Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

REFERENCES

  • Bennett, J. (1974): ‘Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2, 381–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J. (1982): '“Even If.”, Linguistics and Philosophy 5, 403–418. Broad, C.D. (1927): Scientific Thought, London: Harcourt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman (1991 [1947]): ‘The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals’, in Jackson, F. (ed.), Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hazen, A. and Slote, M. (1979): '“Even if.”, Analysis 39, 35–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, P. (1987): Asymmetries in Time – Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kundera, M. (1991): Immortality, New York: Grove Weidenfeld.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I. (1986): A Theory of Counterfactuals, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I. (1991a): ‘Counterfactuals and Causal Relevance’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74, 314–337.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I. (1991b): ‘Transitivity and Preemption of Causal Relevance’, Philosophical Studies 64, 125–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I. (1992): ‘Counterfactuals’, Erkenntnis 36, 1–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I. (1994): ‘Causal Independence’, Philosophy of Science 61, 96–114.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1973): Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peirce, C.S. (1965): Collected Papers – vol. 6. ed. by Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rescher, N. (1967): ‘Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective’, in Gale, R.M. (ed.), The Philosophy of Time – a Collection of Essays, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 183–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (1980): ‘A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle’, in Harper, W., Stalnaker, R. and Pearce, G. (eds.), Ifs – Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 87–104.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tichy, P. (1984): ‘Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters vs. Three’, Philosophical Studies 45, 147–179.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, CB 232, Boulder, CO, 80309-0232, USA

    Luc Bovens

Authors
  1. Luc Bovens
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bovens, L. Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming. Philosophical Studies 90, 79–101 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004281414376

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004281414376

Search

Navigation