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From Certainty to Fallibility in Mathematics?

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Part of the book series: Episteme ((EPIS,volume 22))

Abstract

The title of this paper was borrowed from the heading of a chapter in Davis and Hersh’s celebrated book The mathematical experience.1 Here, however, we have inserted a question-mark: is it really true, as some people maintain, that mathematics has lost its certainty? For the sake of simplicity, we refer to this conception as mathematical fallibilism which is a feature of the quasi-empiricism initiated by Lakatos and popularized by Davis and Hersh, Kline, Tymoczko and many others. In this paper we would like to make a critical survey of this viewpoint which constitutes an interesting trend in philosophy of mathematics today.

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Borga, M. (1997). From Certainty to Fallibility in Mathematics?. In: Agazzi, E., Darvas, G. (eds) Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Episteme, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5690-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5690-5_2

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