Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed (ed. Joseph Rouse)

Harvard University Press, 2013, 336 pp, $49.95 (Hardcover), ISBN: 0674072111

  • Published:
Continental Philosophy Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. These include all of Haugeland’s published work that is directly on Heidegger, with the exception of an early paper co-authored with Hubert Dreyfus [“Husserl and Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand,” in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. Michael Murray (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 222–238]. One might also wish to consult Haugeland’s brief review of Frederick Olafson’s Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990): 633–635.

  2. This schematic would further link up “Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger” with the manuscript itself, “Letting Be” and “Death and Dasein” with “Authentic Intentionality,” and the remaining two late essays with “Social Cartesianism.”

  3. “Dasein’s Disclosedness” engages with Donald Davidson’s distinction between mental and physical events; “Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger” tries to show that Robert Brandom gets Heidegger wrong concerning language; “Social Cartesianism” challenges Nelson Goodman’s riddle of induction (how to tell the difference between blue and grue), W.V.O. Quine’s indeterminacy of translation (how to understand ‘Gavagai’), and Saul Kripke’s puzzle from Wittgenstein on private language (how to distinguish the ‘plus’ operation from a ‘quus’ operation); “Authentic Intentionality” picks a fight with Daniel Dennett and various cognitive-scientific accounts of artificial intelligence.

  4. Even if the differences between Wissenschaft as Heidegger was concerned with it and natural science as contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of science means it would have to be articulated.

  5. See Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” Pathmarks (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 247–250/GA 9: 325–328; Contributions to Philosophy/GA 65: §§172, 176, 199.

  6. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trs. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 174–175/GA 40: 172–173.

  7. Contributions to Philosophy 248/GA 65: 313. Cf. Contributions 237/GA 65: 300 (original emphasis): “Da-sein signifies an ‘entity’ itself and not a mode of being in the [usual] sense [like being-present]. Yet it does mean the mode of being in a distinctive and unique case, namely insofar as the mode of being determines the quiddity, the whatness, precisely as who-ness, selfhood. ‘The entity’ at issue, however, is not the ‘human being’, and Da-sein is not simply the human mode of being (still very easily misunderstood in Being and Time). Instead, this entity is Da-sein as the ground of a determinate future being of the human being, not the ground of ‘the’ human being as such. […] Da-sein—the mode of being that is distinctive of humans in their possibility…” See further GA 65: §§193–197; Besinnung, GA 66: §§92–96.

  8. Martin Heidegger, The Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. xxiv, translation modified/GA 71: 5.

  9. In the critical work that follows, I will stick almost exclusively to those texts of Heidegger’s addressed by Haugeland: Sein und Zeit (GA 2), Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26), Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (GA 29/30).

  10. Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. Michael Heim (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 169/GA 26: 217. Cf. other uses of Dasein as a count noun: SZ 240, 336; GA 29/30: 229.

  11. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 208, tm/GA 24: 296.

  12. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trs. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1962), p. 32/Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), p. 11.

  13. BT 408, 444/SZ 357, 392.

  14. BT 209-10/SZ 166.

  15. Haugeland traces out a whole series of such parallels: the with-world (Mitwelt) to the surrounding world (Umwelt), being-with (Mitsein) to being-amidst (Sein bei), circumspection (Umsicht) to considerateness or indulgence (Rücksicht, Nachsicht), and solicitude or caringness (Fürsorge) to concern or carefulness (Besorgen).

  16. See, e.g., Metaphysical Foundations, p. 168/GA 26:216, where “an actually existing human” is in apposition to “a factually existing Dasein.”

  17. For Dasein as the being of the human being, see (e.g.) GA 29/30: 95; for uses of the locution ‘Dasein in us’ or ‘in me,’ see GA 29/30: 215, 216, 227, 395, 410; for Dasein as both ontic and ontological, see BT/SZ §§3–5. In an especially confusing passage for this account, Heidegger claims to be trying to “liberate the humanity of man, i.e., the essence of man, to let the Dasein in him become essential.” Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trs. Will McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 166/GA 29/30: 248.

  18. BT 168, tm/SZ 130; quoted by Haugeland, p. 134.

  19. BT 303, tm/SZ 259.

  20. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 (zōon logon ekhon) and Politics 1.2 (zōon politikon).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

    William Britt

Authors
  1. William Britt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William Britt.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Britt, W. John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed (ed. Joseph Rouse). Cont Philos Rev 47, 465–472 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9299-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9299-8

Search

Navigation