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Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-consistency and Iterated Revision

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Abstract

We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within the modal logic introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007). Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA, 95616-8578, USA

    Giacomo Bonanno

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  1. Giacomo Bonanno
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Correspondence to Giacomo Bonanno.

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Bonanno, G. Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-consistency and Iterated Revision. J Philos Logic 41, 201–236 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9202-6

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