Abstract
In this paper I will present and evaluate Anandi Hattiangadi’s arguments for the conclusion that meaning is not intrinsically normative or prescriptive. I will argue that she misconstrues the way the thesis that meaning is normative is presented in the literature and that there is an important class of semantic rules that she fails to consider and rule out. According to Hattiangadi, defenders of meaning prescriptivity argue that speaking truthfully is a necessary condition for speaking meaningfully. I will maintain that this is not how prescriptivity is construed by ‘normativists’ such as Kripke, Hacker and Baker, Brandom and Millar. I think that Hattiangadi misconstrues the prescriptivity thesis because she does not distinguish between the general notion of correctness of use and the specific notion of correctness of application. In other words, she does not distinguish between using a term correctly and applying it truthfully. In addition, I submit that there is an important class of semantic rules determining correct use that Hattiangadi does not consider. Following the later Wittgenstein, Hacker and Baker argue that accepted explanations of the meanings of words have the function of semantic rules. These rules are categorically prescriptive because following them is constitutive of being a speaker of a language.
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Notes
Daniel Whiting (2007) makes this point in connection with Hattiangadi’s paper but he does not indicate the implications it has for Hattiangadi’s argument. “In my view, although norms of truth might well govern the practice of assertion, the norms determinative of meaning should be viewed as quite distinct. Nonetheless, for present purposes I shall waive this concern, as it does not bear on what follows” (Whiting 2007, 135)
I also think that it’s a mistake to reduce the notion of correct use to the notion of warranted assertion (Boghossian 1989). This view does not acknowledge the fact that there are other language-games besides assertion, and there are rules governing those language-games. Also, as Wittgenstein notes, applying a term without justification does not mean applying it incorrectly.
There are two senses in which a rule can be action-guiding. It can guide action in the sense that it helps one acquire a relevant disposition or in the normative sense that it shows one what one ought to do. In Hacker and Baker’s analysis it is only the normative sense of ‘guide’ that is relevant. A semantic rule shows a speaker how to use a word correctly. However, dispositions do not guarantee correctness. In addition, in their view, rules are not causes. So, following a rule is not being caused in a certain way by the rule-formulation. They distinguish, for instance, between participating in normative practices and being trained to act in a certain way (Baker and Hacker 1985). In general, ‘normativists’ reject the idea that normativity can be captured in naturalistic, dispositional terms (Kripke 1982; Brandom 1994; Millar 2004).
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Buleandra, A. Normativity and Correctness: A Reply to Hattiangadi. Acta Anal 23, 177–186 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0028-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0028-y