Demonstrative Sense: An Essay on the Semantics of Perceptual DemonstrativesThis work defends the view that demonstrative thoughts are object-dependent via a new logico-semantical argument. It argues that arguments in favour of object-dependence provided by Evans, McDowell and others will not do; that they are unjustifiably presupposed by their global theory of meaning, whereas such an argument needs to be provided on independent grounds. The argument offered in this book is independent in this respect. |
Common terms and phrases
according acts of demonstration anaphorical attributive basis believes chapter claim B2 corresponding Criterion of Difference cues currently perceived objects definite description deictical demonstrative phrase demonstrative sentence demonstratives referring descriptive conditions determines its referent different objects discriminating knowledge discussion distinguishing properties distinguishing publicly shareable Dummett essay Evans example fact Frege Fregean Fregean sense given demonstrative given object grasp hearer identity Intuitive Criterion Kaplan know which object Kripke language linguistic meaning linguistic rule matter McDowell mode of presentation notion of sense noun phrases object's colour particular mode pointed previously encountered objects pronoun proper name Propositional Attitudes propositional knowledge publicly shareable properties pure indexicals question recognitional capacity referential regarding relevant object respect rigid designators road rôle Russell's semantic semantically complete sense and reference sense mode singular term speaker subject knows subject may know subject's knowledge subject's perceptual discrimination take different attitudes Thought expressed truth-conditions types utterance words