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Interpretation and Improvisation: The Judge and the Musician Between Text and Context

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Abstract

This paper analyses the paradigms of interpretation and the evolution of the creative processes in music and law. Whether it is matter of a score or a law, the text is reborn through the work of the interpreter who, in dealing with the epistemological problem of the understanding, has to harmonize the purity of the philological reconstruction of the object with the need to actualize its sense. Moving from the creative character of every interpretation—neither the musician can be reduced to a mere executor of a concatenation of musical symbols on the staff as Stravinsky wanted nor the judge may be conceived as a bouche de la loi according to Montesquieu’s theory—this work, after having discussed Gadamer and Betti’s hermeneutical approaches to music and law, focuses on the issue of the limits to the interpreters’ freedom. The interpretation here proposed revolves around improvisation, seen as a typical cultural practice of the aesthetic dimension of music. Improvisation, which from baroque to jazz does not correspond to the realm of absolute freedom, is used as a trait d’union in order to make a comparison with legal experience. This is particularly true with the development of case law, which becomes increasingly problematic especially in the light of “liquid modernity”, where the “polytheism of values” has been gaining strength. Seen from this perspective, the comparison between the judge and the musician in their activity as interpreters of a formalized system of signs highlights the controversial relationship between form and creativity, the accuracy of the text and the requisites deriving from the social context, certainty and justice.

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Notes

  1. See Plato [96: 245].

  2. See Aristotle [7: 920a]. Hobbes [70: 114] highlights this aspect by arguing that “in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the Lawes were many times put into verse, that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might more easily retain them in memory”.

  3. “Science of well-regulated movement”: this is the renowned definition of Augustine’s “De Musica” [2: 90], one of the most important musical treatises from Late Antiquity. Even Isidoro of Seville, three centuries after Hipponax, referring to the concept of “modulation”, defines music as “peritia modulationis sono cantuque”. See Randel, Nadeau [103: 340].

  4. The Roman Philosopher, in his well-known work De Istitutione Musica, pulling together the essential strands of ancient Greek musical theory, describes music as a powerful pedagogic tool and sets forth a threefold classification of the types of music: musica mundana, connected to Pythagoras’ “Music of the Spheres” and concerned with the proportions in the movements of celestial bodies, the alternation of seasons and the combinations of elements; musica humana, a metaphor of the harmonious union of the soul with the body that leads to harmonizing the rational and the irrational in the human being; musica instrumentalis, associated with audible music in general, including vocal music. See Boethius [26].

  5. Dante Alighieri [39: 88]. Original version: “ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportio, que servata hominum servat sotietatem, et corrupta corrumpit”. See Quaglioni [100: 27–46].

  6. This topic has been studied by Häberle [66]. Häberle [67] also sees interesting analogies between the preamble of constitutions and the overtures from operas.

  7. See Weber [117].

  8. Canetti [31: 394–396]: “There is no more obvious expression of power than the performance of a conductor. Every detail of his public behaviour throws light on the nature of power […] His eyes hold the whole orchestra. Every player feels that the conductor sees him personally, and, still more hears him. The voices of the instruments are opinions and convictions on which he keeps a close watch. He is omniscient, for, while the players have only their own parts in front of them, he has the whole score in his head, or on his desk. At any given moment he knows precisely what each player should be doing. His attention is everywhere at once, and it is to this that he owes a large part of his authority. He is inside the mind of every player. He knows not only what each should be doing, but also what he is doing. He is the living embodiment of law, both positive and negative. His hands decree and prohibit. His ears search out profanation”.

  9. See Balkin, Levinson [12].

  10. See Gouhier [58].

  11. On this subject, see the well-argued analysis by Picozza [92] who, starting from the study of the metronome, offers a comparison between musical and legal interpretation.

  12. See Nitrato Izzo [83: 99–127]; Picozza [93: 73–120].

  13. See Stravinsky [111: 119–142].

  14. Montesquieu [81: 268]: “Les juges de la nation ne sont […] que la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi; des êtres inanimés qui n’en peuvent modérer ni la force ni la rigueur”.

  15. For an introduction on various modes and subjects of law and humanities scholarship, see Sarat, Anderson, Frank [106]. An interesting use of musical metaphor in the legal field is carried out by Hirsch [69] who compared the judge to a pianist.

  16. According to Frank [47: 149]: “Judging involves discretion and individualization. The judge, in determining what is the law of the case, must choose and select, and it is virtually impossible to delimit the range of his choice and selection”.

  17. On this subject, see the well-argued analysis by Endicott [43].

  18. See Krenek [74].

  19. Frank [48: 1263] clarifies that “Even around the more precise words, often there is a wide fringe of ambiguity which can be dissipated only by a consideration of the context and background”.

  20. Frank [48: 1272] also states that “Just as, perforce, the musical composer delegates some subordinate creative activity to musical performers, so, perforce, the legislature delegates some subordinate (judicial) legislation—i.e., creative activity—to the courts”.

  21. See Holmes [71]: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law”.

  22. On the distinction between paper rules and real rules see Llewellyn [77].

  23. Allen [3: 45], referring to the approach of legal realism, argues that: “It was perhaps appropriate that the age of Jazz should produce a Jazz Jurisprudence”.

  24. See Frank [47]. Bobbio [25], reviewing the second edition of “Law and The Modern Mind”, criticizes Frank, arguing that “legal certainty, rather than being an illusion, is an intrinsic element of law, so that the law is certain or is not law”. For a different viewpoint on Frank’s thesis, see Tarello [112]. See also Faralli [44] and [45].

  25. For a thorough reconstruction of this debate on musical and legal interpretation, see Resta [104].

  26. See Brendel [27].

  27. See Guastini [64: 35–52].

  28. According to Guastini [64: 40], the first approach ignores the open texture essence of language whereas the second approach neglects the objective constraints that affect the interpreter’s choices.

  29. See Luzzati [80: 89].

  30. See Gatti [54].

  31. According to Picozza [94], these two opposing standpoints are expressed, among pianists, by Ferruccio Busoni, who intervened on Bach to adapt his music to modernity, and Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli, who instead professed absolute fidelity to the text. The same division was also visible, as Pratelli [98] points out, in the style of two prestigious conductors: Gustav Mahler was famous for his creative performances, whereas Arturo Toscanini believed that a performance should adhere strictly to the score.

  32. Zaccaria [119: 9], in the light of Ricoeur’s thought, envisions three areas of autonomy of the text. First, the autonomy to the author’s intention. Second, the autonomy towards the economic, social and cultural constraints that contributed to producing the text. Third, the autonomy of the original recipients of the text itself.

  33. See Graziosi [61: 40]: “ogni musica scritta è infinite musiche”.

  34. See Cossutta [35: 107].

  35. See Graziosi [61: 24].

  36. For an excellent reconstruction of the concept of good faith, also through a historical and comparative perspective, see Zimmermann, Whittaker [121].

  37. Auer [11: 288] underlines three dimensions of good faith: “first, a substantive dimension of justification of good faith duties in terms of, for instance, contractual ethics; second, a formal dimension concerned with its structure as a vague standard; and finally, an institutional competence dimension raising the question of judicial freedom and constraint in adjudication based on open standards such as good faith”.

  38. See Brunello, Zagrebelsky [29: 80–81].

  39. See Parente [86: 223]: “L’esecuzione dell’opera d’arte è da riferire ad una funzione pratica e non lirica, ed è insomma tecnica non creativa”.

  40. See Parente [85: 296]: “ridare ai simboli della scrittura musicale il valore più prossimo a quello che il musicista creatore dette verosimilmente alla sua composizione nell’affidarla alla notazione grafica”.

  41. See Gorla [57].

  42. Justinian, Digest, Book 1, Title 3, 17.

  43. See Corradini [34: 67–71].

  44. See Treves [113: 368–378].

  45. See Paresce [87: 187].

  46. See Ascoli [10].

  47. For an overview on this topic and for a reconstruction of the twentieth-century debate see Cossutta [36: 9–108].

  48. See Ascarelli [9].

  49. Grossi [62: 331], in an elegantly worded study, emphasizes that “Ascarelli has always refused to impoverish the law in a text, in a written rule to be venerated as a sacred product; he has always wanted to look beyond a written rule, its environment, the network of relationships within which it was situated, he has always denied […] the easy choice of slipping into the silent shadow of the existing Italian law”. Original version: “Ascarelli si è, da sempre, rifiutato di immiserire il diritto in un testo, in una regola scritta da venerare come un prodotto sacro; ha, da sempre, voluto guardare al di là della regola scritta, al suo ambiente, alla rete di relazioni entro cui si collocava; ha, da sempre, ricusato […] la facile scelta di mettersi all’ombra quieta del diritto italiano vigente”.

  50. See Betti [20] and [21]. In those years, he wrote his monumental work “Teoria generale dell’interpretazione”, one of the most important works of general hermeneutics of the twentieth century. See Betti [22].

  51. In order to better explain this syntagma, he referred both to the conception of form expressed by Baratono [15] and Peirce’s semiotics, in particular his idea of “representamen” [90: 564]. See Danani [38: 13–19].

  52. See Hegel [68: 119–122].

  53. Chiassoni, Feteris, Kreuzbauer [32: 363].

  54. See Betti [22: 304].

  55. See Viola, Zaccaria [114: 175–237].

  56. See Betti [24: 217].

  57. See Gadamer [51].

  58. See Betti [22: 305–306]: “la forma rappresentativa deve essere intesa nella sua autonomia, alla stregua della propria legge di formazione, secondo una sua interiore necessità, coerenza e razionalità”.

  59. See Zaccaria [120: 694–709]. See also Argiroffi [5].

  60. See Betti [23].

  61. See Gadamer [52: 241–276].

  62. According to Betti, this canon states a fundamental need, already highlighted with particular clarity by the Roman lawyer Celso for which: “incivile est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua particular eius proposita iudicare vel respondere” (“It is improper, without looking at the whole of a law, to give judgment or advice, upon a view of any one clause of it”). (Dig. 1, 3, 24). See Betti [22: 307].

  63. See Danani [37: 146].

  64. See Betti [22: 318].

  65. See Betti [22: 789–866]. See Frosini, Riccobono [50].

  66. For a thorough analysis of the theological interpretation, see Betti [22: 867–885].

  67. See Betti [22: 790]: “intendere per decidere (agire)”.

  68. See Betti [22: 760].

  69. See Parente [86: 220–223].

  70. See Betti [22: 763].

  71. See Betti [22: 763]: rivelare “entro l’apparente ermeticità della pagina musicale, quella liricità che vi scorre e pulsa silenziosa”.

  72. See Graziosi [60: 193].

  73. See Betti [22: 765].

  74. See Pareyson [88].

  75. See Sparti [109]. For more on this subject see the monographic number of the journal Critical Studies in Improvisation, 2010, vol 6, entitled “Lex non Scripta, Ars non Scripta: Law, Justice and Improvisation”. More recently, for an interesting overview on this theme, see Lewis, Piekut [75].

  76. See Nitrato Izzo [84: 119–123].

  77. In this regard, Piper [95: 2] speaks of “law as improvisation approach”.

  78. See Piper [95: 4].

  79. Ramshaw [101].

  80. See Ramshaw [101: 72–90].

  81. See Derrida [41: 230–298].

  82. See Ramshaw [101: 71].

  83. See Bertinetto [19: 177].

  84. Brunello, Zagrebelsky [29: 41]: “Nel campo del diritto (…) chi improvvisasse, cioè pretendesse di eliminare i due momenti—creazione ed esecuzione—concentrandoli in un solo simultaneo atto, non sarebbe legislatore, ma dittatore; non produrrebbe diritto ma eserciterebbe la forza”.

  85. See Sparti [109: 118–119].

  86. On the mistake in law and improvisation, see Ramshaw and Stapleton [102: 50–69].

  87. See Viola, Zaccaria [114: 145].

  88. See Aristotle [6: 176].

  89. See Grossi [63].

  90. See Pastore [89: 19–49].

  91. See Vogliotti [116: 299–317].

  92. Peters [91: 6], very interestingly, posits that most improvisation is actually predictable: “it is precisely the improviser’s desire for certainty that does indeed protect formal structures from any serious disruption or deconstruction—that’s the point. (…) If you want uncertainty then stay away from improvisation”.

  93. See Lopez De Oñate [79]. On this subject see Lombardi Vallauri [78: 575–601], Jori and Pintore [73: 194–198], Gianformaggio [55], Luzzati [80], Bertea [18], Campanale [30] and Gometz [56].

  94. See Luzzati [80: 290].

  95. See also Balkin, Levinson [14].

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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my thanks to Professors Eugenio Picozza and Christopher Williams for their valuable advice and suggestions which helped to improve the article.

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    Angelo Pio Buffo

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Buffo, A.P. Interpretation and Improvisation: The Judge and the Musician Between Text and Context. Int J Semiot Law 31, 215–239 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-017-9537-6

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