Abstract
His Divine Grace Śrīla A.C. Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda was a highly revered ācārya (“lineage teacher of significance”) from the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava (GV) tradition, an important Hindu lineage of Kṛṣṇa bhakti (“devotional love of God”) that historically can be traced back to the venerated saint Śrī Kṛṣṇa Caitanya Mahāprabhu in sixteenth-century Bengal. Among a variety of other groundbreaking achievements, Bhaktivedānta Swami is notable for being the founding Ācārya of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in New York City in 1966. At a surprising rate, it quickly became a large international movement and, therefore, is an interesting case study for theologies of religion in the contemporary, global era.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
By “theologies of religions,” I am following the use of the term employed by Paul Knitter whereby religious practitioners make sense of “the multiplicity of religions and of the many different ultimate answers.” Some of the issues that the paradox of multiple possible ultimate truth claims invokes are the following: (1) the idea that since “God is one” it seems there should be “one religion,” (2) the question of whether “all the religions [are] valid in God’s eyes,” (3) if the “differences [are] more a matter of varied colors than conflicting content,” and (4) to answer the question of “how the religious traditions [should] relate to each other?” (Knitter, 2011, 1 ff.). When I use the term “theologies of religions,” I am invoking these complex questions and any others that might arise from a realization that there is a contradictory tension between religions that may or may not be reconciled in a way that is completely agreeable to all parties etc.
The term “non-negotiable” is widely attributed to Dr. Judith Berling, Graduate Theological Union. “Non-negotiable” refers to those beliefs that one will not compromise when engaging in an interfaith dialogue, and these “non-negotiables” will likely be a source of disagreement between traditions and interfaith dialogical partners. More on this will be discussed below.
E.g. the centrality of śakti (divine “energy” or perhaps, “relational dynamism”) as Kṛṣṇa’s “most important attribute…[and] all his other attributes can be subsumed within it” (Gupta, 2014, 47).
For a systematic articulation of Gauḍīya theoethics, see my forthcoming publication on this topic based on my PhD dissertation thesis.
I would argue that we see this pattern across other dharmic traditions.
This term, aupadharmya, is an abstract (taddhita) noun, derived from upadharma. Since upadharma can be either (by Monier Williams) “a minor or subordinate duty, a by-law, a false faith, heresy,” then aupadharmya might be an abstraction of any of these. According to Goldman & Goldman, such “derivations are usually best translated X-hood, the state of being an X; Y-ness, the state of being Y” (Goldman & Goldman, 1980, 378). Thus, aupadharmya could be either a “state of being a false faith,” or it could be a “state of being a minor or subordinate duty.” I favor the latter for a variety of reasons. One of which is because in the Manu-smṛti (MS), upadharma is used in the sense of important but subordinate duties where honoring ones mother, father and teacher (MS 2.233) are the “highest duty” (dharmaḥ paraḥ) while “all other [duties] are secondary (upadharmaḥ) (MS 2.237). The abstract version of the term aupadharmya itself doesn’t seem to be in the MS, although it is reasonable to understand upadharama in MS as having some connotative relationship to the sense of aupadharmya in the BhP.
For example, Doniger O’Flaherty (1971, 271), approvingly cites Louis Renou as writing, “It is quite difficult in India to be completely heretical” (From Louis Renou 1961. Hinduism, New York, 46).
In addition, we must be very careful not to conflate “caste” with social classes such as varṇa that in many cases allow for more social mobility and equity than the term “caste” would imply.
Jayadeva’s Śrī Daśāvatāra-stotra, verse 9 (All translations of Sanskrit and Pāli, not Chinese, herein are my own): nindasi yajña-vidher ahaha śruti-jātaṁ | sadaya-hṛdaya-darśita-paśu-ghātam | keśava dhṛta-buddha-śarīra jaya jagad-īśa hare || “Praise to you (jaya) O’ Lord of the universe (jagad-īśa), O’ Hari, O’ Keśava [who] bears (dhṛta) the body of the Buddha (buddha-śarīra). Alas! (ahaha), you condemn (nindasi) the killing (ghātam) of animals, displaying (darśita) a compassionate (sadaya) heart (hṛdaya). [You condemn that killing] that comes from the Vedas (śruti-jātaṃ) on the part of those who following ritual prescriptions (yajña-videḥ).”.
Literally, “brāhamaṇa-s who know mantra-s.”.
All Pāli translations are my own. Pāli: kasmā tvaṃ eḷaka hasi, kasmā rodīti?
In Pāli, from Matakabhatta-jātaka: ahaṃ brāhmaṇa pubbe tādiso va mantajjhāyaka-brāhmaṇo hutvā brāhman ‘mataka-bhattaṃ dassāmīti'; eḷakaṃ māretvā adāsiṃ, sv-āhaṃ ekassa eḷakassa ghātitattā eken'; ūnesupañcasu attabhāvasatesu sīsacchedaṃ pāpuṇiṃ ayaṃ me koṭiyaṃ ṭhito pañcasatimo atta-bhāvo, ‘sv-āhaṃ ajja evarūpā dukkhā muccissāmīti'; so manassa-jāto iminā kāraṇena hasiṃ …. ayaṃ pana (but) brāhmaṇo maṃ māretvā ahaṃ viya pañcajātisatāni sīsaccheda-dukkhaṃ labhissatīti' tayi kāruññena rodin" ti.
At that point in his incarnation, the Buddha was then a Bodhisatta (Sanskrit: Bodhisattva), not a full Buddha, in the Pāli text.
Pāli rukkha-devatā, in Sanskrit would be vṛkṣa-devatā.
Ibid. Bodhisatto tasmiṃ ṭhāne rukkhadevatā hutvā nibbatto.
I take it as “preach” from various Pāli derivatives from the Sanskrit √diś in this passage such as: desentaḥ, desesi, desetvā, desanam, etc.
Evañ ce sattā jāneyyuṃ ‘dukkh’; āyaṃ jātisambhavo' na pāṇo pāṇinaṃ haññe, pāṇaghātī hi socatīti. || 1.17 ||
The tone of the Buddha’s teaching style seems similar between Jayadeva and the Jātaka story that I’ve cited. While Jayadeva seems to have the Buddha “rebuking” or “condemning” the Vedic animal sacrificers, the “instructional” (√diś, see fn. 27 above) aspect of the Matakabhatta-jātaka must have had at least some degree of harsh rebuke. Here, despite the “sweetness of his voice in teaching the dharma” (ti madhurena sarena dhammaṃ desento) those present where imparted with “the fear of falling down to hell” (niraya-bhaya-bhītā… pātā) that inspired them to live “charitable and virtuous” (pānādīni puññāni) lives that awarded them a heavenly birth (devana-garaṃ pūresi).
E.g. CC’s emphatic relationship to the variety of polemics with Buddhists are described as: khaṇḍa khaṇḍa (Madhya 9.43) and khaṇḍite (Madhya 9.44). The term is specifically applied to the Buddhists with khaṇḍāite in CC Madhya 9.48. The bauddha-śāstra is khaṇḍila by Caitanya (Madhya 9.49), and their “nine doctrinal issues” (nava praśna) are also khaṇḍa khaṇḍa (Madhya 9.50).
Of course, I’m not saying that Gauḍīya-s revere Buddhist teachings in the same way that Vedāntin-s revere the Vedas. However, both display patterns of “reverence” and “inclusion” with subordination.
E.g. the bauddha-śāstra of CC Madhya 9.49 as being khaṇḍila.
The school of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism that proceeded ISKCON founded by Bhaktivedānta Swami’s guru, Bhaktisiddhānta Saraswati Swami.
Bhakti Vikāsa Swami cites “A translation of ‘Ācārera Asamodva Mahattva’” as the source for this. This source, in turn, cites “Madhya-līlā, chapter nine” of the CC (Bhakti Vikāsa Swami, vol. 3, 2009: 61).
In this paper, I have elected to designate “Chatanyite Vaishnavism” as Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism.
In Bangla: jat harale boshtum, “One who loses caste is a Vaishnava” (Bhatia, 2017, 69).
A central disciple of Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu.
For example, in the Pāli Vinaya Mahāvagga (VI.31.14). We will discuss this formulation in the context of the Majjhima Nikaya (MN 55) below.
For example, the Mahāyana Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and the Śūraṅgama Sūtra-s all explicitly forbid the eating of meat. In the interest of space, I will only briefly cite the Mahāyana Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra below.
For example, see the Animal Rights campaign, “Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos,” http://endchickensaskaporos.com/
Delineating a systematic Gauḍīya Theoethics is the topic of my PhD dissertation; publication is forthcoming.
E.g. this is a central concern of the well-known deontology versus utilitarianism argument.
Mahāvagga 4.14.31:
O’ Bhikkhus, not knowingly should meat meant for that purpose be eaten.
na bhikkhave jānaṃ uddissakataṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbam.
(Otherwise) these are eaten offensively and require confession:
yo paribhuñjeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa.
O’ bhikkhus I approve of consuming meats only of three pure varieties:
Anujānāmi bhikkhaveti koṭi-parisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ
[When they are] not seen, not heard and not suspected.
adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ aparisaṅkitan ti.
MN 55: “I say, in three cases indeed, O’ Jīvaka, meat should not be eaten:”.
Tīhi (kho ahaṃ Jīvaka ṭhānehi maṃsaṃ aparibhogan-ti vadāmi:
MN 55: diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ parisaṅkitaṃ.
From the Urban Dictionary, a “freegan” is “Somebody who abstains from contributing to the economy and salvages society’s wasted food and resources rather than purchase more themselves. Often pertains to a VEGAN (somebody who doesn’t eat or wear animal products) who only makes exceptions when dealing with otherwise wasted items.” Retrieved from: https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Freegan
Referring to the three restrictions from the Pāli Canon that I just discussed.
Blum, 2013, 110–111. Blum’s translation from Chinese.
E.g. Bilimoria 2017 “void” as a translation of śūnyatā: “Nāgārjuna took the position that all existence is void or empty, that there are no substances, things and no soul-like self either.” Also, if we look at the work of Edward Conze, a Buddhist scholar that was contemporary with Śrīla Prabhupāda, he employs the terms “emptiness” and “void” in relationship to the central Buddhist doctrine of śūnyatā. Thus, voidism is how at least one important Buddhist scholar contemporary to Bhaktivedānta Swami depicts the tradition (Conze, 1962, 59).
For example, Sarvāstivādins and Thervādins “assume that an event lasts for three, four or even more moments” (Gombrich, 1996, 134–135).
“We see that material things have a beginning, a middle, and an end” Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda, 1975, purport CC Madhya 9.49.
It is important to note that sat-karya-vāda is generally though to imply that the “effect is within the cause,” and they these cannot be separated in a mutually exclusive way. This is also known as Pariṇāma-vāda, likened to the relationship of curds to milk, that is, they are the same and different. This can be understood in contrast the kṣanīka-vāda momentariness of the Buddhists, but also the idea of vivarta-vāda that favor the idea that any distinctions between cause and effect are a result of illusion and delusion.
Bilimoria 2017, 66–67.
A quick internet search can verify this. For example, Kencho Tenzin. 2006. “Shankara: A Hindu Revivalist or a Crypto Buddhist?” Retrieved from http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=rs_theses
I don’t necessarily believe that the differences with Advaita and Mādhyamika are superficial. The clear affirmation of a holism of the Advaitic ātman-brahman complex should not be conflated with Mādhyamika śūnyatā. In addition, there is an ontological sublation with Advaita where the material world is “neither real nor unreal.” By Rao’s words: “The Advaitin makes a breakthrough [compared to Naiyāyika-s Prābhākara-s, Kaumārila-s and Buddhist-s] by suggesting that the object of error is neither real nor unreal but different from both these (sadasadvilakṣaṇa)” (Rao, 1998, 102).
We should be cautious about our ontological commitments (as per Quine) regarding the nature of “zero.” Berto and Plebani might remind us that to position of Quine and van Inwagen is “that existence or being is captured by the quantifier” (Berto & Plebani, 2015, 10). Therefore, saying that everything amounts to “zero” is not necessarily denying the existence of everything.
Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda, 1990, 151.
I only intended this paper as a constructive theology of one possible presentation of interfaith dialogue in the Gauḍīya tradition in general, and with Bhaktivedānta Swami’s statements in particular. Certainly other data could be drawn upon to present a different model. What I’m seeking to do is to focus on the data that best allows for peacebuilding as being of central concern, allowing for statements that might contradict this to be of secondary value in comparison to those that allow for peacebuilding. With any religious text or thinker, we are inevitably confronted with contradictions, and it is incumbent upon emic practitioners and theologians within a tradition to argue for what is to be considered of primary importance and what is to be considered as of secondary value to be understood by the primary axioms.
References
Berto, F., & Plebani, M. (2015). Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide. Bloomsbury Academic.
Bhakti Vikāsa Swami. (2009). Śrī Bhaktisiddhānta Vaibhava (vols. 1–3). Bhakti Vikas Trust.
Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda, A.C. (1975). Śrī Caitanya Caritāmṛta: The Pastimes of Lord Caitanya Mahāprabhu (vols 1–9). Bhaktivedanta Book Trust. Retrieved from: https://www.vedabase.com/. Accessed 10 May 2021
__________. (1980). Śrīmad Bhāgavatam (vols. 1–18). Bhaktivedanta Book Trust. Retrieved from: https://www.vedabase.com/. Accessed 10 May 2021
__________. (1990). The Journey of Self-Discovery. Bhaktivedanta Book Trust. Retrieved from: https://www.vedabase.com/. Accessed 10 May 2021
Bhatia, V. (2017). Unforgetting Chaitanya: Vaishnavism and Cultures of Devotion in Colonial Bengal. Oxford University Press.
Bilimoria, P. (2017). Horizons of the Self in Hindu Thought. D.K. Printworld.
Blum, M. L. (2013). Translator. The Nirvana Sutra Volume 1. Bukkyo Deno Kyokai America.
Clough, B. S. (2017). Buddha as Avatāra in Vaiṣṇava Theology: Historical and Interpretive Issues. Journal of Vaiṣṇava Studies, 26(1), 161–188. Fall 2017.
Conze, E. (1962). Buddhist Thought in India. The University of Michigan Press.
Dasa, S. N. (1999). Hindu Encounter with Modernity. Sanskrit Religions Institute.
Doniger O’Flaherty, W. (1971). The Origin of Heresy in Hindu Mythology. History of Religions, 10(4), 271–333.
Doniger, W. (2009). The Hindus: An Alternative History. Penguin Press.
Eck, D. L. (2001). A New Religious America: How a ‘Christian Country’ Has Become the Wrold’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation. HarperCollins.
Goldman, R. P., & Goldman, S. J. S. (1980). Devavāṇipraveśikā. Motilal Banarsidass.
__________. (1996). How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. Athlone Press.
Gombrich, R. F. (2009). What the Buddha Thought. Equinox Publishing.
Gupta, R. M. (2014). Epistemology and Ontology I. In R. M. Gupta (ed) Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Philosophy (pp. 35–60). Ashgate.
Harvey, P. (1995). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge.
Knitter, P. F. (2002). Introducing Theologies of Religions. Orbis Books.
Knitter, P. F. (2011). Theologies of Religions. New York: Orbis Books.
O’Connell, J. T. (2014). Ethics and Practice: Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Ethics in Relation to Devotional Community. In “Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Philosophy,” edited by Ravi M. Gupta. Ashgate.
Rao, S. (1998). Perceptual Error. University of Hawai’I Press.
Samuel, G. (2008). The Origins of Yoga and Tantra: Indic Religions to the Thirteenth Century. Cambridge University Press.
Smock, D. R. (2002). Introduction. In Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, edited by David R. Smock. United States Institute of Peace Press.
Śrīdhara. (2013). Traditional Bhāgavata Purāṇa Commentary: Śrīmadbhāgavata-Mahāpurāṇam, Śrīdharī Ṭīkopetam, Sampādakaḥ: Paṇḍita Ṛametaja Pāṇḍeya. Rāmateja Pāṇḍeya, commentator and editor. 2013. Chaukhambha Sanskrit Pratishthan.
Valpey, K. R. (2014). Introduction, Circling in on the Subject: Discourses of Ultimacy in Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism. In “Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Philosophy,” edited by Ravi M. Gupta. Ashgate.
Acknowledgements
This paper is a modification of one that I wrote at the request of Dr. Edith Best. I am grateful to Dr. Best for approving of my refurbishing of the current version for this publication. Further, I would like to express my appreciation to Steven Rosen for helpful suggestions in the writing of this piece.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bohanec, C. Bhaktivedānta Swami and Buddhism: a Case Study for Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding. DHARM 4, 91–113 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-021-00104-3
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-021-00104-3