Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal
Correctness Conditions*
Gunnar Björnsson
Abstract
The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,
on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,
seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgments
would be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, and
moral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter
views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon
Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way in
making sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and its
independence of moral judges and their attitudes or standards. The
success of this strategy would undermine the traditional way of
understanding the distinction, and it is not obvious how it can be
reformulated. In this paper, I outline the difficulty posed by quasirealism, raise problems for some prior attempts to overcome it, and present my own suggestion, focusing on correctness conditions that are
internal to the act of moral judgment.
1. Some Traditional Distinctions, and Why They Seemed Important
Metaethicists have traditionally distinguished between absolutist cognitivism (sometimes called “objectivism”), relativist cognitivism (often
called “appraiser relativism”), and noncognitivism. Both the distinctions
and their importance seemed clear enough.
First, if some form of cognitivism were correct, moral opinions and
statements could be true or false, correct or incorrect. If noncognitivism
*
Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2007 at seminars at University of
Gothenburg and Uppsala University, and at ETMP 2008. I thank the audiences on
those occasions as well as Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, Stephen Finley,
and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The topic of this paper seemed
a good fit for the occasion, as Ingvar Johansson’s manuscript Is Ought? from 1994
explores metaethical issues from an internal perspective in ways resembling quasirealist strategies.
were true, on the other hand, there would be no such correctness or
incorrectness and no truth or falsehood: only different moral opinions
and different moral claims. Moreover, moral claims would not express
propositions and would not be describing actions, characters or political
institutions, and moral opinions would not be beliefs about, or
representations of, states-of-affairs. Instead, they would be desires, or
conative or emotive states of approval or disapproval, or commitments
to act or not act in certain ways. Consequently, there could be no fact of
the matter as to whether an act is morally wrong.
Second, if relativist cognitivism were true, then if one person thought
that an act was morally wrong while another thought that it wasn’t, they
could both be correct, or both incorrect, if their judgments were made
relative to different moral standards. And if they were, there would be no
real disagreement about the facts: even if the two judgments shared the
same character — the same function from contextually given standards
to content or truth-conditions — they would have different truthconditions. If absolutism were correct, on the other hand, the judgment
that one person accepted and the other rejected would be subject to the
same appraiser-independent standards of correctness. If one were correct, the other would be incorrect.
Given this map of the metaethical territories, it was quite clear why
these distinctions mattered for normative ethics. My impression is that
most normative ethicists have assumed some form of absolutist cognitivism, and it is easy to see why. On absolutism, there would be correct
answers to the moral questions that are being asked and the answers one
person suggests would be directly relevant to others who are thinking
about the same question: if my answers are correct, they will be correct
for others too, and vice versa. Consequently, there can be what I will call
a “moral science”: a collaborative enterprise aiming at the accumulation
of correct answers to shared moral questions. Assuming the importance
of correct moral beliefs, and assuming that answers to moral questions
are not hopelessly beyond our ken, normative ethics would have a
straightforward rationale.
Weak forms of relativism would also be capable of sustaining a moral
science, although of a slightly parochial sort. These are the forms that lie
closest to absolutism and take moral standards to be either widely shared
— shared by most or all people in liberal societies, say — or quite similar although not strictly identical. But the stronger and more judgedependent the relativism — the more it takes moral standards to vary
widely from individual to individual — the more moral agreement and
disagreement would have to be the kind of agreement or disagreement in
attitude that noncognitivists say they are. There would be room for
moral enquiry, but as versions of relativism approaches subjectivism,
such inquiry would increasingly be a matter of finding out what the
investigator herself likes or accepts. The collective aspect of moral
science would be gone.
On noncognitivism, finally, there could be no moral science because
there could be no correct or incorrect answers to moral questions. The
room for systematic investigation into correct answers would be
restricted to investigations concerning the non-moral assumptions on
which some moral claims are based. Moreover, noncognitivists standardly think that in many cases, moral disagreements are fundamentally
based on disagreements in attitude: in such cases, the way the world is
wouldn’t support one of these claims in favor of the other.1
This is not to deny that both noncognitivism and strong relativism
allow for a pursuit of a coherent system of attitudes or norms, or a
mutual adjustment of attitudes through discussion of the sort that can
help cooperation through the coordination of attitudes and expectations
(Gibbard 1990; Lenman 2007). But, as traditionally understood, neither
takes the content of our moral questions to determine any one correct
answer independently of who is asking the question.
My concern here is with what I have just discussed: the straightforward consequences of the basic metaethical positions for the possibility
of a moral science. Given this concern, the important distinction seems
to be that between absolutist cognitivism and weak relativism, on the
1
The old distinctions were not always clear-cut. For example, since prescriptions
seem incapable of truth or falsehood, prescriptivism is usually understood as a form
of noncognitivism. But Richard Hare’s (1981) form of prescriptivism took
knowledge of the relevant non-moral facts to determine what the correct moral
judgments would be and thus seems to leave room for a moral science.
one hand, and noncognitivism and strong relativism, on the other: under
the former, a moral science might be possible; not so under the latter.1
Admittedly, matters might be more complicated. Further information
can give us reason to expect absolutism to have different consequences.
Suppose, for example, that the only form of absolutism that has any
chance of being true were one given which moral knowledge is outside
our epistemic reach. Then absolutism would render moral science
impossible. Or suppose that moral truths would lose all authority or
normative force if we came to believe in some form of relativism or
noncognitivism, however weak (Smith 1994: 172, e.g.). Then the
important distinction would seem to be that between absolutism and the
other positions: weak relativism would not undermine moral science, but
would undermine our interest in it almost as much as strong relativism
and noncognitivism. To focus the discussion, however, I will ignore
these complications, and take for granted that the traditional distinction
that matters for a moral science is that between absolutism and weak
relativism, on the one hand, and noncognitivism and strong relativism,
1
By contrast, the distinction between strong forms of relativism and noncognitivism
doesn’t matter for the possibility of a moral science: it is mostly stressed by people
in the noncognitivist tradition (e.g. Horgan and Timmons 2004) who think that
relativism is obviously false and that opponents of noncognitivism (e.g. ShaferLandau 2003: 33) tend to equate or conflate the two and therefore think that
noncognitivism must also be false.
A number of interesting points about can be raised concerning the relation
between relativism and noncognitivism. For a recent discussion of combinations of
cognitivist and noncognitivist views, for example, see Ridge (2006a) and Schroeder
(2009), for a defense of the distinction between relativism and expressivism, see
Horgan and Timmons (2004), and for recent discussion of the relation between
judgment and expression, see Joyce (2002), Ridge (2006c), and Schroeder (2008a).
A further complication is the introduction of assessor-relativism, according to
which the truth-value of a judgment or claim is relative to circumstances of evaluation determined by the context of assessment. Applied to moral judgments, this
view might imply that a moral judgment is true relative to my circumstances of
evaluation, but not to yours. I ignore this complication, as the difference between
assessor-relativism, noncognitivist expressivism and speaker relativism seems
largely notational. (See e.g. Dreier 2009; Björnsson and Finlay 2010: 24–5; Björnsson and Almér 2010: n. 26, e.g.).
on the other. The difficulty that I will be concerned with here is that this
distinction has seemed to dissolve in light of work by people in the
noncognitivist tradition: people have been at loss pinpointing the real
difference between an absolutist cognitivist such as Russ Shafer-Landau
and an heir of the noncognitivist tradition such as Allan Gibbard. If my
way of explaining the distinction and deal with this difficulty is basically
sound, complications can be added afterwards.
2. The Difficulty: Quasi-Realism and Quasi-Absolutism
The difficulty I have in mind, and that I would like to circumvent, stems
from the promise of what Simon Blackburn dubbed “quasi-realism”.
Under this banner, Blackburn and others have famously attempted to
show how phenomena characteristic of paradigmatically absolutist
cognitive thinking and discourse are just what we should expect given
only make assumptions that noncognitivists would be happy to endorse.
Such ambitions were part of the noncognitivist tradition in ethics from
early on (Stevenson 1937; 1963: 214-20; Hare 1970) but have been especially prominent in recent work by people such as Blackburn himself
(1984, 1993, 1998), Mark Timmons (1999) and Allan Gibbard (1990,
2003), and I have contributed in small ways to this recent trend myself
(Björnsson 2001, 2013; Björnsson and Finlay 2010).
Quasi-realism responds to what might be the major problem for
noncognitivism: that it seems to go against the common sense
understanding of moral thinking and discourse. No category mistake
seems to be involved in saying that some moral claims are true or
correct, or that some people believe that suicide is morally wrong, or
that someone’s conduct was described as morally objectionable.
Moreover, moral predicates can figure in various unasserted contexts,
just as ordinary descriptive predicates: in negated claims, questions,
antecedents of conditionals, and in characterizations of objects of mental
states such as fear or hope. Such embedded occurrences, it seems, would
not be straightforwardly intelligible if moral claims were simply expressions of conative and noncognitive states of mind. Why, for example,
would we make negative moral claims, expressing negative moral
judgments, unless they rule out states-of-affairs represented by their
positive counterparts? To make a negative judgment isn’t just to not
make, or event to refuse to make, the positive counterpart: the agnostic
rejects both a claim and its negation. And why would we make conditional statements with moral antecedents if moral terms express desires
rather than represent facts? Saying that it might be right to punish
someone only if she has done something wrong seems to presuppose that
it is a real matter of fact whether she has done something wrong, a fact
that something can be conditional on. A further problem — shared by
noncognitivists and relativists — is that it has seemed to many that when
one person believes that an act is morally wrong and another believes
that it isn’t, then if one person is correct, the other must be wrong: they
have a real disagreement about the correctness of the claim that the act is
morally wrong.
Defenders of noncognitivism or relativism can reply in three ways to
these problems. The first is to deny or qualify the alleged evidence. This
might be most promising when it comes to intuitions about agreement
and disagreement, where quite a few people — philosophers and laymen
— deny that moral disagreement must be factual (but see Goodwin
2008). The second is to try explaining away the phenomena as based on
widespread mistakes about moral thinking and discourse. But the third
and probably most popular kind of reply is quasi-realism. It takes
seemingly cognitivist or absolutist phenomena for granted and tries to
show how they can be accommodated by noncognitivism. Various
approaches have been attempted, but what follows, in brief outline, is
one that I find comparatively plausible (Björnsson 2001, 2013; cf.
Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 1990, 2003; Timmons 1999; Schroeder
2008).
First, let a thought be something that is formed in an act of judgment
and can be subject to negation. Given the practical importance of the
moral attitudes that noncognitivists take to constitute our basic moral
thoughts, and the complexity of grounds on which such attitudes can be
based, it makes sense that we should have a “faculty of judgment”
governing such attitudes, letting us accept some attitudes — putting
them in position to govern us in normal ways — while rejecting others
— disqualifying them from so governing us (Björnsson 2001: 90–93).1
Now understand the negation of a thought as the psychological item the
function of which is to prevent a given thought from governing us, an
item added to a thought when we make a negative judgment. Since we
can suspend judgment — consider a thought and try on an attitude
without either fully disqualifying it from or putting it in position to have
its effects — it is possible for the agnostic to accept neither a thought
nor its negation (Björnsson 2001: 94; cf. Sinclair 2011).
Second, non-cognitivists can understand the application of predicates
such as “correct”, “wrong”, “true” and “false” to moral thoughts and
claims, building on the following two assumptions: (1) “True” and
“false” attribute conformity to or violation of some fundamental
standard for accepting or rejecting a thought, or for accepting or rejecting a syntactically declarative claim expressing such a thought.
(2) “Correct” and “right” more generally attribute conformity to some
relevant standard; “incorrect” and “wrong” attribute violation of such a
standard. What the relevant standard is typically varies with the object of
assessment: we say that a move in chess is correct, having in mind its
adherence to the rules of the game, or say that a map correct, having in
mind that its elements correspond to relevant elements in the are
mapped. In applying any of these six predicates to ordinary representational thoughts, the relevant standard is that he world is at it is
represented by the thought. In applying them to moral thoughts,
however, non-cognitivists can say that we relate to whatever standards
fundamentally govern our acts of moral judgment, i.e. the standards that
ultimately determine whether we accept or reject the attitude constituting
the moral thought under consideration (Björnsson 2013).
Third, it seems that in everyday parlance, to believe something just is
to take it to be true, so noncognitivists can say that our thought that
wanton cruelty is wrong is a belief insofar as we take it to accord with
1
It is of course true that we can prevent the expressions of thoughts that we do
accept, and allow expression of thoughts that we reject: perhaps we are acting, for
example. But acceptance and rejection in judgment could be seen as what governs
the sincere and spontaneous effects of our thoughts, rather than our play-acting. Cf.
Gibbard 1990: ch. 4.
our standards for attitudes constituting such thoughts, i.e. insofar as we
accept the thought, or are disposed to accept it, in an act of judgment.
Relatedly, to describe something seems to be to say something about it
that can be true or false. If so, we describe wanton cruelty when we say
that it is wrong. Furthermore, it seems that something is a representation
if it is the kind of thing that can be true or false. So beliefs or claims that
wanton cruelty is morally wrong are representations. Similarly, we can
say that our belief that wanton cruelty is wrong is true if and only if it
corresponds to the facts in the sense that things are as it says they are,
that is, if and only if wanton cruelty is wrong. Since we accept the claim
that wanton cruelty is wrong, we can also say that it corresponds to the
facts. (Cf. Dreier 2004.)
Fourth, since we typically assume that fundamental standards for
accepting or rejecting moral thoughts have universal scope, applying to
thoughts independently of whose thoughts they are, we will think that if
one party of a moral disagreement is correct, the other is not (Björnsson
2013). Noncognitivists can explain the assumption of universal scope
with reference to the general function of moral thinking and moral
discourse, namely to coordinate attitudes: such coordination requires that
attitudes satisfy the same standards, independently of whose attitudes
they are.
Fifth, noncognitivists might say that to accept a conditional thought is
to accept the consequent under supposition of the antecedent, thus
making sense of conditional thoughts, such as the thought that if he
didn’t do anything wrong, he shouldn’t be punished. To accept
something under the supposition that someone didn’t do anything wrong
is to accept it while reasoning as if accepting the thought that he didn’t
do anything wrong, which on noncognitivism is to reason as if accepting
a negative moral attitude towards what he did (Björnsson 2001).
Sixth, and finally, noncognitivists can deny that moral facts depend on
our attitudes. For example, for me to accept that torture would have been
right even if I had not disapproved of torture would be for me to accept
that torture is right when reasoning as if accepting that I do not disapprove of torture. Since my grounds for accepting that torture is wrong
make no reference to my disapproval of torture, but instead to its disrespect for and effects on the victim and society, such reasoning would not
involve any changes in these grounds, and thus no changes in my
judgment that torture is wrong (Blackburn 1993: chs. 8-9, 1998: ch. 9).
It is still an open question to what extent quasi-realism is successful,
and absolutists in particular tend to be unimpressed (see e.g. ShaferLandau 2003: ch. 1; Huemer 2005: ch. 2). Nevertheless, the quasi-realist
program is clearly rich and promising enough to warrant an interest in its
consequences. The most obvious, and intended, consequence of its
success would of course be that noncognitivism becomes more plausible, as it would avoid the seemingly implausible metaphysical,
epistemological and semantic commitments of absolutist cognitivist
positions, while respecting the many similarities between morality and
paradigmatically cognitive domains that seem to afford knowledge of
objective facts.1
But our concern here is with a difficulty recognized by a number of
authors, namely that the success of quasi-realism would undermine
standard ways of understanding the difference between absolutism and
noncognitivism (Wright 1985; Boghossian 1990; Divers and Miller
1994; Dworkin 1996; Rosen 1998; Dreier 2002; Gibbard 2003; Dreier
2004; Harcourt 2005; Street 2011). If successful, quasi-realism would let
noncognitivists say that moral thinking ensues in moral beliefs that can
be true or false depending on whether they correctly represent how
things are, and whose truth-value is independent of whose beliefs they
are, and further say that in moral disagreement, both parties cannot be
correct. Employing similar explanatory strategies, strong relativists
might try to adopt and adapt some of these explanations, defending a
form of quasi-absolutism with reference to the practical function of
moral thinking, discourse, and criticism (Björnsson and Finlay 2010;
Björnsson 2013; cf. Wong 1984: 73; Finlay 2004). Traditionally,
noncognitivists have of course also rejected more specific positive theses
often associated with substantial forms of both absolutist and relativist
cognitivism, denying that moral predicates come with analytic
1
Intriguingly, Street (2011) argues that quasi-realism will face epistemic problems
inherent in taking moral facts to be entirely independent of our views about such
facts. For criticism, see Vavova (2013).
constraints substantial enough to provide truth-conditions for moral
judgments, or that standard naturalist theories of reference determine the
referents of moral predicates. But so have metaethical non-naturalists
(Shafer-Landau 2003; Huemer 2005; Enoch 2011).
3. Some Attempts to Retain the Old Distinctions
Drawing on earlier proposals (O'Leary-Hawthorne and Price 1996; Fine
2001; Gibbard 2003), Jamie Dreier (2004) suggests that the real bone of
contention between contemporary heirs of noncognitivism (“expressivists”) and non-naturalist absolutist cognitivists (“realists”) is this:
realists, but not expressivists, think that fundamental explanations of the
nature of our moral beliefs will make reference to moral facts.1 In a
similar vein, James Lenman (2003) suggests that what distinguishes
cognitivists from a quasi-realists is that the former takes moral statements to have truth-conditions irreducibly, rather than in virtue of their
practical function. The proposals remain somewhat unclear in the
absence of constraints on the relevant kind of explanation, and this difficulty is somewhat compounded by the fact that quasi-realists have
argued that they too can accommodate explanations of moral beliefs in
terms of moral facts (e.g. Gibbard 2003: part IV). Of course, Gibbard
(1990: ch. 5; 2003: 20) denies that “robust normative facts” play a role in
explaining the nature of moral judgments, but the question here is what
that denial amounts to — as Gibbard (2003: 20) notes, this denial is
shared by some non-naturalist realists. More importantly for our
purposes, however, it is unclear why the difference in explanatory
commitments matters for the possibility of a moral science. Such differences are of course theoretically interesting. But as long as moral truth is
independent of the attitudes of individual judges, the correctness of
judgments made by one party of a moral disagreement excludes the
correctness of judgments made by another, and the correctness is determined by judge-independent facts, why does the order of explanation
1
The explanation in question is not a causal explanation of why we form moral
beliefs, but an account of the truth-makers of attributions of such beliefs. Realists
can deny that moral facts are causally efficacious without thereby ceasing to be
realists.
matter for the possibility of a collaborative enterprise aiming at the
accumulation of correct answers to shared moral questions?
Another way to try drawing the relevant distinction is to understand
belief in terms of the function or direction of fit of the act of moral
judgment. This looks promising, because noncognitivist from Stevenson
(1937) onwards have stressed that the function of moral claims is to
produce a desire-like state, a state the psychological function of which is
to bring about certain emotional states and behavior: disapproval of
actions taken to be wrongful, say, and the avoidance of such actions. In
other words, they have stressed that the function of moral thinking is to
make the world fit the judgment (Stoljar 1993; Horwich 1994; O'LearyHawthorne and Price 1996).
Unfortunately, this is not enough in itself to make the distinction,
since cognitivists can take moral beliefs to have exactly that function or
direction of fit in addition to their cognitive function (cf. Dreier 2004:
33; Fine 2001: 8). What needs to be added, it seems, is that noncognitivists take the act of moral judgment not to have the direction of fit of
belief-forming mechanisms: moral beliefs are not to be adjusted to the
world; the function of moral judgment is not to adequately map moral
reality; and moral beliefs are not parts of such a map. The problem is
that the quasi-realist strategies might seem to force the non-cognitivist to
say that the act of moral judgment is to adjust moral beliefs to fit the
facts. After all, if quasi-realism is successful, we are justified in saying
that if it is a fact that wanton cruelty is wrong, then judgments to the
effect that wanton cruelty is wrong are correct and judgments to the
effect that it isn’t wrong are incorrect; conversely if it is a fact that
cruelty isn’t wrong. In order to be correct, moral judgments need to be
adjusted to fit the facts, just as do ordinary non-normative beliefs (cf.
Sinclair 2005: 255–56).
A possible way around this problem is to take the relevant kind of
function to be a biological or more broadly etiological function. Such a
function can be defined not in terms of when the judgments produced
are correct or incorrect, but in terms of what the judgments have tracked
such that this explains why, in general, we keep making the judgments.
The noncognitivist would then deny that moral judgment have as their
etiological function to track features of the world (cf. Ridge 2006b: 637–
8), and the relativist could deny that your moral judgment and mine have
as their function to keep track of the same features of the world. But
there are problems with this suggestion too. One is that the proposal
would be rejected both by some self-professed noncognitivists or
expressivists who have thought that moral judgment has as its biological
function to produce thoughts that correspond to certain (judge-relative)
facts (e.g. Gibbard 1990: 117–18), and by others, who are more sceptical
about this biological claim, but nevertheless deny that its truth would
undermine expressivism (Blackburn 1998: 121). 1 Another problem is
that at least non-naturalist cognitivists also want to deny that the content
of moral judgments is determined by whatever function such judgments
might be said to have from an etiological or biological point of view.
The last problem points to yet another way of understanding functions
and direction of fit. Here is Neil Sinclair (2006: 257–58):
Our beliefs determine the means we take to pursue our ends — this is
why the truth conditions of a belief can be plausibly thought of as the
condition under which the action it prompts would be successful in
pursuit of those ends it is coupled with. Since the successful pursuit of
ends depends on the state of the world, the best explanation of why
beliefs affect the way we pursue our ends is that the system responsible for them is taken to produce representations whose content
matches the state of the world. That is, the function of beliefs … is to
have their contents match the state of the world.
I have already pointed out problems with an appeal to tracking based on
etiology. But Sinclair’s suggestion is designed to allow that the
representations in question can be given the role of beliefs by agents
because they take the system to produce representations whose content
matches the state of the world. This might seem like a very sensible
move. Whatever biological or etiological function something has, what
matters seems to be what function we give it: perhaps the primary
biological function of perception of human beauty is to select a healthy
spouse, but human culture have given this perception and our reactions a
1
What Gibbard denies (1990: ch. 6) is that these facts are substantive normative
facts, such that believing that they obtain is ipso facto to form a normative belief.
much larger role, in many ways disconnected from that function.
Similarly, even if moral judgments have as their etiological or biological
function to track facts pertaining to how well a moral thought would
promote beneficial cooperation, agents might rely on them for other
reasons.
Unfortunately, this move to agent-selected function does not seem to
help, if we assume that noncognitivists have successfully explained why
we would take our moral beliefs to be correct representations, or to
correspond to the facts, or match the state of the world. Given that
assumption, it seems overwhelmingly likely that we do let our moral
judgments govern our actions because we take our faculty of moral
judgment to be fairly reliable in producing correct representations. For
suppose that we had constantly found our judgments to be in conflict
with our standards of correctness for such judgments, because the
deliverance of our faculty of moral judgment were seriously unstable, or
because we somehow kept being seriously mistaken about what our own
moral beliefs are. Then we would very likely not be relying on our moral
beliefs to guide our actions. If we wanted to help people do what is
morally right, for example, we would not rely on our judgments of moral
rightness, and if we wanted to do some good, we would not trust our
judgments about what is good. So it seems that we do rely on our moral
judgments in guiding our actions because we take our faculty of moral
judgment to reliably produce correct moral beliefs.
In this section, I have briefly raised various problems for attempts at
preserving the cognitivist-noncognitivist distinction. I do not presume
that my discussion has been conclusive: there might well be ways of
finessing these attempts to overcome the problems. However, instead of
exploring these attempts further, I will suggest that we can sidestep all
these difficulties if we put to one side the distinction between
cognitivism and noncognitivism and focus on the distinction between,
on the one hand, absolutism and weak relativism, and, on the other,
noncognitivism and strong relativism. The trick is to spell out the sense
in which a moral science is made possible by the former because,
according to them, people who are trying to answer moral questions
have a common goal, or are concerned with answering the same
questions.
4. Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions
Intuitively, absolutism makes room for what I have called a moral
science because if we are all asking the same questions, then we can
share the answers. (Weak relativism approximates the result by having
large groups being concerned with the same question, or nearly the same
question.) What I want to capture is the sense that only absolutism takes
everyone who judges whether an act is morally wrong to be concerned
with the same question.
The difficulty is that, assuming the success of quasi-realist and quasiabsolutist strategies, talk about ”being concerned with the same
question” can be understood even from a noncognitivist or relativist
starting point. You and I can plausibly be said to be concerned with the
same question when I would be correct in thinking that the act is wrong
if and only if you would correct in thinking so, and incorrect in thinking
that the act is wrong if and only if you would be. And, as outlined in
section 2, noncognitivists or relativists can let us say this because they
take assessments of whether the judgments of others are correct or
incorrect to be based on whether they satisfy our standards for moral
judgment.
What is striking about this quasi-absolutist move is that it lets us say
that the correctness conditions of two moral judgments coincide on the
mere ground that they involve the same non-cognitive attitude. It is on
this ground that we can proceed to assess the correctness of the moral
judgments of others by whatever standards we assess our own moral
judgments, in effect projecting an external standard of correctness onto
their judgments. My plan, then, is to recover the important metaethical
distinctions with reference to judgment-internal — rather than projective
or external – correctness conditions. So let me explain what these are.
Start with the following trivial observation: human beings engage in a
wide variety of goal-directed mental and physical activities. We try to
win wars, have coffee, express our innermost feelings, remember a
password, or hurt someone. Goal-directed activities come with their own
success conditions and their own correctness conditions. Suppose that
Jill wants to hurt Joe, and manages to do so by telling him that she has
always seen him as a loser. We can judge her action as a mistake by
various standards, but relative to the goal that defines her effort to hurt
Joe, it is a success, and her way of trying to hurt Joe is a correct way.
The action satisfies its internal success and correctness conditions.
Among goal-directed activities, we find acts of judgment: we try to
determine whether British Marmite is tasty, whether Brussels is the
capital of Belgium, whether increasing the number of troops will win the
war, or whether it was wrong to go to war in the first place. In making
such judgments, we are trying to get something right. Exactly how to
best think about what we are trying to get right when making a judgment
is debatable. In the first instance, it might seem that we should go by the
agent’s fundamental criteria for a correct judgment, the ones that we take
to trump all others if there is a conflict. If there are no clear fundamental
criteria, but rather a tangled cluster of criteria, we should perhaps go by
whether the object judged has whatever property best fits this cluster
well enough and better than other properties, or he property that makes
best sense of the practice of relying on the concept. Alternatively, the
requirement might be that the object should have whatever property the
concept is counterfactually responsive to, or has as its etiological
function to track. A fully worked out theory of moral judgment will take
a stance on these issues, telling us what exactly determines internal
success conditions to acts of judgment. But independently of what that
account might say, my suggestion is that we should understand the
distinction between absolutism and the other metaethical positions in
terms of such judgment-internal correctness conditions, rather than in
terms of truth conditions. Here is how it would let us define absolutism
about a concept C:
ABSOLUTISM:
For any object A, and any two acts of judgment, J and
J’, about whether A is C, if J would be internally correct (incorrect) if
yielding the verdict that A is C, then J’ would also be internally
correct (incorrect) if yielding the verdict that A is C.
To illustrate: If you and I are both judging whether Brussels is the
capital of Belgium, then if my judgment would be internally correct
yielding the verdict that Brussels is the capital of Belgium, then your
judgment would be internally correct if yielding the same verdict:
ABSOLUTISM holds for C = the capital of Belgium. By contrast, if you
and I are both judging whether British Marmite is tasty and if my
judgment that it is tasty is internally correct, that doesn’t mean that your
judgment that it is tasty would be internally correct: ABSOLUTISM does
not hold for C = tasty, because you and I judge taste in relation to different standards, i.e. our different palates.1
In this context, the most important advantage of defining absolutism
in terms of judgment-internal correctness conditions is that it provides a
straightforward answer to the worry raised by the prospect of a successful quasi-realism, the worry articulated by Wright, Gibbard, Dreier and
others. The crucial difference between absolutist cognitivism and a form
of noncognitivism that lets us affirm the very sentences that used to
define absolutism, is simply that the latter denies ABSOLUTISM about our
various moral concepts.
This denial, I take it, is no less part of Gibbard’s and Blackburn’s
views than it was part of Stevenson’s. Noncognitivist analyses of moral
judgments in terms of attitudes, decisions or the acceptance of norms or
plans leave it conceptually open that two judges applying the same
moral concept to the same action perform acts with different internal
success and correctness conditions. Moreover, these analyses suggest no
internal success conditions other than whatever ultimate criteria that
moral judges employ in the application of moral concepts, criteria that
seem to vary from judge to judge (cf. Fine 2001: 23–4). Indeed, I suspect
that it is at least in part because noncognitivists have thought that
something like ABSOLUTISM is implausible for moral predicates that they
have thought that moral disagreement often is best understood as
disagreement in attitude rather than cognitive or factual disagreement.2
1
I am not denying that some tastiness-judgments have more intersubjective
ambitions. However, I take it that most of our tastiness-judgments are different: we
make our judgments knowing fully well that others might make different
judgments, and without thinking that our resulting beliefs will map onto some
standard independent of our own palate. The example is intended to involve
judgments of this latter kind. For further illustration, see the case of nearby, in
section 5.
2
Blackburn (1998: ch. 9) is concerned to reject of various forms of relativism, but
nothing he says in his criticism of relativism contradicts our new characterization of
absolutism, as its truth or falsity would have no direct implications of the sort
Blackburn is concerned to reject.
Redefining absolutism in terms of judgment-internal correctness
conditions not only lets us uphold the distinction between cognitivist
absolutism and quasi-realism or quasi-absolutism, but also preserves
what was important about the distinction between absolutism and weak
relativism, on the one hand, and noncognitivism and strong relativism,
on the other. If absolutism or weak relativism were true about moral
concepts, the internal correctness conditions of our moral judgments
would be coordinated in just the way needed for a moral science.
According to absolutism, everyone who asks what acts are wrong, and
what societies just, etc. would be performing acts with the same internal
success conditions, thus opening prospects for collaboration in achieving
that success; according to weak relativism, the same would be true about
large groups of people. Not so for noncognitivism or strong relativism:
we would be voicing different concerns when asking moral questions,
and common enquiries would have to be preceded by the establishment
of common objectives for these efforts through a prior convergence of
attitudes. This wouldn’t necessarily be a less worthy task, but more akin
to politics than a normative enquiry or a normative science.
Understanding absolutism in terms of judgment-internal correctness
conditions also makes perfect sense of mainstream metaethical inquiry.
For example, the search for conceptual rules for or platitudes about
moral concepts seems entirely appropriate if such rules or platitudes are
understood as our fundamental criteria for the application of these
concepts in acts of judgment. Similarly, standard arguments for and
against different metaethical positions are perfectly intelligible. Our
sense that two people are in real disagreement when one thinks that an
act is wrong and another thinks that it is right can certainly indicate that
in thinking about the issue they are engaged in acts of judgment with the
same goals, and thus support absolutism (Brink 1989: 29–35; Smith
1994: 34–5; Björnsson 2012: 372–6). This support is of course problematic if relativists and noncognitivists can explain this sense with
reference to kinds of disagreement that do not presuppose a common
goal of judgment, as they have tried to do (Gibbard 2003: 268–87).
Conversely, the deep and widespread disagreement that seems to plague
normative theory and has been taken as evidence for noncognitivism or
neighboring forms of relativism is well understood as prima facie
evidence that we have different goals when we are trying to decide
whether an act is wrong: we use different criteria, and disagree
systematically about particular cases (Wong 1984; Blackburn 1984: 168;
Harman and Thomson 1996: 8–14; Loeb 1998; Tersman 2006; Björnsson
2012, 2013). This evidence, in turn, is problematic if it can be made
plausible that there is a common goal behind these criteria and that disagreement is due to a variety of mistakes (Brink 1989: 197–210; Huemer
2005: ch. 6).
If my proposal here is on the right track, quasi-realism can be what
most have taken it to be: not a threat to the most important metaethical
distinctions, but an attempt to show that various embedded moral claims
as well as everyday talk and thinking about moral truth, facts, disagreement, and so forth are intelligible given noncognitivist (or strongly
relativistic) starting-points. If successful, quasi-realism undermines
objections to noncognitivism based on apparently cognitivist phenomena, and objections to both noncognitivism and strong relativism based
on apparently absolutist phenomena. But it leaves noncognitivism and
strong relativism as much of a threat to the idea of a moral science as it
used to be. Convergence in moral belief would still depend not only on
better methods to find correct answers to our questions, but also,
crucially, on the convergence of these questions.
5. Questions and Answers
Question: Quasi-realists like to say that the function of moral judgment
and moral discourse is to achieve coordination of attitudes. Doesn’t that
suggest that moral judgments have absolutist correctness conditions:
they are correct if they are such as to achieve successful coordination
(under suitable circumstances)? Reply: If they have, then for our
purposes quasi-realism would indeed be a form of absolutism. But there
is no reason to think that whatever correctness conditions are provided
by that function would be the same for every moral judge. The function
of moral judgments is not simply to coordinate attitudes in some judgeindependent way, but plausibly to coordinate attitudes in ways beneficial
to the moral judge, and to determine with whom she coordinates. What
counts as successful coordination of the relevant sort is thus likely
relative to the moral judge (Gibbard 1990: 117–18; Björnsson 2012:
382–83; cf. Wong 1984).
Question: Doesn’t the quasi-realist story presuppose that judges are
committed to an intersubjective standard of correctness for attitudes,
applying equally to all moral judges? And doesn’t that show that under
quasi-realism, ABSOLUTISM is satisfied for moral concepts? Reply: There
are numerous different possible intersubjective standards. To say that
judges are committed to the intersubjectivity of standards of correctness
because this is required for coordination is not to say that they are
committed to the same intersubjective standard.
Question: According to quasi-realism, everyone who is judging
whether an act is wrong is trying to decide whether it is wrong, and
every moral judge thinks that she would be successful if and only if the
act is either wrong and she judged that it is wrong, or the act isn’t wrong
and she judged that it isn’t wrong. Why, then, isn’t ABSOLUTISM satisfied for C = wrongness? Reply: Assume that we can naturally say that
two judges are both trying to determine whether A is C, and that each is
thinking that she would be successful if and only if either A is C and she
judges that it is, or A isn’t C and she judges that it isn’t. This doesn’t
show that if the first judge would be successful in judging that A is C,
the second would be successful in making the same judgment. For
example, suppose that both Laura and Liz are in London, each trying to
find out whether Regent’s Park is nearby, and each thinking that she will
be successful if and only if either Regent’s Park is nearby and she judges
that it is, or it isn’t nearby and she judges that it isn’t. It doesn’t follow
that if Laura would be successful in her endeavor if she concluded that
Regent’s Park is nearby, Liz would also be successful if she came to the
same conclusion. For if Laura and Liz are at different locations, or have
different amounts of time or means of transportation at their disposal,
what areas they count as nearby might be quite different. Similarly,
suppose that both Laura and Liz want to find out whether British
Marmite is tasty. If Liz is successful in her endeavor by coming to think
that Marmite is tasty, that doesn’t mean that Laura would be successful
in her endeavor if she came to think that Marmite is tasty: perhaps it is
tasty for Liz, but not for Laura.
6. A Complication: The Pragmatics of Goal-Attribution
Before closing, I want to mention what I take to be a more serious worry
about the appeal to judgment-internal success conditions, a worry relating to the pragmatics of goal-attributions.
The basis for the worry is that our grounds for attributing judgmental
goals to a moral judge might be conflicted. She might in effect lean on
conflicting criteria for judgmental success, and what criteria she takes as
overriding might vary with the circumstances; with whether she is
considering the matter in abstract or concrete terms, say, or with the
order in which she considers various considerations. She might also be
conflicted about which way of considering the matter is the right way,
leaning one way or the other depending on what considerations are
brought up. Or she might express a consistent view about which criteria
are overriding, but in practice nearly always relies on the other set.
Moreover, her judgments might perhaps be seen as tracking either of
two kinds of fact, depending on what one takes to be ideal or normal
conditions for tracking. And perhaps considerations of interpretative
charity points in different directions depending on how much weight is
given to different aspects of rationality.
Perhaps grounds for attributing judgmental goals are conflicted in one
or more of these ways for most of us. Suppose in addition that the
constitutive rules of goal attribution fail to determine what weight to
give to these conflicting grounds and so fail to determine what we
should say that the goals are. On this view of goal attribution, related to
Quine’s view of the indeterminacy of translation, it could be a
fundamentally pragmatic or political move in moral discourse to say that
everyone who is deciding whether an act is wrong has the same goal,
and will be successful under the same conditions.1 And if that were the
1
Compare what goes on when we say that, at heart, someone means well, even
though some of her actions and intentions are malicious. Though she is disposed to
do evil and endorse malice under some circumstances, she might very well also be
disposed to do good and to reject malice under other circumstances. What dispositions should we take to show her innermost intentions, her fundamental nature,
whether she means well at heart? That, it seems, could be a matter of what dispositions are best integrated with other dispositions, or most stable under normal or
privileged circumstances. But it could also be a matter of what dispositions we have
case, the choice between absolutism, forms of relativism, and noncognitivism could be a fundamentally political choice, and one in which the
quasi-realist might come down on the absolutist side, thus again
eradicating the proposed distinction.1 After all, on standard noncognitivist or relativist accounts, we engage in moral discourse because it
helps us coordinate our expectations and actions so as to be able to live
together and cooperate. Coordination might be much helped by treating
each other as having a common goal and working together to both
clarify that goal, and to find ways of achieving it.
This, then, is the worry that I want to address very briefly before
closing: the politics of goal attribution could give us strong enough
reasons to endorse ABSOLUTISM for moral predicates on grounds that
seem perfectly acceptable given a picture of moral thinking that
noncognitivists and relativists have been happy to endorse.
Suppose that this worry is well founded. If so, we might try to distinguish absolutism from its rivals with reference to the grounds on which
ABSOLUTISM is accepted. Metaethicists, in particular those in the
noncognitivist and relativist traditions, have been concerned mainly with
explaining various puzzling aspects of moral thinking and moral
discourse, in part guided by a wish to let us participate in normative
discussion with a clearer grasp of what is going on (cf. Wong 1984:
ch. 8). Their concern has not been to paint the most agreeable or
pragmatically useful picture possible, but the one that is most revealing
and accurate. For that reason, we might understand absolutism as the
claim that in contexts where we are primarily interested in politically
disinterested explanation, it is correct to ascribe the same judgmentinternal success conditions to everyone who is judging whether something is C.
reasons to stress. Her friends are perhaps likely to stress one aspect, her enemies
another, a moral reformer a third, a social engineer a fourth, and she might herself
stress different aspects in different situations. But the mere recognition of her various dispositions, unguided by a definite interest might point in no definite direction.
1
Complicating the picture somewhat is the possibility that the attribution of
judgments of moral wrongness might also be a pragmatic affair (cf. Björnsson and
McPherson 2013).
Much more can be said about taking absolutism and its rivals as
explanatory claims. It is not clear that shared explanatory standards are
determinate enough to settle the issue here in all cases, nor entirely clear
that explanatory virtues can be entirely independent from the very practical concerns that noncognitivists and relativists are eager to stress. But
understanding the metaethical positions as claims with a primarily
explanatory import offers a perspective that should appeal to those who
take a pragmatic view of goal-attribution and for whom the worry raised
in this section will seem especially pressing. For those who think that the
pragmatics of goal-attribution has little to do with what the judgmental
goals we actually have, ABSOLUTISM itself would seem to capture what
absolutism was all about.
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