Between Existentialism and Anti-Existentialism

Authors

Oleh BONDAR Nanjing Normal University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24231/wisdom.v21i1.605

Keywords:

existentialism, anti-existentialism, truth, propositions, possible worlds, closure under containment

Abstract

The article is an evaluation of Pollock’s anti-existentialist argument and its place in the contemporary debates about Existentialism. We demonstrate that the main contemporary objections to Pollock’s Anti-Existentialism can be grouped into two argumentative directions: (1) Pollock’s supposed confusion of inner and outer truth (Fine, Speaks); (2) Pollock’s assumption that there is such state of affairs as Socrates’s not existing (Kroon). We also introduce an argument against Pollock`s crucial argumentative step against existentialism.

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Author Biography

Oleh BONDAR, Nanjing Normal University

PhD in Philosophy, a postdoctoral fellow in Department of Philosophy, School of Public Administration, Nanjing Normal University (China). His areas of interest include metaphilosophy, metaphysics, modal epistemology, metaethics, and grounding theory. Recent publications: “Existence Requirement, World-Indexed Properties, and Contingent Apriori”, “Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will”, “A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism”.

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Published

2022-03-28

How to Cite

BONDAR, O. (2022). Between Existentialism and Anti-Existentialism. WISDOM, 21(1), 204–216. https://doi.org/10.24231/wisdom.v21i1.605

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Issue

Vol. 21 No. 1 (2022): 1-2022

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Articles

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