Abstract
Sometimes conducting an experiment to ascertain the state of a system changes the state of the system being measured. Kahneman & Tversky modelled this effect with ‘support theory’. Quantum physics models this effect with probability amplitude mechanics. As this paper shows, probability amplitude mechanics is similar to support theory. Additionally, Viscusi's proposed generalized expected utility model has an analogy in quantum mechanics.
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Bordley, R.F., Kadane, J.B. Experiment-dependent priors in psychology and physics. Theory and Decision 47, 213–227 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005107029264
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005107029264