Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Surviving resurrection

  • Published:
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Baker L. (1995). Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist?. Faith and Philosophy 12: 489–504

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2001a). Materialism with a human face. In: Corcoran, K. (eds) Soul, body and survival: Essays on the metaphysics of human persons, pp 159–180. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2001b). Material persons and the doctrine of resurrection. Faith and Philosophy 18: 151–167

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2002). The ontological status of persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 370–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2004a). Christians should reject mind-body dualism. In: Peterson, M. and VanArragon, R. (eds) Contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, pp 327–338. Blackwell, Malden, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2004b). Reply to Zimmerman. In: Peterson, M. and VanArragon, R. (eds) Contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, pp 341–343. Blackwell, Malden, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker L. (2007). Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies 43: 333–348

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, L. (2008). Big-tent metaphysics. Abstracta (Special Issue 1), 8–15

  • Baron-Cohen S. and Wheelwright S. (2004). The empathy quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger Syndrome or High Functioning Autism and normal sex differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 34: 163–175

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corcoran K. (2001). Physical persons and postmortem survival without temporal gaps. In: Corcoran, K. (eds) Soul, body and survival: Essays on the metaphysics of human persons, pp 201–217. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Damasio A. and Maurer M. (1978). A neurological model for childhood autism. Archives in Neurology 35: 777–786

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. (1988). The importance of what we care about. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 80–94). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Frankfurt, H. (1999). On caring. In Necessity, volition, and love (pp. 155–80). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Grossberg S. and Seidman D. (2006). Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, emotional and timing substrates. Psychological Review 113: 483–525

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennett J. (2002). Autism, empathy and moral agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 340–357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGeer V. (2004). Autistic self-awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11: 235–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Minshew N., Goldstein G. and Siegel D. (1995). Speech and language in high-functioning autistic individuals. Neuropsychology 9: 255–261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy N. (2006). Bodies and souls, or spirited bodies?. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson E. (1997). The human animal. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D. (1971). Personal identity. The Philosophical Review 80: 3–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russo N., Flanagan T., Iarocci G., Berringer D., Zelazo P. and Burack J. (2007). Deconstructing executive deficits among persons with autism: Implications for cognitive neuroscience. Brain and Cognition 65: 77–86

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sigelman C. K. and Rider E. A. (2006). Life-span human development. Thomas Wadsworth, Belmont, CA

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen P. (1978). The possibility of resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9: 114–121

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Velleman J. D. (1996). Self to self. The Philosophical Review 105: 39–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, NY, 2601, USA

    Andrei A. Buckareff

  2. John. C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ, 07079, USA

    Joel S. Van Wagenen

Authors
  1. Andrei A. Buckareff
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Joel S. Van Wagenen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrei A. Buckareff.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Buckareff, A.A., Van Wagenen, J.S. Surviving resurrection. Int J Philos Relig 67, 123–139 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation