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Leibniz's Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods GREGORY BROWN 1. AN APPARENT TENSION IN LEIBNIZ'S THEODICY A'r TH~ODICYw (G 6:244 = T 26o)? Leibniz wrote: "I believe.., that God can follow a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that the best and the most regular is always opportune [commode] for all creatures simultaneously ." But in his Remarques sur le livre de l'origine du real, he said: "God resolved to create a world, but he was bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world as should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity, virtue, happiness" (G 6:426 = T 431). Reflection upon these passages has provoked Catherine Wilson to remark, in a symposium paper, that "the only way in which this statement [i.e., the one from Theodicy w quoted above] can be reconciled with [Leibniz's] claim that God chooses to create the world that contains the most order, regularity, virtue, and happiI employ the following abbreviations: A = Leibniz: SiimtlicheSchriften und Briefe, Academy edition (Darmstadt and Berlin, 1923- ); C = Opusculesetfragments in(dits de Leibniz, edited by L. Couturat (Paris, 19o3); DM = Discourseon Metaphysics (cited by section); G = Die philosophischen Schriflen yon G. W. Leibniz, edited by C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-189o); Grua = G. W. Leibniz: Textesin(dits, 2 vols., edited by Gaston Grua (Paris, 1948); GW = BriefwechselwischenLeibniz und Christian Wolf, edited by C. I. Gerhardt (Halle, 186o); L = Leibniz: PhilosophicalPapers and Letters, edited and translated by L. E. Loemker, 2d ed. (Dordrecht, 1969); LA = The LeibnizArnauld Correspondence,edited and translated by H. G. Alexander (New York, 1967); LMP = John Hostler, Leibniz's Moral Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1975); MP = Leibniz: PhilosophicalWritings , edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, translated by Mary Morris (London, 1973); NE = New Essayson Human Understanding, edited and translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (New York, ]981); PNG = The Principles of Nature and of Grace, based on Reason (cited by section); R = The Political Writings ofLeibniz, edited and translated by Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); T = Theodicy(cited by section), edited by Austin Farrer and translated by E. M. Huggard (1951; rpt. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985). Where the translation of quoted" material is not my own, the source of the translation is cited in the notes. However, when I thought they were required, I have made minor changesin translations without notice. If there is no English translation cited in the note to a quoted passage, the translation is wholly my own. [57 a] 579 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:4 OCTOBER 1988 ness possible is by assuming that happiness and virtue are subordinate to order and regularity. The latter may be maximized only relatively to the former. TM Wilson's argument can be expanded as follows: At Theodicy w 11, Leibniz appears to have conceded the existence of a conflict between the regularity that a world might exhibit and the happiness of the creatures that it might contain; and this, in turn, seems to entail that for Leibniz regularity and happiness cannot be maximized in the same world. The passage at Theodicy w also suggests that the best world, which God chose, is one in which regularity is maximized. The upshot of Theodicy w then, would seem to be that the actual world is a world in which regularity, but not happiness, is maximized. But in his Remarques, Leibniz appears to have adopted the position that what I shall call "aesthetic good" (i.e., order and regularity), on the one hand, and what Leibniz called "physical" and "moral good" (i.e., happiness and virtue, respectively),~ on the other, could both be maximized in a single world. Thus Wilson decides that the best one can offer Leibniz, if contradiction is to be avoided, is a world in which aesthetic good is at an absolute maximum, but moral and physical good are at a maximum only in comparison to the moral and physical good that can be found in other maximally aesthetic worlds. (This, of course, leaves it open that there should be possible worlds in which there is more physical and moral good...

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