Abstract
I, along with others, have been critical of the social construction of brain death and the various social factors that led to redefining death from cardiopulmonary failure to irreversible loss of brain functioning, or brain death. Yet this does not mean that brain death is not the best threshold to permit organ harvesting—or, as people today prefer to call it, organ procurement. Here I defend whole-brain death as a morally legitimate line that, once crossed, is grounds for families to give permission for organ donation. I do so in five moves. First, I make the case that whole-brain death is a social construction that transformed one thing, coma dépassé, into another thing, brain death, as a result of social pressures. Second, I explore the way that the 1981 President’s Commission tried to establish the epistemological certainty of brain death, hoping to avoid making arcane metaphysical claims and yet still utilizing metaphysical claims about human beings. Third, I explore the moral meaning of the social construction of a definition that cannot offer metaphysical certainty about the point at which somebody becomes just some body. Fourth, I describe how two moral communities—Jewish and Catholic—actually ground their metaphysical positions with regard to brain death in the normativity of prior social relations. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the aesthetic-moral enterprise of the metaphysical-epistemological apparatus of brain death, concluding that only such an aesthetic-moral approach is sufficiently strong to stave off the utility-maximizing tendencies of late-modern Western cultures.
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Notes
Both Moschella and Sulmasy appear to have a theory of mind that operates behind their claims [19, 20]. For them, there seems to be a Thomistic theory of mind, being, and God that secures the being of being and the being of our knowing of being in an agent intellect in much the same way as Anthony Kenny describes in his book Aquinas on Mind [23]—even while neither Moschella nor Sulmasy appeals to that theory overtly. But that is another story.
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Bishop, J.P. When is somebody just some body? Ethics as first philosophy and the brain death debate. Theor Med Bioeth 40, 419–436 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-019-09508-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-019-09508-6