Abstract
Schlick quite clearly maintains that the shift from classical physics to the theories of relativity is not necessitated by experience, but motivated by the pragmatic payoff of simplifying space-time ontology. However, there is in his work another, heretofore unrecognized argument for the revolutionary shift from classical to relativistic physics. According to this conceptual line of argument, the principles that define simultaneity and motion in classical physics fail to establish a univocal correspondence to physical quantities, and therefore must be revised, along with the notions of absolute space and time that they underpin. Though these insights appear only intermittently in Schlick’s work, I will seek to elaborate on them in an effort to clarify his views on conventions within physics and the nature of revolutionary science, and to suggest that these views are invulnerable to the criticisms of pragmatic empiricists such as Quine.
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Notes
More recently, Maddy has made the claim that our inability “to differentiate revisions in purportedly a priori claims from ordinary scientific progress” gives us a good reason to abandon the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge (Maddy 2000, 114).
Both Howard and Ryckman take this to be the principal result of Schlick’s correspondence with Reichanbach. See (Howard 1994, 56–75), (Ryckman 1992, 484–485), and (Ryckman 2005, 58–59). Friedman, by contrast, thinks that it is Reichenbach who gives up a principled fact-convention distinction under pressure from Schlick, see (Friedman 1999).
In Coffa’s estimation, the principal result of the Schlick-Reichenbach correspondence is Reichenbach’s adoption of conventionalism, see (Coffa 1991, 201–204).
Schlick, of course, recognizes that all definitions are conventional, but uses the term ‘convention’ “in the narrower sense” to single out this way of “correcting” concrete definitions. See (Friedman 2002, 214–215).
Schlick uses these terms interchangeably.
Since Quine is a semantic holist, he is committed to the view that every change to our scientific theories results in a change in the meaning of certain theoretical concepts. However, he denies that the meanings of theoretical terms are determined by individual principles that are subject to revision in cases of scientific revolutions.
Einstein himself, on the other hand, cites the asymmetries produced by the application of Maxwell’s laws to moving bodies as the primary motivation for SR (Einstein 1905, 37).
Schlick claims that when presented with empirically equivalent theories, we ought to prefer the simplest alternative because it contains the fewest arbitrary elements and therefore is governed to a greater extent by the facts:
But we naturally want to rule out so far as possible from our theories, not only what is false, but also the superfluous accessories, our own contribution. We do this by selecting theories with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions, in other words, the simplest. We are then sure of diverging from reality at least no further than is necessitated by the bounds of our knowledge as such. (Schlick 1915, 171)
For a more detailed characterization and defense of this distinction, see (Bland forthcoming).
I will call this the principle of temporal congruence.
The principle of free mobility holds only in the geometries of constant curvature, and it is for this reason that Poincaré dismisses Riemann’s geometries of variable curvature as being “purely analytical” (Poincaré 1902, 47–48).
If I am reading Schlick correctly, then the “presuppositions under which the measurement takes place” are concrete definitions and conventions, and the “postulates which must be met in order to arrive at a measuring-figure at all” are constitutive principles.
This view was inspired by Helmholtz’s neo-Kantian work on the foundations of geometry, and thus, I see a stronger Kantian element in the conventionalism of Poincaré and Schlick than Ryckman does in (Ryckman 2005, 67–75).
See (Schlick 1920, 14–15):
Experience teaches us that the only time-data which do not lead to contradictions are those which are got by using signals which are independent of matter, i.e., are transmitted with the same velocity through a vacuum. Electromagnetic waves traveling with the speed of light fulfill this condition. If we were to use sound-signals in the air, for instance, the direction of the wind would have to be taken into account. The velocity of light c thus plays a unique part in Nature.
See, for example, (Schlick 1921, 330–331).
The fourth edition also contains a paragraph that does not appear in the third edition, which appeals to Mach’s principle in discrediting Newtonian physics.
Presumably, Schlick has in mind Einstein’s equivalence principle, according to which both inertial effects and gravitational effects are governed by the metric tensor, see (Norton 1985).
Schlick’s confusions are understandable, however, since they reflect views shared at this time by many physicists, philosophers, and of course, Einstein himself.
Laue argues in correspondence with Einstein that this is not the case because the Riemann-Christoffel curvature tensor vanishes in the case of the rotating disk, but not in a gravitational field. For a summary and defense of Einstein’s response, see (Norton 1985).
In this regard, Schlick’s understanding of the rotating disk thought-experiment is similar to his understanding of Einstein’s lift thought-experiment: in neither case is the point that we can capture all the same measurement results using empirically equivalent theories. The point of these experiments, rather, is to show us that the definitions that make measurements possible in classical physics are deficient.
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Robert DiSalle for our many conversations on this and other related topics, and for his insightful comments on many earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Kathleen Okruhlik and Sona Ghosh for their comments on earlier drafts.
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Bland, S. Schlick, Conventionalism, and Scientific Revolutions. Acta Anal 27, 307–323 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0131-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0131-3