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Notes
See Vogel (2000, pp 602–623). Vogel generously attributes independent launching of the bootstrapping problem to Fumerton (1995). But to my mind, it is unclear whether the epistemic phenomenon Fumerton discusses there---a sort of circularity seemingly present in “track record” reasoning---is the same phenomenon found in bootstrapping reasoning.
See Cohen (2002, pp. 309–329).
See Vogel ( 2008 , pp. 518–539).
We cannot set up the example in such a way that Roxanne writes down the second conjunct just because it feels good, say. For then the reliability of the gauge would be irrelevant, and Roxanne would not be employing a reliable belief-forming process in writing down the second conjunct.
The inferential belief-forming process of conjunction-introduction is conditionally reliable.
Vogel does not explain how Roxanne arrives at (4), but IBE is what is typically proposed in the subsequent literature.
It is important to note that bootstrapping is a phenomenon that involves reasoning as a psychological process. There could be a reasoner who writes down the same sentences as does Roxanne and yet she would not be a bootstrapper because her second conjuncts are supported by dipstick-checking or by consultation with a Devil mechanic. In her case, her belief in her conclusion about the gauge’s reliability could well amount to genuine reliability-knowledge, unlike Roxanne’s belief about her conclusion. In short, you cannot spot a bootstrapper just by looking at the sentences she accepts. Similarly, you cannot spot a problematic track record reasoner just by looking at the sentences he accepts. For it could be that his reasoning does not rely upon an assumption that the belief source whose reliability is at issue is in fact reliable. He might well be appealing to some other reasons for his premises that have nothing to do with the reliability of the pertinent belief source.
Vogel discusses an instance of the template which I will describe briefly below.
Roxanne II is my invention, just to make a parallel with the original bootstrapper in “Reliabilism leveled”.
See Vogel (2008, p. 530).
In his discussion of bootstrapping about memory in Vogel (2008), the reader can infer that the pertinent epistemic rule is something like ‘if you have a seeming memorial experience of having done X, then you are justified in believing that you have done X’. See Section IV of that article.
See, e.g., Cohen’s discussion of a principle along the lines of ‘if something looks red to you, then you are prima facie justified in believing that the thing is red’. Cohen’s critique of EI bootstrapping in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge” centers around this principle.
I say ‘the (F)-conclusion’ because there can be many different instances of the template having different conclusions regarding the reliability of different epistemic rules.
See p. 531; emphasis added for reasons to be explained later. Compare NRC with Fumerton’s dictum: “You cannot use perception to justify the reliability of perception! You cannot use memory to justify the reliability of memory! You cannot use induction to justify the reliability of induction! Such responses to the skeptic’s concerns involve blatant, even pathetic, circularity”. See Fumerton (1995, p. 177).
Thanks to Andrew Jewell here. See Cohen (2010) for a related take on this problem for Vogel.
See Vogel (2008, pp. 528–529).
Thanks here to Claudio de Almeida. Stewart Cohen raised the following question: If the reliabilist attempts to avoid bootstrapping in the suggested manner, then he cannot reasonably claim to know that perception is reliable, in the absence of appealing to some sort of a priori guarantee, since he would need to use perception in making good such a claim. It seems to me, however, that Vogel is in the same boat: how can the internalist claim to know his epistemic rules are reliable without using them to make good that claim?
References
Cohen, S. (2002). Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXV, 309–329.
Cohen, S. (2010). Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification. Philosphical Perspectives, 24, 141–159.
Fumerton, R. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Vogel, J. (2000). Reliabilism leveled. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 602–623.
Vogel, J. (2008). Epistemic bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 518–539.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the members of graduate seminars at UCSB, UCLA, and Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre, Brazil. I would like to thank especially Claudio de Almeida, Katia Etcheverria, Luis Rosa, Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues, Lucas Rodrigues, and Rafael Mello.
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Brueckner, A. Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity. Philos Stud 164, 591–597 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9