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Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2015

PATRICK BONDY
PATRICK BONDY*
Affiliation:
Cornell University
*
*<patrbondy@gmail.com>
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Abstract

The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, which can come apart, and to argue that deontological epistemic evaluations apply to the active aspect of belief.

Les idées suivantes sont raisonnables prises indépendamment, mais inconsistantes quand on les considère ensemble : (1) le déontologisme en épistémologie est correct; (2) on n’exerce pas de contrôle volontaire sur ce que l’on croit; (3) si S n’a pas de contrôle sur le fait qu’elle φ, elle n’a aucune obligation de faire φ ou de ne pas faire φ (c’est-à-dire que le devoir implique le pouvoir). Cet article vise à soutenir que nos croyances ont des aspects actifs et passifs, lesquels peuvent être séparés, et que les évaluations épistémiques déontologiques s’appliquent aux aspects actifs de la croyance.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 747 - 768
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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