본 논문의 목적은 데리다의 법철학을 헌법이론의 관점에서 재독해하여, 근대 법/정치 이론이 봉착한 딜레마와 해체론에 제기되는 비판을 데리다의 법 이론이 어떻게 극복하는지를 살피고, 동시에 그러한 시도가 입헌민주주의에 새로운 대안을 제시해 줄 수 있는지를 모색하는 데 있다. 데리다는 해체론을 통해 지금까지 정당하다고 여겨져 온 법과 정치질서의 정당성에 물음을 던지고 근대적 법/정치 이론에 내재된 논리적 모순과 은폐된 폭력성을 폭로한다. 법과 정의를 구분하는 데리다에게 헌법의 정당성이란 하나의 해석적 모델이며, 입헌권력의 성립 이후에야 이뤄지는 사후 정당화에 불과한 것이다. 데리다는 해체적 작업이 근대적 법/정치 이론과 입헌주의적 기획의 맹점과 모순을 노정하는 기능뿐만 아니라 법과 정치 질서를 새롭게 재구축하는 구체적이고 실천적인 대안임을 주장하며, “해체가 곧 정의”임을 선언한다. 이러한 해체론의 관점에서 바라볼 때 헌법의 정당성은 정의를 통해, 그리고 정의를 실현시키고자 하는 끊임없는 해체와 재구축의 과정들의 반복을 통해 도출될 수 있다. 따라서 데리다에게 헌법의 정당성은 제헌의 순간이라는 과거의 가상적인 사건과 정치신학적 개념이 아닌 미래의 시점에 도래할 대상으로, 약속으로 남아 있게 된다. 이에 기반하여 본 논문은 데리다의 해체론이 기존의 법과 정치질서를 성찰하도록 강박하며, 이를 토대로 새로운 계몽과 시민교육의 효과를 의도하고 있음을 주장한다. 결국 데리다의 해체론이 가진 진정한 의미와 가치는 헌법의 정당성과 헌법적 정의의 한계를 노정하고 교조화된 법과 정치질서를 넘어설 수 있는 실천의 동기를 제공해 준다는 데 있다.
The purpose of this paper is to read Derrida’s legal philosophy from the perspective of constitutional theory in order to examine how Derrida’s legal theories overcome dilemmas inherent in modern legal/political theories and the criticisms that the postmodernist project of deconstruction faces. Through deconstruction, Derrida questions the way modern legal and political order has been legitimized and exposes the logical contradictions and hidden violences that modern legal/political theories have. To Derrida, who separates law and justice, the legitimacy of the constitution can be done only heuristically, and a constitution can be legitimized only after the establishment of the constituted powers. Derrida argued that the process of deconstruction not only had the function of exposing the blind spots and contradictions of modern legal/political theory and constitutional project, but also is a concrete and practical alternative to newly reconstruct legal and political order. That is what he meant when he declared that “deconstruction is justice.” When viewed from this deconstructive perspective, the legitimacy of the constitution can be done through justice-seeking only, and the repetition of deconstruction and processes of reconstruction that aim to realize justice. Therefore, to Derrida, the legitimacy of the constitution was not the hypothetical and political-theological event which emerges at the moment of constitutional founding, but rather something that shall come in the future, or a promise that remains as such. In the end, Derrida’s deconstruction invites critical reflections on existing legal and political orders, thereby compelling new enlightenment and civic education. Ultimately, the true meaning and value of Derrida’s deconstruction is to expose the limitations of the legitimacy of a constitution and constitutional justice and provide the motivation for actions by which to overcome the legal and political orders which have become dogmatic.
The purpose of this paper is to read Derrida’s legal philosophy from the perspective of constitutional theory in order to examine how Derrida’s legal theories overcome dilemmas inherent in modern legal/political theories and the criticisms that the postmodernist project of deconstruction faces. Through deconstruction, Derrida questions the way modern legal and political order has been legitimized and exposes the logical contradictions and hidden violences that modern legal/political theories have. To Derrida, who separates law and justice, the legitimacy of the constitution can be done only heuristically, and a constitution can be legitimized only after the establishment of the constituted powers. Derrida argued that the process of deconstruction not only had the function of exposing the blind spots and contradictions of modern legal/political theory and constitutional project, but also is a concrete and practical alternative to newly reconstruct legal and political order. That is what he meant when he declared that “deconstruction is justice.” When viewed from this deconstructive perspective, the legitimacy of the constitution can be done through justice-seeking only, and the repetition of deconstruction and processes of reconstruction that aim to realize justice. Therefore, to Derrida, the legitimacy of the constitution was not the hypothetical and political-theological event which emerges at the moment of constitutional founding, but rather something that shall come in the future, or a promise that remains as such. In the end, Derrida’s deconstruction invites critical reflections on existing legal and political orders, thereby compelling new enlightenment and civic education. Ultimately, the true meaning and value of Derrida’s deconstruction is to expose the limitations of the legitimacy of a constitution and constitutional justice and provide the motivation for actions by which to overcome the legal and political orders which have become dogmatic.
