Predictivism and the periodic table

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.007

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volume 38, Issue 1, March 2007, Pages 256-259

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.007 Get rights and content

Abstract

This is a comment on the paper by Barnes (2005) and the responses from Scerri (2005) and Worrall (2005), debating the thesis (‘predictivism’) that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law (Brush, 1996) to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers of science employ, rather I describe how scientists themselves use facts and predictions to support their theories. I find wide variations, and no support for the assumption that scientists use a single ‘Scientific Method’ in deciding whether to accept a proposed new theory.

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Cited by (13)

Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus
2017, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
This article is about structural realism, historical continuity, laws of nature, and ceteris paribus clauses. Fresnel's Laws of optics support Structural Realism because they are a scientific structure that has survived theory change. However, the history of Fresnel's Laws which has been depicted in debates over realism since the 1980s is badly distorted. Specifically, claims that J. C. Maxwell or his followers believed in an ontologically-subsistent electromagnetic field, and gave up the aether, before Einstein's annus mirabilis in 1905 are indefensible. Related claims that Maxwell himself did not believe in a luminiferous aether are also indefensible. This paper corrects the record. In order to trace Fresnel's Laws across significant ontological changes, they must be followed past Einstein into modern physics and nonlinear optics. I develop the philosophical implications of a more accurate history, and analyze Fresnel's Laws' historical trajectory in terms of dynamic ceteris paribus clauses. Structuralists have not embraced ceteris paribus laws, but they continue to point to Fresnel's Laws to resist anti-realist arguments from theory change. Fresnel's Laws fit the standard definition of a ceteris paribus law as a law applicable only in particular circumstances. Realists who appeal to the historical continuity of Fresnel's Laws to combat anti-realists must incorporate ceteris paribus laws into their metaphysics.
State of the Field: Why novel prediction matters
2013, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
There is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the field on this question, noting both fully articulated views such as weak and strong predictivism, and more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for the instrumental value of prediction. By examining the various reasons offered for the value of prediction across a range of inferential contexts (including inferences from data to phenomena, from phenomena to theory, and from theory to framework), we can see that neither weak nor strong predictivism captures all of the reasons for valuing prediction available. A third path is presented, Pluralist Instrumental Predictivism; PIP for short.
Mendeleev and the periodic table: A response to Scerri
2013, Educacion Quimica
Citation Excerpt :
According to Scerri: “The article by Scerri and Worrall argues that Brush should not draw back from even applying his view to the acceptance of the periodic table” (p. 11). Actually, Brush (2007) has not drawn back and stated clearly: “Having found little evidence for predictivism in physics, I did find it in chemistry, in particular in the case of Mendeleev’s periodic law” (p. 257). So what is the argument!
This is a response to some of the issues raised by Scerri, “Some comments on the views of Niaz, Rodríguez and Brito (2004) on Mendeleev’s periodic system”. We thank the Editor, Dr. Andoni Garritz, for inviting us to write this response. However, due to limited space in the journal I shall restrict myself to responding to only the important issues. In order to help the reader I have maintained the same section headings as those of Scerri.
Use-novel predictions and Mendeleev's periodic table: response to Scerri and Worrall (2001)
2008, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. (2001). Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.
Values and periodicity: Mendeleev's reception of the equations of Mills, Chicherin, and Vincent
2019, Centaurus
The Periodic-Table—A Universal Icon: Its Birth 150 Years Ago, and Its Popularization Through Literature Art and Music
2019, Angewandte Chemie - International Edition

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DiscussionPredictivism and the periodic table

Abstract

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Prediction and the periodic table: A response to Scerri and Worrall

Journal for General Philosophy of Science

The prospect for intelligence

Yale Review

The reception of Mendeleev’s periodic law in America and Britain

Isis

Discussion
Predictivism and the periodic table