Journal of the History of Philosophy

Marx and Human Rights GEORGE G. BRENKERT 1. INTRODUCTION A GREATDEALis claimed on behalf of human rights in contemporary philosophy . Human rights, it is said, give a person a basis upon which to stand; they are the ground of human dignity; they constitute the essence of respect for persons.' Crucial to the significance of human rights is the claim that they hold not simply for modern, Western society but for all societies, modern as well as ancient, Western as well as Eastern. Thus, human rights can be used to evaluate the social life and practices of all humans throughout history. Whether Marx did or could accept such a notion of human rights has been of late a matter of considerable dispute. Some hold that Marx criticized inadequate or mistaken conceptions of rights, but still was committed to rights. G. A. Cohen, for instance, maintains that natural rights occupy a place of central importance in revolutionary Marxist belief.' Others, however , deny this. Accordingly, Steven Lukes claims that those Marxists who believe in human rights can only be "... revisionists who have discarded or abandoned those central tenets of the Marxist canon which are incompatible with such a belief.''s ~ See Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (Winter ~97o): 249-55. 2 G. A. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism," New Lrft Review, No. ~26 (March-April ~98i): ~~-12. In this paper I will concentrate simply on human rights (sometimes also referred to by others as moral rights, natural rights, or innate rights) and the question of their relativity or universality. I will thus not consider questions of distributive justice as such, nor will I consider questions of legal rights. The moral or human rights at issue here may be the basis for legal rights, may be linked with distributive justice, and may or may not be the same as the civil and political rights which individuals in modern society claim for themselves. Ziyad I. Husami also appears to attribute to Marx an acceptance of human rights inasmuch as he claims that Marx held a view of equal rights and justice which can be validly applied to any society. See Ziyad I. Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice," Marx, Justice and History, edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanoln (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 198o). 3 Steven Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?," Praxis International, ~ (January, ~98~): 344. [551 56 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 94:~ JANUARY ~98~ In the following, I shall also argue that Marx rejected the notion o human or natural rights. Those rights claimed to be human rights are, h~ held, relative to capitalist society.4 However, in contrast to other recent dis cussions, I believe it is possible to identify a basis for Marx's views on humai rights which explains the relativism Marx attributes to human rights, link.. his views on human rights with his characterization of bourgeois distributiw justice, and indicates the dialectical origin of human rights out of earlie~ forms of society. Though this account of Marx's understanding of huma~ rights enables us to evaluate more accurately than alternative recent discus sions other aspects of his views on human rights, e.g., their egoism, I shal not concentrate on this internal evaluation. Rather, I shall focus on Marx': argument that human rights, as such, do not exist. What have been callec human rights are simply those rights fundamental to capitalist society whict it has proclaimed to be universal. 9. THE CRUCIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF HUMAN RIGHTS Though Marx was aware of at least some of the major issues concerning th~ nature of rights which trouble philosophers today, he says very little abow these topics. Thus, for example, though Marx refers to a wide variety oi rights, e.g., "human rights," "the rights of man," "natural rights," "civi~ rights," "political rights," "legal rights," "abstract rights," "nominal rights,' "existing rights," etc., and occasionally suggests their interrelations, in gen. eral he rarely seeks to subordinate some either conceptually or logically tc others. 5 He mentions various interrelations between rights and duties, bu~ did not concern himself with the nature or acceptability of such correla. tions.~ Finally, even though in...