Abstract
Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’, and can be defended from objections of the sort that relativists mount against contextualist theories.
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Braun, D. An invariantist theory of ‘might’ might be right. Linguist and Philos 35, 461–489 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-012-9124-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-012-9124-y