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Notes
Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Structure of Intention’,The Journal of Philosophy LXVII (1970), 636. We take this occasion to thank Prof. Chisholm for discussion of the issues taken up in this paper and for his criticism of an earlier version of it.
See Henry Sidgwick,The Methods of Ethics, (7th ed., New York 1966), p. 202. G.E.M. Anscombe's critique of Sidgwick in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in J. J. Thomson and G. Dworkin (eds.)Ethics, (New York 1968), pp. 199–200 shows the importance of the issue. Sidgwick's position implies that one intends the side effect of his actsimpliciter; if one intendsP and foresees that bringing aboutP brings aboutQ, then, on Sidgwick's view, one intendsQ. On Chisholm's view one intendsP and Q, and notQ by itself.
Other examples in the literature which can be used as counter-examples to the diffusiveness principle do not include the critical factor of the agent's struggling against the foreseen consequence of his action. See J. L. Austin, ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink’, inPhilosophical Papers, ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (2nd ed., London, Oxford, New York 1970), pp. 278–279; A. Kenny, ‘Intention and Purpose’,The Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966), 642–651; B. N. Fleming, ‘On Intention’,The Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 307–310; and G. Pitcher, “ ‘In Intending’ and Side Effects,”The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 663–668.
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Boyle, J.M., Sullivan, T.D. The diffusiveness of intention principle: A counter-example. Philos Stud 31, 357–360 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01873863
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01873863