Abstract
I argue that argumentation is not to be identified with (attempted) rational persuasion, because although rational persuasion appears to consist of arguments, some uses of arguments are not attempts at rational persuasion. However, the use of arguments in argumentative communication to try to persuade is one kind of attempt at rational persuasion. What makes it rational is that its informing ideal is to persuade on the basis of adequate grounds, grounds that make it reasonable and rational to accept the claim at issue.
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Notes
Pinto (2010, p. 230) calls advocating an argument, “making” and argument.
To persuade (Oxford English Dictionary): “1. To induce (a person) to believe something; to lead to accept a statement, doctrine, fact, etc.; to win to a belief or assurance. 2. To induce or win over (a person) to an act or course of action; to draw the will of another to something, by inclining his judgement or desire to it; to prevail upon, or urge successfully, to do something. … 5. To induce the doing or practice of (an act, course or action, etc.) by argument, entreaty or the like; to urge successfully upon one; to induce or lead to by reasoning, etc.”
After having conducted the inquiry you might say, “I am now persuaded by these considerations that….” But that is a façon de parler: it does not follow that you were trying to persuade yourself of the proposition you ended up endorsing as a result of the inquiry.
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference, Persuasion et argumentation: Colloque international organisé par le CRAL à l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. 7–9 septembre 2010. I am grateful to Rongdon Jin and Ralph Johnson for helpful critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to two anonymous referees for invaluable criticisms and suggestions.
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Blair, J.A. Argumentation as Rational Persuasion. Argumentation 26, 71–81 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9235-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9235-6