Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-09T04:32:46.438Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

La conception du raisonnement de John Broome: «Que nous exprimons-nous lorsque nous raisonnons?»

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Josée Brunet
Josée Brunet
Affiliation:
Institut de technologie agroalimentaire, campus de St-Hyacinthe
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article offers a critical analysis of John Broome's conception of practical reasoning. I first introduce his main claims and then point out some of the difficulties raised by the notion of “double expression” and by some aspects of the cognitivism which he explicitly endorses. I then emphasize two consequences of these criticisms: one concerning the link he sees between belief and intention, and the other concerning the idea that our practical reasonings are inextricably linked to our theoretical reasonings. Finally, I argue that the problem Broome seems to be facing has its source in the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between reasoning (a relation between mental states) and the description of its content (a relation between propositions).

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 3-4 , Summer-Fall 2008 , pp. 633 - 662
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Bonjour, L. et Sosa, E. 2003 Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Maiden, MA, Blackwell.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1999 «Normative Requirements», Ratio, vol. 12, p. 398–419.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2000 «Instrumental Reasoning», dans J. Nida-Rumelin et W. Spohn, dir., Rationality, Rules, and Structure, Dordrecht, Kluwer, p. 195–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2001a «Normative Practical Reasoning», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. supp. 75, p. 175–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2001b «Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?», dans C. Morris et A. Ripstein, dir., Practical Rationality and Preference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 98–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2002 «Practical Reasoning», dans J. L. Bermudez et A. Millar, dir., Reason and Nature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 85–111.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2004 «Reasons», dans R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler et M. Smith, dir., Reason and Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 28–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2005a «Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz», Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2005b «Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?», Philosophical Issues, vol. 15, p. 321–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2007a «Is Rationality Normative?», Disputatio, vol. 2, no 23, p. 161–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2007b «Wide Scope or Narrow Scope», Mind, vol. 116, p. 359–370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kolodny, N. 2005 «Why Be Rational?», Mind, vol. 114, p. 509–563.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. 1949 La notion d'esprit. Pour une critique des concepts mentaux, Paris, Payot [1978].Google Scholar