Abstract
I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form “S is pleased/glad that P” and “S is displeased/sad that P” should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman’s examples. My interpretation is plausible in its own right. Moreover, it is significant within the context of the debate. It allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the initial understanding of happiness that Feldman believes is open to counterexample: that happiness is the sum of attitudinal pleasure minus attitudinal displeasure and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness.
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Notes
Feldman (2004).
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 16.
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 20.
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 66.
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 56.
More recently Feldman has stated his theory of happiness as an aggregation of what he terms “occurrent” intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure. He contrasts occurrent attitudinal pleasure with the disposition to have attitudinal pleasure. “[S]omeone might say that throughout the time Bob lived in Massachusetts, he was always pleased to live there. He might intend to express the idea that Bob never had any complaints about living in Massachusetts and that, whenever he thought about it, he was occurrently pleased about it. When these things are true, Bob may be said to be dispositionally pleased about living in Massachusetts. If we are talking about dispositional pleasure, it would be acceptable to say that Bob is pleased to be living in Massachusetts throughout a certain interval of time even if Bob happens to be asleep at many moments during that time….” (“What is This Thing Called Happiness?” (Delivered to the Philosophy Department at Arizona State University, 2 March 2009), pp. 11–12; available at one point on Feldman’s website.) Feldman also uses ‘occurrent’ to formulate his account in his book with the same title, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 137. Since my argument in this paper does not turn on the distinction Feldman draws in these remarks, I state a simplified version of his theory of happiness that does not use the term ‘occurrent.’
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 57.
Pleasure and The Good Life, p. 58. In his reply to Michael Zimmerman in a book symposium on Pleasure and The Good Life in Philosophical Studies, 136/3 (2007), Feldman draws a distinction between basic and derivative value states. He does not there use the language of ‘extrinsic attitudinal pleasure.’ Rather, he says that “when a state of affairs is a basic intrinsic value state, it has its own intrinsic value and not in virtue of any relation it bears to other valuable states of affairs.” (p. 448.) He says that he has not explained this distinction in much detail “in print” and that his “most extended discussion appears in my ‘What is this thing called happiness?’ which has not yet been published.” (note 6 on p. 448.) Here is what he says in the unpublished paper (available at one point on his website): “It seems to me that there is an important distinction between intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and extrinsic attitudinal pleasure. In some cases a person is pleased about a certain fact, but only because he takes this fact to be a sign of another fact that he is pleased about. For example, Bob might be pleased to see the beads of sweat breaking out on his rival’s forehead. Bob might be pleased about this, but only because it suggests that his rival is tiring fast, and he’s pleased about that. And he’s pleased that his rival is tiring fast only because it suggests that Bob is going to be able to defeat him. I will say that a person is intrinsically attitudinally pleased to some degree about some state of affairs p, if and only if he is pleased about p to that degree for its own sake, and not because there is some other state of affairs, q, such that he is pleased about p only because he takes p to be suitably related to q, and he is pleased about q. I will say that a person is merely extrinsically attitudinally pleased about some state of affairs if and only if he is pleased about it, but not intrinsically.” (pp. 17–18.) Feldman presents little defense of the distinction in his book What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford University Press, 2010). He does, however, make remarks to similar to those in the paper. “It seems to me that there is an important distinction between intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and extrinsic attitudinal pleasure. In some cases a person is pleased about a certain fact, but only because he takes this fact to be a sign of another fact that he is pleased about. For example, Tom might be pleased to see beads of sweat breaking out on his rival’s forehead. Tom might be pleased about this, but only because it suggests that his rival is tiring fast, and he’s pleased about that. And he’s pleased that his rival is tiring fast only because it suggests that Tom is going to be able to defeat him. I will say that a person is intrinsically attitudinally pleased to some degree about some state of affairs, p, if and only if he is pleased about p to that degree for its own sake, and not because there is some other state of affairs, q, such that he is pleased about p only because he takes p to be suitably related to q, and he is pleased about q. I will say that a person is merely extrinsically attitudinally pleased about some state of affairs if and only if he is pleased about it, but not intrinsically. Every atom of happiness is an attribution of occurrent intrinsic attitudinal pleasure or displeasure to a person, at a time, to a degree, in a specific propositional object.” (pp. 117–118.)
Feldman does frame the problem in terms of “double-counting” in “The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism” (2002, pp. 612–613). As far as I know, however, he does not mention the problem in either Pleasure and The Good Life or What is this thing called Happiness?
Millgram (1997).
“Practical reasoning tends to take one from a position of lesser pleasure to a position of greater pleasure. When I decide to make Korean scallion pancakes instead of another round of marinated tofu, the likely upshot is that my subsequent life will be more pleasant than otherwise.” (Practical Induction, p. 117).
Pollock (2006).
Thinking about Acting, note 1 on 37.
Thinking about Acting, p. 41.
Thinking about Acting, p. 41.
“But just what psychological state is [state liking]? Bentham talked about feeling happy, and in discussing our foreign traveler I talked about her enjoying foreign travel. I also talked about feeling satisfied with one’s situation. Can state liking be identified with any of these familiar psychological states? Probably not.” (Thinking about Acting, p. 42.) In an earlier work, Pollock says this. “Instead of saying a rational agent seeks to make its situation more to its liking, the same point could probably be made by saying that the agent seeks to make itself happier, or seeks pleasure. I have avoided these more traditional formulations because the terms ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ have connotations not intended by the theory.” (Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person, pp. 12–13. MIT Press, 1995.) “As I shall use the term, to live the good life is to live so that, insofar as possible, the situation one is in is likable.” (p. 13).
Thinking about Acting, p. 54.
Thinking about Acting, p. 47.
Thinking about Acting, p. 48.
Thinking about Acting, p. 42.
Thinking about Acting, p. 30.
Thinking about Acting, p. 31.
Thinking about Acting, p. 48.
References
Feldman, F. (2002). The good life: A defense of attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 604–628.
Feldman, F. (2004). Pleasure and the good life. Concerning the nature, varieties, and plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Millgram, E. (1997). Practical induction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pollock, J. (2006). Thinking about acting. Logical foundations for rational decision making. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Blackson, T.A. Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Philos Stud 159, 277–291 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9707-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9707-4