Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Game Theory in Philosophy

  • Published:
Topoi Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence (prisoner’s dilemma), liberalism and efficiency (Nash equilibrium), Hume’s concept of convention (correlated equilibrium), morality and rationality (bargaining games), and distributive justice and egalitarianism (evolutionary game theory). A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • J. Alexander (2000) ArticleTitle‘Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice’ Philosophy of Science 67 490–516 10.1086/392792 Occurrence Handle10.1086/392792

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • A. Alexandra (1992) ArticleTitle‘Should Hobbes’s State of Nature Be Represented as a Prisoner’s Dilemma’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 92 1–16 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb01712.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • N. Anbarci (2001) ArticleTitle‘Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited’ Theory and Decision 50 295–304 10.1023/A:1010363409312 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1010363409312

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L. Apostel (1960) ArticleTitle‘Game Theory and the Interpretation of Deontic Logic’ Logique et Analyse 3 70–90

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation Basic Books New York, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Benthem Particlevan (2001) ArticleTitle‘Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic’ Bulletin of Economic Research 53 219–248 10.1111/1467-8586.00133 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8586.00133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • K. Binmore (1992) Fun and Games D. C. Heath and Company Lexington

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Blais (1987) ArticleTitle‘Epistemic Tit for Tat’ Journal of Philosophy 84 363–375 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2026823

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • M. Blais (1990) ArticleTitle‘Misunderstandings of Epistemic Tit for Tat: Reply to John Woods’ Journal of Philosophy 87 369–374 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2026675

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • T. Bracanovic (2003) ArticleTitle‘The Referee’s Dilemma: The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory’ Prolegomena 1 55–74

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Braithwaite (1963) Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • S. Brams A. Taylor (1994) ArticleTitle‘Divide the Dollar: Three Solutions and Extensions’ Theory and Decision 37 211–231 10.1007/BF01079266 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01079266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Bruin B. (2004), ‘Explaining Games: On the Logic of Game Theoretic Explanations’, Diss. (University of Amsterdam).

  • H. Brock (1979) ArticleTitle‘A Game Theoretic Account of Social Justice’ Theory and Decision 11 239–265 10.1007/BF00126380 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00126380

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L. Carlson (1994) ArticleTitle‘Logic for Dialogue Games’ Synthese 99 377–415 10.1007/BF01063995 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01063995

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • W. Charron (1980) ArticleTitle‘Convention, Games of Strategy, and Hume’s Philosophy of Law and Government’ American Philosophical Quarterly 17 327–334

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Cudd (1993) ArticleTitle‘Game Theory and the History of Ideas about Rationality: An Introductory Survey’ Economics and Philosophy 9 101–134 Occurrence Handle10.1017/S0266267100005137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. D’Arms R. Batterman K. Gorny (1998) ArticleTitle‘Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice’ Philosophy of Science 65 76–102 10.1086/392627 Occurrence Handle10.1086/392627

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. Deb P. Pattanaik L. Razzolini (1997) ArticleTitle‘Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes’ Journal of Economic Theory 72 74–95 10.1006/jeth.1996.2201 Occurrence Handle10.1006/jeth.1996.2201

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • G. Dodds (2002) ArticleTitle‘Why We Can’t All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes’s State of Nature’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 345–374 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01906.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • K. Dowding (2004) ArticleTitle‘Social Choice and the Grammar of Rights and Freedoms’ Political Studies 52 144–161 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00469.x Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00469.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Feibleman (1976) Adaptive Knowing: Epistemology from a Realist Standpoint Martinus Nijhoff The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Franssen (1994) ArticleTitle‘Constrained Maximization Reconsidered: An Elaboration and Critique of Gauthier’s Modelling of Rational Cooperation in a Single Prisoner’s Dilemma’ Synthese 101 249–272 10.1007/BF01064019 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01064019

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • P. Gärdenfors (1981) ArticleTitle‘Rights, Games and Social Choice’ Noûs 81 341–356 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2215437

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Gauthier (1967) ArticleTitle‘Morality and Advantage’ Philosophical Review 76 460–475 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2183283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Gauthier (1974) ArticleTitle‘Rational Cooperation’ Noûs 8 53–65 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2214645

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Gauthier (1986) Morals by Agreement Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Gauthier R. Sugden (Eds) (1993) Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes from Morals by Agreement Harvester Wheatsheaf New York, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Goodin G. Brennan (2001) ArticleTitle‘Bargaining over Beliefs’ Ethics 111 256–277 10.1086/233473 Occurrence Handle10.1086/233473

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Hardwig (1987) ArticleTitle‘Epistemic Dependence’ Journal of Philosophy 82 335–349 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2026523

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Hardwig (1991) ArticleTitle‘The Role of Trust in Knowledge’ Journal of Philosophy 88 693–708 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2027007

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B. Harrenstein (2004) ArticleTitle‘Logical Consequence and the Theory of Games’ Philosophia Scientiæ 8 179–193

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Harsanyi (1979) ArticleTitle‘Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior’ Theory and Decision 12 115–133 10.1007/BF00154357 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00154357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • G. den Hartogh (2002) Mutual Expectations: A Conventionalist Theory of Law Kluwer Law International The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Heath (1998) ArticleTitle‘Mandeville’s Bewitching Engine of Praise’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 205–226

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Hees Particlevan (1996) ArticleTitle‘A Game-Theoretic Logic of Norms and Actions’ Logique et Analyse 39 229–241

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Hees Particlevan (1999) ArticleTitle‘Liberalism, Efficiency, and Stability: Some Possibility Results’ Journal of Economic Theory 88 294–309 10.1006/jeth.1999.2602 Occurrence Handle10.1006/jeth.1999.2602

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • M. Hees Particlevan (2000) Legal Reductionism and Freedom Springer Netherlands Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Hegselmann (1994) ArticleTitle‘Humboldt’s Argument against the Welfare State: A Reconstruction in Terms of Game Theory’ Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 2 229–243

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Hollis R. Sugden (1993) ArticleTitle‘Rationality in Action’ Mind 102 1–35 Occurrence Handle10.1093/mind/102.405.1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • K. Jaegher Particlede (2003) ArticleTitle‘A Game-Theoretic Rationale for Vagueness’ Linguistics and Philosophy 26 637–657 10.1023/A:1025853728992 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1025853728992

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Kern (1969) ArticleTitle‘The Reality Game’ Tulane Studies in Philosophy 23 71–84

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Kusch (2004) Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Lewis (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study Harvard University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Luce H. Raiffa (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Mackie (1973) ArticleTitle‘The Disutility of Act-Utilitarianism’ Philosophical Quarterly 23 289–300 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2218058

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L. Marinoff (1994) ArticleTitle‘Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Highway Robbery and Game Theory’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 445–462 Occurrence Handle10.1080/00048409412346251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Neumann Particlevon O. Morgenstern (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior Princeton University Press Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Nolfi (1969) ArticleTitle‘Strategische Spiele’ Dialectica 23 7–23 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.1746-8361.1969.tb01174.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • M. Osborne A. Rubinstein (1994) A Course in Game Theory The MIT Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Parikh (2000) ArticleTitle‘Communication, Meaning, and Interpretation’ Linguistics and Philosophy 23 185–212 10.1023/A:1005513919392 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005513919392

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • P. Pattanaik (1996) ArticleTitle‘The Liberal Paradox: Some Interpretations When Rights Are Represented As Game Forms’ Analyse & Kritik 18 38–53

    Google Scholar 

  • M. Pauly (2001) ArticleTitle‘A Logical Framework for Coalitional Effectivity in Dynamic Procedures’ Bulletin of Economic Research 53 305–324 10.1111/1467-8586.00136 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8586.00136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • A.-V. Pietarinen (2003) ArticleTitle‘Games as Formal Tools versus Games as Explanations in Logic and Science’ Foundations of Science 8 317–364 10.1023/A:1026319711838 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1026319711838

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • M. Resnik (1987) Choices University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Robins M. (1970). ‘The Fact-Value Dichotomy: A Theory of Games Analysis’, Ph.D. thesis (Northwestern University).

  • R. Rooy Particlevan (2004) ArticleTitle‘Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles’ Synthese 139 331–366 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024904.37199.6c Occurrence Handle10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024904.37199.6c

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • A. Rubinstein (2000) Economics and Language: Five Essays Cambridge University Press Cambridge Occurrence Handle10.1017/CBO9780511492358

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • D. Sally (2002) ArticleTitle“‘What an Ugly Baby!”: Risk Dominance, Sympathy, and the Coordination of Meaning’ Rationality and Society 14 78–108 Occurrence Handle10.1177/1043463102014001004

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • W. Schuhmacher (1970) ArticleTitle“Colonel Glotto’ oder sprachlicher Konflikt als strategisches Spiel’ Grundlagenstudien aus Kybernetik und Geisteswissenschaft 11 103–105

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Sen (1970) ArticleTitle‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’ Journal of Political Economy 78 152–157 10.1086/259614 Occurrence Handle10.1086/259614

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B. Skyrms (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • B. Skyrms (2000) ArticleTitle‘Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models’ Philosophy of Science 67 94–113 10.1086/392763 Occurrence Handle10.1086/392763

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B. Skyrms (2001) ArticleTitle‘The Stag Hunt’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 31–41 Occurrence Handle10.2307/3218711

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Smart (1961) An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics Melbourne University Press Melbourne

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Sober (1998) ArticleTitle‘To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory’ Synthese 115 355–373 10.1023/A:1005012607804 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005012607804

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. Sugden (1991) ArticleTitle‘Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy’ Economic Journal 101 751–785 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2233854

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. Tuomela (1992) ArticleTitle‘On the Structural Aspects of Collective Action and Free Riding’ Theory and Decision 32 165–202 10.1007/BF00134050 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00134050

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • E. Ullmann-Margalit (1977) The Emergence of Norms Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Vanderschraaf (1995) ArticleTitle‘Convention as Correlated Equilibrium’ Erkenntnis 42 65–87 10.1007/BF01666812 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF01666812

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • P. Vanderschraaf (1998) ArticleTitle‘Knowledge, Equilibrium and Convention’ Erkenntnis 49 337–369 10.1023/A:1005461514200 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005461514200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • P. Vanderschraaf (1999) ArticleTitle‘Hume’s Game-Theoretic Business Ethics’ Business Ethics Quarterly 9 47–67 Occurrence Handle10.2307/3857635

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • F. Vega-Redondo (1996) Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour Oxford University Press Oxford Occurrence Handle10.1093/0198774729.001.0001

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • B. Verbeek (2002) ArticleTitle‘Game Theory and Moral Norms: An Overview and an Application’ Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 337–352

    Google Scholar 

  • Verbeek, B., Morris, C.: 2004, ‘Game Theory and Ethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(published online 16 Oct. 2004), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/game-ethics>, accessed 27 Jan. 2005.

  • J. Weibull (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory The MIT Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • S. Woodcock J. Heath (2002) ArticleTitle‘The Robustness of Altruism as an Evolutionary Strategy’ Biology and Philosophy 17 567–590 10.1023/A:1020598804674 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1020598804674

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Woods (1989) ArticleTitle‘The Maladroitness of Epistemic Tit for Tat’ Journal of Philosophy 86 324–331 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2027125

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • E. Zachary (2001) ArticleTitle‘Explaining the Social Contract’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 1–24 10.1093/bjps/52.1.1 Occurrence Handle10.1093/bjps/52.1.1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Zamora Bonilla (1999) ArticleTitle‘The Elementary Economics of Scientific Consensus’ Theoria 14 416–488

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9714, DX, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Boudewijn de Bruin

Authors
  1. Boudewijn de Bruin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Boudewijn de Bruin.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bruin, B. Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24, 197–208 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-005-5055-3

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-005-5055-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation