Stromdichtung and subjectivity in the later Heidegger

Abstract

A not uncommon way to mark both the development of Heidegger’s thought and the distinction between the so-called “early” and “later” Heidegger is to focus on his philosophy of the subject. A frequently expressed view of Heidegger is that while Sein und Zeit offers a profound critique of the Cartesian subject, the existential analysis of Dasein still remains within the bounds of a traditional or “modern” view of the subject. This latent, modern view of the subject is said not only to be detectable within the language of “authenticity” and “resoluteness, “ but also to rise to an unfortunate climax in the Rektoratsrede of 1933. Heidegger’s subsequent “turn” (Kehre) is hence linked to a dramatic self-realization about the “subjectivist” nature of his early work and an effort to expunge this latent philosophy of the subject from his later thought. This particular reading of Heidegger, already present in the literature of the late 1940’s, became rather canonical, or at least, it became the passively understood framework from which to understand the development of Heidegger’s thought. Indeed, after William Richardson’s highly influential study of Heidegger, this reading not only became the way to grasp the distinction between what Richardson named “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II, “ but as is implied by the title of his book—Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought ¹—phenomenology itself is identified with a subjectivist perspective.