Abstract
Recent work in republican political theory has identified various forms of domination in the structures and relations of capitalist societies. A notable absence in much of this work is the concept of exploitation, which is generally treated as a predictable outcome of certain kinds of domination. This paper argues that the concept of exploitation can instead be conceived as a form of structural domination, understood in republican terms, and that adopting this conception has important implications for republican attempts to theorize modern capitalist societies. Building on existing domination accounts of exploitation, we argue that exploitation is a form of structurally constituted domination that enables a systemic illegitimate extraction of value. However, in contrast to competing accounts, domination is understood here in the republican terms of subjection to arbitrary power. We show that conceiving of domination in these terms not only makes the concept easily accessible from within a republican framework, but has advantages over competing accounts. Our argument also demonstrates why using the concept of exploitation will be useful for republican theorists. We show that a polity based on exploitative relations of production is antithetical to key republican commitments. These asymmetric power relationships undermine the economic and political independence of citizens and, crucially, constrain the political and economic ends that a polity will be effectively able to pursue. As such, exploitation should be a central preoccupation of republican political economy.
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Notes
See also Taylor (2013, p. 596).
We do not use this definition substantively. We merely use it as a placeholder to facilitate the exposition of the different theories that fill in the terms in normatively different ways.
For a literature review on exploitation see Vrousalis (2018).
See Weirtheimer’s (1996) discussion of ‘transaction-specific fairness’.
This example is offered by Vrousalis (2013).
This is an especially influential critique among Marxists. That said, this critique remains important for all theorists that hold that capitalist production necessarily involves exploitative relations. For a defence of the luck egalitarian view see Warren (2017).
For example, Vrousalis (2013, p. 150) offers the following example in support of this point: ‘Grasshopper spends the summer months singing, whereas Ant spends all his time working. When the winter comes, Grasshopper needs shelter, which she presently lacks. Ant has three options: she can do nothing to help Grasshopper, she can offer her costless shelter, or she can provide the same shelter on the condition that she signs a sweatshop contract’.
This example is problematic as it seems to allow that any time a person can be said to act for a reason other than ‘because they told me to’, we might have to say they are not dominated in the relevant sense. Our exploitation theory avoids this problem because it is based on a republican account of domination. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point.
Vrousalis (2020) describes the neo-Aristotelian account of domination as follows: ‘Neo-Aristotelians object not to the existence of arbitrary power, as such, but rather to the nature of the action that power facilitates. Suppose A has power over B and is disposed to use it. These are two power facts. Most social relations involve power facts: a doctor has power over her patient, a teacher over the student, a coach over an athlete, and so on. When things go well, the motivations of the patient (in taking the medicine), of the student (in reading the book), and of the athlete (in running the marathon) do not reflect the power facts. That is, these actions are performed for the sake of values independent of the respective dispositions of powerful doctors, teachers, and coaches’.
One might argue that this is not an important difference as the account will work in the same way regardless of which domination theory one uses. We do not have the space to argue in length for a republican account of domination. Yet, as the doctor example illustrates, the republican theory of domination that deals with tracked interests rather than power facts and reasons for acting avoids the problems associated with neo-Aristotelean account of domination.
Pettit (1997, pp. 52–53).
Note the similarity to the standard psychological components of domination often highlighted by Pettit (1997, p. 5).
Note that the interest that workers hold in being able to produce without selling their labour to a capitalist is a ‘common avowable interest’ of the kind which institutions should aim to promote. In contrast, the interest that capitalists have in being able to exploit workers is not a ‘common’ interest as it is not one which can be held by all citizens by virtue of their joint membership of a political community (Pettit 1997, pp. 198–199).
For a historical discussion of this facet of domination with specific focus on patriarchal domination, see Coffee (2012).
Note that this will be true for any account of exploitation.
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Bryan, A., Kouris, I. Should Republicans be Interested in Exploitation?. Res Publica 28, 513–530 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09542-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09542-z