Abstract
Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition ‘strong rationalizability’), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a Nash equilibrium; (2) in a normal-form game a strategy profile is strongly rationalizable if and only if it belongs to C∞ , the set of profiles that survive the iterative deletion of inferior profiles.
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REFERENCES
Stalnaker, R. (1994), On the evaluation of solution concepts, Theory and Decision 37: 49–74.
Stalnaker, R. (1996), Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games, Economics and Philosophy 12: 133–163.
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Bonanno, G., Nehring, K. On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games. Theory and Decision 45, 291–295 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005090905103
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005090905103