse les idéologistes qui donnent au mot idéologue toute sa connotation péjorative. En effet on peut aussi comprendre par cette contradiction qui n'est qu'apparente entre la politique et la philosophie " la grande thèse de Marx, de Lénine et de Gramsci: que la philosophie est fondamentalement politique" [Althusser (1968, p.27)] tant il est vrai que si la philosophie est essentiellement instance politique, la politique, elle, recourt à la philosophie pour son efficacité.

Quoique la définition de l'idéologue présentée par Quillet ne soit pas explicitement de Napoléon Bonaparte, un fait est clair qu'elle ne s'écarte pas de la logique dictatoriale de son pouvoir. Que nous sachions, la crainte d'une théorie susceptible de faire obstacle à ses intérêts aveugles ne le poussa-t-il pas à prendre ombrage de penseurs, en suppriment l'académie des sciences morales et politiques, bastion de l'idéologie? Voilà l'implicite qui devient explicite et nous permet de conjecturer suffisamment l'origine napoléonienne du terme idéologue.

Aujourd'hui pire qu'hier les termes 'idéologie' comme 'idéologiste' ont perdu presque leur signification primitive. Ils sont devenus sinon mieux compris dans un sens politisé. Pour tout dire, leur emploi usuel renvoie toujours à un esprit de dénigrement. Cette déviation découle de la connotation péjorative attaché au mot idéoloue.

Si donc 'idéologue' ne peut qu'être 'doctrinaire de chambre' c'est-à-dire un dogmatiste qui se laisse diriger par la théorie plutôt que par la réalité; l'idéologie dans ce contexte politique est loin d'être une science des idées se fondant sur une problématique anti-métaphysique et spéculative.

Au contraire elle n'est que discours de classe où les idéologues (idéologistes) et anti-idéologues (idéologistes) dénoncent réciproquement les bévues et mensonges de l'adversaire ceci nous fait voir explicitement "qu'une même personne, qu'un même penseur", écrit Lokadi, "soit considéré par les uns comme idéologue et par las autres anti-idéologues. C'est le cas notamment de Marx et Engels"[3] qui, "dans les pays à dictature de la bourgeoisie sont considérés comme idéologues et utopistes par la classe au pouvoir, et anti-idéologues par les classes opprimées, en tant que critiques scientifiques des idéologies dominantes" [Lokadi Longandjo (1979, p417)].

En clair un penseur, selon sa position de classe est vu sous la toge de l'utopie ou du dogmatisme par l'adversaire; par contre il est considéré comme un pragmatiste, mieux l'incarnation de la sagesse et de la science par son parti.

DU REJET DE LA CONCEPTION IDÉOLOGIQUE DE L'HISTOIRE

Ce tire en soi n'est rien d'autre qu'un horizon théorique par le protocole duquel nous tenterons d'élaborer un bref rapport de Marx à Hegel (entendons, de Marx aux jeunes hégéliens).

Ce rapport de Marx à l'école hégélienne permet d'illustrer la reprise du terme idéologie par Marx enrobé de sa connotation péjorative. Cette dernière acception est loin de cette que Destutt et Cabanis lui donnaient à l'origine.

L'idéologie allemande trouve sa forme achevée dans l'idéalisme hégélien. "Dans le système de Hegel, affirme Marx, ce sont les idées, pensées, concepts qui ont produit, déterminé, dominé la vie réelle des hommes, leur monde matériel, leurs rapports réels. Ses disciples révoltés lui empruntèrent ce postulat (...)" [Marx et Engels (1972, p.35)].

L'idéalisme se répercute sur la conception que Hegel se fait de l'histoire du monde. "La contemporanéité du temps (catégorie du présent historique) où tous les éléments du tout sont donnés dans une co-présence, qui est elle-même la présence immédiate de leur essence, devenue immédiatement lisible en aux" [Althusser (1965, p.5)]. Tels sont les termes qu'emploie Louis Althusser pour stigmatiser cette incidence de l'idéalisme sur la notion d'histoire chez Hegel.

Pour Hegel l'histoire est l'extériorisation de l'esprit dans le temps. L'esprit est l'acte de se créer lui-même et de se manifester. Il est donc son être et son acte. En plus l'histoire n'est pas le produit de certains héros plutôt des hommes. Ceux qui passent pour des grands dans l'histoire sont des figures qui répondent aux besoins de leur temps et partant à la nécessité historique [Van Parys (1985)]. Napoléon se présente comme un produit de la révolution de 1789 pour avoir renversé la monarchie en France ce qui fut une nécessité historique.

Il s'établit dans la conception hégélienne de l'histoire l'idée de progrès. La relation dynamique entre l'esprit et la nature illustre la contradiction dialectique dans l'histoire comprisse comme progrès. Les moments dialectiques de l'histoire sont entre autres, les crises, les luttes, et les révolutions [Van Parys (1985)].

C'est la logique qui étudie toutes ces contradictions immanentes au concept lui-même. L'être et la pensée se résument dans l'esprit (Geist), compris comme la principe unique et universel.

Ainsi donc l'histoire est unique, c'est-à-dire universelle. Cette dernière est "la marche rationelle et nécessaire de l'esprit du monde; esprit qui constitue la substance de l'histoire, qui est toujours un et identique à lui-même, et qui explicite son être unique dans la vie de l'univers (l'esprit du monde est l'esprit en général)"[4].

Pour revigorer cette idée de Hegel, il faudrait souligner que chaque peuple n'est rien d'autre que l'expression particulière de l'esprit du

monde. Celui-ci s'objective dans les déterminations -le droit , la politique ou l'économie- et "les dépasse en les conservant dans tout peuple ayant attaint la conscience historique"[5].

Cette conception hégélienne de l'histoire cristalise la fin de l'histoire dans la notion de liberté ou de conscience historique. En effet la liberté ou la conscience historique n'est autre chose que cette identité qui s'établit entre l'homme et le monde, et a permis le dépassement de toute extériorité des choses, autant qu'elle s'établit entre chaque peuple et le monde par le dépassement de toutes les dEterminations.

Cette conception idéaliste est considérée comme une idéologie dans son sens péjoratif le plus strict. Il va de soi que Hegel, comme ses disciples, soit traité lui aussi d'idéologue. Elle est une conception idéologique du temps historique "parce que le tout hégélien est un 'tout spirituel', au sens leibnizien d'un tout dont toutes les parties 'conspirent' entre elles, dont chaque partie est pars totalis que l'unité de ce double aspect du temps (continuité-homogène ou contemporanéité) est possible et nécessaire" [Althusser (1965, p.7)].

L'unité du temps est à la fois dynamisme et contemporanéité décrivant non le mouvement de la matière plutôt celui de l'esprit absolu. A cet idéalisme historique qui est l'idéologie par excellence au sens péjoratif du terme, Marx oppose le matérialisme historique. Ce dernier a pour fondement la relation dialectique Homme-Nature.

C'est pourquoi cette conception de l'histoire a donc pour base le développement du procès réel de la production, et cela en partant de la production matérielle de la vie immédiate ...[Marx et Engels (1972,-p.78)]. En clair ce rapport dialectique Homme-Nature traduit l'impossibilité pour ces éléments contraires d'être séparés, c'est-à-dire ni l'homme ni la nature ne peuvent exister 'en soi'. Ils existent en complémentarité.

Dès lors Marx élabore une nouvelle conception du sujet qui s'inscrit en faux contre le sujet tout constitué de Hegel. Les grands moments de l'histoire universelle reflètent les grandes étapes de la prise de conscience de ce sujet. Cependant le sujet marxien se saisit à partir d'une réflexion sur l'histoire.

"L'histoire elle-même est une partie réelle de l'histoire de la na-

ture, de la transformation de la nature en homme. Il n'y a qu'une seule science parce que la division de la science de la nature et de la science de l'homme engendre une science, puissance d'aliénation comme le droit, la politique ou le religion" [Van Parys (1990)].

C'est donc par le travail que l'homme humanise la nature et se naturalise pour s'approprier son être objectif. Ce rapport Homme-Nature est l'expression de la lutte des contraires. Le sujet marxien est au départ sujet aliéné parce que l'histoire révèle la façon dont s'exerce la dialectique Homme-Nature. Cette base réelle de l'histoire est ignorée dans la conception hégélienne de l'histoire.

Tout le mouvement de l'histoire se dessine dans la contradiction entre les forces productives et les rapports sociaux de production. Et par opposition à l'idéologie de l'histoire de Hegel, Marx forge certaines catégories -mode de production, rapports de production- qui engendrent des lois de l'histoire. Telle est la raison pour justifier le caractère scientifique de la théorie marxienne de l'histoire [Van Parys (1985)].

Pour Marx, le communisme marque la fin de l'histoire. Mais il faudrait éviter la méprise du terme communisme compris comme un idéal. "Le communisme, notent Marx et Engels, n'est pour nous ni un état qui doit être créé, ni un idéal sur lequel la réalité devra se régler. Nous appelons communisme le mouvement réel qui abolit l'état actuel. Les conditions de ce mouvement résultent des prémisses actuellement existantes" [Marx et Engels (1972, p.70)].

Voilà qui permet aux prolétaires de saisir le pourquoi de leurs aliénations antérieures, et en même temps le sens de toute l'histoire.

Après cet exposé sommaire il est possible d'en dégager l'observation suivante; Si Marx avait de son temps qualifié Hegel d'idéologue, il n'échappe pas non plus à ce qualificatif. De nos jours, Marx est traité aussi d'idéologue dans tous les pays anti-communistes c'est pourquoi Hegel et Marx seront successivement idéologue et anti-idéologue relativement à leurs partisans.

La différence entre Hegel et Marx en est que "à l'encontre de la philosophie allemande (de Hegel) qui descend du ciel sur la terre, c'est de la terre au ciel, note Marx, que l'on monte ici. Autrement dit, on ne part pas de ce que les hommes disent s'imaginent, se représentent,

ni non plus de ce qu'ils sont dans les paroles, la pensée, l'imagination et la représentation d'autrui, pour aboutir ensuite aux hommes en chair et en os; non on part des hommes dans leur activité réelle ... " [Marx et Engels (1972, p.51)].

Aujourd'hui pire qu'hier l'attitude qui consiste à considérer l'idéologue comme un utopiste n'a fait que contribuer au renforcement de la connotation péjorative attachée au mot 'idéologue'. La conséquence théorique en est qu'elle a conduit à faire oublier la signification primitive de deux premiers termes 'idéologie et idéologiste'. Ces derniers pourtant, pour peu qu'on le sache, répondaient à l'origine à une préoccupation théorique conforme au projet idéologiste.

Le grain fut donc semé parce qu'il n'est pas rare d'entendre dans les discours polémistes de notre temps des formules tels que 'économistes de chambre', 'théoriciens' ou 'chercheurs de fauteuil', etc., pour dénigrer un esprit contestataire ou progressiste ne voulant pas partager nos convictions idéologiques et philosophiques.

Ces formules, auxquelles peut-être on ne prête pas assez attention, sont inspirées par celle de la facture napoléonienne à savoir 'doctrinaires de chambre' ou idéologues pour désigner Antoine Destutt de Tracy, Géorge Cabanis et leurs acolytes.

Notes

1. Ou théoriciens des idées pour désigner les idéologistes; l'expression empruntés à Lokadi Longandjo (1979, pp. 408-410).

2. L'un d'eux, Condorcet, rapporte Quillet, fut emprisonné et s'empoisonna sous la détention (Mortier, 1953).

3. On pourra aussi évoquer les cas de Lénine (Vladimir Ilitch Oulianov) défendant dans Matérialisme et empiriocriticisme (1906) le marxisme; Antonio Gramsci face au **fascisme**. "Gramsci", écrit Macchiocchi (1974, p.910), "est le premier à l'analyser non seulement en tant que réaction armée du capitalisme mais aussi en tant que longue que guerre superstructurelle qui vise la manipulation de l'inconscient des masses (...)" et Mao Tsé-Toung face au Kuomitang de Tchiang Kai-Chek.

4. Hegel, cité par Van Parys (1990)

5. Hegel, cité par Van Parys (1990)

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Resumée

Cet article présente une version qui porte sur la théorie de la guerre juste et notamment de la lutte armée que mène l'ANC en Afrique du Sud. La théorie est adaptée dans le but de l'approprier à une analyse faite de la guerre intestine.

Dans l'article l'auteur avance que la lutte armée de l'ANC ne répond pas à deux conditions constitutives de la théorie: la condition qui dicte que, tout compte fait, nous connaissons l'heureusse issue de la guerre et la condition qui stipule que le succès en cas de guerre est relativement probable.

Cependant, l'auteur présume que les deux conditions sont tellement solides que la lutte armée menée par l'ANC répond vraisemblablement à ces conditions bien que ses manifestions plausibles soient plus faibles.

JUST WAR THEORY AND THE ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE

S.R. Miller

Recently traditional just war doctrine has been receiving considerable attention both in respect of the question of its viability as a theory, and as a means for determining the justifiability of particular wars.[1] In this paper I wish to apply Just War Theory to the situation in South Africa.

Now traditional just war doctrine principally concerns itself with wars between states, as opposed to internal wars against the state. Accordingly just war doctrine has as one of its conditions that war be conducted under lawful authority. Clearly such a condition would automatically rule out any internal war against the state, and for this reason ought not be part of a **general** theory of just war. This is not to say that wars against the state may not for a variety of reasons be especially difficult to justify, nor is it to deny that some suitably adjusted notion of legitimate authority might not be required for a just internal war, but it is to say that in principle there could be a just internal war, and that therefore it cannot be a necessary condition for a just war that it be fought under the authority of the state. But historically many just war theorists allowed for the possibility of a just war to remove a tyrant.[2] And of course political theory in general, including liberalism, admits of the moral possibility of a just internal war, and this because there are limits to the obligation to obey the state, and because the state itself has obligations the discharging of which is part of the ground of its legitimacy.

Before presenting the theory that I intend working with there are a number of definitions that need to be constructed, and a number of distinctions that need to be introduced. These are as follows.

Firstly I will operate with the following sense of the term, 'war'. I will take it that wars are waged between corporate entities, and that if one corporate entity is at war with a second corporate entity, then the second corporate entity is at war with the first. Moreover I suggest the following necessary condition for any corporate entity A to be at war. There is no other corporate entity, or leadership thereof, B, such that B is the legitimate authority of A. It would not follow from this that A's own leadership was a legitimate authority, but it would follow that insurrections and Mafia style campaigns of violence against legitimate governments are not wars.[3] I will also assume that some of the members of each corporate entity (the armed forces) have been organised for the purpose of co-ordinated, ongoing and (in principle) reciprocated acts of violence against the members of some other (at least notional) corporate entity. This violence would consist of destroying and damaging property (as well as perhaps the physical environment) and the injuring and killing by members of this corporate entity of members of the other corporate entity or entities - normally by the use of arms, armaments etc..[4] For two (or more) corporate entities to be at war is for the armed forces of one corporate entity to be actually performing acts of violence against the members of another corporate entity. And in so acting these armed forces are: (a)instruments of the leadership of the corporate entity to which they belong; (b) performing on behalf of this corporate entity, and (c)using violence against members of the opposing corporate entity qua members of that opposing corporate entity. In addition, it seems that **in general** wars are waged under a claim of moral, and indeed legal, right, and are fought in accordance with some (perhaps quite minimal) set of conventions. But that conflict be conducted under such a claim, or claims, of right, is not necessary for it to be war, nor is it necessary that there be at least some conventions governing the conflict. Total war conducted by warriors who proclaimed themselves to be acting immorally and illegally would still be war.

The notion of a corporate entity here used is relatively weak, and is such that an individual could not only belong to more than one corporate entity, he could also belong to two (or more) corporate entities

in opposition to one another. In such a case conflicting demands would very likely be made of him. It is just such a state if affairs that obtains in societies undergoing (violent) revolutionary change. An individual can at one and the same time be an element of the official nation-state (first corporate entity) and a member or supporter, and therefore element, of the revolutionary group (second corporate entity). I suggest, then, that a corporate entity is a group of individuals such that: (a) they have a structure of practices, including rule-governed practices, and a network of beliefs, in common; (b) there is a set of interlocking collective ends to which these practices are directed; (c) the rules which govern some of these practices provide for a differentiated and hierachically ordered -though not always clearly defined- set of roles for the individuals, and; (d) the individuals see themselves as belonging to, or owing allegiance to, the group as a whole; or, if not, they at least view themselves as having to comply with the dictates of the leaders of the group and their instruments.

Secondly, I distinguish violation of (moral) rights from other sorts of wrongdoing. For example, it may be morally wrong not to assist an intoxicated person across a busy street, but it would not ordinarily be thought to be a violation of a **right**. Rights are generally taken to be a severely circumscribed and very fundamental set of moral claims on others.[5] In general rights tend to override other moral claims. Moreover many rights give rise to **obligation** on the part of others. And here I want to distinguish such obligations from other moral requirements not thus derivative from rights. We can thus hold that I morally ought to assist the intoxicated person without holding that I am under an obligation to do so. In the definition above I use the terms 'right', and 'obligation' in this way.

Thirdly, I distinguish **absolute** from **prima facie** obligations.[6] An absolute obligation overrides all other obligations and moral requirements. A prima-facie obligation can, by contrast, be overidden. In general, if not always, rights give rise to prima facie obligations only.

Fourthly, I distinguish between (morally) legitimate and (morally) illegitimate leaders of political corporate entities. A political leadership is not legitimate and has therefore no **right** to rule and its 'constituency' no **obligation** to obey its dictates if it fails to meet any of the following conditions. Such leadership is not legitimate if: (a) numbers of its constituency fail to obey its dictates to the point where the 'leadership' is in effect no longer leading; (b) the leadership does not enjoy even the tacit consent of its constituency; (c) the leadership or its instruments have as a standard practice the violation of the basic moral rights of its constituency. In relation to these conditions I note the following. There are a number of tests for tacit consent e.g. frequent and widespead insurrection is evidence of the absence of tacit consent. The rights in question would include rights such as freedom of the person and of speech, as well as political rights such as the right to vote and certain socio-economic rights such as the right to the means to subsistence. Moreover I would distinguish between the question of the legitimacy of the leadership and the question whether it (morally) ought to be obeyed. If a leadership is illegimate then there is no obligation (in my sense) to obey it, but nevertheless it may still be the case that one morally ought obey it, because of, say, the morally unacceptable consequences of not doing so.

With these distinctions and qualifications in mind, I will take the following definition as in part constitutive of what I'll call, Just War Theory.[7] The definition is only **in part** constitutive because it only offers a set of conditions which are jointly (morally) sufficient for waging war; it does not offer a set which is jointly (morally) necessary. It should also be noted that the definition provides conditions under which a corporate entity is morally entitled to go to war, as opposed to conditions under which it is morally obliged to do so.

The definition is as follows. Corporate entity, A, is morally entitled (though not necessarily morally obliged) to wage war (and thus use violence) against corporate entity, B, if (though not necessarily, if and **only if**):

-1- B is violating the rights of members of A;
-2- There is no alternative non-violent method by which A could prevent this violation;
-3- A has a reasonable chance of ending this violation by using violence;
-4- It is probable that if A uses violence the consequences, all things considered, will be better than if A does not;
-5- A uses violence only to the end of bringing about the cessation of B's violation of the rights of members of A;
-6- A only uses types of violence that are morally legitimate, and an extent of violence that is necessary to the end in question.

Notice that on the basis of clause -1- of our definition, and our assumption that a political authority must enforce and not violate rights if it is to be legitimate, B is not a legitimate political authority. But we need to assume in respect of this definition that: (a) there is no additional corporate entity C which could count as the legitimate political authority of A, and; (b) A, or at least its political leadership, is not itself illegitimate as it would be if, for instance, it consistently violated the rights of its constituency or if its constituency did not (at least tacitly) consent to this leadership.

Notice also that the definition makes the requirement that only morally legitimate methods of waging war be used (jus in bello) one of the conditions for engaging in war (jus ad bellum). It might be claimed that jus in bello and jus ad bellum need to be sharply separated, and that ,as Walzer has argued,[8] a just war can be fought by immoral means and an unjust war by moral means. But, as C. A. J. Coady has pointed out,[9] such a sharp separation is not acceptable since the question of how a war must be fought is integral to the decision as to whether or not to fight it. It is appropriate in that case simply to build the jus in bello requirement into the definition of just ad bellum.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Let me now offer a general characterisation of the situation in South Africa prior to making application of our theory. Here we can usefully distinguish five issues:

(1) racial segregation;
(2) inequalities in respect of economic and social opportunities;
(3) political control;
(4) moral rights;
(5) the current direction of change in respect of the first four issues.

(I include the latter since as I write there appear to be important developments taking place in South Africa, the likes of which have not been seen before, e.g. the unbanning of the A.N.C..)

Now while all of these issues are of great importance I will take (4) as fundamental because it is violation of rights that is of direct relevance to our theory, and because (1)-(3) are directly relevant only in so far as they involve violations of rights. I don't here have the space to demonstrate how (1)-(3) can involve violation of rights, but it will be evident in what follows.

What then of the actual state of affairs in South Africa in respect of these four questions.[10] Let us take segregation first.

(1) Unequal racially based segregation in the Republic of South Africa (as distinct from the so-called Independant States) remains fundamentally intact. In accordance with the Group Areas Act, blacks must by law live in black only areas, whites in white only areas, coloureds in coloured only areas, Indians in Indians only areas and so on. State schools are by law either blacks only, or whites only etc.and hospital wards are racially segregated. Moreover the facilities and living areas provided for blacks are far and away inferior to those provided for whites. There has been considerable desegregation in the sphere of so-called, petty apartheid eg. whites and blacks use the same hotels, shops, parks etc. and it is not now illegal to marry or have sexual relations with a person of another race group. At any rate the key

point here is that while the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act remain racial segregation remains. Indeed de facto segregation would probably remain even were the Group Areas Act repealed; this is because the poor (blacks) are bound to live in separate areas from the relatively rich (whites).

Moreover the so-called Independant States -Ciskei, Transkei etc.- must also be regarded as (partially autonomous) racially segregated areas of South Africa, rather than as distinct nations resulting from genuine and legitimate political division. Their creation has involved the forcible removal of millions of people; they are hugely overcrowded, poverty-stricken and dependant on South Africa for handouts; their continued existence depends on the South African government. Since these 'states' are in essence (partially autonomous) racially segregated regions of South Africa, their existence constitutes a violation of the rights of South Africans of fundamentally the same kind as does the existence of the racially segregated living areas within the so-called Republic of South Africa itself.

(2) Social and economic goods are notoriously difficult to measure. However it is clear that: black unemployment is very high in South Africa and the so-called homelands, and there does not exist the safety net of unemployment benefits for most of these unemployed people; many black workers, especially those outside industries served by strong unions, receive wages below what would be adequate to keep themselves and their families above what is considered in advanced western countries to be the poverty line; the majority of blacks do not receive adequate primary and secondary education, and have to take the lowest paid and most menial jobs. There is a massive housing shortage for blacks, and millions of blacks do not receive basic services such as water, electricity, sewerage. In short, in general social and economic terms the majority of blacks are essentially in a third world situation. The whites by contrast earn wages, receive education, and experience general living conditions comparable with people in advanced western countries. Moreover -and this is one of the most striking features of the South African situation- that this degree of inequality exists is to a significant extent due not simply to cultural differences or even

neglect but to the deliberate policies of the South African government over many decades. These policies have included: the dumping of millions of people onto areas that the government's own investigative commissions have told them could not possibly sustain even the existing population; an official policy until quite recently of not educating black people beyond primary school level; policies of job reservation for whites so that blacks are left to perform only the most menial tasks at very low wage levels.

(3) Political control rests firmly in the hands of the white minority government. The recent constitutional changes have made no substantial difference to this situation. Blacks in particular -and they constitute 75% of the population- have no political rights in the central government; they cannot vote or hold office. Moreover this political control, underwritten by economic power and, in the last analysis, military power, is used to maintain the system under which whites are hugely socially, economically and politically, advantaged at the expense of blacks.

(4) The moral rights of blacks are violated in South Africa, and violated massively. The rights of whites are also violated, though to a much lesser extent. Moreover the violation of some of the rights of blacks has a concomitant (and morally wrong) privileging of whites. These violations are both de facto and de jure. Thus blacks, as already noted, are without political rights. South Africans, black and white, are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention. There are numerous cases of torture and death while in custody. Millions of black South Africans have been forcibly removed from their homes. Freedom of expression has been severely curtailed. The basic material needs of millions of South Africans are not being met, and not being met in a society which is sufficiently wealthy to be able to meet them. The per capita income of South Africans is relatively high by third world standards, but the discrepancy between rich and poor is certainly one of the highest, and perhaps the highest, in the world. There is not even a semblance of equality of opportunity in the competition for wealth, power and status, and this fact is in large part the explanation for the massive social and economic inequalities.

What of issue number (5), the matter of the direction of change in South Africa. Certainly at this time there is some reason to believe that there is a resolve on the part of the South African government to at least partially reverse the above described rights violations. There appears to be a resolve to at least partially desegregate, to uplift the economic plight of black people, to provide greater economic and social, e.g. educational, opportunity and control, e.g. unionisation of many industries, and even to allow a greater extent of political control. But equally it must be said that little has yet been achieved in fact. And of course there is a whole history of rights violation presenting itself as evidence that the institution of full rights for blacks will be strongly resisted.

JUST WAR THEORY APPLIED TO ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE

Having thus characterised the situation in South Africa, and having earlier outlined a theory of the just war, we are now in a position to apply that theory to the situation in South Africa. Now if there is a war in South Africa, and clearly there is at least an ongoing violent insurrection, it is a war between the South African state and (at least principally though by no means exclusively) the African National Congress (A.N.C.). It is not possible for both sides to be fighting a just war, although it is possible that neither is. Could the South African state be fighting a just war? Now as we have seen this state is responsible for the ongoing massive violation of the rights of the majority of South Africans. Moreover the periodic widespread insurrections and the large-scale boycotting of black local elections is powerful evidence of the absence of even tacit consent to the South African government. The South African state, then, fails our tests for legitimacy. As such it is not entitled to use violence to maintain its existence, and to ensure the continuation of its morally unacceptable policies. The South African state, then, cannot be fighting a just war. What of the A.N.C.? Prima facie the A.N.C. has a much stronger case. Let us then apply our Just War theory clause by clause, taking the A.N.C., including its armed

wing Umkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation, hereafter MK) and supporters, as corporate entity A, and the South African government together with its agencies of enforcement and supporters, as corporate entity B. We are entitled to make this application since: (a) both the government and the A.N.C. are corporate entities by our account, since the members of each have rule-governed practices and beliefs in common, pursue interlocking collective ends, and so on in accordance with our definition, and (b) there is no corporate entity, or leadership thereof (apart from the actual internal leadership of the A.N.C.) which counts as the legitimate authority of the A.N.C., and thus the A.N.C.'s armed struggle against the South African government is properly termed a war and not merely a civil insurrection.

Concerning clause -1-, clearly B is violating A's rights, and doing so massively and over a very long period of time. A corollary of this is, as we've just seen, that the South African government is illegimate, and that therefore South Africans are not obliged to obey laws because they have been enacted by the South African government. Of course there remains an obligation to obey many if not most of the existing laws, but this will be for some reason other than that the South African government promulgated that law. Thus some laws ought to be obeyed because the act they proscribe is in itself immoral eg. murder, others because of reciprocal obligations to other citizens e.g. payment of wages, and so on. Moreover one of the dangers in a society in which the government is illegitimate, and is perceived to be so, is the **general** breakdown of law and order, as opposed to selective, disciplined and politically motivated violations of the law. Thus there are consequentialist grounds for maintaining respect for the law. Indeed it may even be that the South African government, as opposed to South African law as such, ought to be obeyed (as opposed to has a right to be obeyed) because of consequentialist considerations. The possibly undesirable alternatives to white minority rule would be one such consideration. A second consideration is the apparent existence of a resolve on the part of the present government to bring about the cessation of rights violations, and the consequent possibility of its acting on this

resolve. But more of this shortly.

Clause -2- states that there be no non-violent method by which A could prevent this violation of rights. The history of resistance to the South African government is instructive here. From its formation in 1912 up until it was banned in 1960 the A.N.C. -an organisation which seems entitled to claim the support of the majority, or at least a very large minority, of black South Africans- pursued certain non-violent strategies. In 1961 in the face of evident failure -if anything, violation of rights increased over this period, particularly with the coming to power of the Nationalist party in 1948- the strategy of violent resistance was adopted. This consisted initially of bombing strategic installations, then widened to include military and police personnel, together with certain other categories of civilian personnel. (The question of legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence is something that will be taken up in the discussion of clause -6-.) On the face of it a strategy which restricts itself to non-violent resistance alone has been tried and has failed. Now this is not to say that non-violent means of resistance, including strikes and boycotts, are not necessary. The claim is rather that they have not been sufficient. For in the past the South African state has responded ruthlessly and effectively whenever such non-violent resistance have begun to look as though it may challenge the basic power structure of the status quo.

It might be claimed that in fact it has been certain sorts of non--violent strategies -especially sanctions- deployed by external countries that have been most effective in the struggle against the apartheid system, and in bringing the South African government to the negotiating table. Concerning economic sanctions. In the first place the drying up of the capital inflow, the divestment and so on have to a considerable extent been caused by a perception of political instability, which in turn has been largely due to internal insurrectionary activity, and especially internal violence. In the second place these sanctions would hardly have been imposed if internal insurrectionary activity had not riveted the world's attention on South Africa. Let us look now at the arms embargo and sanctions in respect of high technology goods. These have

had an important role in shifting the balance of regional military power. The South African Defence Force can no longer do as it sees fit. There has been a corresponding shift within the South African government in favour of those seeking a political solution to their domestic problem and against those in favour of an essentially military one. But while these sanctions are in themselves a strategy of non--violence they presuppose violent strategies. Some group or other, be it SWAPO, or whoever, has to be waging war against the South African government for that group or its allies to benefit from an arms embargo against the South African government.

A second kind of argument draws a sharp distinction between the past and the present, and asserts that whereas in the distant past non-violent strategies failed, at the present time they are likely to succeed. This is due, the argument would run, to the newfound economic importance of blacks both in the workforce -including in the skilled workforce- and as consumers, together with their increased organisational power especially in the form of trade unions. The argument would then go on to draw a distinction between the activities of on the one hand the A.N.C. and MK, and on the other the broadbased internal campaigns of protests, strikes, boycotts etc. The conclusion would be that it is the latter and not the former, that is the best hope for change in South Africa, and that in fact it is these campaigns which have been putting the most pressure both direct and indirect on the South African government. The direct pressure consists in the real and threatened social and economic disruption produced by these campaigns. But since such campaigns produce highly visible manifestations of instability they have an effect on overseas investors, and thus on the South African economy, and thus the campaigns put indirect pressure on the South African government.

But this argument overplays its hand. In the first place in respect of their indirect pressure via overseas investors, sanctioneers etc., in the very recent past the success of these campaigns relied heavily, if unintentionally, on the violence that they generated, including not only military and police violence directed at protesters, but also the violence directed by militant blacks at perceived collaborators. In the second

place these campaigns obviously owed a great deal to the continuation, and in some cases, exacerbation, of conditions of material impoverishment, as opposed to emerging economic empowerment. In the third place political activists who are either members of, or sympathetic to, the A.N.C., obviously played an important role in these campaigns, and that they were able to do so was presumably in part due to the prestige they enjoyed as members of an organisation which was prepared to literally fight for the rights of blacks.

The fact remains that MK combatants in particular did not play a crucial role in these campaigns. But this point pertains not so much to the question of the sufficiency of non-violent strategies as to the question of the effectiveness of the armed struggle, and hence to clause -3-. It may turn out that non-violent strategies are not sufficient, but that equally a combination of the A.N.C.'s armed struggle in conjuction with those non-violent strategies is not sufficient either.

What then is the upshot of our discussion on the availability of non-violent methods sufficient to bring about the cessation of rights violation? It is clear that non-violent strategies are necessary. The question is whether they are sufficient. For many decades they were not sufficient. So the matter really resolves itself into the question as to whether they are sufficient in the current situation, the situation in which negotiations are in the offing. It is possible that the South African government could try to wind the clock backwards: abandon negotiation in favour of repression, increased militarisation and so on. Moreover if it did so non-violent strategies would be an inadequate response, as they were an inadequate response for many decades. On the other hand it is perhaps unlikely that the government will move backwards. However a crucial consideration in favour of the claim that winding back the clock is unlikely is the thought that to do so would entail the conducting of a gradually escalating, and in the (perhaps very) long term, unwinnable civil war. In other words the decisive role of non- violent strategies in the current situation takes place against the threat of strategies of violence in the future on a very much greater scale than has thus far been experienced. I conclude that non-violent strategies have not been sufficient and are not now suf-

ficient to bring about the cessation of rights violations. It may well be, however, that the threat of violence, as distinct from the actual use of violence, is all that it necessary at this stage in which case the armed struggle could be suspended. But we have not addressed the question as to the effectiveness of violence. Let us turn to clause -3-.

According to clause -3- violent methods must have a reasonable chance of success. More particularly, does the use of violence by the A.N.C. in conjuction with non-violent strategies have a reasonable chance of bringing about the cessation of the violation of rights by the South African government and its enforcement agencies?

We can distinguish four sorts of violence - remembering that our notion of violence consists of the killing and injuring of persons, and the destruction of property. Firstly, there is the more or less spontaneous violence of mass action, crowds of people out of control, killing, burning etc. Secondly, there is premedidated, disciplined terrorism. This involves tactics such as bombing civilian areas, torture etc. Thirdly, there is premeditated, disciplined violence which is not terrorism. Fourthly, there is the violence one receives as opposed to the violence one directs at others. Peaceful protestors shot in the back by police are in receipt of violence. What is the difference between the second and third forms of violence? One difference is that terrorism does not accept restrictions on its targets: the innocent are targets along with the guilty. Indeed a characteristic feature of terrorism is that it directs violence at innocents in order to bring about changes in the behaviour of those it regards as guilty. Now the business of determining who counts as an innocent and who as guilty is a difficult one. Certainly the guilty would include combatants, the leaders of combatants and those guilty of rights violations. And clearly there are many categories of people who would turn out to be innocents. A second difference is that terrorism accepts no limits on the extent or type of violence to be used -except of course that it must secure its end. A third difference is that a terrorist does not accept constraints on the occasion for the use of violence; for the terrorist the availability of non-violent methods would not necessarily rule out violence as illegitimate.

The fourth type of violence -violence received at the hands of the South African security forces- has in the past been important in generating domestic and international outrage against the South African government. But sending out people to peacefully protest so that they can be shot dead is obviously not acceptable as conscious policy.

It seems likely that use of the first two sorts of violence would in the long term bring about the downfall of the South African government. The social and economic damage, not to speak of the cost in terms of lives, would presumably be massive. But there seems little doubt that a concerted ongoing campaign of violence of this sort is not particularly difficult to launch, and would in the long term be uncontainable.

But the more interesting question from the point of view of this paper is whether a long term campaign of violence of the third variety could be decisive -in the context of non-violent strategies. For our Just War Theory dictates that this form of violence, and this form only, be pursued. And in fact for the most part of its history the A.N.C. has only pursued this form of violence. Certainly in the long term there could be very considerable escalation in this type of campaign. Prior to the recent phase of negotiation there had over some years been a growing number of acts of sabotage, attacks on military personnel and so on. And the class of legitimate targets is in fact wider than have in fact been targetted by the A.N.C. (This is not to say that the A.N.C. has not been guilty of killing innocent people. Clearly it has. More of this in relation to clause -6-.) But it is not clear whether such a campaign could be decisive. And there are real questions as to whether such a campaign would not have to be abandoned in favour of the tactics of terrorism and mass violence. One pressure to do so might be increasing use of terrorism by the South African government forces, another might be the successful use of these tactics by competing, alternative, insurrectionary groups, and so on.

So the answer to the question as to whether the restricted form of violence acceptable to Just War Theory has a reasonable chance of success is that it is not known. So the A.N.C.'s armed struggle does not meet clause -3-.

Further it would not follow from the fact, if it were a fact, that the A.N.C. has a reasonable chance by using this form of violence (together with non-violent strategies) of prevailing against the white minority government, that whatever government replaced the present one would not also violate the rights of South Africans - black and white. But this brings us to clause -4-.

-4- The overall consequences of actions, and particularly the long term consequences of a protracted campaign of violence are extremely difficult to determine. It was argued above that non-violent strategies by themselves have not, and will not, bring about the cessation of rights violations by the South African government and its agencies. It has also been argued that it is not known whether the A.N.C's armed struggle -in so far as it used methods acceptable to Just War Theory- has the capability even in conjunction with non-violent strategies to eventually bring about this cessation of rights violations.

Now it is probable that continuation of the A.N.C.'s armed struggle is likely to produce counter-violence from the state, and is likely to go hand in hand with mass violence. And the armed struggle if it were to continue over a very long period may transmute into out and out terrorism. Moreover violence produces economic and social disruption, and high levels of ongoing violence economic and social disarray. So there will be at least some evil consequences associated with pursuing the armed struggle. The difficulty is that it is not known how great this evil will be. If the armed struggle were to escalate and continue for a very long period of time the social and economic costs, not to speak of the costs in terms of lives, would be very great. On the other hand if the period were relatively short, the costs would be relatively small. The problem is that the likely effectiveness of the armed struggle increases the longer the time period looked at. In the short term its effect is likely to be minimal.

What then is the answer to our question about the balance of good over evil? Certainly the present South African social and political arrangement is an unjust one. Crucially the injustice will continue unless the present government is replaced, if for no other reason than

that it is by definition a minority government committed to preserving white power and privilege. Its removal then is (in the long term) both probable and in itself desirable. But there is a danger, given the probability of white intransigence, that the interregnum period will be so long and so destructive that eventual black rule will bring with it instability, authoritarianism, inefficiency, corruption, declining living standards and so on. There is also the possibility that these elements can be minimised, particularly if a negotiated settlement can be achieved in the relatively near future. There can be no **certainty** or even reasonable probability, one way or another: the outcome is too dependent on unknown quantities such as the intentions and future character of the A.N.C., as well as the degree of its future support and its consequent ability to exercise control in a destabilised society. But in that case the A.N.C.'s armed struggle does not meet the condition specified in clause -4-, and for the same reason it did not meet clause -3-: the consequences of the policy of violence cannot be adequately known in advance. Clause -4- requires that it be probable that if the A.N.C. uses violence, then the consequences, all things considered, will be better than if it does not. But if the consequences of this use of violence are uncertain then it is not the case that it is probable that they will be better if violence is not used.. However there is a complication here in that it is probable that continued white rule will have evil consequences. So if it were probable that the A.N.C.'s armed struggle would either lead to consequences no worse than those attendant upon white rule, or to better consequences, then the armed struggle would be the rational course of action. And perhaps this probability obtains. Unfortunately however clause -4- requires more than this probability: it requires the probability that the consequence not simply be either as good/bad or better, but rather that they be better. Now perhaps clause -4- ought to be weakened so as to merely require the probability that the consequences be as good/bad or better. Indeed it might be argued that a weaker formulation still is required: perhaps that a course of action whose outcome is uncertain ought to be preferred to one whose outcome is known to be evil. Such a formulation expresses a principle of hope, but might nevertheless turn out to be a rationally compelling

principle. It might be rational if, for example, there was no **general** presumption in favour of the likelihood of evil outcomes over good outcomes. Thus in any given specific case where it is uncertain whether an action will have good or evil consequences, each possible outcome might have to be given equal weighting. This is because even though there is no evidence to support this weighting, there is no evidence to support any weighting, and in the absence of any evidence whatsoever every possible outcome ought to be presumed to be as likely as every other. Of course something is known about the consequences of adopting a policy of violence -people will be killed and thus there will be a certain amount of evil. But the point is that it is not known whether this amount of evil will be small or large relative to the evil that it is known will obtain if a course of violence is not pursued. At any rate as things stand if, as I suggest, it is not known to be probable that the A.N.C.'s armed struggle will lead to a better outcome in South Africa, then that armed struggle does not meet the condition specified in clause -4-.

Let us turn now to clause -5-. The A.N.C. has certainly been deploying violence to lower white South African morale and to foment rebellion amongst blacks. It has in short been using violence to undermine the present white minority government. In so doing it has not simply been engaged in acts of **direct** self-defense as would be the case if it used violence only against the South African government's enforcement agencies, and did so only to the end of resisting arrest, imprisonment or violence at their hands. Rather in seeking to bring about the removal of the present government it is at least seeking to remove the agency responsible for violation of its rights. Now it does not follow from the fact that I am entitled to prevent a government from violating my rights that I am entitled to overthrow it. However it does follow that I am under no obligation to obey it, and that I am entitled to defend myself against its attempts to enforce compliance with its dictates. Moreover if the only possible way of bringing about the cessation of ongoing massive violation of my rights by a government is by overthrowing or otherwise removing that government then, other hings

being equal, I am entitled to do so. The South African government has displayed a longstanding refusal to countenance cessation of violation of the rights of blacks; and indeed for blacks to receive their political rights in particular, would mean the end of white minority rule. It follows that the A.N.C. is entitled to seek to remove the present government to the end of bringing about the cessation of the violation of the rights of its members and supporters. To the extent that its violence has been directed to that end it is legitimate, and certainly its violence has been directed at that end. (If it achieves this end it will also achieve a broader end, namely the cessation of the violation of the rights of **all** South Africans by the white minority government.) However a question arises as to whether there is a further end to which the A.N.C.'s violence has been directed, namely the end of bringing about a situation in which it governs: this would be the end to which Lenin's Bolshevik party's violence was, for example, directed. Such an end would not be legitimised by our just war theory. Certainly the A.N.C. claims to be working toward a non-racial **democratic** South Africa, and has produced blueprints of the shape of this future society according to which it will be a unitary democracy with a mixed economy and so on. Moreover there is at least one further piece of prima facie evidence in support of the democratic commitments of the A.N.C. This is the apparent fact that under a democratic arrangement the A.N.C. would probably govern. This fact (if it is a fact) is not completely compelling since it does not necessarily demonstrate a commitment to democracy as an end in itself but perhaps only as a means to the implementation of certain social programmes under A.N.C. control. A further kind of prima facie evidence relevant here would be the extent to which the A.N.C. and its supporting organisations are themselves run on democratic lines. At any rate current A.N.C. violence is apparently consistent with clause -5- since arguably it is directed only at ending rights violations. Let us turn to our final clause, clause -6-.

In terms of clauses -1-, -2- and -5- the A.N.C. could reasonably claim to be engaged in a just war. Now the A.N.C.'s armed struggle does not meet the conditions specified in clause -3- and -4-, but this was due to lack of knowledge of outcomes, and it may be that their

armed struggle could meet some acceptably weakened versions of these clauses. The principle of hope was an attempt to construct such a version of clause -4- and clause -3- could in some similar way be reformulated. Let us, then, deal finally with clause -6-.

-6- Violence can be directed at property or at persons. The A.N.C. is entitled to destroy buildings and installations -as distinct from their occupants- in so far as they are used by personnel performing tasks which constitute violations of the rights of their members and supporters. What of violence directed at persons? Here we need to distinguish between types of violence and types of person at whom violence is directed. Certain forms of violence such as necklacing, bombing civilian areas clearly count as instances of terrorism, and are thus morally illegitimate in terms of Just War Theory. Moreover some of these forms have been employed at times by the A.N.C., or at least by persons trained by, and supporters of, the A.N.C. (There was for a period some dispute in respect of de facto A.N.C. policy in this regard.) In fact the A.N.C. has on a number of occasions disassociated itself from such acts. And historically it has demonstrated a concern in respect of loss of innocent life. But in any case since the coming into being of a climate of negotiations there has been very little violence directed at so called soft targets of any sort. For this reason it is fairly easy at this time for the A.N.C. to pass the ius in bello test. Of course whether or not it could do so if negotiations break down and the armed struggle is stepped up, would depend on the specific tactics of violence it chose to deploy at that time.[11]

Notes

1. See especially Walzer (1977). For a critique of Walzer see Coady (1980). For specific applications of just war theory see Anscombe (1981) and Simpson (1986).

2. Aquinas, for example, seems to have accepted this principle. See Russell (1975) p54.

3. However if such insurrections cause the government of the state to lose control we may have a war since according to my account of legitimate political leadership such governments are no longer legitimate.

4. For an account of the notion of violence favoured here see Coady (1985).

5. See Dworkin (1977).

6. Wasserstrom (1963) makes this distinction.

7. This definition is an version of that offered by Anscombe (1981) and adjusted for the case of internal wars.

8. See Walzer (1977).

9. See Coady (1980) p286.

10. The specific claims made in offering this characterisation of the overall situation in South Africa are all fairly familiar and well--documented. However a particularly useful source is Wilson and Ramphele (1988).

11. Thanks to Bob Ewin, C.A.J. Coady, I.A. Macdonald and M. Vermaak for criticisms of earlier versions of this paper.

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A RETURNING TO THE SOURCE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALAINE LOCKE

Dr. Robert E. Birt

I welcome as an event of momentous importance the appearance of The Philosophy of Alaine Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond[1]. Edited by Leonard Harris, professor of philosophy at Morgan State University, this volume offers a collection of over twenty articles, essays and lectures by Alaine Locke. It is the first volume to anthologize the specifically **philosophical** writings of an Afro-American savant who is virtually unknown as a philosopher. It thereby introduces us to a new Alaine Locke. And this occurs at a time when a number of younger Afro-American philosophers have become increasingly curious about this ancient sage.

Of course, it is well known that Locke was well educated at the universities of Harvard, Oxford (as the first Black Rhodes Scholar) and Berlin -- that he was the first Afro-American to receive a doctorate degree in Philosophy. It is known that he taught in Howard University's Philosophy Department and also served as its Chair. A few even know (or know of) his seminal philosophical essay 'Values and Imperatives'. But Locke as philosopher is virtually unknown in America's philosophical community. Most white philosophers have never heard of him. And his status as a philosopher has often been doubted by some philosophers at Howard University itself. He is known to have described himself as more a philosophical midwife of a generation of Black writers, poets and artists than a professional philosopher. Locke is best known as a leader and premiere literary critic of the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s. And his first major work was an anthologist and literary critic for Afro-American literary artists.

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1 Alaine Locke,The Philosophy of Alaine Locke:Harlem Renaissance and beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

But Locke was also a professional philosopher whose writings focus on value theory, and whose criticisms of metaphysical and moral absolutism are seen by some as a prefiguration of contemporary deconstructionist projects. Dr. Harris' anthology of these writing renders unquestionable Locke's previously debatable status as a philosopher. This will come as an intellectual boon for some younger black philosophers who seek (and sometimes find) a pioneering predecessor in Alaine Locke.

The Philosophy of Alaine Locke is divided into four sections: 'Epistemological Foundations', 'Valuations: Commentaries and Reviews', 'Identity and Plurality', and 'Identity and Education'. The first section presents Locke's formal analyses and writings on value theory and cultural pluralism. His classic 'Values and Imperatives' (which in 1935 was his first published article in philosophy) appears in this section, and lays out the initial arguments for a functional value relativism and opposition to metaphysical and value absolutism or monism. Other articles like Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy and Pluralism and Ideological Peace are notable for their deepening commitment to tolerance and intensifying critique of absolutism of various kinds.

In the second section ('Valuations...'), we are presented with Locke's approach to valuation in the context of a variety of commentaries and reviews of books by philosophers like Santayana and Ralph Barton Perry. Particularly interesting is Locke's article 'Unity through Diversity.' He seeks there (in consistency with his commitment to pluralism) a conception of human and cultural universality which prizes diversity and particularity, but which divorces "the association of uniformity with the notion of university"[Locke, p.135]. In this context, the reader should perhaps be aware of Locke's tacit practical concern to delegitimize the exclusive claim to universality by Western civilization. Likewise, in the article entitled 'Value', when Locke claims that all "values are disputable", and that "they involve a relation to a valuer whose valuation need not be correct" [Locke, p.117], he is implicitly denying Eurocentric claims to cultural supremacy and eroding the West's denial of all worth (or equal worth) to the cultures and values of other peo-

ples. The valuer whose valuations he holds open to scrutiny, may be an individual, group, nation, culture, race or civilization. At least provisionally, Locke is prepared to define value as a "personal attitude". [Locke, p.126] But he also recognizes values as emanating from cultural attitudes and collective experiences.

The third section offers a selection of topical articles which illustrate Locke's application of his value theory to his understanding of the relationship of race and culture. Here he not only promotes cultural relativism, but also offers an extensive critique of ontological designation by race. He attacks theories which posit a causal connection between race and culture, and conceptualizes 'race' as a social myth rather than an immutable essence or biological category. There one finds an eloquent germ --- 'The Ethics of Culture' -- which was first presented as a lecture (in 1923) to the Freshman class at Howard University, and in which Locke espouses his ideal of a cultured person and his notion of a 'duty' to become cultured. Culture he defines as "the capacity for understanding the best and most representative forms of human expression, and of expressing oneself, if not in similar creativeness, at least in appreciative reactons and in progressively responsive refinement of tastes and interests". [Locke, p.177] The "man of culture", he claims, "is the man of trained sensibilities..." [Locke, p.178] Locke espouses an ideal of self-development which echoes the influence of German Idealism and American Transcendentalism. His ideal exudes a (tempered) Nietzschean scorn for the narrowly utilitarian, materialistic, and conformist American culture and its "psychology of the herd" [Locke, p.181]. His ideal of culture and the cultured person, his admonition to youth to stand apart from the crowd and its conformist culture of mindless acquisitiveness, undoubtedly opens him to the charge of elitism. One might also wonder how his pluralist and relativist conception of values allows one to discern what are the 'best and most representative forms of human expression'. But his ideal of culture and the cultured person is not out of harmony with the thinking of much of the Western philosophical tradition,nor with the idea of the Talented Tenth espoused by the renowned Afro-American pan-Africanist intellectual, W.E.B. DuBois.

The final section features articles examining the role of educational institutions in a racially segregated society. One finds discussion there of pedagogical approaches to the study of racism in adult education that seeks both to avoid ethnocentrism and to promote self-esteem and cultural autonomy among Afro-American students. Locke wrestles with the question of how education might promote emancipation from an oppressive racial caste system. Since Afro-American education is already separate, Locke arques that it "ought to be free to develop its own racial interests and special aims....The highest aim and real justification of the Negro college should be the development of a racially inspired and devoted professional class with group service as their integrating ideal" [Locke, p.249]. Hence we see that the idea of 'education for liberation' so often esteemed by radical intellectuals, and the ideal of academic achievement and social responsibility, was an essential part of Locke's pedagogical thought.

Yet it is as a value theorist, and as a theorist of value relativism and cultural pluralism, that Locke makes his central contributions as a philosopher. Hence a few comments on these ideas are in order. Locke's ideas concerning values first appear in 'Values and Imperatives', where he claims that all philosophies "are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and not abstract, disembodied 'objective' reality; products of timed history rather than timeless eternity" [Locke, p.34]. This anti-absolutist view of philosophy in general finds its corollary in his relativist conception of values. Adopting a meta-ethical mode of discourse, Locke constructs what may be called in his own words an "affective theory of valuation" [Locke, p.45]. This theory claims that that values have their basis in feelings and are relative to individuals, ethnic and cultural groups. "The basic qualities of values", Locke writes, "pertains to psychological categories" [Locke, p.39]. In the final analysis, the primary judgments of value are emotional judgments" [Locke, p.39]. This emotivist and relativist conception of values is intended to stand in sharp opposition to moral absolutism which, on Locke's view, promotes cultural and ethnic conflict, value bigotry and intolerance. Value relativism is the view that "values are rooted in attitudes, not in reality and

pertain to ourselves, not the world" [Locke, p.46].

But Locke is now confronted with a problem. For he wants to avoid subjectivism, the idea that value judgments are simply expressions of individual tastes, in which case there are no objective standards of right and wrong. For him the 'gravest problem of contemporary philosophy' is how to ground some normative criterion for the 'objective validity for values' without resorting to dogmatism and absolutism on the intellectual plane, or, on the plane of social practice, to mass coercion and intolerance. The criterion he sought would presumably lie within "some middle ground between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism" [Locke, p.38]. Some such criterion for the 'objective validity' of values would have to be found. We cannot live in an anomic or valueless world. For no matter how relativistic a philosophy is, no matter how inimical to absolutism, it can not afford to ignore "value ultimates" or abandon the "quest for certainty" [Locke, p.34].

But is not the quest for certainty precisely what must be given up if we accept relativism and assume it true that 'values are rooted in attitudes, not in reality'? Locke, after all, is as opposed to epistemological and metaphysical absolutism as to moral absolutism. In fact, he believes that truth is (at least sometimes) "the sustaining of an attitude, the satisfaction of a way of feeling..." [Locke, p.37]. What kind of certitude is possible? In particular, how can any grounds of moral certitude be established within the limits of a relativist philosophy? How far can we travel the relativist path before entering the sinuous maze of subjectivism.

Locke insists that "in dethroning our absolutes, we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for after all, we live by them" [Locke, p.34]. We must recognize that "values create imperatives", and that "norms control our behavior as well as guide our reasoning" [Locke, p.34]. The human being cannot live in a valueless world. And by denying the validity of value ultimates as absolutes, we "do not escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of actions and as norms of preference and choice" [Locke, p.35].

But how might our imperatives provide us criteria for the 'objective validity' of values. Do these imperatives themselves constitute the criteria we need to save us from the scourge of subjectivism? But Locke tells us that our 'values create imperatives'. Those values are rooted in attitudes (or are personal attitudes). These claims not only seem to blur the line between relativism and subjectivism, they seem ultimately make our subjective inclinations, feelings, or motivations the source or ground of our imperatives. And if our imperatives are essentially subjective, how (or in what sense) do they constitute or provide objective criteria. Moreover, the values which create imperatives can vary or even conflict with each other. Will not the imperatives also conflict with each other. And if as individuals or groups we live by contending imperatives, do we not live in contention with each other? Perhaps this problem is not insoluble if we have some means for discerning 'right' from 'wrong' imperatives. But it is not clear that Locke's philosophy can allow of a criterion for doing so. And if it did allow us to make such a discernment between imperatives, would we be led to make a similar judgment about the values which create the imperatives? It is far from clear how this may be done if values are relative and rooted in attitudes rather than reality, or if they are themselves personal attitudes. In short, while Locke sees the need to avoid subjectivism while affirming relativism, it is not fully evident that he has shown the way.

There is another possible danger which could impact upon such practical aims of Locke's value relavism as the promotion of tolerance or parity. The danger is that a door may be open within Locke's own philosophy for precisely the intolerance and value bigotry which he abhors and which his anti-absolutist thought seeks to negate. What if conflicting values derive their contentiousness from contentious attitudes in which they are rooted? Intolerance is certainly an attitude, and perhaps a quite natural attitude. It is hardly less 'natural', and certainly not less common than tolerance. Perhaps there are psychological roots of intolerance which affect the valuations of many human beings even after absolutism has been intellectually vanquished. It may

be that some human beings are psychologically inclined toward absolutism. If so, that would partly explain a phenomenon which Locke elsewhere observes with chagrin, viz, the emergence of new absolutisms to replace the old. If attitudes contend because they derive from diametrically opposed psychologies (whether of individuals or groups), then the ideal of tolerance (not to mention criteria of objective validity) can become exceeedingly problematic. Unless we can master or transform our psychologies, Locke's admirable advocacy of parity, reciprocity and mutual tolerance must inevitably come to nought. One would like to see this problem addressed more thoroughly and persistently by Locke.

Still there can be no ambiguity about Locke's insistence on the value of parity, reciprocity and mutual tolerance as the finest fruits of relativist theory. The importance of these for him transcends the subtleties of axiology. One must be cognizant of the practical import of his value relativism and cultural pluralism. In his article of 1942, 'Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy', Locke expresses the concern that new absolutisms are emerging to replace the old, and that "absolutism has come forward in new and formidable guise" with the accompanying evils of "authoritarian dogmatism and uniformitarian universality" [Locke, p.53]. The newer absolutisms are secular rather than religious or metaphysical. Yet these "modern Frankensteins are the spawn of older absolutistic creeds", and the "inherent strains ... in the germ plasm of our culture" [Locke, p.53]. The reader can probably guess that Locke had in mind the intolerant, moralistic, ideological absolutisms of Nazism and Stalinism. But his reference to 'inherent strains' of absolutist intolerance in 'our' culture is indicative of his awareness of the deep-seated racism, religious bigotry and intolerant national chauvinism which commonly masquerades as patriotism in America. In 1942, Locke finds himself confronted with a violently pathological American racism which manifested itself in a racial caste system strikingly similar to apartheid in South Africa, and ideologically akin to notions of Aryan racial supremacy in Germany. Even the principles of 'democratic liberalism have (especially in America) taken on the character of an intolerant creed, and "by its close affiliation with doctrinal religious and

philosophical traditions, modeled its rationale of democracy too closely to authoritarian patterns" [Locke, p.59]. The contemporary relevance of Locke's observations is fairly evident. For the cultural attitudes he criticizes here are still obviously present in the common American assumption that America alone knows what true freedom is (for we commonly call it 'The American Way'); or in the sable rattling proclivities of political leaders who deem it their right to forcibly impose 'freedom' on other peoples who do not willing accept it (or who do not understand freedom in the way Americans do). The very equating of democracy and freedom with the 'American Way', or the veritable assertion of a simple identity between goodness or virtue and 'one hundred per cent Americanism' was for Locke an affront to the ideals of tolerance and pluralism to which he was intellectually committed.

Cultural pluralism, for which Locke implicitly sought epistemological grounds in 'Values and Imperative', is intended as a rebuttal of moral and cultural absolutism and monism (which imagines there to be but one culture or value system of genuine worth). Its principles call for "promoting respect for difference" and "for safeguarding respect for the individual" and protection from "enforced conformity" [Locke, p.61]. Pluralism also seeks tolerance and protection 'of minority and non-conformist groups'. As a member of a despised race in a racist society; as a cultured intellectual in an anti-intellectual society; as a practicer of the Bahai faith in a militantly Christian culture; respect for differences and protection from 'enforced conformity' were for Locke crucial matters of survival as well as passionate intellectual interests.

These practical concerns also appear in Locke's article of 1944, 'Pluralism and Ideological Peace'. Again, one finds his rejection of absolutes and authoritarianism. He praises pluralism for having involved, "explicity or by implication, an anti-authoritarian principle" [Locke, p.96]. He also commends American pragmatist philosopher William James for having carried the pluralist position "beyond traditional metaphysical pluralism based on recognition of a plurality of principles or ele-

ments to the discovery and vindication of a psychological pluralism stemming from a plurality of values and viewpoints" [Locke, p.96]. Ideological agreement in the realm of values as envisaged by absolutism and monism is neither possible nor desirable. What is needed is "some permanently conceded basis of ideological neutrality or reciprocity in the context of which our differences over values can be regarded as natural, inevitable and mutually acceptable" [Locke, p.97]. What we need, according to Locke, is a realistic and sympathetic understanding of the bases of our value differences, their root causes --"some of them temperamental, more of them experiential, still more, of cultural derivation" [Locke, p.97]. Once we reach this understanding, we seek not to change others but to change our attitudes toward them. After the disestablishment of absolutism and the abandonment of orthodoxy, the next step is to "legitimate and interpret diversity, and....if possible, to discover some 'harmony in contrariety', some 'commonality in divergence'[Locke, p.97].

Pluralism, then, is committed to the position that the affirmation of one's own world of values need not involve the denial or negation of someone else's. One does not seek rapproachment by the eradication of differences but by tolerance, reciprocity and mutual respect. It is with respect to these attitudes that Locke sees an obvious affinity between value pluralism and the 'basic democratic viewpoint,' a viewpoint which asserts that each **individual** has a right to think, live and believe as he chooses. But for Locke this is also inadequate. Lockean pluralism goes further by extending democracy "beyond individuals and individual rights to the equal recognition of parity and the inalienable rights of corporate ways of life" [Locke, p.98].

Perhaps it is in this pluralistic broadening of ideals of democracy and freedom that Locke's ideas most clearly evince their contemporary relevance. The idea that groups as well as individuals are entitled to freedom and respect; that individual members of oppressed and disinherited groups (a full generation after our momentous civil rights movement) can often not achieve or actualize their personal liberties without the emancipation and elevation of their whole people; indeed, the very

idea that peoples have a right to their autonomous peoplehood, community and self-determination, constitutes a refreshing alternatives to America's ruling dogma (so dear to our current conservatives) that rights are the exclusive property of individuals. Those who continually disparage the supposedly 'pathological' culture of Afro-American (or other Third World) communities, but hardly entertain the slightest doubt about the uniquely universal value of Anglo-American or European cultures, will find it hard to appreciate the 'inalienable rights' of diverse 'corporate ways of life.' Yet there has never been a time when our society (and the world) was more pluralistic -- racially, culturally, linguistically and otherwise -- than in our present era. Unfortunately, our self-perceptions have not kept up with our changing social realities. Comparatively, the pluralistic thought of Locke reveals itself to be prescient, even in advance of the dominant thinking of his (or our) time insofar as his transcendence of cultural (as well as moral and metaphysical) monism and absolutism is concerned.

The decline of the ideal of the 'great American melting pot,' lends added cogency to the pluralist thinking of Alaine Locke. Black philosopher Bernard Boxhill observes that we Afro- American philosophers 'have inherited Locke's problem'[2]. We do not accept the erstwhile liberal ideal of civil or racial equality which entails an idea of freedom as assimilation, as the estrangement from self and identity and the loss of self in the mainstream of white civilization. But as we accept neither a complete racial separatism, nor any whimsical idea of Black supr-

2 The comments in this paragraph, though neither quoting nor paraphrasing the author, is essentially inspired by a currently unpublished article on Alaine Locke written by Bernard Boxhill. Its title is apparently the same as Leonard Harris's anthology (upon which is comments), and is due to appear in the October edition of Ethics, an American philosophical journal.

emacy to replace the old discredited (though still thriving) madness of white supremacy, then we are obviously left with the option of pluralism. Thus, we must seek a new social order in which different racial and cultural groups can live together (with their differences) as equals. This clearly requires a reappraisal of the concept and meaning of democracy. And here we can see that Locke has already begun to lead the way.

We are living in an era of increasingly complex cultural and racial diversities, but not necessarily tolerance. America is witnessing a resurgence of racism in both its subtle and primitive (often violent) forms. White American intellectuals more often (and more publicly) talk about the 'barbarism' of Black communities, or the cultural and intellectual inferiority of nonwhite peoples. They endlessly assert the superiority of Anglo-American culture. And they think it self-evident that all genuine philosophy is white and Western; that the only universally valuable art or literature is that which is included in the dominant European and American 'canon'. In cosmopolitan Europe one increasingly hears of the rising fury against the multitudes of 'unassimilable' Third World immigrants. Locke would regard all this as regressive expressions of a coercive absolutism. He would deem the **exclusive** assertion of the universality of Western culture as an expression of a clandestine will to power which seeks to impose a 'uniformitarian universality'. Locke saw absolutism as fuel for the flames of cultural and racial intolerance, conflict and bigotry. He hoped that his more relative and pluralist conception of value would promote racial concord and tolerance. It remains to be seen whether the ideas of his fertile reflection will bear fruit in our tormented and strife-ridden cultural world.

JOURNAL REVIEW: EDUCAÇAO E FILOSOFIA

Willem Storm

Educaçao e Filosofia (EeF) is a Brazilian journal which started in 1986, about one year after more than twenty years of military government. It was an initiative of some professors of the Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU). Educaçao e Filosofia is a semestral publication of the department of pedagogy of the UFU in the Portuguese language.

Principally, the journal is dedicated to the fields of education and philosophy, but it also pays attention to the education of philosophy (especially in secondary schools). Furthermore it promotes the idea of interdisciplinarity. About 50% of the articles, discussionpapers and reviews are written by authors of the department of philosophy, and more than 70% of the reviewed books have a Brazilian author.

Looking at the contributions in the field of education we find that one of the authors typified Brazil as a capitalist country with Third Worlod characteristics.The Brazilian education-system is influenced by France and the UK and the first university was founded only in the early twenties of this century (about 100 years after independence!). The influence of France is still marked in the field of philosophy, while the introduction of (neo-)marxist philosophies had to wait till the end of the fifties. The culture-historical school of Vygotskij and Gal'perin seems to have had no influence in Brasil.

In other contributions to EeF it is stressed that Brasil uses the liberal education-model; a model which does not take into account the daily-world of the pupil.This constitutes a problem especially for the pupils from the periphery of the towns (the 'favelas'). The journal pays special attention to this problem and the problems in and around the schools which are built in the periphery. Investigations in this area show, for example, that it is in some cases impossible to find the homes of pupils and of their bread-winners. The influence of religion

(e.g. Umbanda and Candomblé) and television ('telenovelas', Dallas-like series, as Sinha Moça, Vale Tudo and O Meu Pé de Laranja Lima) on the life-world of the pupil are not mentioned. Some discussions in EeF focus on the anthropological method of investigation in the classroom, a method which could give us most interesting knowledge about the cultural background of various groups of pupils.

Furthermore there are articles and discussion papers about the influence of ideologies on the curricula, the influence of the state on the university (e.g. on the outreach-activities), etc..

Philosophical articles in EeF pay attention to a wide range of subjects, e.g. stratification in Brazilian society, the concepts of 'pessoas' ('person' with a positive connotation) and 'indivíduos' ('individual' with a negative connotation), and for example the influence of the bourgeoisie and the French revolution on the education-system and the curricula.

Other topics in the philosophical discussions are:

- the relation between myth and science (e.g. the question whether myth and science are complementary).
- the possibility of being intellectually autonomous; e.g. in the discussion about adopting or adapting imported science, philosophy, and other branches of knowledge.
- the problem of the existence of the subconscious after Freud.
- the western history of the relation between power and knowledge. On this subject a series started recently in EeF with a discussion about the relation between political power and philosophical knowledge in the times of Plato.
- the use of audiovisual equipment. In EeF this discussion is centered around recording (oral) history, but it could also apply to oral philosophy.

The pretention of the interdisciplinarity of the journal EeF does not seem to be fully realised. It is still multidisciplinary and not interdisciplinary, for example, in nearly all the philosophical articles the authors refer to other philosophers but not to educationists. However,

EeF gives a good insight into the Brazilian education-system and in Brazilian philosophy. More generally, it shows the selfconscious discussion of the problem of 'import' in a Third World society; import in a wide sense, for example language, economical and political modes of reasoning, the philosophical and educational culture of the country, the culture of the university, etc.. On looking at the references, however, the impression may be got that the Brazilian intellectual culture is facing a language barrier in the form of the Portuguese language. Relatively few references to developments in other language domains like English, French and German can be found. Brasil in addition, of course, shares the problem of economic (and possibly political) limitations to the acquisition of foreign books and journals with many other Third World countries.

Finally, let me mention some observations on the importance of this journal for African philosophy today.

(1) the question of the relation between Afro-Brazilian religions and traditional African thinking is an important discussion topic.
(2) the relation between Weltanschauung and education is discussed, and this is relevant for Africa as well as for Brazil.
(3) the journal gives the impression that Brazilian intellectuals are quite self-consciously reflecting on their own society, an example perhapsusefullyfollowedinotherpartsoftheworld.

ERRATA

Please note the following erratum in the article by Winston Langley, "The Right of Self-Determination in International Law" in Quest, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1990, pp. 4-17.

p. 9 line 5 read "reinvested" not "reinsted"

Please note the following errata in the article by Christian Neugebauer, "Ethnophilosophy in the Philosophical Discourse in Africa: a Critical Note" in Quest, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1990, pp. 42-64.

p. 45 line 7 read "reconcille" not "recon"

p. 56 line 25 read "318" not "316"

p. 62 line 14 read "Morscha, Neimeir und Zecha" not "R.Moritz, H.Rüstau und G.R.Hoffmann"

p. 63 line 19 read "in Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Africa. Ed. UNESCO, Paris 1984" not " in The Source of African Philosophy. Ed.Cl.Sumner, Stuttgart 1986"

Add to the bibliography:

G. Lukàcs, Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, Berlin 1981.

Cl. Sumner, The Source of African Philosophy, Stuttgart 1986.

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Institutions	ZK 40.-	US$ 15.-	US$ 25.-

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Abonnements: voir dernière page.

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