Abstract
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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Notes
One way to sharpen this concern would be to point out that everything Sosa says in defence of his claim that we can distinguish being awake from dreaming, can be applied regardless of the frequency of dreaming. For instance, see the example of Rip the Dreamer (Ichikawa 2007:522).
References
Ichikawa, J. (2007). Scepticism and the imagination model of dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 519–527.
Kornblith, H. (Forthcoming). Sosa in perspective. Philosophical Studies.
Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. Journal of Philosophy, XCIV(8), 410–430.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgement
Thanks for useful comments and discussion from Jonathan Ichikawa, Duncan Pritchard, Jason Stanley, as well as colleagues at St Andrews, especially Martin Smith, Elia Zardini, Crispin Wright.
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Brown, J. Sosa on scepticism. Philos Stud 143, 397–405 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9342-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9342-5