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Michael Blome-Tillmann, Knowledge and Presuppositions, Mind, Volume 118, Issue 470, April 2009, Pages 241–294, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp032
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Abstract
The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’, namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of ‘knows’ in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility with the intuitions of Moorean dogmatists. Finally, the paper shows that the account defended is not subject to the most prominent and familiar philosophical objections to epistemic contextualism discussed in the recent literature.