Opinion
The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual mechanisms framework

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A core component of cognitive control – the ability to regulate thoughts and actions in accordance with internally represented behavioral goals – might be its intrinsic variability. In this article, I describe the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework, which postulates that this variability might arise from qualitative distinctions in temporal dynamics between proactive and reactive modes of control. Proactive control reflects the sustained and anticipatory maintenance of goal-relevant information within lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) to enable optimal cognitive performance, whereas reactive control reflects transient stimulus-driven goal reactivation that recruits lateral PFC (plus a wider brain network) based on interference demands or episodic associations. I summarize recent research that demonstrates how the DMC framework provides a coherent explanation of three sources of cognitive control variation – intra-individual, inter-individual and between-groups – in terms of proactive versus reactive control biases.

Section snippets

Shifting the emphasis to variability in cognitive control

One of the most fascinating mysteries of human cognition is the capacity for cognitive control: the ability to regulate, coordinate, and sequence thoughts and actions in accordance with internally maintained behavioral goals. Although it is clearly the case that substantial theoretical and experimental progress has occurred in the past 20 years regarding the mechanisms that enable cognitive control 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, there is still a great deal that remains poorly understood, subject to

The dual mechanisms of control framework

The central hypothesis of the DMC framework is that cognitive control operates via two distinct operating modes: ‘proactive control’ and ‘reactive control’. The proactive control mode can be conceptualized as a form of ‘early selection’ in which goal-relevant information is actively maintained in a sustained manner, before the occurrence of cognitively demanding events, to optimally bias attention, perception and action systems in a goal-driven manner [1]. By contrast, in reactive control,

Intra-individual variation

A central assumption of the DMC framework is that a change in situational factors will result in alteration of the weighting between proactive and reactive control strategies. Thus, the DMC account naturally leads to the idea that potentially subtle differences between otherwise similar tasks might lead to significant changes in an individual's preferred cognitive control strategy. These control mode differences would be expected to result in shifts in both behavioral performance

Inter-individual variation

A second assumption of the DMC framework is that there may be stable individual difference factors that lead to biases in whether proactive or reactive control is the preferred mode in performing tasks with high cognitive control demands. The key insight underlying this assumption is that the utilization of proactive control will be related to cost/benefit tradeoffs that relate both to the efficacy or ease of actively maintaining goal representations in advance of their utilization, as well as

Between-group variation

A final assumption of the DMC framework is that the differences between proactive and reactive control modes might be important for understanding the variation in cognitive control functions observed in different clinical and developmental populations or groups (e.g. individuals with schizophrenia, older adults, etc.). In particular, rather than making the simpler hypothesis that these populations have global impairments in cognitive control, we instead suggest that they might show differential

Concluding remarks

In this article, I have attempted to lay out a potentially useful framework for understanding the variable nature of cognitive control mechanisms. The crucial insight of the framework is an appreciation of the fact that variability might be an intrinsic component of cognitive control mechanisms that increases their effectiveness and applicability in dealing with the fluctuating and dynamic nature of both internal physiological states and external environmental constraints. The DMC framework may

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by NIH R01 MH66078. Thanks to Greg Burgess, Koji Jimura and Bethany Edwards for their contributions to the work described here, and to the rest of the Cognitive Control and Psychopathology laboratory for many fruitful discussions. Thanks to Carol Cox for assistance with figure preparation.

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    Current address: Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis, CB1125, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA.

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