

Making Sense of Unpleasantness

Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger

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Abstract

Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as *bad* for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every bit as unreasonable. In this paper I distinguish two versions of the shooting-the-messenger challenge: First, how do we account for the badness of unpleasant sensation? And second, how do we account for our *access* to that badness? I suggest plausible responses to the first question, but I also argue that the seriousness of the second has not been appreciated. I then propose a solution to the second: when we introspect our pains we also turn our emotional distress inwards, enabling them to represent our pains as bad.

1 Introduction

Pain and other unpleasant sensory experiences intuitively seem to bear a tight normative relation to certain aversive actions. I do not respond strangely to scalding bathwater by leaping out of it and then hopping around to distract myself from the pain, at least under the circumstances. Nor does it seem to me that I do. But someone — call him Yellowman — who flails about in order to avoid yellow things and experiences of yellow *is* acting strangely, and surely would *see himself* that way too. (It is crucial for my purposes that we not think of Yellowman as finding yellow unpleasant in any way. His experience of yellow is just like ours — except that he has dispositions we do not.) In contrast to the

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experience of yellow, my pain makes sense of both my body-directed aversive behavior (leaping from the bath to save my skin) and my experience-directed behavior (distracting myself from the pain). That is to say, these behaviors both seem to me to be *pro tanto* justified and really are *pro tanto* justified.¹

So I take it that one task of a philosophical theory of unpleasant sensations is to explain how our unpleasant sensations give us access to a justification for *both* body-directed and experience-directed behavior.² How can we account for the way in which, in experiencing unpleasant sensations, we quite generally have access to a genuine justification for these kinds of actions? I'll call this question **Q1**.

A new and hotly-contested view hopes to give a satisfying answer to just this question. Call a view *evaluationist* if it holds:

(Evaluationism) Necessarily, a sensory experience's being unpleasant amounts to its being a certain kind of representation as of an event in or near the subject's body being bad for the subject.³

The hedge "a certain kind of representation" alludes to conditions on the manner of representation. So, for instance, Tye (1995) holds that, among other things, phenomenally conscious representations must be *abstract, non-conceptual*, and *poised* to affect a subject's conceptual systems in a certain way. The hedge is necessary to avoid over-inclusion, since obviously a pictorial representation as of a wound's being bad for the wounded is no unpleasant sensation itself.

Recent evaluationists include Helm (2002), Tye (2005), Cutter & Tye (2011), O'Sullivan & Schroer (2012), and Bain (2013).⁴ Because so much more is known about pain than other unpleasant sensations, pain has monopolized the litera-

¹Hereafter I'll often drop explicitly mentioning that the kind of justification I have in mind is *pro tanto*. It also bears noting that I am throughout only concerned with our *intentional* responses to pain.

²By 'access to a justification' I mean more than *de re* awareness of something that is a justification; the subject must be aware of it *as* a justification. But otherwise I use 'access' as a placeholder for whatever sort of epistemic state the above description picks out. I am not here concerned with determining the quality of our access, e.g. whether it constitutes knowledge.

³As I use it, the schema "*X* amounts to *Y*" is neutral as to whether *Y* explains *X* or *vice versa*. See the discussion on p. 12 below. I will also suppose throughout that the badness represented by pain experiences, as well as the sense in which pains really are bad, is badness *for* the subject of the pain, though for verbal economy I will generally leave out this qualification.

⁴Critics include Aydede (2005), Jacobson (2013), and Cohen & Fulkerson (2014).

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ture's attention, and it will be the focus of this paper as well. Evaluationists typically holds that pain in particular represents an alteration or injury in the body as bad for the subject.

We can now see the outlines of a response to our initial question: if we can show that unpleasant sensations are representations of events as bad, and if we can show those events to generally *be* bad, we not only will have given a justification for our aversive behaviors, we will have explained our access to that justification too.

But note that our concern so far has been with *sensory* experiences, even though *all* unpleasant experiences, worries and fears as well as pains and itches, seem to bear a similar normative relation to action.⁵ Anxiety typically prompts world-directed behavior such as avoiding other people, and it also motivates attempts to relieve oneself of that very anxiety. So one reason to favor evaluationism is that it coheres well with an attractive general account of unpleasant experience:

(Broad evaluationism) Necessarily, an experience's being unpleasant amounts to its being a certain kind of representation of a *pro tanto* justification for aversive behavior.⁶

There is another reason to hope the broad evaluationist project succeeds, too. Unpleasant experiences clearly motivate action, and so can be used to explain it. But if these experiences contain evaluative representational content, then they also show us the way in which the action *seemed good* to the agent, and so they suffice for a *rationalizing* explanation of that action. The result is that many cases of intentional action that have thus far resisted subsumption under the story of rational action will turn out to be explicable by it after all. For instance, Hursthouse (1991) famously accuses some cases of emotion-driven intentional actions, such as that of a woman angrily defacing a photograph of her enemy, of being "arational" because they seem to require us to attribute absurd beliefs to the agent if we are understand them as aiming at some good. (Must the woman

⁵Among evaluationists only Helm (2002) has thus far shared this broader concern to extend the account to unpleasant experience generally.

⁶Obviously, something similar can be said for pleasant experiences. I will follow the literature in focusing exclusively on unpleasant experiences and in hoping that the account developed can be extended in a fairly straightforward way to pleasant ones.

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believe that the photograph *is* her enemy? Certainly not.) But attributing such a belief is unnecessary if her anger *already* presents her action as good.⁷ And if the representational content of unpleasant sensation is non-conceptual, then we have a rationalizing explanation of small children's intentional responses to pain.⁸

Evaluationism thus offers a scheme for tackling at least one difficult question, and it promises fruitful explanations down the road. Yet its progress has recently been stymied by the objection that it endorses *shooting the messenger*.⁹ Consider Siddharth and Ann, both of whom suffer from occasional shooting pains in the left knee. Siddharth's pains are caused by small pieces of shrapnel around the joint that were acquired in a war, and when he feels them Siddharth knows to keep pressure off his left leg to avoid aggravating any damage. In the stream of Siddharth's experiences, his response is immediate: there is the pain, and then there's his keeping off his leg. Here evaluationism gives just the sort of response to Q1 we are hoping for: the pain represents the existence of a bad alteration, and this motivates Siddharth to address his injury. Moreover there is an injury in his knee, and it is bad for him. So the evaluationist can explain how Siddharth is accessing a justification for the action he is motivated to perform.

But poor Ann suffers from a disease whose only symptom is the shooting pain. Not that there's anything wrong with her knee. The root of her problem is in her somatosensory cortex, where some crossed wires confuse pressure for pain. But Ann is well aware of her condition, and when she gets the pain in her knee she is inclined, not to stop walking and inspect it, but to reach for an oral painkiller she keeps in her pocket.

Now, the problem for the evaluationist is that:

1. There must be similar explanations of Siddharth's and Ann's actions. Intuitively, in both cases the response is *practically immediate*: as soon as they experience the pain, or are aware of their pain, they engage in aversive behavior.

⁷Döring (2007) sees related opportunities for affect to play an explanatory role in action.

⁸See also Tappolet (2000, pp. 178-183) and Hawkins (2008).

⁹See Jacobson (2013) and Aydede & Fulkerson (2015).

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2. The explanation of Ann's action must satisfactorily answer Q1. For Ann's pain itself really is bad, and in taking the painkiller as she does Ann is accessing that justification for acting.
3. It seems the evaluationist cannot offer similar explanations of Siddharth's and Ann's actions that give satisfactory answers to Q1.

The worry behind 3 is that extending the evaluationist's explanation of Siddharth's action to Ann's yields but two events: the tokening of an experience that represents a harmful event in Ann's knee, followed by an immediate attempt to get rid of that experience. And that, it seems, makes about as much sense as shooting the messenger who bears bad news. Even if we know the message to be false, what justifies shooting the messenger? To the extent that evaluationism offers an answer to this question it seems to wrongly accuse Ann of confusion, for it only explains Ann's access to one (apparent) reason for acting, *that there's a bad alteration in her leg* — which is surely no reason to get rid of her *pain*.

Responses to this problem thus far in the literature have not been encouraging. O'Sullivan & Schroer (2012, p. 755) seem to endorse shooting the messenger. Bain (2013, p. S87) asserts that there is reason to shoot the messenger because it is intrinsically bad to be in a state in which something else seems bad for you, even if you do not believe it to be bad. I find the premise here questionable. There are, after all, less affect-laden ways of entertaining normative propositions. "The polls might look bad for us", the adviser tells the politician, "but given the demographics, I'm confident we will win". Surely it would be odd to say that the adviser is in a bad state.

Cutter & Tye (2014, p. 428) are prepared to deny that there is anything bad about unpleasant pain itself, and regard non-instrumental aversive behavior to it as *arational*. But one might reasonably complain that this fails to fully address Q1. True, as Cutter & Tye point out, pain can have negative consequences: it is distracting, and chronic pain can cause a host of problems. At best this establishes that unpleasant pain is *extrinsically* bad, and that it would be good to learn to avoid it, much as it is good to learn to be careful with sharp knives. But unpleasant pain seems to be importantly different from a sharp knife in that it is bad intrinsically, *of itself*, and that we can appreciate its badness by being aware

of it.

I have two goals in this paper. First, I aim to get some clarity on just what the shooting the messenger (STM) objection amounts to. There are in fact two parts to STM: (a) what can the evaluationist say about the *badness* of pain? and (b) how can she explain our *access* to that badness? The literature has concentrated on the badness problem, but I give reason to think that an adequate response is within reach. I argue that it is the access problem that is especially difficult.

Second, and more importantly, I offer a solution on behalf of the evaluationist to the access problem. The clinical literature on pain tells us that pain's unpleasantness really has two components, sensory and emotional. I argue that when we introspect our pains the intentional object of our emotional unpleasantness is the pain itself, and thus represents it as bad.

§2 addresses some background issues concerning the phenomenology of unpleasantness and the commitments of evaluationism. §3.1 addresses the badness prong of STM, and §3.2 argues that the seriousness of the access prong has been underappreciated. §4 develops and defends the solution to the access problem, and §5 concludes.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 The phenomenology of unpleasantness

Following the clinical and philosophical literature on pain, in this section I distinguish pains from *unpleasant* pains and contrast the latter to unpleasant emotions. The main conclusion I draw is that our access to unpleasant emotion, unlike to unpleasant pain, must be inferential — where “inferential” is used in a broad sense to include abductive inferences and guesses based on evidence, and more generally any sort of reasoned transition from thought to thought. This result is used in §4.4 to explain why the solution I propose to STM does not simply move the bump in the rug and push the objection upwards to unpleasant emotional states.

It has long been known in the clinical research on pain that it is possible to experience pain-like sensations that are not unpleasant. The experiences of patients of frontal lobotomies, those with congenital indifference to pain, and especially pain asymbolics all challenge the notion that pain *by itself* possesses

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any special normative property.¹⁰ Asymbolics and lobotomy patients use strikingly similar language: “I feel the pain, but it doesn’t hurt”.¹¹ This, together with the fact that what it’s like to have one of these conditions is clearly very different from what it’s like for the rest of us, suggests that asymbolics and the lobotomized share with us some phenomenological component of our overall pain experience, *the pain sensation*, and wholly or partially lack some other component, *the unpleasantness*.¹² This comports well with clinical research on pain, which divides normal pain experience into sensory-discriminative and affective-motivational components,¹³ and also reflection on our phenomenology: some pains are more sharp than unpleasant, and sometimes the unpleasantness of a throbbing pain fades before the throbbing does.

Here I take this standard interpretation of these dissociation cases and their connection to normal pain experience for granted. One’s overall *pain experience*, I will say, is generally a composite of a *pain sensation* and *unpleasantness*, though some pain experiences involve pain sensations with no unpleasantness. So token pain experiences, or *pains*, may be unpleasant or not, and when they are not unpleasant they feel quite a bit different from normal pain.¹⁴ Finally, I also take it for granted that unpleasantness is affective: unpleasant experiences feel *bad*, where ‘bad’ here describes its negative phenomenological valence, not its normative status.¹⁵

Now, what should we say about how pain and its unpleasantness are related?

¹⁰For a case of congenital indifference to pain, see Frances & Gale (1975). For lobotomy as a treatment for chronic pain, see Freeman & Watts (1950); Hardy et al. (1952). For asymbolia, Schilder & Stengel (1928); Weinstein et al. (1955); Berthier et al. (1988).

¹¹Compare the case reports in Freeman & Watts (1950) with those in Berthier et al. (1988).

¹²See Grahek (2007) for an influential view of this kind, though at times he does seem uncertain whether asymbolic pain is indeed pain; see *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12.

¹³See Fields (1999); Price (2000).

¹⁴Klein (2015) has recently questioned whether asymbolics’ pains feel different from those of non-asymbolics, but I fail to see how the truth of his positive account — that asymbolics lack concern for their bodily integrity — undermines the standard interpretation. One significant symptom of asymbolics’ lack of concern is their total lack of pain affect. See Bain (2014) for further criticism.

¹⁵It should be noted that some motivation or attitude-based theories of unpleasantness seem to deny that unpleasantness itself contributes to phenomenal experience; see for instance Tye (1995, p. 135), Clark (2005), and Heathwood (2007). But lest they deny what seems to me to be an obvious truth about phenomenology, these theories are often better construed as offering a reductive account of unpleasant experience in terms of motivation or an attitude.

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First consider how attention relates the two. Recall the last time you stubbed your toe: a sharp, relatively well-localized and only moderately unpleasant pain was followed about a second later by a more unpleasant and diffuse throbbing pain that radiated outward from the injury.¹⁶ The latter kind of pain is more memorable, so concentrate on the way that felt. Do you think you could switch your attention from the sensory aspect of the pain to its unpleasantness, and back again? No, at least not more than you can switch your attention from the timbre of a trumpet blast to its pitch. In both cases you are attending to what seems to be a single spatially-located event with two aspects.¹⁷

Next, consider the nature of our access to our unpleasant pain. Famously, it seems that to have an unpleasant pain *just is* to have an experience with the phenomenal character of an unpleasant pain, and that introspection can make us aware of an experience with the phenomenal character of a pain *as* an experience with that character.¹⁸ Since our introspective awareness of our phenomenal experiences is non-inferential, we have non-inferential access to our unpleasant pains *as* what they are — that is, as experiences with their particular unpleasant character.¹⁹

But unpleasant *emotions* contrast with pains in both respects just considered. Take your fear of a snarling dog, and note that whereas the unpleasant pain seemed to be about a body event in part in virtue of seeming to be located there, your fear does not seem to be about the dog in virtue of seeming to be co-located with it. The dog is before you and the fear inside you, if anywhere. In contrast,

¹⁶See Price & Aydede (2005, §4.1) for an overview of psychophysical studies concerning these two pains.

¹⁷It's possible that the phenomenal character of pain and unpleasantness are not experienced as exactly co-located: perhaps the pain is limited to the area of perceived damage while the unpleasantness radiates further outward from it. In that case it would be hard to say that the unpleasantness is an aspect *of the pain*. I'll ignore this complication in what follows, since what matters for my purposes are the claims about the location of unpleasantness and how pain and its unpleasantness are "bound together" as about the same thing. There is some psychophysical evidence that the unpleasantness itself is experienced as having a body location. Ploner et al. (1999) describe a case study of a stroke patient who, for some nociceptive stimuli to the hand that would normally be painful, experienced an unpleasant sensation "somewhere between fingertips and shoulder" (*ibid.*, p. 213) — but no pain.

¹⁸Pace Rosenthal (1991, p. 17), who suggests that pain can be unconscious if it is unnoticed.

¹⁹Note that I am assuming only that our introspective access to our *phenomenal experiences* is non-inferential, not that introspection of *any* mental state must be non-inferential. Determining the nature and scope of introspection is beyond the scope of this paper.

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the unpleasantness of your fear is not experienced as having a specific location. After all, *what* is unpleasant about your fear? What should you attend to if you wanted to attend to the unpleasantness of your fear?²⁰

Also, how might you come to be aware of your fear *as* what it is — that is, as an episode of fear? If you attend to where in your body you feel the fear, you might find a tightening in your chest.²¹ But surely that alone does not license you to infer that you are afraid. That feeling is common to other unpleasant emotions, such as anxiety and surprise, and to non-emotional states such as angina. Similarly for other aspects of the overall experience of fear, which include an attentional bias towards the dog, a feeling of arousal, and the adoption of a new goal to get away from the dog together with an inclination to pursue that goal immediately.²² Even if certain processes sufficient for an experience of fear each contributed to the phenomenal character of one's experience, and even if the contributions of each of these processes are each accessible via introspection, it seems we would only become aware of the emotion as the emotion that it is by being aware of its phenomenal markers and *inferring* that we must be experiencing the emotion of which they are markers. Moreover, many of the processes which arguably are necessary components of the experience of an emotion like fear (e.g. a change in one's attentional bias or in the goals that one is inclined to pursue) may not have a phenomenology.²³

On a somatic feeling theory of emotions, according to which emotions are a kind of perception of bodily states, introspection may at first seem to give us better access to our emotions. If the emotion of fear *just is* the feeling of one's heart pounding, one's palms sweating, one's veins constricting, etc., then isn't it the case that we have introspective access to that set of feelings as we experience them? Here it is important to note that, even according to the contemporary defender of the strictest version of this view, Jesse Prinz (2004a,b), emotions are not *just* occurrent, conscious perceptions of bodily states. According to Prinz,

²⁰It is instructive to compare the introspectionist Titchener (1896, p. 96) on this point, who writes of the unpleasantness of affection that it "pervades the whole consciousness of the moment".

²¹For a study that maps where emotions are experienced in the body, see Nummenmaa et al. (2014).

²²See Tappolet (2010, p. 327) for a similar list of components of fear.

²³See Schwitzgebel (2008, pp. 249-50) for further worries about the introspectability of the emotional phenomenology.

some emotions are dispositions to feel (Prinz 2004a, p. 50) and even occurrent emotions need not be consciously felt (Prinz 2004b, Ch. 9). We will not have introspective access to these emotions, it seems. Also, on his account a bodily perception is an emotion only if it is characteristically caused by certain organism/environment relations, for that is part of what makes such a perception an emotion (Prinz 2004a, p. 53). But it seems it would be a category mistake to suggest that we have *introspective* access to the characteristic environmental causes of our perceptual states. So, even on Prinz's view we do not have introspective access to our emotional states *as* emotional states, which is the key claim defended above. Thus, the truth of a somatic feeling theory of emotion would not threaten the claim that we do not have that kind of introspective access to our emotions.

On the whole, it seems that our access to an emotion is at a distance from our access to the phenomenological aspects of that emotion. Our emotions are not simply and obviously reflected in the character of our experience, and therefore we must infer their existence *from* that experience.²⁴ To simplify the prose below, I'll use 'introspectable' in place of 'non-inferentially introspectable'. Thus, emotional experiences are non-introspectable experiences — though of course they have introspectable components.

2.2 Intentionalism

Nearly all the evaluationists cited above see their views as a development of a major position within the philosophy of mind known as *intentionalism*,²⁵ which can be *very* roughly glossed as the view that *representation exhausts phenomenology*.²⁶ One of the major intuitions supporting the view, and which also gives

²⁴Note that among intentionalists (see below) there has been some recognition of our relatively poor epistemic access to our emotions in light of their complexity; see Seager (2002).

²⁵Cutter & Tye (2011) and O'Sullivan & Schroer (2012) are explicit in their commitment to intentionalism. In outlining an earlier, injury-perceptualist view of pain Bain (2003) takes himself to be defending intentionalism. Helm (2002, 2009) is more carefully characterized as *intentionalist-friendly*. He aims to account for the *distinctive* phenomenology of emotions in terms of their intentional content, but it is unclear whether he thinks this accounts for its phenomenology without remainder and whether he is willing to extend a representational account to all phenomenal experience.

²⁶A traditional formulation is that *phenomenal character supervenes on representational content* (see Byrne 2001), though at least one of the most prominent intentionalists, Tye (2014), now rejects this characterization in favor of what he calls "property representationalism".

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some sense to the gloss, is the supposed transparency of experience: gazing at a blue square painted on the wall before you, the square very much seems to be *out there*, not some private mental object.²⁷ Try as hard as you might to concentrate on your *experience* of the square, you only end up concentrating harder on the square and its properties. The phenomenal character of experience is “inseparable from” what that experience represents.²⁸

I take it that a defense of evaluationism should not threaten intentionalism. Partly this is because a defense of evaluationism that almost no extant evaluationist could accept would lack dialectical punch, but it is also because evaluationism itself borrows much support from the possibility that *all* phenomenal experience is representational, and with it the phenomenology of pain. For, putting this theoretical consideration aside, the unpleasantness of pains is often thought to be a prime candidate of a “raw” non-representational feel if ever there was one.²⁹ And a lack of transparency really would be a mortal threat to intentionalism, for then we could switch our attention from what our experience represents to some *other* feature of the experience, say to its “raw feel”. In that case it would be hard to maintain that representation exhausts phenomenology. For that reason I will assume a moderate transparency thesis TP:

(TP) One cannot attend to, nor become directly aware of, one’s own phenomenal experience.³⁰

Importantly, TP does *not* imply that one cannot attend to the phenomenal *character* or what-it’s-likeness of one’s experience. According to Tye’s intentionalism, for instance, the character of one’s experience just *is* the cluster of properties it represents non-conceptually; the experience is the internal representational vehicle of that character.³¹ Nor does TP deny us introspective access to our experiences, for it allows that we can be indirectly aware of them, via the access

²⁷Tye (1995, p. 30).

²⁸From Horgan & Tienson (2002, p. 521). See also Harman (1990) and Dretske (1995).

²⁹See Block (1996).

³⁰Aydede & Fulkerson (2014) have recently argued that representationalism cannot explain in a manner consistent with transparency what, exactly, affective qualities like *awful* qualify. Are experiences awful, or are the objects they present us with awful? I think their challenge can be met, but it is also important to recognize that it is only aimed at representationalists committed to a stronger version of transparency than TP.

³¹Tye (2014).

they give us to extra-mental events and properties.³²

However, it is also important to recognize that many evaluationists take on additional commitments in elaborating their broader philosophical projects. Some aim to defend reductive naturalism about the normative property represented in unpleasant pain (O'Sullivan & Schroer 2012; Cutter & Tye 2011), others a tracking psychosemantics (Cutter & Tye 2011). And all evaluationists so far have been *representationalists*, intentionalists who aim to explain phenomenal experience in terms of, or even reduce it to, a certain kind of representation. Not all intentionalists share these views.³³ Indeed I am more sympathetic to *phenomenal intentionalism*, which differs from representationalism by inverting the order of explanation: it explains the intentionality of experience in terms of its phenomenology.³⁴ For that reason the phrase “amounts to” in the statements of evaluationism and broad evaluationism should not be understood as offering a reduction or even as assigning a priority of explanation. But the solution I offer to the access problem is independent of any of these further commitments; I point them out only because, as I explain in the next section, different commitments will differentially affect the evaluationist's options for responding to the badness prong of STM.

3 The STM objection

3.1 Badness

We are ready to return to the shooting-the-messenger objection. In my brief response to Cutter & Tye (2014) above (p. 5) I noted the intuition that

4. Unpleasant pain is intrinsically bad for its subject.

Pace Cutter & Tye, 4 has recently received support from both sides of the dispute over evaluationism: the evaluationist Bain (2013) lists 4 as a constraint on

³²I give a mechanism for introspection consistent with TP later in the essay. Note that TP does entail that some of the phenomenological investigation in §2.1 above is misdescribed: one *attends* to the phenomenal character of one's experience but *introspects* the experience itself. Addressing this wrinkle above would have unnecessarily complicated the presentation, however.

³³See Chalmers (2004) for an overview of intentionalist positions. Note that imperativism about pain (Klein 2007; Hall 2008; Martínez 2011) is often considered a form of intentionalism, and that 'representationalism' is often used not for a subtype of intentionalism but as a synonym for it.

³⁴See especially Horgan & Tienson (2002) and Kriegel (2013).

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any account of pain's unpleasantness, and critics Aydede & Fulkerson (2015, p. 16) agree, understanding pain's intrinsic badness in terms of its constituting a non-instrumental reason for experience-directed aversive behavior. The badness prong of the STM objection then amounts to the following argument:

5. If evaluationism is true, then an unpleasant pain is merely a representation of a distinct event as bad for its subject.
6. No state that is merely a representation of a distinct event as bad for its subject is *itself* intrinsically bad for its subject.
7. (From 4, 5, and 6) So, evaluationism is false.

The principal difficulty with this argument is introduced by the term “mere”. Premise 6 is most plausible when interpreted as denying that the representation of badness is itself a bad-making feature, or that representations inherit the badness of what they represent. For the former, recall that our objection to Bain's response to STM (p. 5) was that something's merely *seeming* to be bad need not itself be a bad state. Korsgaard (1996, p. 155) seems to hold a view of the latter sort for pain, but it is hard to see how it can be made to work. Fire alarms represent a very destructive kind of badness, but a ringing fire alarm is bad only because it's *annoying*, not because it is a representation of something destructive — let alone because it *is* destructive. Something similar seems to be the case for pain: the principal badness of the injury and the badness of the unpleasant pain are of different sorts, for the former is a matter of physical harm and the latter is not. Unpleasant pain does not inherit the harmfulness of the injury.

On this interpretation of 6, a “mere *P*” is something that has no relevant properties other than *P*: if unpleasant pain is nothing but a representation, *of some sort or other*, of some other event as bad then it seems the pain is not intrinsically bad at all. The problem with this interpretation is that it renders premise 5 false. As we saw above, evaluationists hold that unpleasant pains, as conscious states, are representations *of a certain kind*, and evaluationists are free to appeal to any special features they take conscious representations to have in order to explain the badness of unpleasant pain.

What features might evaluationists appeal to? First we will need a rough sketch of a theory of the badness of unpleasant pain, and then consider how it can

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be understood in intentionalist-friendly terms. There is no space to adequately carry out that project here; my goal in this section is simply to point to features evaluationists *could* plausibly appeal to.

One highly intuitive proposal for the badness of unpleasant experience is that, at bottom, all unpleasant experiences impose on one's freedom. This is clearest in cases where the pain is severe enough to undermine one's agency and so one's freedom to act, but even in more mundane cases it still discourages one from basic goods like the free use of one's body, or it disrupts the free flow of thought. And even in cases where it is not severe enough to interrupt or prevent one's pursuits, one's engagement in the pursuit will be less than free: if Ann dances, it will be *in spite of* the pain. Her dancing is compromised by being painful. So it is not merely that pain may *deprive* a person like Ann of something good, a carefree dance. It constitutes a way of engaging in otherwise good activities that is less than fully voluntary. That is itself a bad thing, so unpleasant experience is thus intrinsically bad.³⁵

So much for a sketch of the intrinsic badness of pain. But how is it consistent with intentionalist scruples? Here I merely note that there are many options intentionalists might pursue. The way is perhaps easiest for the phenomenal intentionalist who reduces phenomenal consciousness to psychofunctional role, for everyone agrees that there is a very tight connection between unpleasantness and motivation. Affect primes motor systems for action, alters the weighting of goals, changes what information counts as relevant or significant for present action, provides steady input into conceptual evaluations of one's situation, and enables one to learn appropriate avoidance behavior.³⁶ A phenomenal intentionalist may plausibly hold that unpleasant pain reduces to or is realized by a state that in part plays that functional role. The resulting theory would be well-poised to explain why unpleasant pain constitutes an imposition on one's freedom.³⁷

³⁵The idea that unpleasant pain is bad because, or at least when, it interferes with agency is common one in the recent literature; see Swenson (2009); Klein (2015); Martínez (2015).

³⁶See Panksepp (1998); Rolls (2014); Navratilova & Porreca (2014); Aydede & Fulkerson (2015) for recent contributions to theorizing on this issue.

³⁷It is also important to recognize, *contra* Cohen & Fulkerson (2014), that evaluationism is not itself committed to denying causal accounts of unpleasant experience. Evaluationists do think that no *mere* causal account will suffice except one that *rationalizes* aversive action. But this only commits them to thinking that if a causal account of unpleasant experience is true, it will be of

The way forward is less clear for representationalists, who typically explain phenomenology not in terms of the realization of an internal functional role but in terms of the tokening of a state that bears some external (teleofunctional or tracking) relation to extra-mental content or properties. But here too there are options. A tracking theorist might argue that at the level of cognitive architecture the state that causally covaries with, and thus represents, harmful injuries is a hybrid of sensory and motivational states. Or one might propose that a conscious *affective* representation of bodily harm must, in addition to being poised to affect cognitive, concept-applying systems, be poised to affect lower-level motivational and goal-setting systems as well.³⁸

3.2 Access

Now we turn to the access prong of STM. Recall from 1 (p. 4 above) that we want to account for the way in which pain-directed aversive behavior like Ann's is *practically immediate*. Yet because we are also looking to account for the normative relation between her unpleasant pain and her attempt to get rid of it, we need to explain how Ann is motivated in part by her access to the badness of her unpleasant pain. This requires that before acting (or at the latest, *in acting*) Ann *takes* her unpleasant pain to be bad, and that in turn requires that her pain be the *object* of one of her mental states. And surely, the state that gives Ann access to her unpleasant pain is a state of introspection.

This makes for a small difference with Siddharth's action, where introspection of the unpleasant pain is not required since evaluationism holds that the unpleasant pain by itself provides the access he needs to rationalize his action. But intuitively, upon introspecting her unpleasant pain Ann is in a position to act out of recognition of its badness. Given that introspective access to one's pain is non-inferential, this means that Ann must have non-inferential access to its badness. And this seems right. Ann does not need the *further thought* that pain is bad in order for her painkiller-taking to be rationalized. All she needs is to recognize that she is having an unpleasant experience.

a very special sort — one that makes it a representation of a certain kind.

³⁸This latter option does bear the cost of making representationalism less pure since it takes away some explanatory work from the content of a representation and gives it to the *way* that content is represented. (See Chalmers 2004 on the distinction between pure and impure representationalism.) But as nearly all representationalists are to some extent impure, the cost is a matter of degree.

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But the problem for the intentionalist at this point is that introspection *only* gives Ann access to the fact that she is having an experience with a *bad-injury-in-knee* character. There she is, attending to the (apparent) bad injury in her knee and rightly recognizing that really she has only an *experience as of* a bad injury in her knee. If, as we are supposing, her experience is transparent, then the badness of the pain itself has disappeared from view. Indeed, it seems the evaluationist must say that in order to access the badness of her pain Ann must do some further thinking — she must, say, remember that pains compromise her freedom and that this is a bad thing. This is inconsistent with 1, which requires her to have better access than that.

Now, it may seem as if there is an easy way out for the evaluationist at this point, one that Cutter & Tye (2014, pp. 428-9) seem inclined to take. Why not suppose that Ann, upon introspecting her unpleasant pain, immediately forms a non-instrumental desire to get rid of it? Doesn't this give her all the access she needs to the badness of her pain?³⁹

Here I'll argue that such a response falls prey to a dilemma, one that shows the true depth of the STM problem. The argument is inspired by one David Bain (2013, §4) levels against what he calls "mere inclination" views of pain's unpleasantness, and it turns on the nature of the desire that is thought to give the subject access to the badness of unpleasant pain.

Suppose first that the desire to get rid of the pain *cannot* be characterized as itself an evaluation and that instead it can only be characterized in terms of its motivational role, as a mere disposition or inclination to end one's pain. Citing Warren Quinn's (1993) infamous Radio Man, Bain argues that such a desire does not itself give the subject access to a justification for ending her pain. Radio Man has a bare disposition to turn on radios in his vicinity — not because he likes to hear what's on, nor because he expects it'll be pleasant. From his perspective, he doesn't turn on radios for any reason at all — it's just something he does. But Radio Man's reaching to turn on a radio is rather too much like Yellowman's flailings, for to understand Radio Man correctly is to understand that, as it seems to him, his reaching for the radio very much stands in need of justification. And if that is so then the non-evaluative desire that causes his reaching cannot give

³⁹Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.

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him access to a justification for it — and neither can a similar desire explain the difference between Ann’s taking a painkiller and Yellowman’s avoiding yellow experiences.

So it must be that the desire to end the pain admits of an evaluative characterization: to desire that p is in part to see p ’s obtaining as good, and to desire that $\neg p$ is to see p ’s obtaining as bad. Evaluative views of desire are common enough in philosophy,⁴⁰ and are certainly consilient with the general project of evaluationism.

But here we run into another dilemma, this time turning on whether or not the evaluative nature of the desire is to be explained in terms of phenomenal representation. The first horn may look attractive in this case since it is plausible that the practically immediate desire Ann forms to get rid of her pain is an *experienced* desire — it is such that there is something that it is like to have it. Indeed, one might think it is the paradigm case of a motivation with distinctive phenomenology. Furthermore it is natural to think that the phenomenal feel of the desire is in part *unpleasant*: it feels bad to want to get rid of one’s pain, one might think. A solution thus appears at hand: if, on broad evaluationist lights, bad feelings are representations of something as bad, and a desire to get rid of one’s pain has a bad feel to it, doesn’t that entail that the feel of the desire represents the pain as bad?

The problem for the evaluationist is that, if anything, she seems to be committed to answering *no* to this question at this point. For the hypothesized unpleasantness of Ann’s desire to get rid of her pain is clearly part of her overall pain experience, and it appears that evaluationism is committed to holding that the unpleasantness of a pain experience transparently represents *the apparent injury*, not the pain, as bad. It seems that the evaluationist must say that although the desire itself is about the pain, the *unpleasantness* of that desire, as a component of Ann’s overall pain experience, is not about the pain at all. Indeed it is unclear how it could in a way consistent with TP (p. 11): if Ann has a feeling that represents her pain as bad, then can’t she attend to the way her pain *feels* to be bad as much as she can attend to the way her knee feels to be bad?

Now, there are other ways to understand Ann’s desire to be rid of her pain as an evaluation of it, ways that do not appeal to its phenomenology; this is the

⁴⁰See for instance Stampe (1987); Oddie (2005); Tenenbaum (2007).

second horn. One could construe desire as an evaluative attitude by holding that the good is the formal end of desire (Tenenbaum 2008) or is part of its Fregean force (Schafer 2013). But given the evaluationist's explanation of Siddharth's injury-directed behavior, appealing to a non-phenomenal evaluative seeming at this point leaves her with an inelegant and unmotivated theory. Contrary to desideratum 1 (p. 4), it gives fundamentally different explanations of Siddharth's and Ann's actions: each accesses a justification for acting, but while Siddharth's access is explained by the content of his phenomenal experience, Ann's is explained non-phenomenally by the nature of her desire. Moreover, presumably it's true that Siddharth *desires* to avoid his injury. On the view under consideration, that fact alone suffices for Siddharth's access to the badness of the injury. Appealing to a general thesis about the evaluative nature of desire that is independent of its phenomenology thus undercuts a principal motivation for evaluationism, that it is otherwise necessary to postulate that Siddharth's unpleasant pain has evaluative content in order to explain his access to a justification for acting. If desires are by nature evaluative, that postulation is superfluous.

Here is another way of looking at the problem. There is a philosophically popular sense of 'desire' according to which nearly any motivating state is a desire.⁴¹ If desires come so cheaply it is no problem to say that Siddharth desires to be rid of his injury and Ann to be rid of her pain, and that these desires explain their actions. The distinctive contribution evaluationism makes is to explain why acting out of such desires counts as acting out of one's access to a justification for acting: it claims that *the phenomenology of pain* provides the evaluative access. Pre-theoretically, we might expect this to work for Ann just as well as it works for Siddharth. When Ann introspects her unpleasant pain, doesn't it feel to her just as awful as her knee does? And shouldn't that count as access to her pain *as bad*?

But the transparency thesis and evaluationism together seem to exclude this, for the only sense that they can make of unpleasant pain's "feeling bad" is its being an unpleasant feeling. And on this view, all we find when we attend to the phenomenal character of our unpleasant pains is an (apparent) event in our body and *its* normative properties. But when we introspect an experience as of some external object or event's having property *P*, we do not thereby come

⁴¹For more on this, see Finlay (2007).

to have a seeming as of that very experience's being *P*. When I introspect my experience as of a red apple, I do not come to visualize my *experience* as red. Why, upon introspecting the unpleasant pain in her knee, should Ann come to feel her unpleasant pain as bad?

4 How to shoot the messenger

In this section I will show how, contrary to appearances, it is possible to feel your unpleasant pain to be bad, and in a way consistent with TP. The main pieces of the solution involve recognizing a distinction in *kinds* of unpleasantness and applying a theory of introspection to that distinction.

4.1 Secondary unpleasantness

The empirical literature on pain indicates that there is more to unpleasantness than the kind sketched in §2.1, which I will now call 'primary unpleasantness' or 'unpleasantness₁'. There is also what is called 'suffering' (Wade et al. 1996; Price & Barrell 2012), 'secondary unpleasantness' (Fields 1999), or 'secondary affect' (Price 2000). This aspect of pain experience, which I will follow Fields in calling 'secondary unpleasantness', is considered to be processed in series with pain and primary unpleasantness, and is also mediated by higher-level, cognitive processing related to the implications of the pain (Price 2000; Wade et al. 2011; Roy 2015). In contrast to primary unpleasantness, which may be processed in parallel with pain as well as in series (Price 2000) and is sometimes thought to be a kind of sensory discrimination (Fields 1999) that is independent of cognition (Gracely 1992), secondary unpleasantness is considered by all these authors to be distinctly emotional. Pain, as we might have suspected pre-theoretically, reliably causes some fear or anxiety, though the unpleasantness that occupies our attention in a given episode is primary unpleasantness.

The main disagreement over the two kinds of unpleasantness is how dependent on cognitive processing primary unpleasantness is. Price (2000) believes that both kinds of unpleasantness are mediated by cognitive processing, and that the distinction between them is largely in their intentional object: primary unpleasantness is directed at the stimulus and the immediate threat it poses, and secondary unpleasantness is directed at the pain's meaning and long-term implications. Fields (1999) believes that primary unpleasantness, unlike secondary, is

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not mediated by cognitive processing.⁴² I think the phenomenology of primary unpleasantness described in §2.1 provides some evidence that Fields is right here, for it is characteristic of sensory experience to seem to have a spatial location, and sensory experience is not dependent on the kind of high-level cognitive processing Price has in mind. At any rate, I will assume that primary unpleasantness can be felt prior to *conceptualization*: like the pain itself, it does not require that you have a concept-laden thought about, say, injury or harm before you experience it.

Now, given that it is primary unpleasantness, not secondary, that occupies one's attention, one might wonder why we should consider secondary unpleasantness part of one's overall pain experience. Why is it not like being sad about a breakup and having a toothache at the same time? We normally wouldn't count the sadness as part of one's overall toothache experience.

But there is good reason to consider secondary unpleasantness as part of the overall unpleasantness of one's pain experience, for there is evidence that when experimental subjects are asked to rate the unpleasantness of their pain, they combine primary and secondary unpleasantness in their rating. Cancer patients tend to rate their most intense pains as less intense than do women during the most intense stages of childbirth, but they also rate it as more unpleasant (Price et al. 1987). Women in labor who focus mainly on pain and avoiding it find their pain just as intense as those who focus on the birth of the child, but rate it as considerably more unpleasant (*ibid.*). Induction of a sad mood while experiencing clinical pain is associated with an increase in catastrophizing thoughts about the pain and an increase in the unpleasantness attributed to it (Berna et al. 2010). In all of these cases, what most explains differences in unpleasantness ratings seems to be concept-laden emotional factors.

This data also suggests a straightforward explanation of why the secondary unpleasantness of pain is genuinely part of the pain experience while one's sadness at a breakup is not part of one's simultaneous toothache experience: the former and not the latter bear the right kind of intentional relationship. The sadness is experienced as about the *breakup*, not about the tooth or the toothache. One's dread in experiencing cancer pain, however, is very much about either the pain or the damage it represents (or both). Something similar goes for the study

⁴²For an excellent overview of the dispute, see Aydede & Güzeldere (2002).

by Berna et al. (2010), who induced a sad mood in subjects by playing them sad music at half speed. The subjects' feelings *about their pain* were manipulated just as a film score manipulates our emotional experience of the characters.

So, say that an emotion is *intentionally attached* to a sensory experience if it is experienced as about either the experience itself or what that experience represents. This evidence should lead us to conclude that secondary unpleasantness is intentionally attached to unpleasant₁ pain. Although it does not allow us to say that secondary unpleasantness is about the pain *as opposed to* the injury it represents (say), it does entitle us to a disjunction: the secondary unpleasantness of pain is about the pain or what it represents.⁴³

4.2 Transparent introspection

But recall that the intentionalist has additional commitments here. On intentionalist lights, both primary and secondary unpleasantness are in Siddharth's case about the *injury*; they *both* represent it as bad, though there may be subtle differences in the kind of badness they represent. (Perhaps secondary unpleasantness takes into account broader implications for the subject's well-being.) And as we saw in §3.2, this leads to the STM problem. The solution to the problem, then, is that when the subject introspects her unpleasant₁ pain the intentional object of her secondary unpleasantness shifts to *the pain itself*.

To explain this the evaluationist needs two things. First she needs to explain how to introspect her experiences in a manner consistent with TP, which is what I will take up in this section. Second, she also needs to explain when the intentional object of an emotion can shift from something in the external world to one of the subject's own mental states. I address this in the following section.

As noted in §2.2, introspection to our phenomenal experience is consistent with TP so long as it is *indirect*. In practice this amounts to a kind of *displaced perception* along the lines of Dretske (1995, Ch. 2): one comes to have knowledge of one's experience via an awareness of the properties of physical objects those experiences present one with. An ordinary example of displaced perception in-

⁴³Of course, this is not to say anything about what exactly attached two experiences intentionally, nor how tight the bind is. As in the case of misattribution of arousal (Dutton & Aron 1974), what mental states one's emotion attaches to will often depend on context and what information is salient. The same appears to go for moods; see Schwarz & Clore (1983) for a classic study.

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volves seeing that the gas tank is empty by reading the gas gauge. The gauge wouldn't read 'E' unless the tank were empty, the thought goes, so it must be empty. Dretske's proposal is that introspecting my experience as of a red apple works in a similar way. I first form the belief that there is a red apple in front of me, on the basis of my visual phenomenology. Then, via an appropriate "connecting belief" (*ibid.*, p. 58), I derive the belief that I am having an experience as of a red apple.

There are a number of problems with this proposal. For one thing, the tank analogy suggests that the connecting belief in the introspective case is "There wouldn't be a red apple in front of me unless I were seeing it", which I in general have *no reason* to believe. This fails to account for the epistemic quality of introspection.⁴⁴ For another, on this view introspection is, at bottom, an inferential process: I *derive* the introspective belief from a visually-based belief and a connecting belief. And intuitively, this cannot be how introspection works. In introspecting I simply look at the apple and form the belief that I am having an experience as of a red apple.

Fortunately, the intentionalist has a way around both of these problems. All she needs is to hold that there are two kinds of beliefs that an agent can form from an experience that represents (say) propositional content p : the external-world belief that p^* corresponding to the content p of her experience,⁴⁵ and the introspective belief "I am having an experience as of p ", formed by attending to the content of her experience and using it to refer to her own experience. More precisely, the view is that an agent first attends to the phenomenal character p

⁴⁴See Aydede (2003); Lycan (2003) for similar criticism. Dretske does anticipate this worry and points out that the inference from a visually-based belief that an external world object has property p to a belief that I am having an experience as of an object's having p is infallible (*op. cit.*, p. 61). As he himself notes, this is a "very unusual form of inference" that secures a true belief whether or not the premises are true: it goes through even in the hallucinatory case where there is no object seen (*ibid.*). But this raises further issues. If we think of an introspector as not paying attention to whether her beliefs are visually-based when she makes these inferences — for that would presuppose introspection already — then it seems she should be strongly tempted to conclude from this unusual feature that she is having an experience of everything. For either there is an apple there or not, and she has just been informed that her usual inference from the apple's existence to her having an experience of an apple goes through even when there is no apple. This is absurd.

⁴⁵The contents may not be the same if, as many intentionalists think, the phenomenal experience has non-conceptual content.

of her experience and applies her concept of an experience to it: “EXPERIENCE AS OF (p)”; this is the introspective step. She then comes to believe that she is having just such an experience.

This account gives us the right kind of access to our experiences. As a form of displaced perception it is consistent with TP: it does not require attending to or directly introspecting an experience, as if one could just “see” one’s own experience. Since it holds that introspection is a matter of forming a belief from a phenomenal experience, it is non-inferential, and for that reason it also does not require reliance on an unjustified belief. And it is formed via a reliable process: basing one’s belief that one is having an experience as of p on one’s experience as of p will *always* generate a true belief. Furthermore, it gives us access to our experiences *as* the phenomenal experiences they are. As noted in the case of pain, there is nothing more to being a phenomenal experience, *as* a phenomenal experience, than to be an experience with a certain phenomenal character. According to this proposal, introspection uses that very character, the content p , in specifying precisely what experience one is having, thus giving access to its nature.

4.3 Turning unpleasantness inward

We are at last in a position to solve the STM problem and thereby answer Q1. The explanation of Siddharth’s action is largely unchanged: as before, Siddharth attends to his injured knee via his unpleasant pain, which in turn represents the injury as bad for him. He thus acts upon accessing a justification for acting. The only difference is that now his unpleasantness is understood to be a composite of primary and secondary unpleasantness, both of which represent his injury as bad.

Now as we noted in §2.1, unpleasant₁ pain is an introspectable phenomenal experience. The *secondary* unpleasantness of one’s experience, as an emotional state, is not. So what happens when Ann introspects her unpleasant₁ pain?

Well, consider first a rather different case. When the Marquess of Glastonbury returns to her estate to find her armoire rifled by thieves she is sad, but she becomes positively distraught when she sees what the burglars did to the portrait of her mother: they ripped it, thereby giving it a gruesome appearance. Her emotional experience of the painting is very much intentionally attached to her

visual experience of it, as it is the way her dear mother seems so savagely disrespected in the painting (the object of her visual experience) that is so distressing to her. But then the Marquess might briefly turn her gaze inward and introspect her visual experience as of the painting. Surely she now is just as distressed that she is *seeing* such a horrible thing. And so she turns away.

Here is a plausible principle that explains the Marquess' phenomenology:

(IT) When an unpleasant emotional experience is intentionally attached to an introspectable experience e with content p , then (i) when e is *unintrospected*, the emotion represents p 's obtaining as bad. And (ii) when e is *introspected*, the emotion represents e 's obtaining as bad.

When the Marquess attends visually to the ravaged painting, she represents the horribly desecrated state of the painting. Yet when she introspects her experience of it, she represents her *seeing the painting* to be bad. That not only explains her turning away but rationalizes it, for in turning away she accesses a justification for doing so.⁴⁶

And now we can easily apply IT to Ann's action: as I argued in §3.2, Ann introspects her unpleasant₁ pain before acting. I also argued in §4.1 that the secondary unpleasantness of one's overall pain experience is intentionally attached to the unpleasant₁ pain. Given this, IT entails that the (emotional) secondary unpleasantness of her overall pain experience then represents her unpleasant₁ pain as a bad thing. But this was precisely what was needed to give her access to a justification for experience-directed aversive behavior, so the access prong of the STM objection is solved. Ann shoots the messenger for a reason.

4.4 Objections

It might seem that by appealing to a higher-order affective state in order to explain Ann's action we have only given ourselves another messenger to shoot. Suppose that Ann has a cousin Zorba who occasionally feels an odd, pressure-like sensation in his knee. Though the feeling has no *primary* unpleasantness, Zorba cannot help but feel anxious about it when it comes, and for that reason he keeps anti-anxiety pills in his pocket. (He used to have pills to dampen the

⁴⁶It is worth pointing out that the Marquess is *accurately* representing her experience as bad, since it causes distress and it is generally bad to be distressed.

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odd sensation, but they've gone missing.) Surely Zorba's anxiety is bad for him in much the same way unpleasant pain is, and taking a pill would relieve him of it. Don't we also need to explain his access to this justification for experience-directed aversive behavior?

It's true that Zorba does have access to a genuine justification for taking his pill, but the crucial fact is that it is not the kind of access that generated the STM problem. Recall from desiderata 1 and 2 (p. 4) that Siddharth's and Ann's access to a justification for acting was practically immediate upon experiencing the unpleasant₁ pain: nothing more than introspection on their experience was required in order for them to have that access. And that, in turn, seemed to cause a conflict with TP, for introspection on an experience presenting a property *P* not give us awareness of our experience as *itself* having property *P*. Our account resolves this difficulty by relying upon the presence of an additional state, secondary unpleasantness, and on a principle that explains how the intentional object of secondary unpleasantness shifts with introspection.

But part of the overall account developed here is that secondary unpleasantness, as an emotional experience, is *not* introspectable (§§2.1, 4.1). Our awareness of our emotional experience is not practically immediate upon experiencing it, and instead must be obtained inferentially. Indeed, this gives us a plausible account of how Zorba must access his own anxiety: his focus narrows, he feels a tightening in his stomach, he can hardly keep his mind off his odd sensation, and from all this he infers that he is feeling anxious again. And crucially, it seems that *thinking* about one's emotional state, as opposed to introspecting it, *can* make that state self-representing: when I anxiously consider the fact that I'm anxious, one of the things that I am now anxious about is my own anxiety.⁴⁷ According to broad evaluationism, such an affect-laden thought represents one's own anxiety as a bad thing. And this, in turn, provides a plausible explanation of Zorba's access to the badness of his own anxiety.

In short, our access to our emotional states is too poor for them to cause the special problem at the root of STM, so this account does not incur a similar explanatory burden in appealing to one in order to explain how our unpleasant₁ pain seems to us to be bad.

⁴⁷Note that Colin Klein (2015, pp. 55-6) has recently used this same fact to a similar purpose in his imperativist theory of pain.

Now, some might find the present account an objectionably high-brow theory of experience-directed aversive behavior, for it requires not only metacognitive capacities but a concept of phenomenal experience. Don't infants attempt to avoid pains too, and for the same reasons we do?⁴⁸

Importantly, this is not a *new* objection to intentionalism. Most intentionalists require conceptual capacities for introspection, so the present account does not worsen the intentionalist's position. But supposing that infants *do* lack a concept of experience, it becomes hard to understand how, in apparently distracting themselves from pain, toddlers are really engaging in *experience-directed* aversive behavior. Without the conceptual capacities necessary to differentiate experiences from the content of those experiences, an infant cannot distinguish *being in a painful state* from *being hurt*. So if an infant with a pain disorder learns to distract herself when the pain comes, he is not doing it for the same reason an adult does, for he really thinks that alleviates the hurt or injury.

Before closing, it is worth noting an implication of the account. If it is possible for a person to experience unpleasant₁ pain without *any* secondary unpleasantness, the present account predicts that although such a pain is bad, that subject also has no *non-inferential* access to that badness, and so it should not make immediate sense to her to take a painkiller even upon introspecting the pain. This sounds odd at first, but it becomes intuitive once we understand how different such a person must be from us: while having the pain, she must be *totally unconcerned* about the pain itself. Her experience is more analogous to that of a person with congenital insensitivity to pain who feels the burning stove to be warm to touch but not painful at all. Such a person is aware of an event in his hand that is *in fact* bad for him, but introspection on his experience will not afford him access to that badness. Instead he must infer that it is bad from what he has learned about hot stoves.

5 Conclusion

Intentionalism provides an attractive picture of conscious experience as a fully transparent window to the world. Evaluationism elaborates that picture by adding that the world as given in experience is far from evaluatively neutral: it is full of danger and the opportunity for gain. An important advantage of

⁴⁸Thanks to Peter Railton for pressing me to address this worry.

evaluationism, then, is that it points to a general account not only of *unpleasant* experience but of all affective phenomenology — one that assigns it a foundational role in agency.

The heart of the STM objection to evaluationism is that intentionalism appears to make experience *too* transparent, too world-directed, to account for the practically immediate access we have to the badness of our own unpleasant pain. The main goal of this paper was to show that objection can be met, and indeed that the evaluationist can provide an attractive account of the way in which the emotional component of unpleasant pain gives us that access.

The solution deploys a number of rather fine distinctions that have emerged in either the philosophical or clinical literature on pain: between pain sensations and unpleasantness; primary and secondary unpleasantness; experience-directed and body-directed aversive behavior; and between the experience of unpleasant pain and its intentional content. But it is important to keep in mind that it is no part of the theory that we as agents always keep careful track of all the distinctions there are to be made. Many aversive responses to unpleasant pain may have unclear aims, for instance, and it may be indeterminate whether an agent is introspecting her experience. So too the account respects the intuitive sense in which in both Siddharth's and Ann's case there is just *one thing* that occupies their phenomenal experience: it is the (apparent) *bad injury* in the knee which monopolizes the attention of both. The account just tells us what there is to be clear about, if we are being clear.⁴⁹

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⁴⁹I owe this turn of phrase to Peter Railton.

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