Understanding Belief Reports

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In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is *Russellianism*, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concerns *substitution of co-referring names* in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that all utterances of (1) and (2) express the same proposition and have the same truth value.[1]

> (1)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

> (2)   Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

The *Substitution Objection* is basically this: utterances of (1) and (2) *can* differ in truth value. More cautiously: a competent speaker could rationally *think* that they differ in truth value, and that is very strong evidence that they can.

Two of the best-known proponents of Russellianism, Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, have formulated a (by now familiar) reply to the Substitution Objection.[2] They say that speakers who think that utterances of (1) and (2) differ in truth value are failing to distinguish correctly between what the utterances semantically express and what they pragmatically convey. Utterances of these sentences can pragmatically convey propositions that differ in truth value,

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and so speakers who do not correctly distinguish between what they pragmatically convey and what they semantically express may wrongly judge that the utterances themselves differ in truth value.

I am not satisfied with the pragmatic response to the Substitution Objection, for I think that its explanation of speakers' judgments fails in many, or even most, cases. Nevertheless, I (tentatively) believe that Russellianism is true, for reasons I will sketch later. Thus in this paper I wish to present an alternative Russellian response to the Substitution Objection. This alternative response does not rely on pragmatics, but instead relies on another characteristically Russellian thesis: there are different *ways* of grasping and believing a single proposition. A rational speaker could believe a proposition in one of these ways, without believing that proposition in another way. In fact, a rational person could believe a proposition in one way, while believing its *negation* in a suitably different way.

Most Russellians, and many non-Russellians, admit that this idea can be used to explain how a person could rationally think that two utterances of *simple* sentences that express the same proposition differ in truth value.[3] For instance, many admit that this idea can explain how a rational speaker could think that an utterance of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' is true, while thinking that an utterance of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' is false. But I believe it can also explain intuitions about *belief* sentences such as (1) and (2), even in those (frequent) cases in which the pragmatic explanation fails. If I am right, then Russellians can provide a plausible response to the Substitution Objection without relying on dubious claims about the pragmatics of belief reports. Thus Russellianism itself might be more plausible than is usually supposed, and may also compare more favorably with its non-Russellian rivals than is generally assumed (but I

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shall not argue for this last point here).[4]

In what follows, I first present Russellianism, and briefly describe some reasons for thinking that it is true. Next I present the pragmatic response to the Substitution Objection, and my reasons for thinking that it is not fully adequate. I then present my preferred response. I end with an objection and a reply.

1. Russellianism and Its Strengths

According to Russellianism, propositions are the objects of attitudes such as belief and assertion. They are also the *contents* of sentences, and the things *semantically expressed* by sentences, relative to (or in) contexts. Propositions on this view are *Russellian*: complex, structured entities whose constituents are individuals, properties, relations, and other propositions.[5] When a sentence expresses a proposition in a context, the constituents of that proposition are the contents, in that context, of the expressions that make up the sentence. The content of a proper name or indexical, in a context, is the individual to which the name or indexical refers, in that context. The content of a predicate, in a context, is an appropriate property or relation. The truth value of a sentence, in a context, is the same as the truth value of the proposition that it expresses, in that context. So, for example, the content of `Hesperus', in any context, is just the planet Venus itself; and the proposition expressed by `Hesperus is visible in the evening', in a context, has as constituents the contents of `Hesperus' and `is visible in the evening', in that context, and can be represented by the ordered pair

< Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening >.

A proposition that has an individual as a constitutent, as this one does, is a *singular* proposition.

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According to the Russellian view of belief sentences, the content of the predicate `believes' is a binary relation that may hold between an individual and a proposition.[6] The `that'-clause of a standard belief sentence refers to the proposition that the agent is said to believe. To be more exact, if *S* is a sentence, then the referent and content of `that *S*' (in a context) is the proposition expressed by *S* (in that context). Thus Russellianism entails that (1) and (2) express the same proposition in every context, a proposition that we can represent as

< Hammurabi, <Venus, being-visible-in-the-evening>, believing >.

So Russellianism says that all utterances of (1) and (2) must have the same truth value.[7]

Some philosophers take this unintuitive consequence to be a conclusive reason to reject Russellianism. But they should not, for there are independent reasons to think that Russellianism is true.[8]

One reason is that Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan, and others have argued persuasively that proper names and indexicals lack descriptive content.[9] Their arguments lend some support to the view that the content of a name or indexical (in a context) is *simply* its referent. And so their arguments lend some support to the idea that the following sentences express singular propositions about Newt Gingrich, given the contexts described.

(3)   Newt Gingrich is a Republican.

(4)   I am a Republican [spoken by Gingrich].

(5)   You are a Republican [addressed to Gingrich].

(6)   He is a Republican [said while demonstrating Gingrich].

Thus it's plausible to think that, when people sincerely utter such sentences, they assert and believe singular propositions. And that is some reason to think that the Russellian theory of

belief sentences is correct.

Secondly, some of our intuitions about belief reports actually support Russellianism. For instance, we often take a belief report to be true as long as it "gets the reference right." Imagine, for example, that Linda sincerely, assertively, and comprehendingly utters (5) while addressing Gingrich. Thus she believes the proposition that her utterance of (5) expresses. Now it seems that I could truly report her belief by uttering any of (7)-(9), in the contexts described below.

(7)   Linda believes that Gingrich is a Republican.

(8)   Linda believes that you are a Republican [addressing Gingrich].

(9)   Linda believes that he is a Republican [demonstrating Gingrich].

Russellianism correctly says that my belief reports are true, for on that view, the `that'-clauses of my belief reports express the same proposition (in my contexts) that Linda expresses with her utterance (in her context).

Thirdly, Russellianism gives the most straightforward account possible of (apparent) quantification into `that'-clauses of belief sentences. Consider (1) again. (10) below seems to follow validly from the conjunction of (1) with the sentence `Hesperus is a planet'.

(10)   There is a planet such that Hammurabi believes that it is visible in the evening.

The expression `there is a planet' seems to quantify over planets, and seems to bind a variable-like pronoun (`it') in the `that'-clause of (10). Thus (10) seems to imply that Hammurabi believes a singular proposition concerning a planet. Russellianism, of course, agrees with this conclusion.

Fourthly, there is indirect "negative" evidence in favor of Russellianism, namely the fact that alternative theories that allow utterances of (1) and (2) to differ in truth value run into serious problems.

The most well-known and popular alternatives to Russellianism are Fregean in flavor. According to these views, the `that'-clause of a true belief report must express (or refer to) a sense, or some sort of conceptual content, that the subject of the report believes. Thus on Fregean views, a true belief report must do much more than "get the reference right". But for just this reason, Fregean views have problems with some of the cases that I described above. For instance, Fregean views have trouble explaining how I can truly describe Linda's belief using (7)-(9) when I am ignorant of her conception of Gingrich and when my own conception of Gingrich is quite different from hers.[10]

Recent non-Russellian theories, such as those of Crimmins (1992), Crimmins and Perry (1989), Forbes (1990), and Richard (1990), do not have these particular Fregean problems. But critics have found other, apparently serious, problems with them. Many of their criticisms are rather complex, and depend on the details of the views; I shall not attempt to summarize them here.[11] My own main reason for worrying about them is somewhat less technical. According to these theories, belief reports often express propositions that are partly about believers' mental representations. (That is how they allow utterances of (1) and (2) to differ in truth value.) Moreover, these theories say that speakers routinely think about other people's mental representations, and intend to talk about those representations when they utter belief sentences. But I seriously doubt that ordinary speakers have such sophisticated thoughts and intentions about mental representations when they utter belief sentences. In any case, I believe that a theory that does *not* attribute such thoughts and intentions to ordinary speakers is preferable to one that does, other things being equal. The Russellian theory that I present below does not.

In short, it is not unreasonable to think that Russellianism is correct, despite its

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unintuitive consequences. So it is not unreasonable to think that there is an explanation of the anti-Russellian intuitions that is consistent with Russellianism.

2. The Pragmatic Explanation

Let's formulate the Substitution Objection a bit more carefully. Many would object to Russellianism simply by claiming that it is possible for (1) to be true and (2) false. But if pressed for evidence for their claim, they might cite the fact that a rational, competent speaker of English could understand both and yet *think* that (1) is true and (2) is false.[12] Their argument against Russellianism can be formulated as follows.

> (11a)   If Russellianism is true, then, necessarily, every utterance of (1) expresses the same proposition as every utterance of (2) (keeping the meanings of the words fixed).
>
> (11b)   It's possible for there to be a rational reflective speaker who understands an utterance of (1) and an utterance of (2) and who believes that the first is true while believing that the second is false.
>
> (11c)   Necessarily, if two utterances express the same proposition, then a rational reflective speaker who understands both utterances does not believe that one is true while believing that the other is false.
>
> (11d)   Therefore, Russellianism is false.

(11c) is clearly the crucial premise in this argument. A critic of Russellianism might argue for it in the following way.

> (11e)   Necessarily, if a rational reflective speaker understands an utterance, and thinks

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that it is true, then he believes the proposition that it expresses. Necessarily, if he understands another utterance, and thinks that it is false, then he believes the negation of the proposition that it expresses. So, necessarily, if two utterances express the same proposition, and a rational reflective speaker understands both and believes that one of them is true while believing that the other is false, then he believes a proposition and its negation. But, it's not possible for a rational agent to believe a proposition and its negation. So (11c) is true.

Despite its intuitive appeal, and the above argument in favor of it, Russellians have little choice but to deny (11c): they must hold that a rational, reflective speaker could understand two utterances that express the same proposition, and yet think that one of them is true while thinking that the other is false. The main problem for Russellians is to provide a plausible explanation of how this could occur.

Some Russellians attempt to do so by saying that speakers may fail to distinguish correctly between the semantic content of an utterance and its pragmatic "implications". Let's consider an analogous example. Many semanticists maintain that utterances of (12) and (13) express the same, or logically equivalent, propositions.

(12)   Mary turned the ignition key and the car's engine started.

(13)   The car's engine started and Mary turned the ignition key.

Yet many ordinary speakers of English would judge that utterances of (12) and (13) can differ in truth value. To explain away these common intuitions, many semanticists say that utterances of sentences of the form $\ulcorner P$ and $Q \urcorner$ typically *pragmatically convey* ("suggest", "implicate", or "insinuate") the proposition that P and *then Q*. Thus utterances of (12) and (13) usually

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pragmatically convey *different* propositions. A hearer may (reasonably) believe that one of those conveyed propositions is true and that the other is false. So a hearer who fails to distinguish correctly between what the utterances semantically express, and what the speaker is "getting across," may mistakenly judge that the two utterances themselves differ in truth value.[13]

The pragmatic response to the Substitution Objection is similar in outline. Utterances of (1) and (2) often pragmatically convey different propositions. The hearer may believe that one of those conveyed propositions is true and that the other is false. If the hearer does not correctly distinguish between the "literal content" of those utterances and what they "suggest", then the hearer may mistakenly think that utterances of (1) and (2) themselves differ in truth value. Let's call this the *Pragmatic Explanation* of how rational people could have anti-Russellian intuitions about (1) and (2).

A Russellian who adopts this response can have various views about how utterances of (1) and (2) pragmatically convey propositions. A Russellian *might* say that these pragmatically conveyed propositions are Gricean implicatures of some sort; but then again, he might not. Yet whatever the details of his account, a Russellian must say that the hearer *entertains* the conveyed proposition as a causal consequence of hearing the utterance, and that the hearer's entertaining the proposition plays some crucial role in causing his judgments about truth value. Otherwise, it would be hard to see how an utterance's pragmatically conveying a proposition could explain the hearer's judgment about its truth value.[14]

Since the Pragmatic Response denies premise (11c), the advocate of the explanation needs a response to argument (11e) in favor of it. Notice that the Pragmatic Explanation does *not* offer any explanation of how a rational person could believe a proposition and its negation. Thus

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the Pragmatic Explanation naturally suggests the following response to argument (11e): a person

who thinks that (1) is true and (2) is false does *not* believe a proposition and its negation, for such

a person does not believe the proposition expressed by (1) or the negation of the proposition

expressed by (2). Such people are confused about what (1) and (2) say, or about their truth

conditions. They think that (1) and (2) literally express propositions that are, in fact, merely

pragmatically conveyed; or they mistakenly think that the truth of the conveyed propositions is

necessary and sufficient for the truth of utterances of (1) and (2). These people can think that (1)

is true and (2) is false, even though they do not believe the proposition expressed by (1) or the

negation of the proposition expressed by (2). Nevertheless, they still count as understanding the

utterances, by ordinary standards.[15]

I will now outline two proposals regarding what sorts of proposition are conveyed by

utterances of belief sentences. These are taken (with some modifications) from Salmon and

Soames.[16] I will criticize them in the next section.

The first proposal is that utterances of sentences of the form of (14)

(14)   *A* believes that *S*

routinely pragmatically convey propositions expressed by utterances of the following form.

(15a)   There is a translation of `*S*' into *A*'s language that *A* believes is true, and to which

           A would assent (under normal circumstances).

For instance, an utterance of (2) typically pragmatically conveys the proposition that there is a

translation of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi

believes is true and to which he would assent under normal circumstances. A speaker might

(reasonably) believe that this latter proposition is false, and so might judge that an utterance of

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(2) itself is false.

The second proposal assumes a common Russellian view about the *metaphysics* of belief. Russellianism says that believing is a binary relation between a person and a proposition. But most Russellians (including Salmon and Soames) hold that this relation is *mediated*: one believes a proposition in virtue of standing in some significant psychological relation to a third entity that determines the proposition believed.[17] The third entity is variously called a `propositional guise', or a `mode of presentation' for a proposition, or a `way of taking' or `way of grasping' a proposition; I will often call it a `way of believing'.[18] A Russellian can give various stories about the nature of the third entity: it may, for instance, be said to be a linguistic meaning, a Kaplanian character, a sentence of a natural language, a mental representation, or a mental state. A person believes a proposition iff she accepts (in a technical sense) a certain sentence or meaning or character, or has a certain representation in her head, or is in a certain mental state. On any of these views, a person can believe a proposition in one way without believing it in another (by, for instance, accepting one sentence that expresses the proposition while failing to accept another); moreover, a person can believe a proposition in one way while believing its negation in another, suitably different, way. On all of these views, the binary belief relation can be, metaphysically speaking, "analyzed into" a *ternary* relation between a person, a proposition, and a way of believing. The binary belief relation is, in effect, an existential generalization of this ternary relation, in the following sense: necessarily, *A* believes *p* iff (roughly) *A* believes *p in some way or other*.

Russellians deny that utterances of belief sentences semantically express propositions about ways of believing. But they can allow that a belief report may pragmatically convey

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information about the way in which a believer believes a proposition; and they can say that two reports that semantically express the same proposition may pragmatically convey distinct propositions about distinct ways of believing. This is the basic idea of the second proposal. Utterances of sentences of form (14) routinely pragmatically convey propositions expressed by utterances of sentences of roughly the following form.

(15b)   *A BEL*s that *S* via *W*.

The predicate `*BEL*' here expresses a *ternary* relation that holds between a person, a proposition, and a way of believing iff the person believes that proposition in that way. `*W*' is a variable ranging over names and descriptions of ways of believing.[19] Thus on this view, an utterance of (2) could pragmatically convey the proposition that Hammurabi *BEL*s that Venus is visible in the evening *via* the mental state that typically causes his utterances of (the translation into his language of) `Phosphorus is visible in the evening'. A speaker could rationally believe that this last proposition is false; if she does not correctly distinguish between the proposition conveyed and the proposition expressed, then she might judge that the utterance of (2) is false.

Those are the two proposals that I will consider in detail below. But Russellianism is consistent with many other proposals about the propositions conveyed by belief reports. It's particularly worth noting that Russellians can maintain that the propositions conveyed by utterances of belief sentences vary widely from utterance to utterance, depending on the particular contextual details of the utterance. So they can deny that there is any sort of proposition that belief reports *usually* (or *as a rule*) convey.[20]

3. Doubts About the Pragmatic Explanation

I do not know of any knockdown objections to the Pragmatic Explanation, but I believe

that there are good reasons to doubt that it can account for all anti-Russellian intuitions. I will

begin with criticisms of the two specific proposals described above, and then end with a more

general objection.[21]

Let's begin with the proposal built on (15b).[22] On this proposal, ordinary speakers

routinely entertain and believe propositions of the (15b) sort when they utter belief sentences.

But if this were so, then surely ordinary speakers would be able to articulate propositions of the

(15b) sort. And surely they would sometimes explicitly assert those propositions (or the

negations of those propositions, in order to "cancel" the implications of their reports). Finally, it

seems likely that they would develop some *conventional* means for expressing propositions of

the (15b) sort. That is, they would develop some ordinary expression or construction that can be

used for this purpose without any special explanation or stipulation. But as a matter of fact, none

of these expectations are realized. Ordinary speakers do not have a conventional way of

expressing these propositions. When philosophers wish to express such propositions, they must

introduce new terms (like `*BEL*') or new constructions, and they must accompany their

introductions with lots of explanation (as I did earlier in this paper). Moreover, ordinary

speakers do not explicitly assert propositions of the (15b) sort (or their negations). A speaker

may occasionally say something like "Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the

evening, and he would also put it that way in his language" (or alternatively: ". . . he would *not*

put it that way in his language"). But these utterances do not express propositions of the (15b)

sort; they do not even mention the ternary *BEL* relation, or ways of believing (unless ways of

believing are natural language sentences). Finally, speakers (at the very least) have a very

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difficult time articulating such propositions. Suppose that Sue sincerely utters (1) and the

negation of (2). If we asked Sue "In what way did Hammurabi believe that Hesperus is visible in

the evening?", she probably would not understand our question. It's very doubtful that

paraphrasing, or any other sort of prompting, would help. And so we have little reason to think

that she entertained such a proposition when she uttered the sentences, or intended to convey

such a proposition to her hearer.[23]

There is another aspect of the view that is worrying (to me). Kripke's "Paderewski" case

strongly suggests that ways of believing cannot be natural language sentences or their

meanings.[24] That leaves mental states or mental representations as the most likely candidates for

ways of believing. But I doubt that when ordinary speakers (for instance, ordinary ten-year olds)

issue belief reports, they routinely believe, and entertain, and intend their hearers to entertain,

propositions about such mental states or representations---and particularly not propositions of the

(15b) sort in which those items appear as the third relata of the *BEL* relation. These sorts of

beliefs and intentions just seem (to me) to be more sophisticated and theoretical than those that

ordinary speakers normally have when they use belief sentences.[25]

Let's turn to the (15a) proposal. It's reasonable to think that speakers *sometimes*

pragmatically convey metalinguistic propositions of the (15a) sort when they utter belief

sentences. For instance, in the following conversation, B clearly does convey a proposition of

roughly the (15a) sort.

A: "Will Hammurabi write `T' or `F' when he reads `Hesperus is visible in the

evening' on his True-False quiz?"

B: "Well, Hammurabi *believes* that Hesperus is visible in the evening."

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But if (15a) propositions were *routinely* conveyed by utterances of belief sentences, then we would routinely entertain complex metalinguistic propositions when we utter or hear belief reports. Yet there's little reason to think that we do so. We do not routinely entertain complex metalingistic propositions when we use *non*-belief sentences, like `Gingrich is happy', and there's no evident reason to think that matters are different when we use belief sentences.[26]

This worry might be assuaged by weakening the proposal. It might be claimed that (15a) propositions are pragmatically conveyed by belief reports (only) on those occasions when speakers are considering "Hesperus/Phosphorus cases" and are resisting substitution.[27] But even this weaker hypothesis is problematic, for it seems that speakers may resist substitution and yet lack the beliefs that this version of the Pragmatic Explanation requires them to have.[28] For example, suppose that Fred sincerely assents to an utterance of (1) and rejects an utterance of (2). An explanation that appeals to (15a) would say that Fred assents to the utterance of (1) because it conveys a proposition that he *does* believe, namely the proposition expressed by (16).

> (16) There is a translation of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi believes is true and to which he would assent (under normal circumstances).

And it would say that Fred rejects the utterance of (2) because it conveys a proposition that he does *not* believe, namely the proposition expressed by (17). (In fact, Fred must believe the negation of that proposition for the explanation to work.)

> (17) There is a translation of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi believes is true and to which he would assent (under normal circumstances).

But Fred surely could assent to (1) and yet not believe the proposition expressed by (16). For instance, Fred may think that Hammurabi uses only demonstratives to refer to Venus, and is not acquainted with the names `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' or any translations of them. So Fred may believe that there is *no* translation of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi thinks is true, and to which he would assent.[29]

Finally, there is a more general reason to doubt that pragmatics can always explain resistance to substitution, whether or not appeal is made to (15a) and (15b).[30] Speakers are often able to distinguish between the pragmatic implications and the semantic contents of utterances. For instance, after some coaching speakers usually can distinguish between the semantic contents and the pragmatic implications of utterances of (12) and (13). They can become convinced that the truth of the pragmatic implications of these utterances is not required for the truth of the utterances themselves. They come to believe that (12) and (13) are logically equivalent, and that they "merely suggest" a difference in temporal order. The contrast with (1) and (2) is striking. If an ordinary speaker believes that Hammurabi sincerely assents to `Hesperus is visible in the evening' and sincerely dissents from `Phosphorus is visible in the evening', then it will be extremely difficult to convince him that these utterances must have the same truth value and differ only in what they "suggest". Even professionals who are trained in semantics and pragmatics strongly resist the contention that the utterances express the same proposition. This contrast strongly suggests that speakers' judgments about the (possible) truth values of (1) and (2) are not (always) due to an ordinary failure to distinguish correctly between pragmatics and semantics. Some other sort of phenomenon is at work here.[31]

4. Understanding Simple Sentences

To find an alternative to the Pragmatic Explanation, I want to return to the Substitution Objection (11a)-(11d). One aspect of this argument is very striking: it never mentions that (1) and (2) are belief sentences and never mentions any special feature of belief sentences. Thus one might suspect that the problem that it raises for Russellianism is not peculiar to belief sentences. This suspicion would be correct; some pairs of simple sentences do pose a very similar problem. Consider, for example, sentences (18) and (19).

    (18)   Hesperus is visible in the evening.

    (19)   Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

According to Russellianism, these sentences express the same proposition. And yet a rational, reflective speaker could understand utterances of both (18) and (19), and think that one is true and the other is false.[32] So, it might be argued, they must express different propositions, and therefore Russellianism must be false.

This second argument against Russellianism is virtually the same as the earlier argument. Moreover, Russellians really have no choice but to deny the same premise in both arguments: they must maintain that rational, reflective speakers could (and sometimes do) understand two utterances that express the same proposition, and yet think the utterances differ in truth value. All of this suggests that the problems raised by the two sorts of case are basically the same, and that Russellians should explain the intuitions in the two sorts of case in the same way. Yet most Russellians (I suspect) would find pragmatic responses to this second argument rather *un*appealing. In any case, the long term prospects for pragmatic responses to the second argument do not seem bright, for (as Salmon 1986, 87-91, points out) a speaker who is well-

trained in distinguishing pragmatics from semantics may nevertheless think that an utterance of

(18) is true while thinking that an utterance of (19) is false.[33]

Fortunately for Russellians, there is a plausible Russellian account of anti-Russellian

intuitions about simple sentences that does not rely on pragmatics. Moreover, it can be extended

to speakers' intuitions about the truth values of belief sentences such as (1) and (2). Or so I shall

argue below. To do so, I will first present the explanation for simple sentences. I will extend it

to belief sentences in the next section.

The explanation relies on the previously mentioned idea that there are different ways of

grasping, and believing, a single proposition. In particular, there are different ways to grasp, and

believe, the proposition that Venus is visible in the evening. A speaker can believe that

proposition in one of these ways while failing to believe it in another way. Believing the

proposition in one way may dispose him to think that (18) is true, but not dispose him to think

that (19) is true. Conversely, believing the proposition in another way may dispose him to think

that (19) is true, but not dispose him to think that (18) is true. A person who believes the

proposition that Venus is visible in the evening in the first of these ways but not in the second

may, in fact, believe that Venus is *not* visible in the evening in such a way that he is disposed to

think that (19) is false. Such a person (Hammurabi, for instance) could be rational and reflective

and understand utterances of both (18) and (19), and yet think that the utterance of (18) is true

and that the utterance of (19) is false.

Thus on this view, Hammurabi could think that an utterance of (18) is true because he

believes, *in one way*, that Venus is visible in the evening; and he could also (at the same time)

think that an utterance of (19) is false because he believes, *in another, suitably different, way*,

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that Venus is *not* visible in the evening. On this view, a rational person can believe a proposition and its negation, as long as he does so in suitably different ways.[34]

There are various ways to fill out this explanation, depending mainly on what one takes to be a way of believing. One natural elaboration distinguishes between the mental states that a person may be in, and the propositions to which the person bears attitudes in virtue of being in those mental states. Mental states, on such views, are (realized in human beings by) states of the brain or soul. They bear causal roles with respect to each other, and with respect to sensation and behavior; distinct mental states may (perhaps must) differ in their causal roles. On this view, ways of believing could be identified with certain mental states. Such a view could say that there are two distinct *belief states* such that any person who is in either state believes the proposition that Venus is visible in the evening.[35] One of these belief states tends to cause people to utter (18), given the right set of other mental states (for example, desire states), but does not tend to cause them to utter (19). The other belief state tends to cause people to utter (19), but not (18). A person could be in both of these states, but also be in one and not the other. In fact, a person could rationally be in yet another belief state that is sufficient for him to believe that Venus is *not* visible in the evening, and that tends to cause him to utter the negation of (19). A person in these belief states could rationally think that an utterance of (18) is true and an utterance of (19) is false.[36]

There is a further elaboration of this view that is convenient, vivid, and plausible (in my opinion). It identifies these mental states with states involving mental representations. On one view of this sort, to believe a proposition is to have in one's head (in the right way) a mental sentence that expresses that proposition.[37] These mental sentences express propositions because

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of their structures and because their constituents refer to individuals and express properties and relations. (The constituents might do this because their tokens stand in appropriate causal or historical relations to individuals and instances of properties and relations.) Such a state, of having-sentence-*S*-in-one's-head, can have the causal role of a belief state. For convenience, I will say that if a person is in a mental state that involves a mental sentence, and that state has the right causal role for a belief state, then that sentence is in that person's *belief box*.[38]

To simplify matters, let's assume that the mental sentences in a person's belief box are sentences of that person's natural language.[39] So a person who speaks English can have (18) and (19) in his belief box. If he does, then he believes "twice over" that Venus (/Hesperus/Phosphorus) is visible in the evening. He will also be disposed to believe, in certain ways, that (18) and (19) are true.[40]

But a rational person could have (18) in his belief box, but not (19). In fact, he could have the *negation* of (19), in his belief box. That is, he could rationally come to have (19n) in his belief box.

(19n)   Phosphorus is not visible in the evening.

Of course, by having both (18) and (19n) in his belief box, he believes a proposition and its negation. But it could be rational for him to do this, given the ways in which he believes the propositions (given the ways in which the mental sentences determine the propositions that he believes). He could, for instance, believe certain other propositions in such ways that he has good evidence for believing the propositions expressed by both (18) and (19n), in the ways that he does. And he would not be able to deduce any contradiction from these propositions, given the ways in which he believes them, for no contradictory sentence can be validly derived (in the

syntactic sense) from sentences (18) and (19n) alone. Thus it may be no more irrational for him

to have (18) and (19n) in his belief box than for him to have `Gingrich is a Republican' and

`Clinton is not a Republican' in his belief box.[41]

Such a person could still understand (18) and (19). For on this view, to understand an

utterance is just for the utterance to cause one to grasp, or entertain, the proposition that it

expresses, in the right way. And this is done by tokening a mental sentence in one's head in the

right way. A hearer might, for instance, entertain the proposition expressed by an utterance of

(19) just by tokening (19) in an "entertainment box" (which might be part of a special-duty

"language processing box"). Or he might understand such an utterance by tokening a sentence

like `The speaker just said that Phosphorus is visible in the evening' in his belief box. Clearly a

person who had (18) and (19n) in his belief box could do all of this when he hears utterances of

(18) and (19).[42]

But a person who had (18) and (19n) in his belief box would think that (18) is true and

(19) is false. Thus on this view, two utterances could express the same proposition, and yet a

reflective, rational speaker who understands both could believe that one of them is true while

believing that the other is false.

So goes one plausible Russellian response to the alleged problem with saying that (18)

and (19) express the same proposition. Let's call it the *Psychological Explanation* of how

rational people could have anti-Russellian intuitions regarding simple sentences like (18) and

(19).

I want to emphasize that one does not have to accept the mental-sentence theory of belief,

or even the mental-state theory of belief, in order to accept the Psychological Explanation. I have

presented these theories to illustrate how it might be possible to grasp the same proposition in two ways, and I will continue to rely on the mental-sentence picture to illustrate the Psychological Explanation, because it is vivid and convenient (and plausible, I think). But the essential part of the explanation can be stated more neutrally, simply in terms of ways of believing: One can rationally believe a proposition in one way, while failing to believe it in another way, and one can rationally believe a proposition in one way, while believing its negation in another, suitably different, way.

It is important to notice two further aspects of the explanation. First, the explanation requires that the speaker believe certain propositions in certain ways, but it does *not* require that the speaker grasp or believe propositions *about* ways of believing or the ternary *BEL* relation. (That is, he need not grasp or believe propositions that contain as constituents either ways of believing or the *BEL* relation.) Second, the explanation does not assume that utterances of (18) and (19) pragmatically convey different propositions, and does not assume that the speaker entertains or believes the propositions, if any, that are pragmatically conveyed. So it is consistent with the explanation that a rational, competent speaker understand utterances of (18) and (19), and think that (18) is true and (19) is false, even if those utterances do not pragmatically convey different propositions, or even if the speaker fails to entertain the propositions (if any) conveyed by the utterances.

5. Understanding Belief Reports

The Psychological Explanation can be extended in a straightforward way to anti-Russellian intuitions about belief sentences. Suppose that Mary is rational, understands (1) and

(2), and thinks that (1) is true and (2) is false.

> (1)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

> (2)   Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

To explain how Mary could rationally have such beliefs, we can reasonably suppose that there are different ways of grasping, and believing, the single proposition expressed by (1) and (2). Believing the proposition in one of these ways would dispose a person to assent to (1) and think that it is true; but it would not dispose her to assent to (2) or to think that (2) is true. Believing the proposition in a certain other way would dispose her to assent to (2) and to think that (2) is true, but not so for (1). It's possible for a rational, reflective speaker (like Mary) to believe the proposition in the first of these ways but fail to believe it in the second way, and yet understand both utterances. Such a speaker could believe that (1) is true and that (2) is false.

We can fill out this explanation further if we are willing to adopt the mental-sentence view of belief. If so, then we can say the following: One way in which a person can believe the proposition expressed by (1) is by having (1) itself in her belief box. Another way in which she can believe that proposition is by having (2) in her belief box. A person who had both of these sentences in her belief box would believe "twice over" the proposition that Hammurabi believes that Venus (/Hesperus/Phosphorus) is visible in the evening. Such a person would also be disposed to believe, in certain ways, that both (1) and (2) are true. But it is also possible for a rational person to have (1) in her belief box, and yet *not* have (2) in her belief box. In fact, she could rationally have the *negation* of (2), namely (2n), in her belief box.

> (2n)   Hammurabi does not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

Of course, by having both (1) and (2n) in her belief box, she believes a proposition and its

negation: she believes the proposition that Hammurabi believes that Venus is visible in the evening, and she also believes that Hammurabi does *not* believe that Venus is visible in the evening. But it may be rational for her to do so, given the ways in which the mental sentences determine the propositions that she believes.

A person who had (1) and (2n) in her belief box could still understand utterances of (1) and (2), for to understand utterances of (1) and (2) is to grasp, or entertain, the propositions expressed by those utterances in the right ways. For instance, to understand an utterance of (2) might be to have a token of (2) in one's "entertainment box" as a result of hearing the utterances; or it might be to have a token of `The speaker said that Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening' occur in one's belief box.

But a person who had (1) and (2n) in her belief box would believe that utterances of (1) are true and utterances of (2) are false. Thus a rational, reflective speaker could understand an utterance of (1) and an utterance of (2) and think that the first is true but the second is false.[43]

There are two important ways in which the Psychological Explanation of the anti-Russellian intuitions differs from that of the Pragmatic Explanation. First, although it requires the speaker to believe certain propositions about the binary belief relation in certain ways, it does *not* require the speaker to grasp or believe propositions that are *about* ways of believing or the ternary *BEL* relation. (That is, she need not believe propositions that have as constituents either ways of believing or the ternary *BEL* relation.) Second, the explanation does not assume that utterances of (1) and (2) pragmatically convey different propositions, and does not assume that the speaker entertains or believes the propositions, if any, that are pragmatically conveyed.

Summarizing: According to Russellians, a rational person can believe a proposition *and*

its negation, as long as she does so in suitably different ways. Russellians (and many non-Russellians) think that this idea suffices to explain how a rational speaker can understand two *simple* sentences that express the same proposition and yet think that one is true while thinking that the other is false. I have argued that this same idea suffices to explain how a rational speaker can understand two *belief* sentences that express the same proposition, and yet think that one is true while thinking that the other is false. If I am right, then Russellians need not rely on pragmatics to explain anti-Russellian intuitions regarding belief reports.[44]

6. Reasons for Believing

I have now presented the core of my response to the Substitution Objection. But I want to push on a bit further in my examination of speakers who have anti-Russellian intuitions. In particular, I want to consider *why* Mary might believe the propositions expressed by (1) and (2n), in the ways she does. That is, I want to consider the observations, evidence, reasons, beliefs, and chains of reasoning that could cause her to believe those propositions, in those ways, and that could justify her in believing those propositions, in those ways. I have two reasons to consider these matters. First, some readers might wonder how Mary could have good reasons to believe the propositions expressed by (1) and (2n), in the ways she does, if Russellianism is true. Second, some *Russellian* readers might suspect that Mary could not rationally come to believe those propositions in those ways *unless* sentences (1) and (2) differed in their pragmatic implications. They might suspect that I would have to "smuggle in" some appeal to pragmatics in order to explain how Mary could have evidence or beliefs that justify her in believing propositions (1) and (2n), in the ways she does.[45]

On reflection, however, it should be clear that Mary could have many different reasons for believing the propositions expressed by (1) and (2n), in the ways she does. Think of all the reasons that one person could have for believing that another person has or lacks certain beliefs; those are the sorts of reason that could justify Mary in thinking that (1) is true and (2) is false. Now if Russellianism is true, then it's very likely that some of Mary's supporting beliefs are false; nonetheless, she could rationally have them, if she holds them in the right ways. Furthermore, her supporting beliefs may be unrelated to any (alleged) pragmatic implications of belief reports. To illustrate this, I will describe Mary and her thoughts in three different possible worlds. For convenience, I will sometimes rely on the mental-sentence theory of belief.

Possible world one. Mary is very much like Fred (in section 3). She thinks that Hammurabi has sincerely uttered translations of `That is visible in the evening' while pointing at Venus in evening, and `That is not visible in the evening' while pointing at Venus in the morning. So she has good reasons to believe the propositions expressed by (1) and (2n), in the ways she does. But she believes that Hammurabi has no names for Venus; so she does not believe the relevant metalinguistic (15a) proposition, namely that expressed by (16) (`There is a translation of "Hesperus is visible in the evening" into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi believes is true and to which he would assent'.) Furthermore, she fails to believe any relevant (15b) proposition because she does not have any beliefs concerning *BEL* or ways of believing; she never believes that people *BEL* propositions in certain ways.

Possible world two. In this world, Mary comes to have (1) and (2n) in her belief box as a result of testimonial evidence. She initially has (20) in her belief box.

(20)   Everything that Aunt Sue says about Hammurabi is true.

She hears Aunt Sue utter (1) and (2n), and so she comes to have (21) in her belief box.

(21)   Aunt Sue said that Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the morning and she said that he does not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

So she rationally comes to have (1) and (2n) in her belief box. Yet she has never considered the propositions expressed by the relevant instances of (15a) and (15b).

Possible world three. Mary has observed Hammurabi assenting to (18) and dissenting from (19). She rationally believes the propositions expressed by sentences (22)-(27), in virtue of having them in her belief box.

(22)   Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' and sincerely assents to it.

(23)   Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' and sincerely dissents from it.

(24)   Hammurabi is rational, reflective, and attentive.

(25)   If Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' and sincerely assents to it, then he believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

(26)   If Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' and sincerely dissents from it, then he believes that Phosphorus is *not* visible in the evening.

(27)   If Hammurabi is rational, reflective, and attentive, and he believes that Phophorus is *not* visible in the evening, then he does *not* also believe that Phosphorus *is* visible in the evening.

Sentences (1) and (2n) are simple logical consequences of these sentences. So Mary tokens (1)

and (2n) in her belief box, and so she rationally comes to believe that all utterances of (1) are true and all utterances of (2) are false.[46]

Now some Russellians who favor the Pragmatic Explanation may think that, in this last case, I have smuggled in some pragmatics. For, after all, Mary has (22) in her belief box. So she is likely (on reflection) to come to believe the relevant metalinguistic proposition of the (15a) sort, namely that expressed by (16). And so, this Russellian might conclude, the Pragmatic Explanation (or some version of it) is correct after all.

But this conclusion would be too hasty. Mary already has (1) in her belief box. Her having this belief, in this way, is sufficient for her to come to believe that a given utterance u of (1) is true. So we can coherently imagine that, in the above world, Mary does not entertain a metalinguistic proposition of the (15a) sort when she hears u. But if Mary does not entertain such a (15a) proposition when she hears u, then u does not pragmatically convey that proposition to her. And so her judgment about the truth value of u is not correctly explained by saying that u pragmatically conveys a (15a) proposition to her.

In short, Mary could have beliefs, held in certain ways, that justify her in believing the propositions expressed by (1) and (2n), in the ways she does, even if Russellianism is true and even if utterances of (1) and (2) do not pragmatically convey any propositions to her.

7. Adding Identity Sentences: An Objection and a Reply

I wish now to consider a case in which the belief ascriber thinks that the relevant identity sentence is true. Consider (28).

(28)   Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

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Clearly Mary could rationally think that (1) is true, *and that (28) is true*, and yet think that (2) is false. Can the Psychological Explanation explain Mary's intuitions in this case?

Yes. The explanation is essentially the same as before. She believes the proposition expressed by (1) in one way, a way corresponding to (1); she fails to believe it in another way, a way corresponding to (2). In fact, she believes the negation of the proposition in a way that corresponds to (2n). In addition, she believes the proposition that Venus is Venus, in a certain way; her believing the proposition in that way disposes her to assent to (28) and think that it is true. Therefore, she believes that (1) and (28) are true, and (2) is false. If we assume the mental-sentence theory of belief, then we can add that Mary has (1), (28), and (2n) in her belief box.

But one might be worried that this explanation is inconsistent with Mary's being rational, if Russellianism is true. To explain this worry, and develop it into an objection to Russellianism and the Psychological Explanation, I would like to return to Hammurabi and his attitudes towards the simple sentences (18) and (19).[47] (Warning: the following arguments are rather more complex than those that preceded them.)

Hammurabi can rationally think that (18) and (19n) are both true. But it seems that he can*not* do so if he also thinks that (28) is true. Why is this so? Here's one line of reasoning that might initially appear compelling. (19) is a *logical consequence* of (18), (19n), and (28). So is (19n). But (19) and (19n) are logically inconsistent; they cannot both be true. Therefore (18), (28), and (19n) make up a logically inconsistent set and cannot all be true. Furthermore, the fact that these sentences cannot all be true is (speaking loosely) "easily recognizable". For (19) is a *simple* logical consequence of (18) and (28). What I mean by this is that there is a syntactically simple, mentally untaxing, valid derivation of (19) from (18) and (28). (The relevant derivation

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is just a substitution of one name for another.) But if (19) is a *simple* logical consequence of (18) and (28), and Hammurabi is rational, then he should make the inference, and tentatively believe that (19) is true.[48] But then he should see that he needs to revise some of his beliefs, for he already believes that (19n) is true, and being rational, he should believe that (19) and (19n) cannot both be true. Thus if Hammurabi is rational, then he cannot think that (18), (28) and (19n) are all true. A similar argument could be given for thinking that if Hammurabi is rational, then he cannot have all of (18), (28), and (19n) in his belief box.[49]

A critic of Russellianism could give a parallel argument for thinking that, *if* Russellianism is true, and Mary is rational, then she cannot think that all of (1), (28), and (2n) are true. For *if* Russellianism is true, then (2) is a logical consequence of (1) and (28); but (2) and (2n) are logically inconsistent, and cannot both be true; thus (1), (28), and (2n) make up a logically inconsistent set, and cannot all be true. Moreover, if Russellianism is true, then the fact that (1), (28), and (2n) cannot all be true is "easily recognizable". For if Russellianism is true, then (2) is a *simple* logical consequence (in the above sense) of (1) and (28). But if (2) is a *simple* logical consequence of (1) and (28), and Mary is rational, then she should make the inference, and tentatively believe that (2) is true. But then she should see that she needs to revise her beliefs, for she already believes that (2n) is true, and being rational, she should believe that (2) and (2n) cannot both be true. So if Russellianism is true, and Mary is rational, then she cannot think that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true. A similar argument could be given for thinking that if Russellianism is true, and Mary is rational, then she cannot have all of (1), (28), and (2n) in her belief box.

But clearly Mary can believe that all of (1), (28), and (2n) are true, and have all of them in

her belief box, and yet be rational. So, one might conclude, Russellianism is false, and so is the Psychological Explanation.[50]

That's the objection. In reply, I shall concede that if Russellianism is true, then (2) is a logical consequence of (1) and (28).[51] So if Russellianism is true, and Mary believes that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, then there is a set of logically inconsistent sentences, all of which she has in her belief box and all of which she believes to be true. In that sense, she is making a mistake in logic, if Russellianism is true. But, I maintain, Mary can make this sort of mistake and still be rational. For a person can rationally have inconsistent beliefs of this type if she has the right sort of evidence for her beliefs. And Mary can have such evidence for her beliefs. She can have excellent (though misleading) evidence for thinking that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true. Her evidence could be so strong that she would be rationally justified in believing that (2) is *not* a logical consequence of (1) and (28)--even if, in fact, Russellianism is true and (2) *is* a logical consequence of (1) and (28). In circumstances like these, she can rationally believe that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, even if they cannot be.[52]

Before turning to the details of Mary's case, let's consider a similar example in which a person rationally has inconsistent beliefs. Consider (29) and (30).

(29)   The earth is round.

(30)   If the moon is made of green cheese, then the earth is round.

We can easily imagine a rational person who thinks that (29) is true and (30) is false. For example, a reasonable, intelligent, beginning logic student might think so. (Let me emphasize, however, that I am speaking of the *English* sentences, and not their analogs in familiar formal languages.) A reflective student of this sort would think that (29) and the *negation* of (30), call it

`(30n)', are both true. Some sophisticated logicians might agree with these students---for example, some advocates of relevance logic might think that (29) is true and (30) is false. Yet according to the standard theory of the English indicative conditional, (30) is a logical consequence of (29). Now suppose that this theory is correct. Then (29) and (30n) are logically inconsistent and cannot both be true. Moreover, (30) is a *simple* logical consequence of (29), for the inference from (29) to (30) is syntactically simple and mentally untaxing. So if we followed the reasoning of the earlier objection to Russellianism, we would have to say that a rational person who thinks that (29) and (30n) are true should first deduce (30) from (29), and then realize that he needs to revise his beliefs. But the beginning logic students and sophisticated logicians that we have been considering do not do this. So we would be forced to conclude that they are not rational. But this conclusion is implausible, for the students and logicians we are considering obviously are (or could be) rational.

The above argument goes wrong when it assumes that if (30) is, *in fact*, a simple logical consequence of (29), then a rational person must deduce (30) from (29), and come to believe that he needs to revise his beliefs. On the contrary: a person can fail to make the inference, and fail to revise his beliefs, and yet remain rational. For a person can have (what he takes to be) quite good reasons for thinking that (29) and (30n) are both true. His reasons could be so strong that, if he had the concept of logical consequence, he would be justifed in (mistakenly) inferring that (30) is *not* a logical consequence of (29). (Some actual relevance logicians might be in just this position.) In circumstances of this type, a person can, so to speak, rationally reject the valid inference rather than revise his beliefs.

The earlier objection to Russellianism goes wrong in the same way. It says that if (2) is *in*

fact a logical consequence of (1) and (28), and Mary is rational, then she must make the substitution inference, and so eventually come to believe that (1), (28), and (2n) are not all true. On the contrary: Mary can fail to make the inference from (1) and (28) to (2), and fail to revise her beliefs, and yet remain rational, even if the inference is logically valid. The reason she can is that she can have strong (though misleading) evidence that all of (1), (28), and (2n) are true. She could, for example, have observed Hammurabi's assent to (18) and dissent from (19), and could rationally think that (22)-(27) are all true, and so be rationally justified in thinking that (1) and (2n) are true. Obviously, she could also have good evidence for thinking that (28) is true. In this situation, Mary's evidence for (1), (2n), and (28) could be so strong that, if she had the concept of logical consequence, she would be justified in (mistakenly) inferring that (2) is *not* a logical consequence of (1) and (28). In circumstances like these, she can rationally continue to believe that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, even if they cannot be. She can, so to speak, rationally reject the valid inference rather than revise her beliefs.

To see this more clearly, it may help to consider how Mary could rationally reject a conditional sentence that "corresponds" to the inference from (1) and (28) to (2). Suppose Mary actively considers (31).

> (31) If Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening, and Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus, then Hammurabi also believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

Mary could (and should) deduce (2) from (1), (28), and (31). But she already thinks that (2n) is true, and since she is rational, she should realize that (2) and (2n) cannot both be true. So she could rationally come to believe that not all of (1), (28), (2n), and (31) are true. But she already

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has strong (though misleading) reasons to accept (1), (28), and (2n). Thus it would be at least as

rational for her to give up (31) as to give up (1) or (28) or (2n). So she could rationally come to

think that (31) is false, and have its negation in her belief box. But from the negation of (31), she

could rationally infer that (2) is *not* a logical consequence of (1) and (28), if she had the concept

of logical consequence. If this is so, then she can rationally continue to think that (1), (28), and

(2n) are all true.

Therefore Mary can rationally believe that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, even if, as

Russellianism says, they cannot all be true. Thus the above objection to Russellianism, and the

Psychological Explanation, fails.[53]

Let's consider a reply.[54] A proponent of the objection might concede that I have shown

that, even if Russellianism is true, Mary is *as* rational as the logicians who think that (29) and

(30n) are both true. But he might insist that if (30) really is a logical consequence of (29), then

these logicians are not *fully* rational (emphasis on `*fully*'). Similarly, he might say, if

Russellianism is true, then Mary is not *fully* rational. But Mary is *fully* rational. Therefore,

Russellianism is not true.

In response to this new objection, a Russellian can plausibly deny that Mary is *fully*

rational, *in the objector's sense of `fully rational'.* For it seems that, on the objector's sense of the

term, a person is fully rational only if she (so to speak) "recognizes" the simple logical

consequences of the sentences she believes to be true. (This is apparently why the objector

thinks that if Russellianism is true, then Mary is not fully rational, in his sense.) But that is an

exceedingly high standard of rationality for anyone to meet. As the objector concedes, the

logicians we have been considering are not fully rational, in this sense; but if this is so, then it's

doubtful whether anyone is. Therefore a Russellian can admit, without qualm, that Mary is not *fully* rational, in the objector's strong sense of the term. However, a Russellian can still insist that Mary satisfies ordinary, commonly satisfied, standards for rationality, even if Russellianism is true. In fact, the objector already concedes this (at least in effect), for the logicians we have been considering are rational by ordinary, commonly satisfied standards for rationality, and the objector concedes that Mary is *as* rational as them, even if Russellianism is true.[55]

I conclude that a person who is rational (in the ordinary sense) can think that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, even if Russellianism is true. Notice, furthermore, that such a person could rationally infer that the following sentences are true.[56]

(32)   Believing that Hesperus is visible in the evening is not the same as believing that Phosphorus is visible in the evening, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(33)   The fact (or proposition) that Hesperus is visible in the evening is not the same as the fact (or proposition) that Phosphorus is visible in the evening, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(34)   It's possible for `Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening' to be true, while `Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening' is false, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(35)   Substitution of co-referring names in belief sentences may fail to preserve truth value.

Thus a rational speaker could have an elaborate system of anti-Russellian beliefs, even if Russellianism is true.

The most challenging problem that speakers like Mary pose for Russellianism is one that

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we considered much earlier in this paper: such speakers are rational, and yet (arguably) believe both a proposition and its negation, if Russellianism is true. But, as I pointed out before, Russellians have argued that a speaker can rationally believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as she does so in suitably different ways. They have used this idea to explain speakers' anti-Russellians intuitions about simple sentences. I have argued here that Russellians can use this same idea to explain speakers' anti-Russellian intuitions about belief reports, without relying on dubious claims about their pragmatics.[57]

Appendix of Numbered Sentences, Arguments, and Schemas

(1)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

(2)   Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

(2n)   Hammurabi does not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

(3)   Newt Gingrich is a Republican.

(4)   I am a Republican [spoken by Gingrich].

(5)   You are a Republican [addressed to Gingrich].

(6)   He is a Republican [said while demonstrating Gingrich].

(7)   Linda believes that Gingrich is a Republican.

(8)   Linda believes that you are a Republican [addressing Gingrich].

(9)   Linda believes that he is a Republican [demonstrating Gingrich].

(10)   There is a planet such that Hammurabi believes that it is visible in the evening.

(11a) If Russellianism is true, then, necessarily, every utterance of (1) expresses the same proposition as every utterance of (2) (keeping the meanings of the words fixed).

(11b) It's possible for there to be a rational reflective speaker who understands an utterance of (1) and an utterance of (2) and who believes that the first is true while believing that the second is false.

(11c) Necessarily, if two utterances express the same proposition, then a rational reflective speaker who understands both utterances does not believe that one is true while believing that the other is false.

(11d) Therefore, Russellianism is false.

(11e)   Necessarily, if a rational reflective speaker understands an utterance, and thinks that it is true, then he believes the proposition that it expresses. Necessarily, if he understands another utterance, and thinks that it is false, then he believes the negation of the proposition that it expresses. So, necessarily, if two utterances express the same proposition, and a rational reflective speaker understands both and believes that one of them is true while believing that the other is false, then he believes a proposition and its negation. But, it's not possible for a rational agent to believe a proposition and its negation. So (11c) is true.

(12)   Mary turned the ignition key and the car's engine started.

(13)   The car's engine started and Mary turned the ignition key.

(14)   *A* believes that *S*

(15a)   There is a translation of `*S*' into *A*'s language that *A* believes is true, and to which *A* would assent (under normal circumstances).

(15b)   *A BEL*s that *S* via *W*.

(16)   There is a translation of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi believes is true and to which he would assent (under normal circumstances).

(17)   There is a translation of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' into Hammurabi's language that Hammurabi believes is true and to which he would assent (under normal circumstances).

(18)   Hesperus is visible in the evening.

(19)   Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

(19n)   Phosphorus is not visible in the evening.

(20)   Everything that Aunt Sue says about Hammurabi is true.

(21)   Aunt Sue said that Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the morning and she said that he does not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

(22)   Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' and sincerely assents to it.

(23)   Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' and sincerely dissents from it.

(24)   Hammurabi is rational, reflective, and attentive.

(25)   If Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Hesperus is visible in the evening' and sincerely assents to it, then he believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

(26)   If Hammurabi understands an utterance of `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' and sincerely dissents from it, then he believes that Phosphorus is *not* visible in the evening.

(27)   If Hammurabi is rational, reflective, and attentive, and he believes that Phophorus is *not* visible in the evening, then he does *not* also believe that Phosphorus *is* visible in the evening.

(28)   Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

(29)   The earth is round.

(30)   If the moon is made of green cheese, then the earth is round.

(31)   If Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening, and Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus, then Hammurabi also believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

(32)   Believing that Hesperus is visible in the evening is not the same as believing that

Phosphorus is visible in the evening, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(33)   The fact (or proposition) that Hesperus is visible in the evening is not the same as the fact (or proposition) that Phosphorus is visible in the evening, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(34)   It's possible for `Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening' to be true, while `Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening' is false, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(35)   Substitution of co-referring names in belief sentences may fail to preserve truth value.

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Notes

1. Two points: (i) I use the term `belief report' for an assertive utterance of a belief sentence. (ii) Some Russellians would say that, because (1) and (2) are present-tense sentences, utterances of (1) and (2) that occur at distinct times express distinct propositions that are partly about those times. See Salmon 1986, chapter 2. But I ignore all matters of time and tense throughout this paper.

      To help with subsequent citations of numbered sentences, I have included a list of them in an appendix to this paper.

2. See Salmon 1986, chapters 6-8; Salmon 1989, 245-50; Salmon 1990, 229-34; Soames 1987, 117-22; Soames 1988, 219; Soames 1995, 522-24.

3. By `simple sentence', I mean a sentence that contains no modal, attitudinal, quotational, or other non-extensional contexts.

4. Some parts of Salmon's pragmatic theory anticipate my own view. In particular, he claims that there are distinct ways to believe the proposition expressed by (1) and (2). See especially his 1989, 267-8. One excuse I have for discussing the matter further is that Salmon's discussion occurs as part of a complicated dispute with Schiffer (1987) over *embedded* belief sentences; I think this has prevented many philosophers from seeing the importance of the point. But more importantly, I disagree with Salmon's claims about the role of pragmatics in explaining the anti-Russellian intuitions. See note 15.

5. I follow Richard (1990) in calling the theory `Russellianism', because it makes use of Russellian propositions. In other respects, the name is misleading, for Russellianism includes theses about ordinary proper names that Russell himself rejected.

6. I am again ignoring tense and time here. Russellians who take them into account usually hold that `believes' expresses a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a time.

7. For more detailed expositions of Russellianism, and variations on its basic themes, see Salmon 1986, Soames 1987, and Richard 1990, chapter 3.

8. For detailed arguments in favor of Russellianism, see Salmon 1986 and 1990; Soames 1987, 1988, and 1995; and Richard 1990, chapter 3.

9. See Kripke 1980, Donnellan 1972, and Kaplan 1989. See also Marcus 1961 and Perry 1977.

10. See Kripke 1979 for more detailed criticisms of one Fregean theory. Richard 1990, chapter 2, presents and criticizes several different Fregean theories.

11. See Bach 1993; Clapp 1995; Crimmins 1992a, 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Reimer 1995; Richard 1993; Rieber 1994; Salmon 1995; Saul 1993, 1996, 1998, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b; Schiffer 1992; Sider 1995; Soames 1995.

12. In what follows, I use numerical indices in `that'-clauses as abbreviations for quotation-names of sentences.  For example, I use `The speaker believes that (1) is true' as an abbreviation for `The speaker believes that "Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening" is true'.

13. See Levinson 1983, 107-9, for more details.

14. Soames (1995, 522-24) calls the pragmatically conveyed propositions `implicatures', and seems to think that they are Gricean *conversational* implicatures. (See Grice 1975 and Levinson 1983, chapter 3, for presentations of Grice's theory of implicatures.) Salmon does not commit himself to the view that the conveyed propositions are implicatures. See Salmon 1989, 253.

15. As I said, I think this response (whether plausible or not) is the one that the Pragmatic Explanation naturally suggests. But it is not the response that Salmon (1989) would make. Salmon would say that a person who understands (1) and (2), and thinks that (1) is true and (2) is false, *does* believe the propositions expressed by (1) and the negation of (2). Thus such a person does believe a proposition and its negation. Salmon would appeal to distinct ways of taking propositions to explain how this is possible; see below for details. Thus Salmon ultimately appeals to *more* than mere pragmatics to explain how (11c) could be false. I agree with Salmon that we can appeal to ways of taking propositions to respond to the argument for (11c). But I think that once we do this, we have sufficiently responded to the Substitution Objection. Moreover, Salmon's further claims about pragmatics are implausible, or so I shall argue. See also note 43.

16. See Salmon 1986, 115-8; Salmon 1989, 248-250; Soames 1987, 117-9 and 124-5; Soames 1988, 218-20; and Soames 1995, 522-24.

17. See Salmon 1986, 105-14, and 1989; Soames 1987 and 1995. The third entity usually determines the proposition believed only *relative to* something else, for instance, a context or a causal/historical chain. On this view, standing in the relevant psychological relation to an appropriate third entity, that itself stands in appropriate relations to contexts or causal/historical chains, is metaphysically sufficient to believe a certain proposition. For the sake of brevity, I shall often say that one believes a proposition *by*, or *in virtue of,* standing in the appropriate psychological relation to an appropriate intermediary entity.

18. My use of the term `way of believing' is convenient, but may be misleading, for I intend a way of believing to be an entity *via* which one can also entertain and desire a proposition. See note 36 below.

19. *W* may also be a function term; Salmon uses function terms in his version of (15b). Here are some of the details of his presentation (see Salmon 1986, 117; 1989, 246-7, 249-50). Let *f* be the binary function that assigns to any believer *A* and sentence *S* of *A*'s language the *way* that *A* takes the proposition expressed by *S* (in *A*'s language) were it presented to *A* through the sentence *S*. (Assume for simplicity that *S* contains no indexicals.) Then according to Salmon, there is an

established practice, in certain kinds of cases, of using sentences of the form of (14) to convey propositions expressed by sentences of the form $BEL[A, \text{that } S, f(A, \text{`}S\text{'})]$. Salmon points out that this proposal needs qualification in cases where the believer takes S to express distinct propositions on distinct occasions (for example, Kripke's Peter/Paderewski case).

20. Salmon (1989, 249-50) says that there is an "established practice" of using belief reports to convey propositions of the (15b) sort. This suggests that he thinks that these propositions are in some way *analogous* to Gricean *generalized* conversational implicatures. The wording of Soames's (1995, 522-23) proposal suggests (to me) that he thinks of the pragmatically conveyed propositions as Gricean *particularized* conversational implicatures. (See Grice 1975 and Levinson 1983, 126-32, for the distinction between these sorts of implicature.)

21. Saul (1996 and forthcoming-a) systematically describes and criticizes a large range of Russellian proposals about the pragmatics of belief reports. I will not try to duplicate her excellent work here. Saul also argues in favor of a novel "dispositional" theory of the pragmatics of belief reports; unfortunately, I cannot take the space to consider it here.

22. The objections to the Pragmatic Explanation in this paragraph are inspired by, and closely parallel, some of Stephen Schiffer's objections to the Hidden Indexical Theory of Belief. See Schiffer 1992, 513-18. See also Rieber 1994.

23. A defender of the view might reply that Sue would be able to tell us what (15b) propositions she conveyed, *if* we taught her the theory of the ternary *BEL* relation. But after that sort of coaching, Sue's responses to our questions may not be reliable indicators of the propositions she grasped when she first uttered (1).

24. See Kripke 1979 for details. Notice that the sentence `Paderewski is musically talented' has a single linguistic meaning.

25. I admit that *some* ordinary speakers *sometimes* think about things that are candidates for ways of believing: for example, "concepts", "ideas", mental events, and even mental representations. But even those who think about such matters do so only in their more speculative or theoretical moods. They do not *routinely* think about such things when they issue belief reports. Moreover, I doubt that they ever clearly grasp the nature of the *BEL* relation, or grasp propositions in which the preceding items figure as the third relata of this relation.

26. There is also little reason to think that speakers routinely *intend* their hearers to entertain such propositions; hearers also have little reason to *believe* that speakers intend them to believe such propositions. (Thanks to Jay Atlas for discussion of this.)

27. Salmon advocates this weaker proposal. See Salmon 1986, 116 and 118; Salmon 1989, 249.

28. My criticism here is modeled on some of Saul's (1996, forthcoming-a) criticisms of Salmon's and Soames's views, but the shortcomings of my criticism should not be attributed to her.

29. I am assuming here that translations of the sort mentioned in (15a) must preserve at least *linguistic meaning*. I also assume that a proper name like `Hesperus' does not have the same linguistic meaning as any demonstrative in any other language. (I also assume that Fred implicitly believes all of this.) An advocate of (15a) might deny one of my assumptions, especially the first. For instance, he could, in Richardian (1990) fashion, maintain that the notion of a translation mentioned in (15a) varies from context to context. I will not attempt to criticize such views here. A defender of the view might also reply that the (15a) proposition is not conveyed in contexts like Fred's because the implication is "cancelled" in such contexts. But if this is so, then the (15a) proposal has *no* explanation of Fred's resistance to substitution.

30. The following objection is due to Richard 1990, 125-6.

31. There is another problem with the Pragmatic Explanation that arises because people can entertain the propositions *conveyed* by belief reports *in distinct ways*. I can better explain the problem after I present my own explanation of the anti-Russellian intuitions. See note 43.

32. I am assuming here that the speaker does *not* think that `Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' is true. I discuss the case in which he does in section 7.

33. There are also other problems with such accounts, unless they are supplemented with the claim that *implicated* propositions can be believed in distinct ways. See note 43 below, and also Braun 1991, 299-300. I endorsed roughly the Psychological Explanation of attitudes towards pairs of sentences like (18) and (19) in Braun 1991. Richard 1990 and Crimmins 1992 also accept such a view. I do not know of any Russellian who wholeheartedly endorses a pragmatic explanation of such cases. Salmon 1986, 77-85, tentatively advances a pragmatic account for *identity* sentences, using metalinguistic propositions, but he argues later (87-92) that it is not adequate. Soames 1987, 104-5, gives a pragmatic account of speaker's attitudes towards pairs of sentences of the form *nRn* and *nRn¬*.

34. So this view responds to argument (11e) by asserting that it *is* possible for a rational person to believe a proposition and its negation. Notice that this response to argument (11e) is different from the one naturally suggested by the Pragmatic Explanation, which I described in section 2.

35. Perry (1979) distinguishes in this way between belief states and propositions believed.

36. Russellians often wish to speak of there being a single way in which one can both entertain and believe a proposition. But on the above view, to *entertain* a proposition in a certain way should be identified with being in a mental state, an *entertainment state*. Clearly this state cannot be identified with a *belief state* that allows one to believe that proposition in a certain way. So we need some explication of the idea that there is some *single* way in which one can *both* entertain, and believe, a proposition. These ways could be called `ways of taking propositions' or `propositional guises'. On the mental-sentence view to follow, these guises can be identified with mental sentences: one entertains and believes a proposition under the same guise if the entertainment state and the belief state involve the same mental sentence. On a mental-state view

that lacks mental sentences, one would need an alternative explication. Perhaps one could appeal to certain *relations* between mental states (including, perhaps, causal or functional relations). For instance, a belief state *B* and and entertainment state *E* can stand in the following relation: (i) anyone who is in *B* believes proposition *P*; (ii) anyone who is in *E* entertains *P*; and (iii) (necessarily) anyone who is in *B* is also in *E*. When *B* and *E* are so related, we can say that anyone who is in *B* and *E* believes and entertains *P* in the same *way* (or via the same guise).

37. This claim is almost certainly too strong, because having a *tacit* belief may not require having token mental representations. But issues about tacit belief are orthogonal to my concerns here, so I will ignore them. For discussion, see Crimmins 1992, 58-73, and Richard 1990, 47-57.

38. I believe that other Russellians, including Soames (1990), are tentatively attracted to such a mental-sentence view of belief. Fodor is the most famous advocate of (roughly) this view; see his 1975, 77, and 1987, ch. 1, among many other places. To my knowledge, Schiffer (1981) was the first to introduce the belief box metaphor.

39. This assumption must be dropped if we wish to apply the mental-sentence theory to cases like Kripke's Peter. See note 44.

40. On the mental-sentence view, a person who has (18) or (19) in his belief box has beliefs about Venus; he does *not* have beliefs about the *words* `Hesperus' or `Phosphorus', or about sentences (1) and (2), because mental sentences (18) and (19) do *not* contain terms that refer to words or sentences. To believe the proposition that (1) is true, a person must have in his belief box a sentence containing a term that refers to sentence (1), such as (i).
        (i)   `Hesperus is visible in the evening' is true.
Similarly, to believe that (2) is true, one must have a sentence like (ii) in one's belief box.
        (ii)   `Phosphorus is visible in the evening' is true.
I am assuming that someone who has (18) in his belief box is disposed also to have (i) there. Similarly for (19) and (ii).

41. I am assuming that the speaker does not have `Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' in his belief box. See section 7.

42. Fodor (1975, ch. 3) endorses roughly this view of utterance understanding, as do Schiffer (1987, ch. 7) and numerous psycholinguists. Soames (1989, 592-3) also seems attracted to it. Schiffer (1987, ch. 7) uses such a model to argue that we could understand belief reports even if their semantics were not compositional; but the model is also consistent with semantic theories that assume compositionality, like Russellianism.

43. I can now explain the problem with the Pragmatic Explanation that I mentioned in note 31. The problem is due to the fact that the propositions *conveyed* by belief reports can be entertained and believed *in distinct ways*. Consider the pragmatic theory that says that utterances of (1) pragmatically convey the proposition expressed by (16). On this view (as usually presented), Betty should think that (1) is true if she believes the proposition expressed by (16). But imagine

the following scenario: when Betty hears utterances of (1), she *entertains* that proposition by having (16) in her entertainment box. But her *belief* box does *not* have (16) in it, but rather another sentence that expresses the same proposition, for instance, `There is a translation of "Hesperus is visible in the evening" into *Schmammurabi's* language that *Schmammurabi* believes is true and to which he would assent (in normal circumstances)'. Then Betty would believe the proposition expressed by (16), and yet she might fail to think that (1) is true. Clearly the pragmatic theory must be amended to say that Betty will think that (1) is true if she entertains, and believes, the proposition expressed by (16) *in the right way*. Other versions of the Pragmatic Explanation need similar supplementation. Strangely, neither Salmon nor Soames mentions this important qualification to pragmatic theories, though their views entail that *conveyed* propositions can be believed in many distinct ways.

44. The Psychological Explanation can also explain how a rational speaker can think that two utterances of the same sentence, that express the same proposition, differ in truth value. The basic idea is that different utterances of a single sentence may cause a speaker to entertain *in different ways* the single proposition that they express. For example, Kripke's (1979) Peter may entertain the proposition expressed by utterances of `Paderewski is musically talented' in different ways on different occasions, depending on whether he thinks a musician or a politician is under discussion. On the mental-sentence view, he would do this by having two mental names for Paderewski. Similarly, a speaker may entertain the proposition expressed by `Peter believes that Paderewski is musically talented' in different ways on different occasions, depending on whether he thinks that Peter's "musician beliefs" or his "politician beliefs" are under discussion. On the mental-sentence view, the belief ascriber could do this by having two mental names for Paderewski, even if he, unlike Peter, thinks that (so to speak) Paderewski-the-musician is identical with Paderewski-the-politician. (Thanks to Jennifer Saul for discussion of this.)

45. I would like to thank Scott Soames for suggesting that I discuss these matters.

46. In one part of his explanation of anti-Russellian intuitions, Salmon (1986, 115; 1989, 249) also appeals to speakers' (mistaken) belief that sincere dissent from a sentence is sufficient to show lack of belief in the proposition it expresses.

47. Mark Richard presented an objection of the following sort during discussion. Some of the following issues are similar to those disputed in Schiffer 1987 and Salmon 1989. See notes 49 and 50. After I submitted this paper for publication, Adam Vinueza informed me that Schiffer 1990 raises a similar objection to Russellianism. For discussion of Schiffer 1990, see Adams, et. al 1993a and 1993b, and Yagisawa 1993. Adams et. al and I agree that Mary can rationally believe that (1), (28), and (2n) are all true, even if Russellianism is true. But we seem to disagree about why this is the case.

48. For the sake of brevity, I have omitted certain qualifications that should be added to the antecedent of this conditional. For instance, Hammurabi should understand (18), (19), (19n), and (28); he should be attentive, and actively considering these sentences; and he should be interested in whether they are true. From here on, I will assume that these conditions hold without

explicitly noting them. Similarly for other similar cases that follow below.

49. Schiffer (1987) would agree that Hammurabi cannot rationally think that (18), (28), and (19n) are true, but his reason for saying so would be different from the reason I am considering here. Schiffer would argue that if Hammurabi accepts (28), then Hammurabi cannot have two distinct ways of grasping (or believing) the proposition that Venus is visible in the evening, and so he cannot believe it in one way and fail to believe it in another way. I disagree. Even if Hammurabi accepts (28), there are still two ways in which he can believe the proposition: by having (18) in his belief box and by having (19) in his belief box. Notice that the two mental sentences may be functionally or causally quite different, even if he accepts (28). The presence of (18) in Hammurabi's belief box may tend to cause him to utter (18), but not (19), even if he accepts (28); and vice versa for (19). Certain sorts of experiences might cause Hammurabi to expunge (19) from his belief box, while keeping (18) there (thus causing him to subsequently drop (28)). So there are good grounds for claiming that (18) and (19) constitute different ways of believing the same proposition for Hammurabi, even if he accepts (28).

50. Schiffer (1987) would agree that Mary cannot rationally believe that (1), (2n), and (28) are all true, if Russellianism is true, but his reason for thinking so would be different from the one I am considering. Schiffer would argue that if Russellianism is right and the contents of (1) and (2) are the same, and Mary accepts the identity sentence (28), then she cannot have two distinct ways of grasping or believing the proposition expressed by (1) and (2). I disagree, for basically the same reasons that I gave in the previous note. Sentences (1) and (2) may have different causal roles for Mary, even if she has (28) in her belief box. They might tend to cause her to utter different sentences. She could also acquire evidence which would cause her to remove (2) from her belief box, without removing (1).

51. This is a substantive concession. Russellianism is a view about the semantics of sentences, not a view about the logical consequence relation between sentences. It entails that (1) and (2) express the same proposition, if (28) is true, but it does not (strictly speaking) entail anything about the logical relations among these sentences. But I think that Russellianism naturally *suggests* a (model-theoretic) view of logical consequence according to which (2) is a logical consequence of (1) and (28). So I am inclined to grant the premise. (Thanks to Scott Soames for discussion of this.)

52. Thanks to Theodore Sider and Richard Feldman for discussion of the following response. Thanks also to Adam Vinueza and the other participants in a discussion of a shortened version of this paper at the Pacific APA meeting in 1998. See Salmon 1989, 261, for a somewhat similar response to a somewhat different issue concerning Russellianism and logical consequence for *simple* sentences.

53. We have one loose end to tie up. Why is Hammurabi not rational if he thinks that (18), (28), and (19n) are all true? I suspect that we *think* he is not rational because we find it hard to imagine how he could have good evidence for thinking that (18), (28), and (19n) are all true. But to the limited extent that we can imagine Hammurabi having good (but misleading) evidence of

this type, he will appear rational to us.

54. The following reply was raised by two anonymous referees. One of them also suggested a response similar to the one I give below.

55. Notice, moreover, that the *original* objection apparently used the term `rational' in this ordinary sense; that is why it was supposed to be *obvious* that Mary is rational. So the objector's reply in effect concedes that the original objection was unsound.

56. Salmon (1989, 267-8) also says that a rational speaker may sincerely assert sentences like (33), even if Russellianism is true. Salmon says that such a speaker would be thinking of the relevant proposition in two distinct ways.