

## From logical to existing

Comments to "Logic and Existence" by Prof. Xavier Verley  
by Jean-Louis Boucon

Introduction:

About form:

We propose to use the article of Pr Xavier Verley entitled "Logic and Existence" to make climb the ivy of the Ontology of Knowledge (OK).

We could also define this article by a semantic shift: If Prof. Verley's object is: "logic and existence" we will have as object: "Logical and existing".

This quote introduced by Prof. Verley: "*Logic only applies to what is first constituted in a science, that is to say to a system, which refers to something previously given.* (G. Simondon, The individual and his physico-biological genesis, 24), situates the logic of which Prof. Verley is speaking.

The meaning we wish to introduce here qualifies the logical as opposed to the material or the spiritual. It aims to qualify the logical "essence" of reality, because for OK Reality is pure logical interdependence. We could say that reality is an amorphous logical substance, although the term substance was too often used to denote an ultimate form. We wish to show here that from the logical emerges the Existing and more precisely that the Existing is a necessary order mode of the logical.

Because Prof. Verley's article is clear, exhaustive, well-structured and because it introduces us to the most recognized (Western) thinkers on the question of existence in logic, it is the ideal oak that will allow the OK to get up.

Like ivy, our goal is not to criticize in itself the text of Prof. Verley but to detect in the theories of the authors that it mentions, the points of attachment on which we will be able to advance the understanding of the OK. We will proceed by successive remarks. Each comment is preceded by the extract of the original text which gives rise to it (translated by us). The reader is nevertheless recommended to refer to the full text (link below, unfortunately not translated) to replace the extracts in their context: experience shows that from one author to another the relationship between word and concept is extremely fluctuating.

[https://www.academia.edu/1899792/Logique\\_et\\_existence?pls=RHCM7lvOd](https://www.academia.edu/1899792/Logique_et_existence?pls=RHCM7lvOd)

About background :

For the OK, there is in fact no opposition between the logical and the material or the spiritual: reality is a formless logical substance. Representation is morphogenesis and the terms 'material' and 'spiritual' only denote categories of morphogenesis.

Our constant experience shows us that spiritual and material interact. The border between understanding and becoming, between meaning and act, which seems trivial to us, is elusive when we try to approach it. For example: when the subject follows the object of his attention with his gaze, where to draw the line between material and spiritual ?

Representation is morphogenesis and the OK uses the term 'horizon', not to separate the material from the spiritual, but to distinguish the formless from the representable, the unspeakable from the speakable.

For the OK the speakable is not 'something else' than the unspeakable, it is a mode of order: The rainbow is not 'an other thing' than rain, light, sun, the walk that brought me here and now, my sense of vision, my culture etc ... all this unspeakable set of logical interdependencies from which emerges, for me subject, the meaning of the rainbow.

And above all, this horizon is not 'in my mind'. The ordaining of the unspeakable is not carried out 'by my understanding'. The emergence of the meaning from the unspeakable logic is not happening 'in' and 'by' my mind.

On the contrary, it is a process of pure logic\*, a progressive agglomeration of interdependence, which makes the subject emerge as a representation of the world and of his own existence.

The logical transcends the Existing.

This is the key to understanding this article:

We have not left the Garden of Eden. The representation is not 'overhanging' the world, it is 'the' world. Representation is not "grasping form" but "morphogenesis", not as "attribution of form" but as "necessary ordering mode of logical reality".

Common sense (including science and logic) does not represent reality, it emerges from it in the form of modes of order of reality, of logic. My representation of this white stone is not 'something else' than the unspeakable logic from which the meaning of 'white stone' emerges for me, it is only a mode of order.

There are no "other things" than the things which represent themselves in me and which are modes of order.

The Existing is representation. Existence is a mode of order\*.

The amorphous logical "substance" precedes (transcends) its representation.

The logical transcends logic.

\* The OdC shows that the asymptote of the ordaining of logic is individuation: the Existence of the knowing subject is one of the possible individuations. (ref OdC)

Development :

Page 2

Logicians have shown that, formally, the sign of existence cannot relate to signs of objects, as a predicate usually does, but to a predicate: reduced to a predicate sign applicable to a predicate, they totally emptied it of its metaphysical content to include it in their languages and use it as a synonym for "true". If "to exist" is « to be identical to oneself », as Frege sometimes says, existence and truth do not really differ: there can be no difference between truth resulting from the demonstration and truth as adequacy to a content: if a statement is true because it corresponds to a content, no demonstration can contradict it. Since there is only one universe of reference, the statement which affirms the existence of something cannot be contradicted by another statement.

Explanation: The demonstration and the (logical) content are the same. If the statement corresponds to the content, it also corresponds to its proof, the statement is true.

Comment: As soon as we refuse any ontological referent to the semantic object, the adequacy to the content can only be a judgment: the semantic object can only be "judged true". Its truth is imperfect, "A" is only a "judgment \* of truth".

The syntactic relation between imperfect semantic objects is itself stricken with imperfection because the "reality" of the relation is not between the statements but between the contents. The relation " $A \leftrightarrow B$ " is not absolute necessity but "judgment of necessity".

$A \equiv A$  is not a tautology *per se* although it might be thought so.

Frege wrote (ref on sense and reference) : *the discovery that the rising sun is not new every morning, but always the same, is one of the most fertile astronomical discovery.*

Could we state that  $\text{sun} = \text{sun}$  is a tautology ? Could we *a priori* reiterate indefinitely this identity ? Certainly not from Frege's sentence : to state that yesterday's sun is the same as today's is a judgement : the judgement that although the sun has spent some millions tons in between (stricto sensu the reality of the sun is not « the same »), from today's sun I cannot expect other experience as from yesterday's.

Syntactic logic systems (by definition without referents of objects) should therefore refrain from any recursive reasoning because, as close to the absolute as the judgment of necessity is, the latter loses its judgmental properties if it is infinitely reiterated.

\* For the OK, the judgment (of truth, of necessity) owes nothing to understanding or to a convention: it is a probability infinitely close to one by the fact of a singularity of structure: it is a logical attractor.

Nothing proves that the logical content of a semantic object has a foundation (it is *a priori* unfathomable). Nothing proves either that we can fit the "container" of this content into the space in which syntactic logic operates (they are *a priori* immeasurable). For example: the meaning of a word cannot be defined by a finite number of words and the space of words is immeasurable to the universe it claims to describe.

If, then, the meaning (according to Frege) of identity were to be " $A$  is identical to "Logical content of  $A$ ", the concept of self-identity and therefore of existence would be "in essence" meaningless.

## Page 2

So,  $\exists x F(x) = F(x)$  or  $\exists x x=x$ , are demonstrable in the systems of Russell and Hilbert.

Comment: Not without the axiom of foundation. An unfounded set cannot be shown to be equal to itself.

If  $x$  being unfounded, we impose in the function  $x \rightarrow Fx$ , that  $Fx$  be founded, then  $F$  is a judgment.

## Page 7

To say that there is something in a finite domain is not a problem since theoretically it is possible to exhibit a copy of the entity said to exist.

Comment: The "reality" of  $A$  does not *a priori* belong to the universe where  $A$  makes sense. To exhibit  $A$ , a preliminary judgment : "this is  $A$ " is needed which integrates  $A$  into the semantic universe of the statement.

## Page 3

According to Carnap, symbols should no longer be proper names by which we designate objects but coordinates which designate the places that objects can take as when we designate a place by its geographical coordinates or a point in space-time by a quadruplet of real numbers.

Carnap neutralizes the existential impact of the axiom of infinity by translating it ... by the statement  $\forall x \exists y (y \neq x)$  which means that at any given position there is another neighbor which immediately follows it. This statement is no longer an axiom but a demonstrable statement.

Comment: this attachment point is arbitrary: nothing assures us that it would be legitimate to associate with the concept a point having a finite number of coordinates. On the other hand, to give coordinates to proper names is by definition to presuppose order relations for them.

Similarly Carnap's statement presupposes the idea of a successor which does not work for semantic objects. We cannot define *a priori* the notion of successor.

For OK, objects are syntactic singularities, that is to say sets of relations which form a self-referent whole, or more precisely a set whose envelope presents a minimum of complexity (or entropy) in the syntactic universe.

There is nothing logical in making the logical syntax operate from an *a priori* ordered semantic universe of finite dimension.

But the axiom of infinity requires another condition: if there is an infinity of individuals, there must also be an infinity of names: this is how Wittgenstein interpreted this axiom: now, unless we adopt the Carnapian tactic which designates entities by numbers, the names at our disposal will never be enough to exhaust the infinity of the domain.

"... What the 'Axiom of infinity' claims to say would be expressed in language by the fact that there would be an infinity of names with different meanings" (Tractatus Logico philosophicus).

Commentary The Carnapian tactic does not solve anything, nothing assures us that a countable set of numbers would be sufficient to exhaust the infinities of infinities .... of the semantic domain. What LW does not seem to have considered or that has not been taken into account is that the infinity of names has nothing linear, nor anything possibly sayable. There is no "space" that can capture the complexity of the interdependencies between names.

## page 5

The construction of sets requires the axiom of choice which says that in any set  $E$  whose elements are nonempty sets, without a common element, there exists a set  $E'$  which contains one element, and only one, of each set belonging to  $E$ .

Comment: The impossibility is there: if the elements have nothing in common, they cannot constitute a set. The law of constitution could not be decided neither by the subject nor by any mathematical deity overhanging this logical reality. It must find its logical essence in each element and this attachment of each element to the same law of constitution is a logical fact, common to all the elements.

Existence resulting from axioms is based on the idea that "to exist" results from being non-contradictory: this is the point of view defended by Hilbert and Poincaré.

Commentary: For OK, "to exist" is to have meaning for the subject; and to have meaning is to be non-contradictory of the Individuation of the subject.  $\text{Pr}(I \text{ knowing } x) > 0$

Or again: "To exist" in a given state of knowledge E of the subject, means that there is at least one logical path interdependent from E on which x is true and which participates in the necessity of the "I" (the subject's individuation).

Existence is not in the object that exists but in the knowing subject.

Existence results from a morphogenesis.

The only possible Existence is relative to the knowing subject.

Page 6

Frege: "But if the content of what is predicated in the judgment 'Some men exist' does not reside in the 'exist', where is it? I answer: in the form of the particular judgment. Any particular judgment is an existential judgment which can be converted into the "There is" form. For example, "Some bodies are light" is synonymous with "There are light bodies ..."

Comment: For OK we must see here the fact that the concept (man) takes on meaning (and therefore exists) by the instantiations that it makes possible (there are men). The concept of man exists as a judgment (that there are men), as a sayable label emerging from an unspeakable rule of the game (which makes the concept possible).

We must then reinterpret the term judgment as we have shown.

The judgment of existence is the probability as close to 1 as possible that (logical content of A)  $\rightarrow$  (meaning of A)

The existence of the concept (Man) is only a set of possibilities, it is Actual. It can indeed be "judged identical" (but not "identical") to its logical content; the content being unfounded and therefore unprovable.

On the other hand, the instances of man (proper names) will appear to the knowing subject as Existing, certain, present, necessary.

Since Frege, the theory of dynamical systems and its attractors has been invented. Like the concept, the attractor exists when its measure is non-zero, ie when a non-empty set of initial conditions leads to this attractor. (NB for the attractor we speak of initial conditions because it is generated by an irreversible application).

The attractor therefore does not exist "for itself" but relatively to initial conditions in a context of 'rules of the game' or 'conditions of possibility' (the application and the space in which it is defined).

The actual existence of the logical concept is relative to the set of its possible instances in the context of its conditions of possibility (Knowledge of the subject (in the sense of OK)).

"To exist," says Frege, "is to be different from zero," but "is" fundamentally means identity. In this case, to say: "There are men" is to say: "Some men are identical to themselves", or again: "Something identical to itself is a man. "

Comment: There are two ways to say that the game of chess exists:

1) we can say that it is "identical to its rule", or more broadly to its conditions of possibility which go beyond the strict limits of the rule of the game. We understand that this form of existence can only be a judgment, in that the conditions of possibility are unfathomable.

2) one can also say "there are chess games" or again: "the set of instances of games conforming to this rule is not empty", the measure of the concept of chess game in the knowledge of the subject is not zero.

These two forms of existence of the concept are Actual, they only designate possibilities and do not refer to anything certain. Only the instantiation of a part will exist, experienced by the subject, if only as a trace, sayable, certain, present and necessary.

to say "there are flying submarines" is to identify the concept of submarines with that of a flying object.

Comment: In this form the proposition does not effectively imply the Existence (present, certain and necessary) of flying submarines. It only denotes a condition of possibility. It says: The experience (were it mental) of a flying submarine would not cause an irresolvable hiatus in my representation, it is not contradictory to the theory which proves that I exist.

The meaning of the concept associated with the sign "submarine" states in my knowledge the possibility of the experience "flying" and the meaning of the concept associated with the sign "flying" states in my knowledge the possibility of the experience "submarine" "

The probability of "flying" knowing "submarine" is not zero and vice versa.

This example shows that the existence of the concept does not qualify the concept itself but the conditions of possibility of the concept.

As Descartes might have said, the proposition "I exist" is true whenever a proposition (there are flying submarines) takes on meaning in my mind.

page 9

The instantiation which produces an individual or each individual to whom the predicate suits ... corresponds to a mental operation similar to that which Kant required to apply to a concept: just as a concept without intuition is empty, a predicate without an individual who verifies it remains a possibility without any prospect of realization and on which no verifiable or refutable statement can be formulated.

Comment: The predicate without instantiation is a "condition of possibility" of the predicate. It is in a way the equivalent of the proposition  $\text{Pr}(\text{"experiment of } x \text{ knowing "the predicate of } x\text{"}) = 1$ . It remains effectively unspeakable as long as x is not instantiated as Existing by an experiment, even if it is mental.

But the condition of possibility of a predicate (or of a concept) is not a class, it is not the set of its instantiations: The condition of possibility is beyond the horizon of meaning, outside the time (or chronology) of its instantiations.

The intuition of the predicate is nothing other than a judgment of unity, of singularity of the set of logical inferences which make it possible.

The meaning of the predicate is nothing more than a judgment on the set of instantiations that it makes possible.

Is not a judgment the act which starts from the basis and ends with the declarations?

Instantiations make the meaning of the predicate appear to the subject's world as present, certain and necessary.

For this, instantiation must be projected as Existing in the multiplicity of the subject, which requires, beyond the intuition linked to the concept in itself, to integrate other intuitions such as otherness, the now and here etc. ... which define the predicate as Existing in the subject's world.

This is a major contribution of Kantian criticism: it is not pure intuition that takes on the meaning of the concept for the subject: before being thinkable, intuition must merge with the other intuitions that will integrate it into the representation space.

For OK, it must ultimately be merged into the becoming-self of the subject.

Footer page 9

This need to produce an intuition about a concept characterizes mathematics which, according to Kant, constructs their concepts in a spatial and temporal intuition, while metaphysics constructs the concepts in a system without being worried about constructing them in the finite of intuition.

OK proposes to generalize by distinguishing on the one hand: mathematical, scientific, empirical Representation ... in a spatial and temporal intuition, and on the other hand: Knowledge (the conditions of possibility of meaning and their possible modes of order).

Footer page 10

"... Kant opposed general concepts (which he often called simply Begriffe or concepts) to representations of individual objects which he called intuitions (Anschauungen). As I have argued elsewhere, these intuitions by definition include something that represents an individual. If we follow Kantian terminology, we are led to say that quantors (of existence and universal) do not only work with general concepts but contain an intuitive element. What we are used to calling the logic of quantification in its general form would not have been logic at all for Kant, because according to Kant logic only deals with general concepts. The theory of quantification, Kant would have been forced to say, depends on intuitive, non-logical methods. Of course, this is nothing more than another way of saying that Kant would have called the typically quantification modes of inference mathematics rather than logic" (Hintikka, Logic, languages-games and information, 139).

Comment:

The term "intuition" does not translate the full meaning of the German "Anschauung"

1) We use the term intuition to designate a response that produces beliefs that are phenomenologically:

a) immediate

b) accompanied by the feeling of the obvious, of the certainty and of the necessity of the raw proposals

c) derived from thought experiences, quasi-perceptual, imaginative

-The intuitional a priori Meinong against Kant in the Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to Musil (Vrin) p. 174

2) An intuition helps us which is as foreign to us as the ego, which cannot become an object.

-Schelling Werke I 168 cf I 181-182

3) In the Anschauung the object is shown to the gaze so that its various parts appear and the relations relating these parts to each other. Something is given, both to the soul and to the sense as a complex unit, and this is what is designated as beautiful.

-David Marty: Georg Simmel - Sociological Aesthetics presses of LAVAL University

Note: Schauen (show) and Schönn (beautiful) have the same root.

Logical concepts do not integrate intuitions of time and space and their interrelationships either. It follows that a logical space, unlike the multiplicity of our representations, is dimensionless or rather it is of an infinity of infinities of dimensions. Logical space is exponentially complex one might say.

In this, intuition is indeed the Act by which the indescribable complexity of the conditions of possibility of meaning is reduced in order to bring out at the end of the day a sayable and instantiated meaning.

A complete and coherent theory can of course be designated as an object, but in the (extensional) multiplicity where it can be designated as an object its intensional logic cannot be designated as part of the object. The terms extensional and intensional alter our point of view: Consciousness wants to believe that the intensional is inside the extensional sense, that is to say that if the extensional senses seem to us disjoint, the intensional realities should be disjoint too. But it is not.

As Kant thought, it would be to confuse knowledge and representation, logic and geometry, to put physics before metaphysics.

Note that instantiation in turn alters the conditions of possibility: giving meaning to an instantiation is also creating the conditions of possibility for the consequences of this instantiation: by instantiating the word "snow", I create the conditions of possibility of instantiation of the "white" predicate.

page 12

### Existence from rules and from acts

Hintikka's interpretation of the rules of inference does not in any way allow us to believe that existence is nothing more than a simple possibility. He only showed that the rules of inference, used in certain systems, are not purely analytical rules but that the need<sup>1</sup> to introduce individuals, when we seek and find in order to win, gives them a synthetic character. The construction makes it possible to exhibit an entity from a research and discovery activity when one or more conditions have been previously fixed. The object or individual corresponding to what we were looking for only exists on the basis of the strategy defined from the construction of the model-sets: it depends on the chosen universe of interpretation. Its existence is subject to the rules that define the model-set<sup>2</sup>.

Hintikka, who uses a synthetic procedure so as not to have to return to intuition, saw the link between existence and individuation (Editor's note: of the individual and not of the knowing subject). But the rule of existential instantiation, as he recognizes, does not correspond to a real individuation: this form of individuation has no other meaning than symbolic<sup>3</sup>, because it is subordinated to a whole linguistic system comprising symbols and rules.

The model-sets in which we immerse individuals are comparable to Leibniz's possible worlds, and the individuals belonging to these worlds remain individuals whose existence is only possible.<sup>4</sup> All the possibilities concur in existence, but those who become real come from an act which is in reality only a groping search<sup>5</sup> ...

Comments:

1 once again what meaning for the word necessity? Is it essential for the understanding to create individuals, if so is that consciously perceived? or else: is the appearance of individuals a necessary consequence of logical activity? if so, is it the appearance in general or that of such and such an individual that is necessary?

2 the individual exists according to its conditions of possibility. It is indeed the laws of representation which determine the existence of individuals and not the extensional relations between individuals (the laws of the subject's world)

3 There is therefore no being in reality but only in representation.

4 We must qualify the term possible: in the model-set the individual is in reality only a possible mode of order, but in the world of representation he appears certain and even necessary. What exists in my world certainly, presently and necessarily exists. The aesthetic intuition which creates meaning is precisely this judgment of necessity.

5 the OK would say ... come from a progression from the possible-contingent towards the certain-necessary.

It is conceivable that a species of indeterminate objects results by synthesis of the acts and intuitions of the subject, but from language alone can only come a logical generativity during which the same is associated with the same by virtue of logical principles. Although Poincaré also identified truth and existence with non-contradiction, he could not believe that, starting from nothing, logical generativity could generate anything. From an empty identity, something, a content, cannot come out.

Comment:

This statement is quite surprising, coming from Poincaré : the father of the dynamic systems theory.

On the one hand, nothing allows us to think that the acts and intuitions of the subject from which the objects result would be anything other than logic, a logic unspeakable by his consciousness.

On the other hand, "logical generativity" as a rule of the game effectively presents singularities which are existing objects in that they become themselves. Although the essence of an attractor is a pure logical rule, the attractor has a non-zero measure: it exists for a non-empty set of initial conditions.

Poincaré does not recognize that in the acts and intuitions of the subject, just like in the language activity (whether intra-or inter-subjective) nothing ever changes in reality: what we call acts and intuitions of the subject does not move anything. Existence is a logical and not a spatial mode of order. To create a sense of what exists, we do not "collect" its causes, which is not even the case in the physical world. The unity of being is purely logical.

What links the represented beings to each other is a conditional probability relationship: the probability of (the existence of) A knowing (the existence of) B is not zero and vice versa. Why such a probability relationship? Because neither A nor B are One in reality, they are only the individualized images given by judgment of the unfathomable logical complexities of "whatever makes A (resp.B) possible. As a result, what we call relation  $A \leftrightarrow B$  is also only the image given by judgment of an unfathomable logical complexity.

All the possible order modes are possible before being revealed, they are Actual in the OK sense, but "knowing" what already exists, all these possibilities are not equally probable.

page 13

Frege wrote "... an object is anything that is not a function, it is that whose expression has no empty place. <sup>1</sup> "

Frege, Logical and Philosophical Writings, 92

If Frege conceived of existence and truth in purely logical terms, without falling into the void of being conceived as a simple identity to oneself, in the manner of Parmenides, it is because he had a Platonic conception of truth. , this one pre-existing to its discovery <sup>2</sup>. But Frege sometimes thinks of deduction as something other than a symbolic derivation: he sometimes speaks of a tree and thinks it from life <sup>3</sup>.

Comments:

<sup>1</sup> For OK, what exists is certain, present, necessary. It is formally true that its expression contains no empty place in that it is a judgment of necessity and that this necessity subsumes its unfathomable contingency. It is, however, just as true that its meaning is an open door, a law of possibility over the unrepresented.

<sup>2</sup> OK goes further, the Logos and its corollary the necessity of logical Individuation transcends all representation and all formal existence. It is not only "the truth" which preexists its discovery but "all the possible truths", because these truths are only modes of orders of the logical interdependence. That said, some truths being revealed to the subject, the others are no longer equiprobable for him.

<sup>3</sup> For OK, the subject's Individuation, expresses the relation: "I"  $\rightarrow$  "I" or even  $\Pr ("I" \mid "I") = 1$  as the first axiom of all logic.

page 14

For Frege ... logical individuation remains dependent on the symbolic system which makes it possible and contrasts with philosophical (editor's note: ontological) or biological individuation which both relate to singularity

Comments :

OK merges the two points of view: for OK ontological individuation is a logical singularity rendered necessary by virtue of the Logos. In relation to individuation in general, logos effectively plays the role of a "symbolic system" which transcends and rules the process of individuation.

In his sentence Frege does not deal with the transcendent nature of the symbolic system in the context of logic. Doesn't he dare to venture to seek what transcends the human spirit?

For Brouwer, the only given is the act, and the sequence of acts follows an order which is no longer that of symbolism fixed by rules but that of time or of life which is union and division: intuition is that of an act which *of two makes one*. Do we not find here the intuition both of the force of the will which unifies and of the life which, starting from the one, multiplies?

Comment: trying not to overinterpret Brouwer, the symbolic parallel with the OK is remarkable:

"of two makes one" symbolizes the singularity which unites and gives meaning, the aesthetic, the logical individuation which is **will** or **desire** for a persistent self-identity; the will not as an affect of the subject's consciousness but as a transcendent principle whose essence is purely logical.

"of one makes two" symbolizes the **power**, the abundance of logical interdependence, principle of the expansion of knowledge.

But union and division, will and power, self-identity and becoming, logically precede, i.e. transcend intuition.

In the heuristic model of individuation proposed in the article "Introduction to the OK", the matter is precisely "of one make two" and "of many make one".

The principle of identity, which is also that of existence, is then defined as the principle of an asymptotic balance between **power** (which of one makes two) and **will** (which of two makes one).

For lack of competence I will refrain from making the parallel with Yang and Yin.

The "reality" of power and will is not in the Existing, in becoming oneself, but in its conditions of possibility.

This balance is not universal, it is subjective because subsumed by the Individuation of the subject: All the existing in the representation by a subject contribute to its existence which is the balance between the power to become and the will of self-identity.

..., to be means to act<sup>1</sup>. Only this action must be conceived, as Aristotle had seen it, in relation to a power which plays the role of a substrate<sup>2</sup>.

Comment:

<sup>1</sup> For the subject, to be is to act and to become. Becoming, acting and understanding are one and the same.

<sup>2</sup> Knowledge is the substrate of Being. From its power of expansion, the principle of which is the abundance of interdependencies (Brouwer's "of one make two"), arise both the becoming, the acting and the understanding .

Page 15

Logic only applies to what is first constituted in a science, that is to say to a system, which refers to something previously given<sup>1</sup>: "Before even asking how it can be legitimate or not legitimate to make judgments about beings, we can consider that being is said in two senses: in a first sense, fundamental, being is insofar as it is; but in a second sense, always superimposed on the first in logical theory, being is being insofar as it is individuated<sup>2</sup>. If it were true that logic only relates to statements relating to being after individuation, a theory of being prior to all logic should be instituted; this theory could serve as a foundation for logic, because nothing proves in advance that being is individuation in only one possible way<sup>3</sup>; if several types of individuation existed, several logics should also exist<sup>4</sup>, each corresponding to a type of individuation. The classification of ontogenies would make it possible to pluralize logic with a valid foundation of plurality"

(G. Simondon, The individual and his physico-biological genesis, 24)

Comments

<sup>1</sup> questionable because the system could be its own creation

<sup>2</sup> we must keep open the question of universality of the being and its individuation

<sup>3</sup> this sentence conceals a confusion: there is the being/object and the being / subject. If it is true that the statements relating to a being/object require its individuation, this individuation of the being/object takes place as participation in the individuation of the being/subject for meaning only exists for the knowing subject, and it is this individuation of the subject that imposes the structures of multiplicity in which its logic operates. The extensional truth of being/object is only valid for and through this subjective multiplicity. For the subject, everything made sense within his multiplicity. The horizon of meaning is precisely the place of intuitions which give meaning.

<sup>4</sup> everything depends on the concept of Existing. If Existence is subjective, that is to say regulated by the individuation in the 1st person of the subject himself, then only one logic can Exist for him.

Only generation creates something that exists, which would allow us to say that, if the individual is the paradigm of true existence, logic can only symbolically reconstruct, and in a discontinuous manner, a process by which any object, any individual and all existence are realized: individuation is not a form derived from thought but rather a primary process from which not only beings derive but the forms which allow them to be thought.

Xavier verley

Comment: We would like to distinguish the two possible meanings of the word *logic*:

-The meaning used by the author seems to be logic as a construction by the mind, as a system of representation. In this sense I would absolutely support his statement.

-The other meaning: logical (nb in french logic and logical are the same word: "logique") as opposed to material or spiritual.

Logical interdependence transcends the Logos, which is its principle of order. The Logos transcends individuation which is the general solution resulting from this Logos. Individuation transcends existence which is the meaning given by the subject to his individuation or to the individuation of a being.

From this meaning of "logical", while supporting the conclusion of Professor Verley, we will maintain that logic is the "amorphous substance" from which the existent emerges.

Conclusion

To conclude, we will take up this short text on Hegel (whose author's name I unfortunately lost)

Logic in Hegel can neither be opposed to the philosophy of nature, substance considered as the principle of a change<sup>1</sup> nor to the philosophy of mind where instantiated ideas exist.<sup>2</sup> Its logic is that of the Hegelian concept which, from a movement engendered by the very contradictions of which it is rich, develops and gradually determines itself in nature and in spirit. Logic is therefore here the concrete which has not yet reached the subsequent determinations of nature and spirit, and it is not in itself of another nature, since the self-movement of the concrete logical notion is the common principle of nature and mind<sup>3</sup>. The ultimate term of logic is the idea, of which the whole logical order is the content<sup>4</sup>; in turn, coming out, so to speak, from itself in order to pose, in the form of "being other", as the negative or the exterior of itself, the idea is "nature" whose summit is the individual<sup>5</sup>; but finally overcoming this

exteriority which defines it as nature, the idea returns to arise (Editor's note emerge) for itself and in its concrete subjectivity, in the form of the mind.

On Hegel Encyclopedia art.247 p 207

We already find in this text some of the essential concepts of the OK expressed in this article:

- <sup>1</sup>: Reality (nature) is amorphous logical interdependence
- <sup>2</sup>: It is in the subject's representation that instantiated ideas exist
- <sup>3</sup>: From amorphous logic emerges in the subject the representation of the world and of himself
- <sup>4</sup>: The idea is a mode of order of logic
- <sup>5</sup>: The Individuation of the subject subsumes all his ideas

The singularity is associated with the concept, it derives its meaning from nature (the conditions of possibility, the perspective) whose summit is the subject (the individuation) to emerge from it in the spirit in the form of a concrete, of a sayable idea whose meaning would be a law of probability (ie of conditions of possibility) on the other ideas related to the concept.  
The Logos is the principle of an auto-morphogenesis of amorphous logic.

**Other publications of the author :**

- Ref OdC      *Introduction to Ontology of Knowledge*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref CoG      *The concept of grounding and the Ontology of Knowledge*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref PLOC:    *The philosophy of language and the Ontology of Knowledge*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref CNT:     *A natural concept of time pdf*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref LAMG    *The Ontology of Knowledge, logic, arithmetic, sets theory and geometry*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref BQOC    *Beyond Qbism with the Knowledge Ontology - pdf*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref SOLI     *Is Ontology of Knowledge a solipsism ?*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref MOND    *The Ontology of Knowledge and the form of the world*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
[www.academia.edu](http://www.academia.edu)
- Ref UPF :    *L'Univers n'a pas la forme*  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
Ed. Mon petit éditeur 2013



