THOMAS AQUINAS: TEACHER OF
TRANSHUMANITY?
JOHN H. BOYER AND GEOFFREY MEADOWS
Introduction
In his 2005 article “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” 1 Nick Bostrom
presents a transhumanist response to various ethical criticisms of emerging
human enhancement technologies. Bostrom is a strong proponent of
“transhumanism,” a relatively recent movement which promotes the use of
biotechnology to help humans transcend our nature through material
improvement, ultimately leading to a new state of existence which is
dubbed “posthuman.” Those opposed to transhumanism are pejoratively
labeled “bioconservatives” or “bioluddites” by the transhumanists.
Unfortunately, the “bioconservative” faction, with whom we share many
sympathies, has offered subpar arguments against transhumanist
aspirations. While critics like Francis Fukuyama have rightly pointed out
the possibility of abuse of biotechnology and the need to consider
carefully what technologies we should deem permissible, 2 the basis on
which Fukuyama argues is flawed. He fears that biotechnology will
destroy human nature, thus eliminating the foundation for morality and
human rights. In order to protect these rights, he says that we must prevent
any tampering with human nature by heavily regulating biotechnology.
While there are legitimate concerns about the use of biotechnology, we
should not dismiss all developments in biotech as immoral or illicit. What
is needed is a firm ontological framework on which to base ethical
judgments. The aim of this paper is to show that transhumanism, while
revolutionary in aims, presents nothing new in terms of ontological reality.
Human enhancement technologies will not destroy human nature. Future
individuals with enhanced capabilities will still be fully human. The same
categories which we currently use to make moral judgments will apply
just as much to “our posthuman future” as they do to our current
unenhanced state.
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177
Therefore, the basis for moral judgment, for rights grounded in natural
law, will not cease to exist. However, in order to understand this, we must
work from a proper view of human nature. In this respect, we agree with
the transhumanists that Fukuyama and his colleagues have not leveled
appropriate arguments against transhumanism, although for different
reasons than Bostrom gives. We do not think that the fruits of biomedical
research will fundamentally transform human nature, thereby creating a
new species of persons so advanced that the only description of them will
be in terms of what they no longer are, namely “posthuman.”
In this essay, we will argue that biotechnical enhancements will not
create a new species. Enhanced humans will be precisely that, human. We
will argue that future man, if he is to be considered a person, must retain
rationality. Thus the classical definition of man as a rational animal will
still hold true. Consequently, the foundation for ethics and human rights,
i.e. rationality, will still be present. Whether these enhanced individuals
come to be by moral or immoral means is beyond the scope of this paper.
The alleged “posthumans” will still be rational. They will still be moral.
The rules of ethics will not be altered.
Transhumanism
The central claim of transhumanism is that human beings ought to
pursue the development and application of technologies that will
make it possible to increase human health span, extend our intellectual and
physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own mental
states and moods.3
Prima facie, these goals appear ambitious, but reasonable. However, the
transhumanist goes beyond merely stating that we can and should try to
extend life spans, expand our cognitive and physical capabilities, and
achieve better control of our moods and cognitive states. Transhumanists
assert that the result of these projects will be a change in human nature. In
achieving these goals, we will cease to be human and will become a new
sort of thing, “posthuman.”
This term posthuman is used to describe the next stage of humanity,
attained by self-directed evolution. It is not a merely semantic change, the
result of redefining our conception of what it means to be human; rather
“radical technological modifications to our brains and bodies are needed.” 4
Although there is no set definition of “posthuman,” transhumanists
generally agree that the minimum requirements to be a posthuman will be
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given in terms of enhanced capacities and abilities. Bostrom defines a
posthuman as someone who possesses at least one posthuman capacity,
including increased healthspan, enhanced cognition, and enhanced
emotion5 achieved through either redesigning the human body using
nanotechnology or enhancing it using a plethora of means. 6 Beyond
enhancement, transhumanists speak of posthumanity as including
“completely synthetic artificial intelligences” and “enhanced uploads.” 7
The key question is whether or not posthumans will constitute a new
species. This is a tricky question to answer when reading the
transhumanists. Some, like Bostrom, think that an individual can become
posthuman while remaining a human being. 8 Others, like Mark Walker,
hold that posthumans will be a new genus. 9
The Transhumanist Understanding of Human Nature
To determine why transhumanists think there will be a new species, we
must look at the their understanding of human nature. The very name
“posthuman” indicates that our future state can currently only be defined
in terms of the degree to which it exceeds our current nature. Thus, the
concept of human nature plays a crucial role in transhumanist claims.
Unfortunately, there is no one definitive position among transhumanists
regarding human nature. All that transhumanists seem to agree on is that
human nature is fundamentally material and thus malleable since the
ability and obligation to change human nature and even transcend it is the
defining characteristic of transhumanist thought. The malleability of
human nature is what qualifies it as capable of being transformed into a
new species.
This lack of clarity or concern regarding human nature is a result of the
transhumanists’ singular focus on the goal of becoming posthuman. This
telos dominates their writings. As a result, they pay very little attention to
the nature they are leaving behind except insofar as such knowledge can
be used to leave it behind. Max More, one of the leading proponents of the
“extropian” school of transhumanism, says that biologists’ conception of
human nature “remains useful” but is “becoming increasingly inadequate
as our further evolution depends more on the scientific and technological
products of our minds.” 10 The end result is that technological changes will
“render our chromosomes almost vestigial components of our individual
and species identity.”11
Nevertheless, this materialistic definition of human nature in terms of
our genetic code and evolutionary lineage must be presupposed in order to
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179
argue for the possibility of biotechnological enhancement. 12 Walker
explains that humans are animals with a species specific genome resulting
from the mutation of the genomes of our evolutionary ancestors; all of our
powers and characteristics are rooted in our biology: 13 “The history of our
intelligence lies in a secular phylogeny, that is, with our apelike ancestors
and indeed even more ‘primitive’ organisms.” 14 Walker states that our
distinct nature is best understood in terms of a comparison to these
ancestors. For instance, we differ from chimps in intellectual and moral
virtues, differences based on our biology. 15 Thus, posthumanity will
constitute a new genus because posthumans will possess significant
biological differences from us, which will manifest themselves in
increased abilities. Since the abilities of posthumans are vague, Walker
must use analogy to demarcate humans from posthumans, as we do with
chimps and men:
By altering biology, transhumanists propose to improve human nature to
the point of creating a new genus: posthumans. Perhaps the most powerful
means to adequately conceptualize what is at stake is in terms of a
phylogenetic analogy: posthumans will stand to us in the moral and
intellectual virtues as we stand to chimps. The phylogenetic analogy
underscores the importance of biology in making humans what we are: it
is not prejudice or cultural differences that prevent chimps from
integrating into our society, but differences in human and chimp nature.
Chimps have congenital limitations that prevent them from understanding
much of what we know and doing much of what we do. The confirming
experiment is easy enough to run: send any chimp to the best private
school in the world. The chimp is not going to succeed academically as
well as an average human toddler, no matter how many years of intensive
one-on-one tutoring it receives. Accepting the phylogenetic analogy
means that we will be similarly intellectually challenged compared with
posthumans.16
The transition to posthumanity is thereby defined by altering our
bodies to produce a speciation event. However, the precise point at which
a speciation event takes place is unclear. Let us assume that there will be a
specific point at which our physical phenotype will be significantly altered
(larger muscles, better neural networks inside the brain, more efficient
eyes) such that we would be able to perform tasks that no current human
can. Posthumans then excel at academic and practical activities, which
humans in their current state are simply unequipped to take on. These
changes would presumably be achieved by germ-line selection, genetic
alteration and psychopharmacology. Would this change in our physical
structure be sufficient to produce a new species of posthumans?
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Problems with Transhumanist Assumptions
Walker’s concept of posthumanity treats differences in kind as if they
were merely differences of degree. He presupposes that we differ from
chimps in kind, but only insofar as chimps cannot perform as well as we
do in academic and moral spheres. This means that chimps do have
rational and moral capabilities. This is not a proper distinction in kind, but
only in degree, since both ‘species’ are assumed to possess the same
abilities. The reason that transhumanists use these analogies is that they
assume chimps could perform such actions if they lacked “congenital
limitations.”
However, there is a fundamental difference in essence between human
beings and chimps. Chimps lack the ability to understand universals,
abstract concepts, make abstract judgments, or perform proper logical
deductions. They would never be able to perform academic tasks in any
meaningful way, let alone succeed at them. If we changed the chimp
genome, on the presupposition that rationality is entirely genetic, it would
have a different essence. This would not be enhancing the chimp. It would
be causing a substantial change whereby the chimp would cease to be a
chimp. A chimp can only do what we do by becoming human.
But if posthumans will exceed us academically and morally as we
exceed chimps, we must ask what kind of activities posthumans will be
capable of that we are not. Are they merely better at the same type of
activities or are they performing activities of a completely different nature,
activities which do not belong to reason at all? We have no idea what kind
of super-rational activities posthumans could perform. The transhumanists
do not either. They talk in terms of vague possibilities and analogies.
Bostrom says that posthumans will create and enjoy music which makes
Mozart sound like Muzak. This does not sound like a different kind of
ability. It is just an enhanced ability. Given the general nature of their
predictions, we can only give a general reply. It is of little use to argue
over possibilities that the transhumanists themselves cannot precisely
define, let alone prove to exist. Stating that we will stand to posthumans as
chimps stand to us is of little help. Transhumanists assure us that even
though they cannot describe in concrete terms what these powers are,
these powers will be radically different and, clearly, being radically
different entails that they will be vastly superior. Barring a clear
explanation of what these activities and the corresponding powers would
be, we are forced to assume that they are performing the same type of
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181
activities that we do, but better due to more powerful versions of our own
capacities. Posthumans will be extremely rational, not above rationality.
The very talk of enhancement presupposes an essence, which has the
ability to perform these actions and which stands under the change as the
source of it. Hopkins recognizes this when he notes that there must be a
biologically grounded human nature, otherwise improving our behaviors
and cognition through biotechnology would be impossible.17 Assuming
that the manipulation of the human genome is possible through one means
or another, it is clear that if you alter the genome, and the consequence is
enhanced ability, then you have only actualized a possibility that was
already in the substance materially. We have only shown something which
we are able to do to ourselves while remaining the same. Enhancement
presupposes an innate ability to do something which can be improved.
The reason we think remembering things more easily is better is that
we assume that a human being has a particular essence that would be
benefited by remembering things better. This assumes that the ability to
remember is part of the essence of humanity. Likewise, the assertion that
we can enhance our ability to think or to create presupposes that these
abilities are part of what a human being is. To enhance these abilities
cannot mean to replace them. It merely perfects them and makes what was
potential actual. There is no change in species unless we posit that there is
some further realm of activity, which can only be accomplished by powers
that cannot be described as rational in any sense.
The Thomistic Response to Transhumanism
The Thomistic and, more broadly speaking, the essentialist view is that
things have real natures which are determinate. They are not fixed in a
Platonic sense; they are able to undergo changes. Rather, the changes that
a substance can undergo are circumscribed by its nature. We can
remember things more easily and think more clearly because by nature we
can remember and think. We can have better control over our emotional
states because control over our emotions is something proper to human
beings.
Given this fact, it is strange to claim that enhancement would change
what we are. These enhancements do not introduce some new aspect or
determination that was not already implicitly contained in the notion of
human. We only speak of enhancing what already exists. Genetic
enhancement productive of greater health and increased resistance to
disease presupposes a natural disposition to be healthy and a power by
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which we preserve this health. Because the essential nature of human
beings includes the power of nutrition, whereby animals maintain
themselves, and because this power is exercised through material organs,
there is no change to the power if we realize the full potential of it by
better disposing the matter to the operation of this power. Susceptibility to
the common cold is not a power of human beings; fighting infection is.
Eliminating susceptibility to the common cold by altering our genome to
fight a specific virus does not replace one power with another or add a
new one. It perfects the means whereby the preexisting power acts. When
we come into contact with a particular virus or bacteria, our bodies
naturally fight against it. Even if we are unable to cope with a particular
virus, this does not mean we lack the general power to fight it. We merely
lack a sufficient material means to do this.
For Aquinas, such material changes, which result in the development
of posthuman capacities, would not qualify as speciation events.
Speciation is a special kind of generation. Natural changes involve three
principles: form, matter and privation. In accidental change, the material
cause is the individual substance which acquires a new accidental form.
The subject is present both before and after the change. In generation, the
material cause is the substrate which loses one substantial form and gains
another. The substantial form present before generation is not the same as
the form present after generation has occurred. From one kind of thing, a
different kind of thing results. However, in the generation of living things,
the agent cause will have the same formal nature as the thing generated. A
speciation event is different. The offspring belongs to a different species
than its parents. We tend to speak loosely when we say that species
evolve. The prior species does not actually change. Rather it produces
offspring which are of a different species. New species are created because
before the act of speciating generation, the new species does not exist
except in potency. This potency is contained in the generic nature of the
parents, which is able to take on a variety of specific determinations. The
actuality realized in the new species must be something contained within
the proximate genus of the parents. Birds give birth to other birds. As the
evolutionary tree shows, mutations are modifications of the ancestor’s
nature. Even though birds and mammals are considered to have descended
from the common ancestor reptillia, we must say that both potentialities
were contained in the original ancestor’s essence. A fish cannot give birth
to a bird. It can, however, due to a mutation, give birth to a different kind
of fish or at least a creature which is very fishlike.
What would be required for a speciation event in which humans give
rise to posthumans? A new essence. Human beings are traditionally
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183
defined as rational animals. Aquinas notes that the genus of animals is
subdivided into rational and irrational.18 This is the primary and
exhaustive metaphysical division of animal, for it encompasses two grades
of animality, one more perfect, the other less perfect. This does not mean
that irrational creatures are less animal than rational animals. Both have
complete animality. However, in some, the complete potentiality of
animality is more fully realized. In order to be human, then, to be a
rational animal, the power of reason possessed by the individual must be a
specification of animal. Rationality is a determination of animality. As
Aquinas makes clear,
The understanding of animal is without determination of a special form
and expresses, with respect to the ultimate perfection, the nature of the
thing from that which is material; the concept of the difference, rational,
consists in the determination of the special form. 19
As a determination of animal, the power of reason is proper to rational
animals as animals. As David Oderberg has put it, “Rationality adds to the
purely sentient and vegetative nature of a thing.” 20 If it were possible for
rational computers to exist, they would not be human for their rationality
would not be a determination of animality. To be a human, one must
possess full animality along with full rationality.21
A basic principle of Thomistic taxonomy is that the addition or
subtraction of a difference from the definition of a thing will alter the
species. Just as the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species of
number, the addition or subtraction of a difference changes the species of
the definiendum.22 If the difference added can be reduced to the category
of substance, we will have a new or different species in the category of
substance. If we were to add rationality to an ox, since rationality is a
determination contained potentially in the genus of animal, it would cease
to be an ox and would become a human. 23 If the difference introduced is
reduced to one of the accidental categories, we will not have a different
species of substance but a different species of accident. 24
In order for the creation or discovery of a new species, which comes
forth from human beings, there must either be the subtraction of rationality
and/or the addition of some further perfection, one which adds to
rationality. The former does not concern us here, since the transhumanists
are not interested in creating subhuman individuals. 25 In order to create a
new, posthuman species of animal, the addition of a further perfection
must be contained potentially in the genus of animal. Thus, if from
humans, posthumans come to be, the specific difference of posthumanity
must be contained potentially in human nature.
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However, it is unclear what such a perfecting specific difference would
be. In order to create a tertium quid, a posthuman animal, the difference
introduced must add a power above and beyond rationality. If it merely
adds a further determination to sensitivity, e.g. the ability to sense
electromagnetic fields, then this will not create a posthuman species, for
the crowning perfection of the new creature will still be rationality. If the
division of animal into rational and irrational is an exhaustive division, the
new species must be within one of these two classes: rational and
irrational. There is no tertium quid. If there were to be a new species of
animal that was neither irrational nor rational, it would have to possess
both sensibility, rationality, and some power beyond rationality which was
a further perfection of these two previous classes. It could not simply be
rational in a different way or be more rational. However, as we said, the
division into rational and irrational is exhaustive. Thus, on a Thomistic
account, there is no possibility of a new rational animal coming about
which is not contained in the species animal rationale.
If there cannot be a new species, we can only speak of physical
enhancement. Aquinas recognizes that improvement in body corresponds
to improvement in intellectual activity and cognition: “We observe ‘those
who are refined in body are well endowed in mind,’ as stated in De Anima
ii, 9.”26 Those who take care of their bodies are able to think more clearly.
This does not entail that there is a difference in species when speaking of
differences in bodily refinement. Furthermore, radical changes to the
bodily structure of a rational animal, assuming that these changes do not
corrupt the matter so as not to be able to receive the form of rational
animal, do not change the species either. As noted above, Aquinas
recognizes that there can be differences in the phenotype without altering
human nature. Were we to add rational “to the definition of ox, it would
no longer be an ox, but another species, namely human.” 27 It would be
rational and thus human despite the preservation of its phenotype; a
“rational bovine” would still be four-legged, herbivore, etc.
However, the transhumanists are not talking about a change whereby
an irrational animal gains a power it previously lacked. They talk about a
human being becoming better at performing various actions proper to
humans as human. The qualifier is that these enhancements are produced
by changes to the human phenotype. Nevertheless, the posthuman will still
be a rational animal. As the example of the ox illustrates, these changes to
the phenotype, which do not replace or remove rationality, would not be
sufficient additions to place a posthuman outside the species of rational
animal. Unlike the ox example, the differences between the human and
posthuman phenotype would not be such as to subdivide the species.
Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Transhumanity?
185
Humans can be enhanced because we contain in ourselves a potential for
change. Even if there were a difference due to technological intervention,
this would be the actualization of a potency preexisting within us as
human beings.
Mutations which produce imperfections in individuals do not change
the species of the individual. People with Down’s syndrome are fully
human even though they possess certain congenital defects. Why would
the same not apply to perfections rather than defects? If we were to
produce an offspring which was better at doing what a human does qua
human, it would not be a new species of human but a better human.
The biological changes which transhumanists propose will therefore
fall under the class of natural dispositions. Just as some are born good
boxers or good runners because of physical constitution, so too will those
with enhanced abilities be born with talents. Through enhancement, we
can create a change in species from “bad at running” to “good at running.”
These enhanced abilities, however, belong to the category of “quality,” not
substance.28 This change does not alter our substantial essence, i.e. rational
animal. To run well or poorly is accidental to being a human. Genetic
alteration either enhances abilities we already have or destroys them by
corrupting the material organs whereby we can exercise these abilities.
Conclusion
Given this proper understanding of speciation in light of nature and
definition, it now seems appropriate to ask the question, by way of
conclusion: why ought human beings to pursue posthumanity? Bostrom
replies that it is beneficial for us.29 But who and what are we? Human
beings. It follows from Bostrom’s line that it is better for human beings to
cease to be human in order to fulfill ourselves as humans. This is a rather
queer notion of self-fulfillment. Enhancement enhances us as human
beings. These values which proponents of enhancement hold are values
proper to us as human beings possessing a particular essence which is
directed toward particular ends. All being posthuman entails is that we
achieve ends proper to us as human beings in a more complete manner
than before. If achieving ends proper to us as human beings is fully
consistent with human nature, posthumanity refers not to a new essence or
state of being but to merely living more perfectly. If the transhumanist
agrees with us, then he undermines all talk about enhanced biological
posthumans belonging to a new genus.
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1
Nick Bostrom, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” in H+/-: Transhumanism
and Its Critics, ed. Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia, PA:
Metanexus Institute 2011).
2
Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology
Revolution (New York: Picador, 2002).
3
Bostrom, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” 55; cf. Bostrom et al., The
Transhumaist FAQ: A General Introduction, 2.1, 2003, World Transhumanist
Association. http://www.transhumanism.org/resources/faq.html.
4
Bostrom et al., Transhumanist FAQ
5
Nick Bostrom, “Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow Up,” in The
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science,
Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. Max More and Natasha
Vita-More (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 28-29. Cf. Bostrom et al., The
Transhumanist FAQ. The FAQ lists a host of qualifications: “To be resistant to
disease and impervious to aging; to have unlimited youth and vigor; to exercise
control over their own desires, moods, and mental states; to be able to avoid
feeling tired, hateful, or irritated about petty things; to have an increased capacity
for pleasure, love, artistic appreciation, and serenity; to experience novel states of
consciousness that current human brains cannot access. It seems likely that the
simple fact of living an indefinitely long, healthy, active life would take anyone to
posthumanity if they went on accumulating memories, skills, and intelligence.”
6
Bostrom et al., Transhumanist FAQ
7
Bostrom et al., Transhumanist FAQ
8
Bostrom, “Why I Want to be a Posthuman,” 49-50.
9
Mark Walker, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism Is the Best Bet to Prevent
the Extinction of Civilization” in H +/-: Transhumanism and its Critics, eds.
Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia, PA: Metanexus Institute
2011), 94.
10
Max More, “True Transhumanism: A Reply to Don Ihde” in H +/-:
Transhumanism and its Critics, eds. Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie
(Philadelphia, PA: Metanexus Institute 2011), 136.
11
Max More, “True Transhumanism,” 136.
12
Patrick D. Hopkins, “Is Enhancement Worthy of Being a Right?” in The
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science,
Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, eds. Max More and Natasha
Vita-More (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 351.
13
Mark Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 94.
14
Mark Walker, “Prolegomena to Any Future Philosophy,” Journal of Evolution
and Technology, no. 10 (March 2010), accessed October 1, 2013,
http://www.jetpress.org/volume10/prolegomena.html.
15
Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 94.
16
Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 94.
17
Hopkins, “Is Enhancement Worthy of Being a Right?” 351.
18
Summa Contra Gentiles 1.42.
19
De ente et essentia 1
Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Transhumanity?
20
187
David Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Routledge 2007), 94. Cf. ST I,
q. 77, aa. 4 and 7.
21
Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 105.
22
ST I, q. 5, a. 5; Cf. ST I, q. 25, a. 6; SCG 1.54; SCG 2.95; SCG 4.35.
23
Commentary on the Sentences, 1.44.1.1 co.
24
ST I-II, q. 18, a. 10.
25
However, transhumanists are interested in the subtraction of animality and the
retention of rationality through uploading minds to computers. This, as we have
said, would entail that the uploaded mind would no longer be human, since its
rationality will not be animal rationality. In fact, it will not even be the same
individual. Even though the continuum between the two, the subject of the change,
is identified by rationality being possessed before and after the upload, the
rationality of the computer exists through a different determination and thus will
not even be the same rationality. If this is a different individual power of
rationality, it will be a different individual, assuming that a “rational” computer
can be called per se unum in the first place.
26
ST I, q. 76, a. 5; Cf. ST I, q. 85, a. 7
27
Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, 1.44.1.1 co.; Cf. ST I-II, q. 67, a. 3.
28
Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 9a14-28.
29
Bostrom, “Why I Want to be a Posthuman,” 29.