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More Triviality

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Abstract

This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.

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Bradley, R. More Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 129–139 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004391701130

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004391701130

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