

# Plato's *Theaetetus*: Formation Over Forms?

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## INTRODUCTION

Plato's *Theaetetus* offers the opportunity to consider epistemology in ways that importantly explore the meaning of “student” and “teacher.” Specifically, this article argues that the dialogue's characters—Theodorus, Theaetetus, Protagoras, and Socrates—perform functions that not only reveal competing philosophies of education but templates of and for student engagement as formation. As a text, *Theaetetus* provides a noteworthy means through which students not only read and think about *elenchus* (refutation) and *aporia* (perplexity) but experience it as participants in interlocution. Additionally, the dialogue itself represents formation insofar as it is an instance of Plato's move away from the Theory of Forms and his further development of midwifery. Proceeding in three parts, this paper 1) provides a brief overview of the dialogue; 2) underscores the representational nature of the characters in the dialogue—and the part they play in student formation; and 3) explores the Socrates-as-midwife motif and the overall marginalization of Forms in the dialogue. In short, this paper argues for understanding the *Theaetetus* as an aporetic dialogue about formation over Forms.<sup>1</sup>

## BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DIALOGUE

*Theaetetus* begins with a prologue that takes place just before Socrates' death, in 399 BCE, and begins with Socrates asking Theodorus if he knows of any young men he thinks have potential. Theodorus recommends Theaetetus and the dialogue proceeds with Socrates asking Theaetetus “What do you think knowledge is?” (146c).<sup>2</sup> Initially, Theaetetus only offers examples of knowledge (*ousia*) rather than providing a definition of knowledge itself (*eidos*). The process is aided by Socrates' claim that he is a midwife, like his mother Phaenarete (149a).

Three definitions ultimately follow: knowledge is perception, knowledge is true judgment, and knowledge is true judgment with an account. The first view represents both Protagorean relativism and Heraclitean flux theory. For Protagoras, as Socrates quotes him, “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not” (152a). For Heraclitus, you cannot put your foot into the same river twice, as everything is in constant motion. Socrates provides multiple arguments to refute the first definition, underscoring how perceptions can be deceiving and how the “measure doctrine” is relativism. Indeed, Plato spends a significant amount of time in the dialogue indicting relativism and requiring additional conditions for knowledge.

The second view, knowledge is true judgment, is explored via multiple puzzles, perhaps most notably: 1) the wax block; 2) the aviary; and 3) the jury. For the wax block, Socrates offers a model wherein the soul already has a place in which we imprint everything we want to recall, both as memories and instances of knowledge. The objects to which we grant stability are the objects that get imprinted on the wax tablets of our minds. The problem here is that, as Socrates illustrates it, Theaetetus and Theodorus could be seen together in a crowd by Socrates, who knows both, but in his haste, incorrectly identifies them in that crowd (193-194). It is a true judgment that Socrates makes in claiming that Theaetetus and Theodorus were in the crowd, but he is still wrong in claiming to know that he saw them. This point is an example of a false judgment that results when a perception links to the wrong wax imprint. Memories, like the quality of the wax that varies from person to person, can be both clear and strong or muddled and weak.

The aviary is an extension of the memory concern, but distinguishes between “possessing” knowledge and “having” knowledge (197d-199e). I can possess doves and pigeons in a cage, but I cannot be said to “have” them. If they represent information and information recall in my mind, how will I yield knowledge if I grab the wrong one? That is, for the knowledge claim, “I know that  $7+5=12$ ,” and where the dove represents “11” and the pigeon represents “12,” unless there is more to knowledge than luckily catching the pigeon, how

can I be said to know?

The last illustration to debunk the idea that true judgment is knowledge entails trials. In a court of law, a jury can be persuaded by an eloquent lawyer to judge that what an expert witness offers as testimony is true without it being the case that the jury has knowledge. Socrates' emphasis here is both on a "lucky" truth and persuasion: "... suppose they come to their decision upon hearsay, forming a true judgment: then they have decided the case without knowledge, but, granted they did their job well, being correctly persuaded?" (201c) He concludes that "true judgment without an account falls outside of knowledge" (201c-d), and turns to the positive claim that knowledge is true judgment with an account (*logos*).

In the final section of the dialogue, the Dream Theory is offered by Socrates as a way of better understanding the importance of the added condition. Socrates recounts to Theaetetus a dream he once had in which he heard a theory that stated that everything is made up of complexes and simples (201d-202c). The theory holds that a brush, for example, is made up of bristles and a handle and that the bristles and handle are also made up of even more simples, say horse hair and wood. At the base of these simples are the bedrock elements that constitute the complex brush. Like words made up of letters, Socrates then criticizes the Dream Theory by pointing out that knowing that a word is spelled correctly versus incorrectly is an instance of a true belief with an account, but is not the same as knowing what the word means. The dialogue aporetically ends with the challenge to find out what constitutes knowledge.

## CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE

Along with the content of the dialogue, I am arguing that the characters Plato uses to consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge are vitally important to the idea of formation. That is, engaging the *Theaetetus* as a character-play, students learn from the different figures Plato uses to better consider what counts as knowledge and what does not. They also learn more about their own formation, perhaps ironically, when they use the characters to

distance themselves from what might otherwise be taken as personal attacks. This is part of the reason that seeing the characters as caricatures is often helpful. Understanding the potential and importance of questioning (Theaetetus) requires students to understand the limitations of tradition and narrow expertise (Theodorus), the futility of relativism and winning arguments for the sake of earning money (Protagoras), and the vitality of inquiry (Socrates). Consider each character in turn.<sup>3</sup>

Theaetetus is the rare respondent to Socrates, in all of Plato's dialogues, whose intentions are noble and worthy. Theaetetus is praised for being smart and, importantly, for continuing in learning. Not only is he credited for much of Euclidian geometry, he is described in the dialogue as courageous. He is also described as ugly, like Socrates, with a snub nose and bulging eyes (143e-144a). Theaetetus differs from almost all of Socrates' interlocutors in that he is eager and willing to continue the inquiry, even after repeated *elenchus*. Students reading the dialogue often share Theaetetus' frustration, but unlike Theaetetus (and more like sophists) they stop inquiring and hope to be provided answers as to the meaning of the text and the purpose of having to read the dialogue in the first place. "Will you please just tell me where the justification condition is?" They often plead. Theaetetus represents the potential formation that students have, if only they would realize what they do not know.

Theodorus is an aging tutor who represents an "in-between" of sophistry and philosophy: too much a friend of Protagoras (162a-b), but warily intrigued by some of Socrates' questions.<sup>4</sup> Mostly, however, Theodorus wishes to avoid Socrates' interrogations. His age and his experience make him reticent to engage with Socrates at all. Whenever he does, he does so unwillingly and in a perfunctory manner. He is humorless, too. Theodorus represents the "settled" teacher. His formation is essentially complete. He has his methods and need not contemplate changing. While he might be an expert geometer, expertise narrowly understood means that he is neither wise nor philosophical. Students sometimes identify with Theodorus in their reticence to engage, finding the process fatiguing and wishing to evade it altogether. Some students may also identify with Theodorus because they have significant experience and practice

behind them, but mistake what they do with what can and should be done better, well, or differently.

Protagoras, while not a speaking character in the dialogue, is nonetheless present and represents the evils of relativism and eristic sophistry. Contrary to Avi Mintz, I argue that Protagoras' sophistry represents the antithesis of philosophy.<sup>5</sup> That he is portrayed "gently" or "reverentially" in the dialogue is, on my view, ironic humor.<sup>6</sup> Plato is consistent in his denigration of eristic sophistry throughout his dialogues. Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, etc., are each foils Plato uses to advance a vision of philosophy that champions thinking and questioning at their expense. As Ruby Blondell notes, sophists relied on recitations or lectures that effectively blunted inquiry and, thus, formation—the antithesis of philosophy.<sup>7</sup> Like some poets in the oratorical tradition (and most education consultants?), they competed with one another to attract attention and increase the fees paid to them for their rhetorical skill. For eristic sophistry, the anti-philosophical point is a comparative, mercantile, and social standing enterprise.

Socrates, in contrast, is emblematic of the search for wisdom and virtue. He serves as the mouthpiece for Plato and demonstrates the kind of inquiry and formation to which we all should aspire. He is a midwife for others' ideas and represents the kind of intellectual humility the sophists lack. I find it telling that the students I encounter are consistently irritated by Socrates' questioning. They often claim that it is circular and that it focuses on minutiae. They are eager for answers and find Socrates increasingly frustrating the longer they read the dialogue. Like other professors, I attempt to enact the character of Socrates by restating the kinds of questions he asks to directly challenge students' claims. Questioning students in "real time"—having all of us around the table, face-to-face, reacting and interacting to facial cues, pauses, inflections, terms, etc.—means that students shift from being benign readers to being participants in interlocution. Enter the role of midwife.

Socrates claimed such a role, not unproblematically, when he asserted that "it is the midwives who have the power to bring on the pains, and also, if they think fit, to relieve them ... " (149d). In such a process, many of the students re-inscribe relativism by prefacing responses to questions with "to

me,” “to me, personally,” and “in my opinion,” as though these qualifications rid them of the epistemic responsibility to think more deeply about the content of the questions to which they are responding.<sup>8</sup> I take this to be part and parcel of the process of our inquiry, but one that symbolizes the perverse reification of sophistry over philosophy in much of the course work students have long experienced.

Although this initial sketch is an oversimplification of the parts the characters play, the differences represent important symbolism for teaching the dialogue as formation. I stop short of endorsing James Arieti's view that the characters of the dialogue subsume reason under emotion, but argue that approaching the dialogue's characters symbolically provides a potent means through which students better understand Plato specifically and philosophical formation generally.<sup>9</sup> I now turn to clarifying Socrates' role as midwife and justifying how the *Theaetetus* represents formation over Forms.

### SOCRATES AS MIDWIFE

In his role as midwife in *Theaetetus*, Socrates exemplifies several key characteristics: the primacy of definitions, bringing about *elenchus* and *aporia*, using dialectic to demonstrate maieutic expertise in seeking virtue, and distinguishing between the empirical and the a priori. Socrates is also a matchmaker, of sorts, as when he determines which students should study with him and which ones should be sent to study or learn from others.<sup>10</sup> Being an intellectual midwife means that Socrates must comprehend whether someone is pregnant with ideas (149c) and provide the proper conditions for both “sowing” and “harvesting” the fruits of intellectual labor (149e). Confusingly, Socrates asserts that he is “barren” of wisdom himself (150c) but he does have expertise (after previously criticizing expertise). Responding to Theodorus, Socrates says “But you don't realize what is happening. The arguments never come from me; they always come from the person I am talking to. All that I know, such as it is, is how to take an argument from someone else—someone who *is* wise—and give it a fair reception” (161b). Later in the dialogue, when indicating the success Theaetetus has achieved by

realizing what he does not know, Socrates says “And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as a result of this inquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don’t know. This is all my art can achieve—nothing more” (210c). Such wording is important. If “all” Socrates’ midwifery can achieve is intellectual humility drawn out from Theaetetus, this is actually monumental and significant to formation: knowledge comes from philosophical inquiry.

The midwife metaphor suggests that those giving birth to worthy ideas are the center of attention, but that the midwife plays a key role in helping to birth those ideas. Perhaps most importantly, there is judgment involved in determining which ideas are, in fact, worthy—something beyond the scope or imagination of sophistry. Sophists are not midwives, they parade around claiming to have the answers. Midwives, by contrast, are past child-bearing and help others bring about “intelligent life.” There is a fine line between Socrates’ feigning ignorance and demonstrating humility in the face of Theaetetus’ learning, but what the midwife passage indicates is that Socrates subordinates himself in interlocation to bring about philosophical searching. Understood as an action, not a conclusion, midwifery continues philosophical formation where sophistry ignores it.

This point marks *Theaetetus* as a significant dialogue about formation in that students have an example of philosophical cross-examination that, while not leading to a definitive conclusion, is more important because Theaetetus is nonetheless successful. As Rosa Hong Chen notes, “this pedagogical ‘midwifery’ links the learner and what is to be ‘delivered’ from within, connoting a process of intuitive ‘pregnancy’ and practical ‘labor’ of thought. This metaphorical means of teaching helps bring about what is (or may be) always within each learner.”<sup>11</sup> Similarly, students not only find themselves re-thinking their roles as teachers, counselors, leaders, etc., but also as students *per se*.

## FORMATION OVER FORMS

Far from the first instance of philosophers of education taking up Plato's *Theaetetus*, the ultimate point of this article is to assert that Plato marginalized the Theory of Forms in favor of the world of human interlocation.<sup>12</sup> I am following Timothy Chappell's mapping of revisionists' claims regarding the role of Forms in Plato's later work.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, I am aligning my argument with Gilbert Ryle, Richard Robinson, W.G. Runciman, G.E.L. Owen, and others, who point out that Plato's treatment of Forms (or lack thereof) in the *Theaetetus* is a symbolic and important move.<sup>14</sup> Robinson is especially clear:

The Forms are absent from the *Theaetetus* merely because they are irrelevant to the subject discussed there. The subject of the *Theaetetus* is the essence of knowledge, and the essence of knowledge is not the same as its object. . . . Plato has turned his attention away from the world of Forms to the mind of man. And why not? I venture to assert that to a practicing philosopher nothing more than Plato's explicit discussion of the definition of knowledge is wanted to make the *Theaetetus* a fascinating dialogue. We do not need some metaphysics hinted at behind it all. We are entirely delighted with what is explicit, the keen and full development of the difficulty of defining knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

A "keen and full development" is another way of explaining formation. The dialogue is about interlocation for meaning-making about what constitutes (what forms?) knowledge. Runciman notes that the "reason that the Forms are unobtrusive in the *Theaetetus* is that they are not very relevant."<sup>16</sup> Perhaps this is partly due to Plato's treatment of the Forms in the *Parmenides*. There, and only there, is Socrates seriously challenged by Parmenides regarding Forms themselves. I am not suggesting that Parmenides refutes Socrates wholly (or even successfully), but that this is another example in Plato's later work where he subjects his own ideas to continued scrutiny. This is, said differently, valuing continued formation over settled and universal Forms.



As Chappell puts it, Plato writes the dialogue “more or less completely without the theory of Forms. . . . There are no explicit mentions of the Forms at all in the *Theaetetus*, except possibly (and even this much is disputed) in what many take to be the philosophical backwater of the Digression.”<sup>17</sup> And David Sedley extends Chappell’s point in writing about an important element of the Digression itself:

As an excursus, it shares many of the features of the myths with which Plato loves to crown his dialogues: an eloquent declaration of faith that there is divinely dispensed justice in the world, founded on the bigger picture and looking beyond the range to which dialectical argument can aspire. Typically, a Platonic myth focuses on the dispensation of justice in the afterlife. Here in the *Theaetetus* Digression Socrates’ single reference to the afterlife is both brief and inexplicit. Instead, the theme that everyone reaps the regards of their justice or injustice by being allocated to the appropriate realm is applied primarily to our present existence: even in life, we make the choice whether to inhabit the divine realm, as a philosopher’s intellect does, or the godless world of seedy intrigue in which the gifted but unphilosophical enmesh themselves. The afterlife is mentioned as a mere continuation of that choice between the divine and the godless realms, its details left altogether vague.<sup>18</sup>

Far from “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” what we have is Plato’s mature thinking in modifying the supremacy or centrality of Forms. In one sense, the *Theaetetus* might be a meta-narrative of Plato’s own formation, continuing the philosophical quest for accuracy in thinking and the unfolding project of making meaning. I assert, again, that what is significant about the dialogue is the degree to which it offers students, perhaps especially students in education, the “positively painful” opportunity for elenctic and aporetic struggle and understanding.

Ryle makes a similar point and connects the engagement of readers to

the goal of the later dialogue. He is worth quoting at length:

Plato knew in his bones that elenctic disputation had some important and positive heuristic value over and above the modest values of proving the Delphic Oracle wrong or right, of deflating the intellectually conceited, of rebutting cynical theses, of amusing the young men and of whetting their forensic wits. An argument-sequence too cogent for the answerer to circumvent does not lead only to the questioner's victory in the ring. The employer of it, the victim of it and the audience that follows it also learn something, and learn something over and above the mere techniques of winning such victories. ... What then do we learn *about*? Well, they come to know new things, if seemingly only negative things, about Courage, say, or Beauty, or Knowledge *versus* Belief, or Teaching *versus* Persuading, or Friendship, or Justice. But what are these? Let us label them, non-committally, "Notions," "Ideas," or "Concepts." Is it worth while coming to know new things about these unconcrete matters? Reasoning for maintaining that these Ideas are supreme realities, the apprehension of which constitutes Knowledge or Science *par excellence*, will be step-reasons for maintaining that the dialectical dissection of them has a supreme, theoretical title. The ontological nobility of its objects confers heuristic nobility upon the dialectical study of them.<sup>19</sup>

Such study is formation insofar as the engagement is sincere and the point is philosophical rather than eristical. The frustration that may come from such study of the *Theaetetus* is arguably a necessary feature of both *elenchus* and *aporia*—and such frustration may be alien to students too frequently caught up in rubrics, benchmarks, and the other detritus of a bureaucratized training regime we call "school" or "college."

Indeed, much that goes by the term "education" is formation in only a bastardized sense: preparation for future work in a neoliberal, global

world, bereft of meaning-making and intellectual thought. This negative form of formation is external molding of compliant others willing to, forced to, or hegemonically “eager” to find employ—and figure out the “game” of schooling so any possible work can be circumvented or subverted (not always a bad reaction to bad education policy, admittedly). Still, reducing or denying intellectual capacity in favor of academic sloth or technological escape is the decidedly non-Platonic reification of do-nothingness; of sloth.

The formation represented in the *Theaetetus* is vitally opposed to the preceding characterizations. Plato centers discourse, argument, engagement, and challenge in such a way that Theaetetus—predisposed to such interaction though he may be—relishes the challenge. His formation symbolizes our potential, if we would only realize what we do not know and appreciate that knowing requires effort and frustration and pain. Formation of this sort is, therefore, significantly better than routinized drill, online correspondence courses, and the uninspired drudgery of “teaching as telling.” The *Theaetetus* does not provide us a lesson plan for spelling out formation, it embodies it as part of Plato’s mature thinking as doing philosophy.

1 See E.S. Harding, “The *Theaetetus* Ends Well,” *Review of Metaphysics* 35, no. 3 (March 1982): 509-528. See also, Timothy Chappell, *Reading Plato’s Theaetetus* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2004), 16ff; David Sedley, *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), esp. 2-6; and Gilbert Ryle, *Plato’s Progress* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966). Ryle notes that Plato might have added pages to the *Theaetetus* for expressly pedagogic purposes, “for the sake specifically of students in the Academy. [Plato] is now thinking of curricular uses for the books of his dialogues,” 279.

2 The edition I am using is Myles Burnyeat, *The Theaetetus of Plato*, M.J. Leavett, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990). For this article, I insert Stephanus numbering within the text. For more on an interpretive understanding of the performativity of the dialogue, see Ryle, *Plato’s Progress*, 27-43.

3 See also, Eugenio Benitez and Livia Guimaraes, “Philosophy as Performed in Plato’s *Theaetetus*,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 47, no. 2 (December 1993): 297-328.

4 Alex Long provides an important interpretation of Theodorus’ relationship to Protagoras, arguing that Theodorus might have been a friend of Protagoras, but

would have rejected Protagorean relativism given his work in mathematics. See Alex Long, "Refutation and Relativism in *Theaetetus* 161-171," *Phronesis* 49, no. 1 (2004): 24-40, esp. 34-35. See also, Sandra Peterson, "Socrates and Philosophy: The Digression in Plato's *Theaetetus*," at [http://www.sputtr.com/read/socrates-and-philosophy-the-digression-in-plato-s-theaetetus-d41d.html?f=1qeXpurpn6Wih-SUpOGunKanh7--ube1vKrDkqq8uIbFta64vsm0xI.C-qpK9trmGubasvrTJJul23s5C7t47E.srbBtJPClrm8raa1xq7CybmXqNimoLCH2oqq46ydp6I3eHZ3KmlIOvf3J7mzJzp0-ObytDkpePkzdnV5JmerZXZ3NHN3ezU4NzN5KdZ0tqIsOo](http://www.sputtr.com/read/socrates-and-philosophy-the-digression-in-plato-s-theaetetus-d41d.html?f=1qeXpurpn6Wih-SUpOGunKanh7--ube1vKrDkqq8uIbFta64vsm0xI.C-qpK9trmGubasvrTJJul23s5C7t47E.srbBtJPClrm8raa1xq7CybmXqNimoLCH2oqq46ydp6I3eHZ3KmlIOvf3J7mzJzp0-ObytDkpePkzdnV5JmerZXZ3NHN3ezU4NzN5KdZ0tqIsOo;); and Andrew Barker, "The Digression in the 'Theaetetus,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 14, no. 4 (October 1976): 457-462.

5 Avi I. Mintz, "Socrates and Protagoras against the Sophists in Plato's *Theaetetus*," paper presented at the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Annual Conference, Oxford, March 2009. See also, Sharon Crowley, "A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry," *Rhetoric Review* 7, no. 2 (Spring, 1989): 318-334; and Harold Barrett, *The Sophists: Rhetoric, Democracy, and Plato's Idea of Sophistry* (Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp, 1987). For related debates, see M.A. Stewart and Rosamond Kent Sprague, "Plato's Sophistry," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 51 (1977): 21-61; George Klosko, "Criteria of Fallacy and Sophistry for Use in the Analysis of Platonic Dialogues," *The Classical Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1983): 363-374; David L. Blank, "Socratics versus Sophists on Payment for Teaching," *Classical Antiquity* 4, no. 1 (April, 1985): 1-49; Avi I. Mintz, "Four Educators in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 45, no. 4 (2011): 657-673; and Robert C. Bartlett, "Political Philosophy and Sophistry: An Introduction to Plato's *Protagoras*," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (2003): 612-624.

6 See also, E.S. Haring, "Socratic Duplicity: *Theaetetus*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 45, no. 3 (March 1992): 525-542. Haring explains how taking a "surface" view of Socrates' interpretation of Protagoras is a mistake. See 527-528.

7 Ruby Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251ff.

8 Silvermintz relates a similar scenario in his class. See Daniel Silvermintz, "Socrates on Trial: Strategies for Teaching Ancient Thought Dialectically," *The Classical World* 100, no. 3 (Spring 2007), 286. See also, Rosalyn S. Sherman, "Is it Possible to Teach Socratically?," *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 53, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 225-245.

9 James A. Arieti, *Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991). See also, Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato as Dramatist," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 75 (1955): 82-89; John Randall Herman, *Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); David Fortunoff, "Plato's Dialogues as Subversive Activity," in Gerald A. Press, ed., *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993), 61-76; and Albert R. Spencer, "The Dialogues as Dramatic Rehearsal: Plato's *Republic* and the Moral Accounting Metaphor," *The Pluralist* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 26-35.

10 For more on Socrates' role as matchmaker, see Avi Mintz, "The Midwife as Matchmaker: Socrates and Relational Pedagogy," *Philosophy of Education* 2007, ed. Barbara Stengel (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2007): 91-99. See also, Julius Tomin, "Socratic Midwifery," *The Classical Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (1987): 97-

102.

11 Rosa Hong Chen, "Pedagogy of 'Midwifery' for Self-Knowledge: Meeting Confucius and Socrates," *Philosophy of Education 2011*, ed. Robert Kunzman (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2011), 207-208.

12 See also, Robert H. Beck, "Plato's Views on Teaching," *Educational Theory* 35, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 119-134; David T. Hansen, "Was Socrates a 'Socratic Teacher'?" *Educational Theory* 38, no. 2 (1988): 213-234; and Ignacio Götz, "On the Socratic Method," *Philosophy of Education 1999*, ed. Randall Curren (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1999): 84-92. See also, Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon, "Listening—in a Democratic Society," *Philosophy of Education 2003*, ed. Kal Alston (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2003): 1-18; Mintz, "The Midwife as Matchmaker: Socrates and Relational Pedagogy," 93ff; Mintz, "Four Educators"; Mintz, "Socrates and Protagoras"; and Chen, *Ibid.* This review is illustrative, not exhaustive.

13 Chappell, *Reading Plato's Theaetetus*, 16-21.

14 Ryle, *Plato's Progress*; Richard Robinson, "Forms and Error in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *The Philosophical Review* 59, no. 1 (January 1950): 3-30; W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); and G.E.L. Owen, "The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues," *The Classical Quarterly* 3, nos. 1/2 (Jan.-Apr., 1953): 79-95.

15 Robinson, "Forms and Error," 18.

16 Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology*, 28.

17 Chappell, *Reading Plato's Theaetetus*, 19.

18 Sedley, *The Midwife of Platonism*, 79-80.

19 Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, 213.