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Brigandt, I. Daniel S. Brooks, James DiFrisco, and William C. Wimsatt (Eds.): Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences. J Gen Philos Sci 54, 353–356 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09632-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09632-3