Abstract
Here I summarise the main arguments in “Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs” [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bortolotti, L. 2009. Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jordan, H.W., E.W. Lockert, M. Johnson-Warren, C. Cabell, T. Cooke, W. Greer, and G. Howe. 2006. Erotomania revisited: Thirty-four years later. Journal of the National Medical Association 98(5): 787–793.
Lucchelli, F., and H. Spinnler. 2007. The case of lost Wilma: a clinical report of Capgras delusion. Neurological Science 28(4): 188–195.
McKay, R., and L. Cipolotti. 2007. Attributional styles in a case of Cotard delusion. Consciousness and Cognition 16: 349–359.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bortolotti, L. Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5, 1–4 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9128-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9128-2