

CORRIGENDA

[Because of a misunderstanding on the part of the staff of the NATURAL LAW FORUM, certain of the editorial changes made in Professor Arnold Brecht's review of Erik Wolf's *Das Problem der Naturrechtslehre, Versuch einer Orientierung*, 3 NATURAL LAW FORUM 192 (1958), have distorted the original meaning Professor Brecht wished to convey. We are happy to publish the following corrections prepared by Professor Brecht.—Ed.]

Professor Wolf, at the end of his book, enumerates four approaches to the problem of natural law: the ontological, the ethical, the logical, and the metaphysical. My review called attention to the fact that Wolf explicitly declares all four, including the metaphysical approach, to be necessary in order to establish and justify natural law. In its edited version, the review then goes on to say that this view of Wolf's "enhances greatly the importance of the theory of natural law." But what I had actually written was rather the opposite, namely, that Wolf's statement was "an admission of the greatest importance for the theory of natural law," not that it enhanced the importance of that theory. The point I wanted to make was that Wolf's admission implied a rejection of the secular theory that moral laws can be derived from nature irrespective of whether or not divine forces are operative within nature. The importance of this rejection for the natural law controversy should be clear. If the theory of a moral natural law presupposes divine forces, then its acceptance depends logically on the previous or simultaneous acceptance of divinity. It is then illogical to teach that the existence of a moral natural law can be scientifically verified but that the existence of divine forces cannot, although it is not illogical — even in the absence of scientific verification — to *believe* in both divine will and its expression in a moral law of nature. This corresponds to my own views in this matter.

Second, in the context of scientific verifiability I distinguished between knowledge that is intersubjectively "transmissible *qua* knowledge," and knowledge, real or putative, that is not so transmissible. The term "transmissible" has been editorially changed to "communicable." This is in conflict with my well-considered use of terms. There is no doubt that metaphysical knowledge is "communicable" in the sense of "relatable"; but it is doubtful and controversial whether such knowledge, real or putative, is scientifically "transmissible *qua* knowledge." Having introduced this distinction of terms in several of my former articles and elaborated on it in my book *Political Theory — The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, a full-length review of natural law doctrines just published by Princeton University Press (603 pp.), I wish to prevent confusion in stating here that the term used in my review of Wolf's book was "transmissible," and not "communicable."

Finally, I did not write "We must postulate some 'basic norm,'" as it was printed (p. 197), but I wrote that Kelsen had said so. My own opinions deviate from Kelsen's in this point, as explained more thoroughly in the aforementioned book.

ARNOLD BRECHT